Stinson et al v. Fayetteville School District No. 1 et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
SAMANTHA STINSON et al. 	PLAINTIFFS
V. 	CASE NO. 5:25-CV-5127
FAYETTEVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al. 	DEFENDANTS
AND
STATE OF ARKANSAS ex rel. TIM GRIFFIN,
ATTORNEY GENERAL 	INTERVENOR
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 2
II. BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................... 3
III. LEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................................. 8
IV. DISCUSSION............................................................................................................. 9
A. Standing ................................................................................................................. 9
1. Original Plaintiffs ................................................................................................ 9
2. New Plaintiffs .................................................................................................... 11
B. Ripeness .............................................................................................................. 12
C. Merits Claims ....................................................................................................... 15
1. Establishment Clause ...................................................................................... 15
2. Free Exercise Clause ........................................................................................ 22
D. Irreparable Harm, Balance of the Equities, and the Public Interest ................ 25
E. Scope of Relief..................................................................................................... 25
V. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 26
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Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity,
in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease
any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (1785)
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On August 4, 2025, this Court preliminarily enjoined four Arkansas public-school
districts from complying with Arkansas Act 573 of 2025, a law that requires each
elementary and secondary school in the State to “prominently display” in every “library
and classroom” a poster measuring at least 16” x 20” bearing the State’s approved text
of the Ten Commandments. Act 573 §§ (a)(1)–(2). The Court found at the preliminary
injunction 	stage 	of 	the 	proceedings 	that 	Act 	573 	was 	likely 	to 	violate 	Plaintiffs’
Establishment and Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Constitution prohibits states from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I, XIV.
On August 5, 2025, the day after the Court entered its preliminary injunction, Act
573 went into effect statewide. Four school districts were preliminarily enjoined, but the
rest were not. Several unenjoined districts hung Ten Commandments posters in their
classrooms, and parents and students from two of those districts were added to the
existing lawsuit. Now, a total of six Arkansas school districts have been preliminarily
enjoined.
The State took an interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction order. In the
meantime, the parties completed approximately four months of discovery followed by
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merits briefing. So, “with little additional effort,” the Court’s resolution of their Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 164 & 168) will present the Eighth Circuit with
“one appeal instead of two” and “a final resolution of the case instead of a provisional
one.” W. Pub. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 2019). For the
reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED, the State’s Motion is DENIED,
and Defendants are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from complying with Act 573.
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2025, the Arkansas Legislature passed Act 573, which amends and
expands Arkansas Code § 1-4-133 to require all public schools in the state to display the
Ten Commandments. Each classroom display must contain the following “historical
representation of the Ten Commandments” derived from the Protestant King James Bible:
The Ten Commandments
I am the Lord thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land
which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his
maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor's.
Act 573 § (a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii). The text must be “legible to a person with average vision from
anywhere in the room” and be “prominently display[ed]” in a “conspicuous place” in every
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“elementary and secondary school library and classroom.” Id. § (a)(1)–(2). All displays
must be donated or purchased with private funds. Id. § (b).
Thirteen parents, individually and on behalf of their minor children, sued the
Fayetteville, Springdale, Bentonville, Siloam Springs, Conway, and Lakeside School
Districts to enjoin them from enforcing Act 573. They contend the law’s requirements
violate the Establishment Clause and burden their sincere religious practice under the
Free Exercise Clause. Below is a summary of their claims:
Samantha and Jonathan Stinson are parents to A.R.S. and A.W.S., who
are students in the Fayetteville School District. The Stinsons are raising
their children in the Jewish faith, and it is important to them that their children
practice Judaism. See Doc. 164-13, p. 62 (S. Stinson Dep.). They “assume
responsibility” for their children’s religious education and believe strongly
that no religion should be introduced to school children, except perhaps “in
later high school years” through an elective class discussing it in a historical
context. Id. at pp. 66–67. The version of the Ten Commandments mandated
in Act 573 is not the same as the version taught in the Stinsons’ synagogue;
they identify the State-approved wording as a “Protestant version” of the
Ten Commandments. Id. at p. 44. There are many differences between the
wording of the Commandments selected by the State and the wording
embraced by Jewish believers. For example, Ms. Stinson explains that
Jews do not assign God a gender and, therefore, would never use the word
“Lord” 	in 	the Ten 	Commandments—yet 	“Lord” 	appears 	in 	the 	State-
approved version. Id. The Stinsons also believe that if their schools
complied with Act 573, A.R.S. and A.W.S. would feel pressure “to suppress
their Jewish faith while in school to avoid being perceived as different by
their peers and school staff merely because they are not part of the majority
religion.” (Doc. 8-2, ¶ 15 (S. Stinson Decl.)).
