Teel v. Payne

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
CLIFTON TEEL 	PETITIONER
VS. 	Case No. 6:24-cv-06123-SOH-MEF
DEXTER PAYNE, Director,
Arkansas Division of Correction 	DEFENDANT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, Clifton Teel (“Teel”), has on September 24, 2024, filed a Petition Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. 	(ECF No. 5). 	The
Respondent filed his Response on November 25, 2024. (ECF No. 13). The matter is ready for
report and recommendation.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Teel’s § 2254 Petition concerns his state criminal case in the 9th Judicial (West) Circuit
Court in Pike County, Arkansas, State of Arkansas v. Clifton Teel, Case No. 55CR-22-119.1 On
December 27, 2022, Teel was charged by Information with Possession of a Schedule II Controlled
Substance, methamphetamine (less than two grams), in violation of A.C.A. § 5-64-419, a Class D
Felony, occurring on or about December 14, 2022, and with Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in
violation of A.C.A. § 5-64-443, a Class D Felony, also occurring on or about December 14, 2022.
(ECF No. 13-1 at 4-6). Teel appeared for arraignment on January 6, 2023; a Public Defender was
appointed to represent him; a Not Guilty plea was entered; and the case was scheduled for a pretrial
1 The Court located Teel’s state court case information on caseinfo.arcourts.gov. 	References to
the state proceedings are taken from this information and from Respondent’s Exhibit A (ECF No.
13-1). 	Teel eventually had two other cases pending against him in the same Court during the
relevant time, Case Nos. 55CR-23-23 and 55CR-23-77, but he does not refer to those cases in his
Petition.
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hearing on April 24, 2023, with a jury trial set for May 4, 2023. (Id. at 12). The Judge’s notes
reflect that Teel made his $50,000 bond, the Public Defender was relieved, and Teel was to report
back with his attorney on February 6, 2023. (Id.). Retained counsel, Winston C. Mathis, entered
his appearance for Teel on April 19, 2023, and on the same date he moved for a continuance. (Id.
at 14-18). 	The continuance was granted on April 21, 2023, and the case was reset for pretrial
conference on August 28, 2023, and for jury trial on September 14, 2023, with the period of delay
charged to Teel. (Id. at 29-30). A Motion to Suppress Statement was filed by Teel’s counsel on
September 1, 2023 (Id. at 33-34), along with another Motion for Continuance (Id. at 37-38), and
the Court granted the continuance and reset the case for pretrial conference on October 16, 2023,
and for jury trial on November 16, 2023 (Id. at 35-36).
Defense counsel, Mr. Mathis, moved to withdraw on September 29, 2023 (Id. at 39-40),
but he appeared with Teel on October 16, 2023 (Id. at 42), at which time Teel refused a plea.
Finding there was reasonable suspicion to believe Teel may not be fit to proceed, on November 8,
2023, the Court ordered an examination of Teel, pursuant to A.C.A. § 5-2-307, and all further
proceedings were suspended. (Id. at 46-51). A review hearing was scheduled on January 29, 2024.
(Id. at 53).
A pleading entitled Substitution of Counsel was filed on December 19, 2023, followed on
January 2, 2024, by a renewed Motion to Withdraw by Mr. Mathis. (Id. at 54, 55-56). The Court’s
Order permitting Mr. Mathis to withdraw, and recognizing new counsel, Rowe Slayton, was
entered on January 3, 2024. 	(Id. at 57-59). 	On January 19, 2024, Teel appeared with attorney
Slayton, was found fit to proceed, and the case was scheduled for jury trial on March 14, 2024.
(Id. at 62).
On March 11, 2024, a Plea Statement, signed by Teel, was presented to the Court. (Id. at
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66-67). The Plea Statement covered all of Teel’s cases pending before the Court at that time, to
wit: 55CR-22-119, 55CR-23-23, and 55CR-23-77. The Judge’s notes show Teel’s appearance on
March 11, 2024, at which time he knowingly and intelligently entered a negotiated plea of guilty
upon a factual basis, and the Court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment in the Arkansas
Division of Correction. (Id. at 71). The Court’s Sentencing Order was entered on March 18, 2024.
(Id. at 72-75).
