Knight v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
PAMELA S. KNIGHT 	PLAINTIFF
vs. 	Civil No. 5:25-cv-05136
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION 	DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). ECF No. 15. Defendant has responded to this Motion and
has no objections. ECF No. 18.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L.
Brooks referred this Motion to the Court for the purpose of making a report and recommendation.
In accordance with that referral, this Court enters the following report and recommendation.
1. 	Background:
Pamela S. Knight (“Plaintiff”) appealed to this Court from the Secretary of the Social
Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her request for disability benefits. ECF No. 2. On
March 5, 2026, Plaintiff’s case was reversed and remanded pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). ECF No. 14.
On April 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed the present Motion requesting an award of attorney’s fees
under the EAJA. ECF No. 15. With this Motion, Plaintiff requests an award of attorney’s fees
and costs in the total amount of $7,698.60. Id. This amount includes 30.55 attorney hours at an
hourly rate of $252.00 for work performed in 2025 and 2026. Id.
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2. 	Applicable Law:
Pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a court must award attorney’s fees to a
prevailing social security claimant unless the Secretary’s position in denying benefits was
substantially justified. 	The Secretary has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits was
substantially justified. See Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986) (“The Secretary
bears the burden of proving that its position in the administrative and judicial proceedings below
was substantially justified.”). An EAJA application also must be made within thirty days of a final
judgment in an action, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), or within thirty days after the sixty day time
for appeal has expired. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298 (1993).
An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though, at the conclusion
of the case, the plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and to collect a fee pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)
was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,
535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 186 (1985)). 	The United States
Supreme Court stated that Congress harmonized an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA and
under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) as follows:
Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions [EAJA and 42 U.S.C. §
406(b)(1)], but the claimant’s attorney must “refun[d] to the claimant the amount
of the smaller fee.”. . .“Thus, an EAJA award offsets an award under Section
406(b), so that the [amount of total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives]
will be increased by the . . . EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100
percent of the past-due benefits.”
Id. Furthermore, awarding fees under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to
shift to the United States the prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting
unreasonable government action. 	See id.; Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986 (8th Cir.
1984).
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The statutory ceiling for an EAJA fee award is $125.00 per hour. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(2)(A). A court is only authorized to exceed this statutory rate if “the court determines
that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified
attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” Id. 	A court may determine that
there has been an increase in the cost of living, and may thereby increase the attorney’s rate per
hour, based upon the United States Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). 	See
Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir. 1990); see also General Order 39 (“Attorney’s
Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act”).
3. 	Discussion:
In the present action, Plaintiff’s case was remanded to the SSA. ECF No. 14. Defendant
does not contest Plaintiff’s claim that she is the prevailing party and does not oppose her
application for fees under the EAJA. ECF No. 18. The Court construes the lack of opposition to
this application as an admission that the government’s decision to deny benefits was not
“substantially justified” and that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.
Plaintiff requests a total award of $7,698.60. 	ECF No. 15. 	This amount includes 30.55
attorney hours at an hourly rate of $252.00 for work performed in 2025 and 2026. 	Id. 	This
requested hourly rate for attorney work is authorized by the EAJA as long as the CPI-South Index
justifies this enhanced rate. See General Order 39. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Johnson,
919 F.2d at 504. In the present action, the Court authorizes $252.00 as an hourly rate for work
performed in 2025 and 2026. Thus, the Court recommends this amount be awarded.
Further, I have reviewed counsel’s itemization of time appended to Plaintiff’s application.
ECF No. 15-1. This Court notes that Defendant has not objected to the number of hours for which
counsel seeks a fee award, and this Court finds the time asserted to be spent in the representation
of Plaintiff before the district court is reasonable.
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Defendant claims the fees awarded should be paid directly to Plaintiff pursuant to Astrue
v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). ECF No. 15. Ratliff requires that attorney’s fees
be awarded to the “prevailing party” or the litigant. See id. 130 S. Ct. at 2528. Thus, these fees
must be awarded to Plaintiff, not to Plaintiff’s attorney. However, if Plaintiff has executed a valid
assignment to Plaintiff’s attorney of all rights in an attorney’s fee award and Plaintiff owes no
outstanding debt to the federal government, the attorney’s fee may be awarded directly to
Plaintiff’s attorney.
4. 	Conclusion:
Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
(ECF No. 15) be GRANTED, and Plaintiff be awarded $7,698.60. This amount represents 30.55
attorney hours at an hourly rate of $252.00 for work performed in 2025 and 2026.
The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The Parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).
ENTERED this 16th day of April 2026.
/s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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