Joseph Armendariz is a parent to M.A. and W.A., who are students in the
Fayetteville School District. Mr. Armendariz is a Unitarian Universalist and
is raising his children in that faith. According to Mr. Armendariz, his religion
“does not impose such religious dictates [as the Ten Commandments] on
children or anyone, in part, because an authoritative assertion that one
specific scripture or religious dogma is ‘correct’ would impede the ability to
conduct a free and responsible inquiry for the truth,’” which is vital to the
Unitarian Universalist faith. (Doc. 8-5, ¶ 10 (Armendariz Decl.)). In his view,
displaying 	the 	Ten 	Commandments 	in 	class 	transforms 	them 	into
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“instruction[s]” 	for 	the 	children 	to 	follow, 	akin 	to 	“district-required
knowledge.” (Doc. 164-5, p. 24 (Armendariz Dep.)). Mr. Armendariz sees
the text as an “inherently religious” “list of rules from one particular religion”
that he does not follow. Id. at pp. 24, 39–40. Furthermore, he is concerned
about “expos[ing] elementary-aged students” to mature concepts in the Ten
Commandments, like “adultery” and “covet[ing].” Id. at p. 39. It “would make
[him] 	feel 	very 	uncomfortable” 	if 	he 	were forced 	to 	engage 	in 	such
discussions with his children “before [he and his spouse] decided, as their
parents, that they’re ready to understand something like that.” Id.
Talara and Shane Taylor are parents to K.T. and M.T., who are students in
the Springdale School District. Mrs. Taylor is a Humanist and an atheist
who also follows Native American spiritual traditions. See Doc. 164-7, pp.
13–15 (T. Taylor Dep.). Mr. Taylor shares aspects of those identities with his
wife but does not ascribe to “any particular set of beliefs.” (Doc.164-16, p.
8 (S. Taylor Dep.)). Mrs. Taylor testified that her children would view the Ten
Commandments displayed in their classrooms as religious rules they must
follow. See Doc. 164-7, p. 27 (T. Taylor Dep.). The Taylors object to the
government “sponsoring one religion and . . . from a place of authority . . .
forcing [their] children to read [the Ten Commandments] every day.” Id. at
p. 9. In their view, the displays mandated by Act 573 are “exclusionary and
forceful of a religious indoctrination of [their] children.” Id. at p. 26. The Ten
Commandments’ message conflicts with what they are teaching their
children “about all religions” and how no one religion is “better or worse than
the other.” Id. at p. 17. They worry that if Act 573 is made effective in their
school district, their children will “be bullied and feel like they have to believe
in what our government is sponsoring.” Id. at p. 25.
April Christine and Kyle Berry are parents to children K.B. and C.B., who
are students in the Conway School District. Mr. and Mrs. Berry are
Methodists and are raising their children in that faith. Rather than focus on
the Ten Commandments, which appears in the Old Testament of the
Protestant Bible, the Berrys “focus more on the teachings found in the New
Testament, such as to love God and to love thy neighbor as you love
yourself.” (Doc. 90-3, ¶ 5 (K. Berry Decl.)). Ten Commandments displays
were posted in all of K.B.’s and C.B.’s classrooms from August 18 to August
28, 2025. During that brief time, the Berrys were “astonished by how quickly
[C.B.] had absorbed that much of the poster.” (Doc. 164-9, p. 16 (A.C. Berry
Dep.)). The Berrys object to the promotion of the Ten Commandments over
other Christian teachings and do not believe in the version of the Ten
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Commandments required by Act 573. For example, the Berrys object to “the
reference to ‘manservants’ and ‘maidservants’” because it is “morally
troubling and contrary to [their] faith and the faith values [they] teach K.B.
and C.B. about principles of equality and humanity.” (Doc. 90-2, ¶ 6 (A.C.