No direct appeal was taken by Teel, nor have any post-conviction proceedings been filed
by Teel pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.
Teel filed his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in
State Custody in this Court on September 24, 2024.2 (ECF No. 5). His § 2254 Petition refers to
Case No. 55CR-22-119 in Pike County, his guilty plea, and the sentence of 60 months imposed on
March 18, 2024, for possession of methamphetamine. (Id. at 1). He indicates that no appeal was
taken, and that he has not pursued any other post-conviction relief in any state court. (Id. at 2-3,
6). His only ground for federal habeas relief is his claim that his right to a speedy trial was violated.
(Id. at 5).
On November 21, 2024, mail sent to Teel at the Pike County Jail was returned as
undeliverable and marked “return to sender – refused – unable to forward.” (ECF No. 12). Teel
has not informed the Court of a new address.
The Respondent, Dexter Payne (“Payne”), Director of the Arkansas Division of Correction,
filed a Response on November 25, 2024. (ECF No. 13). Payne asserts that Teel’s § 2254 Petition
should be denied because his speedy trial claim, based on state law, is not cognizable in this federal
2 Teel initially filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September
16, 2024, and by Order entered on September 18, 2024, was instructed to file a Petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF Nos. 1, 4).
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habeas proceeding, was waived by his guilty plea, or is inexcusably procedurally defaulted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a state court shall be entertained only on the ground that the petitioner is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 	28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Before seeking federal habeas review, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies,
giving the state the opportunity to correct alleged violations of a prisoner’s federal rights, “which
means he must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court to alert that court to the
claim’s federal nature.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) and (c)
(requiring state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to exhaust all remedies available in the state
courts). When a habeas petitioner fails to raise his federal claims in state court, he deprives the
state of “an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance” and frustrates the state’s
ability to honor his constitutional rights. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009) (quoting Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991)). Therefore, when a habeas petitioner defaults his federal
claims by failing to raise them in state court in compliance with the relevant state procedural rules,
federal habeas review is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate “cause” for the default and
“actual prejudice” as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or alternatively, demonstrate
that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id.; Coleman,
501 U.S. at 750.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A thorough review of Teel’s § 2254 Petition and the record in this case conclusively shows
that Teel’s speedy trial claim presents an issue of state law and is not cognizable in this federal
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habeas proceeding, was waived by his guilty plea, and since Teel failed to bring the claim before
any Arkansas appellate court for review, it is also inexcusably procedurally defaulted. Teel has
also failed to keep this Court informed of his current address, and his case is subject to dismissal
for failing to comply with a Court order. For the reasons discussed below, it is RECOMMENDED
that Teel’s § 2254 Petition (ECF No. 5) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
A. 	Failure to Comply with a Local Rule
Teel’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) was granted on September 18,
2024. 	(ECF No. 4). 	His § 2254 Petition was filed on September 24, 2024. 	(ECF No. 5). 	On
November 21, 2024, mail sent by the Court to Teel was returned as undeliverable, with no new
address available. (ECF No. 12). Teel has not provided the Court with his new address, nor has
communicated with the Court in any way since the filing of his Petition.
Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a pro se litigant is not excused
from complying with substantive and procedural law. Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir.
1984). For parties appearing pro se, the Court’s Local Rules state in pertinent part:
It is the duty of any party not represented by counsel to promptly
notify the Clerk and the other parties to the proceedings of any
change in his or her address, to monitor the progress of the case,
and 	to 	prosecute 	or 	defend 	the 	action 	diligently. 	... 	If 	any
communication from the Court to a pro se plaintiff is not responded
to within thirty (30) days, the case may be dismissed without
prejudice. 	Any party proceeding pro se shall be expected to be
familiar with and follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Local Rule 5.5(c)(2).
Additionally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically contemplate dismissal of a
case on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to prosecute or failed to comply with orders of the
court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (stating that
the district court possesses the power to dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b)). Pursuant to Rule
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41(b), a district court has the power to dismiss an action based on “the plaintiff’s failure to comply
with any court order.” Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803-04 (8th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
Mail sent to Teel at his address of record has been returned as undeliverable and unable to
be forwarded. Teel has not informed the Court of his new address, and more than 30 days have
passed since mail sent to him was returned to the Court. Teel has failed to keep the Court apprised
of his current address as required by Local Rule 5.5(c)(2). 	Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) and Local Rule 5.5(c)(2), Teel’s § 2254 Petition should be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to comply with the Court’s Local Rules and failure to prosecute this case.
B. 	Teel’s Speedy Trial Claim is Not Cognizable Under § 2254
Teel’s sole ground for relief is his claim that he “wasn’t given the right to a fast and speedy
trial on this case.” (ECF No. 5 at 5). He states his case was “put off and then added to the two
later cases I pleaded guilty too (sic) 4 months after the 12 months that it should have been in court.”
(Id.).
Speedy trial is governed in Arkansas by Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1, which provides:
(c) Any defendant charged with an offense and held to bail, or
otherwise lawfully set at liberty, … shall be entitled to have the
charge dismissed with an absolute bar to prosecution if not brought
to trial within twelve (12) months from the time provided in Rule
28.2, excluding only such periods of necessary delay as are
authorized in Rule 28.3.
Rule 28.1 also provides that any defendant who is charged with an offense in circuit court,
as Teel was, “may move the circuit court for dismissal of the charge,” and if such motion is denied
by the circuit court, “the defendant may raise the denial in a post-trial appeal of a conviction as
grounds for reversing the conviction and dismissing the charge.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(d). It also
provides that upon the denial of a motion to dismiss, “the defendant may enter a conditional plea
of guilty in the circuit court as provided in Rule 24.3(b).” Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(g)(2). And it
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provides that the failure of a defendant to move for dismissal pursuant to the rule prior to a plea of
guilty or trial “shall constitute a waiver of rights under this rule.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(g)(3).
Federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, however, is limited to persons in
custody pursuant to a state judgment in violation of “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“We have stated
many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”) (internal
citations omitted). Teel cites no federal Constitutional provision, or any other federal law or treaty,
in support of his claim. His § 2254 Petition is silent on the matter aside from his general assertion
that he was not given “a fast and speedy trial.”3 But “[v]iolation by state officials of a state speedy
trial law, taken alone, does not present a federal claim reviewable on habeas petition.” 	Poe v.
Caspari, 39 F.3d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, Teel’s speedy trial claim, based on Arkansas state law, is not cognizable in
this federal habeas corpus proceeding, and his § 2254 Petition should be dismissed without
prejudice.
C. 	Effect of Teel’s Guilty Plea
It is well established that a defendant who enters a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional
defenses. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (guilty pleas in the Brady4 trilogy were
found to foreclose direct inquiry into the merits of claimed antecedent constitutional violations);
see also Cox v. Lockhart, 970 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1992) (a voluntary plea of guilty constitutes
a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects, and the right to a speedy trial is non-jurisdictional in
nature) (internal citations omitted).
3 His earlier § 2241 Petition referred to “Court Rule 28.2.” (ECF No. 1 at 2, 3, 6, 7).
4 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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Here, Teel knowingly and intelligently entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the offense
charged in Case No. 55CR-22-119. While he now asserts a violation of his right to a speedy trial,
the facts supporting his claim occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea, and he does not
challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature of his guilty plea. 	Nor did he preserve the issue
under Rule 28.1 by filing a motion to dismiss based on the alleged speedy trial violation, and upon
the denial of such motion, by entering a conditional plea of guilty. Teel’s speedy trial claim is,
therefore, foreclosed by his voluntary and intelligent unconditional guilty plea to the offense
charged, and his § 2254 Petition should be dismissed without prejudice.
D. 	Failure to Exhaust Remedies
It is also apparent from Teel’s § 2254 Petition and the record that he has failed to exhaust
his remedies in state court, and this also precludes consideration of his § 2254 Petition. No direct
appeal was taken, and no post-conviction proceedings have been pursued in state court. 	Quite
plainly, Teel never gave the State of Arkansas an opportunity to address the speedy trial violation
he now asserts. 	Nor has he alleged or shown any cause for his procedural default and actual
prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is RECOMMENDED that Teel’s Petition Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 5) be
DISMISSED without PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
written objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties
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are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 7th day of February 2025.
/s/	
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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