Berry Decl.)). The Berrys feel that “the posters result in coercion and
pressure to follow religious dictates.” (Doc. 164-10, p. 20 (K. Berry Dep.)).
Daniel Rix is a parent to W.R., J.R., and A.R., who are students in the
Bentonville School District. Mr. Rix left the Mormon Church three years
ago and no longer subscribes to a particular faith. Together with his wife, he
is raising their children in a nonreligious tradition. To Mr. Rix, this means
“raising them to be openminded,” which includes “teaching them to . . . be
kind and loving toward [family members who are faith-believing].” (Doc. 164-
12, pp. 26–27 (Rix. Dep.)). Mr. Rix objects to Act 573 because he believes
that the Ten Commandments displays “will send the message to [his]
children that the school, as an institution of authority, favors Christianity over
other religious beliefs and nonbelief.” (Doc. 	8-9, ¶ 8 (Rix Decl.)). He has
already seen the “social pressure” his children have experienced to conform
to the Christian religion of their peers. See Doc. 164-12, pp. 51–52 (Rix
Dep.). He observes that the displays mandated by Act 573 are not part of
the school curriculum, and “context really matters.” Id. at p. 58.
Julee Jaeger is a parent to U.J., who is a student in the Conway School
District. Ms. Jaeger is not religious and is not raising her child in any
specific religion. She testified that a Ten Commandments display compliant
with Act 573 was posted at the front of U.J.’s classroom at the start of the
school year, along with other rules, like what to do “for a fire evacuation or
a tornado drill.” See Doc. 164-11, p. 23 (Jaeger Dep.). She explained that
her child is precocious and “reads everything around,” including “things that
are on the walls.” Id. at p. 35. U.J. interpreted the Ten Commandments
poster as listing rules U.J. “needed to follow”; this made U.J. “feel[ ]
excluded” because U.J.’s family is not religious Id. at p. 29. Ms. Jaeger
clarified 	that 	“for 	the 	nonreligious 	community,” 	posting 	the 	Ten
Commandments causes “a lot of confusion,” id. at p. 32; and despite
“do[ing] [her] best to let U.J. know U.J. doesn’t have to follow these rules,”
the presence of the display alone “can create a lot of dissonance,” id. at p.
33.
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Leah Bailey is a parent to C.T. and D.T., who are students in the Siloam
Springs School District. Ms. Bailey is agnostic and is raising her children
in a non-religious household. When her “children bring religious beliefs to
[her], [she] ask[s] them what does that mean to them; where did they learn
it; what are the implications of that[,] and help[s] them think through religious
tenets.” (Doc. 164-4, p. 25 (Bailey Dep.)). She objects to Act 573 because
posting the Ten Commandments “will directly interfere with and substantially
burden and undermine” her ability to “direct[ ] [her] children’s nonreligious
upbringing and protect[ ] their ability to develop their own views on religious
matters.” (Doc. 8-10, ¶ 8 (Bailey Decl.)). Ms. Bailey testified that when she
spoke with her children about Act 573, they said “that they would feel
pressured and uncomfortable” “about having the Ten Commandments in
the[ir] classrooms.” (Doc. 164-4, p. 38 (Bailey Dep.)). The children “felt like
those are rules that had to be followed,” and if they did not believe in them,
“they would be considered outsiders [by peers and teachers] and . . . treated
differently.” Id. at p. 39.
Christine Benson is the mother of B.B., who is a student in the Lakeside
School District. Ten Commandments posters were posted in all the
teachers’ classrooms at B.B.’s school. (Doc. 164-15, pp. 22-23 (Benson
Dep.)). Ms. Benson is Catholic and raising her child in the Catholic faith.
She believes that Act 573 promotes the Ten Commandments over “the
Bible’s most important command[,] . . . to love your neighbor as yourself”
and other New Testament teachings, which are “most central to [the
Bensons’] faith.” (Doc. 133-1, ¶ 7 (Benson Decl.)). Therefore, in Ms.
Benson’s view, the Ten Commandments display posted in her child’s room
imposed a set of religious rules that “contradicts what [she] [is] teaching” at
home and what her child is learning at church. (Doc. 164-15, p. 21 (Benson
Dep.)). She labeled the text selected by the State as “the Protestant version”
of the Ten Commandments and not the Catholic version that her church
ascribes to and she believes. Id. at pp. 28–29.
Stephen Caldwell is the father of W.C., a student in the Fayetteville
School District. Mr. Caldwell is an atheist and is raising his child in a non-
religious household. He believes the Ten Commandments posters will be
perceived by students as “com[ing] from the teacher because of the . . .
authority 	that 	is 	granted 	by 	the 	teacher, 	by 	the 	institution, 	by 	the
administration . . . by placing it on the wall.” (Doc. 164-6, p. 25 (Caldwell
Dep.)). In his view, “there’s no difference between putting a sign on the wall
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that says: ‘You must raise your hand to go to the bathroom,’ versus, ‘Thou
shalt have no other gods before me.’ Those are equal in their instruction.”
Id. at pp. 25–26. Mr. Caldwell and his spouse “do not want any other entity,
person, institution, or otherwise proselytizing to [their] child without [their]
explicit knowledge”—though permission to do so would never be given “in
any case.” Id. at p. 39. He testified that he plans to discuss religion, including
the Ten Commandments, with his child at an “age-appropriate” time. Id. at
p. 59. But he fears that if W.C.’s school “presented [W.C.] with the Ten
Commandments,” Mr. Caldwell’s parental rights would be compromised,
and he would have to act quickly “to preempt the institution’s ability to
describe the nature of their God” to W.C. Id.
Carol Vella is the mother of E.M.V. and N.M.V., two students who attend
the Bentonville School District. Ms. Vella is Jewish and is raising her
children in the Jewish faith. As a Reform Jew, Ms. Vella accepts the Ten
Commandments as scripture, though she objects to the specific text of the
Ten Commandments required by Act 573. (Doc. 8-8, ¶ 6 (Vella Decl.)). She
believes that displaying the Ten Commandments in the schools “violate[s]
Jewish tenets that oppose proselytizing.” Id. ¶ 9. Her children have already
been 	treated differently 	at school because of their 	Jewish faith. 	For
example, E.M.V. has been pressured by a school official to attend a prayer
circle and an event at a local Christian church. See Doc. 164-8, p. 39 (Vella
Dep.). Ms. Vella finds that simply posting the Ten Commandments is
“coercive” because her children “would be forced to see, meditate, observe,
venerate, and abide by [the Commandments].” Id. at p. 37. Moreover, she
feels that the State’s chosen wording aligns with “the Christian religion,” and
not the Jewish religion, and as such, “give[s] the impression that the school
is Christian and that [her children] should be Christian.” Id. at pp. 58–59.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A party requesting summary judgment must establish the absence of any genuine
disputes of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986);
Nat’l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 606 (8th Cir.
1999). Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must “come forward
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with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Where, as here, both sides have filed motions for
summary judgment, the motions are to be reviewed in their own right, with each side
“entitled to the benefit of all inferences favorable to them which might reasonably be
drawn from the record.” Wermager v. Cormorant Twp. Bd., 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir.
1983); see also Canada v. Union Elec. Co., 135 F.3d 1211, 1212–13 (8th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction. To succeed, they must demonstrate
“actual success on the merits, and if they do, then the court must also consider the threat
of irreparable harm to the moving parties, the harms an injunction might inflict on other
parties, and the public interest.” Watkins v. Lawrence Cnty., 102 F.4th 933, 942 (8th Cir.
2024). The State seeks to defeat this claim.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. Standing
1. Original Plaintiffs
(Fayetteville, Springdale, Bentonville, and Siloam Springs Public Schools)
The original Plaintiffs filed suit before Act 573 went into effect. As Justice Alito
recently explained, “when a deprivation of First Amendment rights is at stake, a plaintiff
need not wait for the damage to occur before filing suit,” provided that the damage is
sufficiently likely and imminent. Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522, 560 (2025). In its
Preliminary Injunction order, the Court made a factual finding that all four original school
districts—Fayetteville, 	Springdale, 	Bentonville, 	and 	Siloam 	Springs—were 	likely 	to
receive enough Ten Commandments donations to hang one in every classroom; this
meant the original Plaintiffs’ likelihood of injury was real and imminent. See Doc. 71, pp.
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15–24. Now on summary judgment, the State rehashes its old standing arguments and
adds a new one: that the Court gauge Plaintiffs’ likelihood of injury by the number of
posters the four school districts received after the preliminary injunction went into effect.
See Doc. 185, p. 3. For the following reasons, the Court rejects that argument.
There was plenty of evidence before Act 573 went into effect that compliant poster
donations were not only likely, but highly likely. Furthermore, the four original school
districts admitted that they would have displayed the compliant posters they received—
had they not been stopped by the preliminary injunction. As for raw numbers, discovery
confirmed that the Court’s initial predictions were sound. Fayetteville School District
received 510 Ten Commandments posters by the date of the preliminary injunction. See
Doc. 168-13. Springdale School District received more than 20,000 posters by then—
some compliant with Act 573 and some not compliant. See Doc. 168-11. Bentonville
School District received 60 posters, see Doc. 168-12; and Siloam Springs School District
received 325 posters, see Doc. 168-15. There are only 4,019 classrooms across the four
school districts. And again, these are pre-injunction numbers.
“Standing is assessed at the time the action commences.” L.H. v. Independence
Sch. Dist., 111 F.4th 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). Therefore, the volume
of 	post-injunction 	donations 	is 	immaterial 	to 	the 	pre-injunction 	standing 	analysis.
Moreover, it is impossible to determine how the Court’s preliminary injunction affected the
quantity of donations. It stands to reason that donors would have stopped donating once
they realized the school districts were not allowed to display the posters.
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Finally, the Court observes that when the original Plaintiffs filed suit, they were not
merely interested observers or concerned citizens; they were—and are—school children
who attend public schools and their parents. Their school districts affirmed they would
comply with Act 573 if it went into effect. Therefore, all original Plaintiffs possessed
standing to sue based on the pre-enforcement likelihood of First Amendment injury.
2. New Plaintiffs
(Conway and Lakeside Public Schools)
After Act 573 took effect, multiple non-enjoined school districts posted Ten
Commandments posters in classrooms. Two such non-enjoined districts were Conway
and Lakeside. Conway School District received 850 posters by August 4 and hung one in
every classroom, including those of Julee Jaeger’s minor child and April Christine and
Kyle Berry’s minor children. The Jaegers and the Berrys moved to join the lawsuit on
August 28, and Conway School District was added to the preliminary injunction on
September 10. See Docs. 87 & 111. Meanwhile Lakeside School District was contacted
by a group of pastors who donated enough Ten Commandments posters for every
classroom in Garland County, including Lakeside School District. One such poster was
hung in the classroom of Christine Benson’s minor child, and on October 23, the Bensons
joined the suit. The Court added Lakeside to the preliminary injunction on November 10.
See Docs. 131 & 149. It is conceivable that the process of adding students, parents, and
school districts might have continued for several more months had the Court not issued
a final scheduling order with an abbreviated deadline to add parties. See Doc. 101, ¶ 1.
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Given these facts, the State has not challenged the new Plaintiffs’ standing to sue.
They asserted actual constitutional injury that persisted until the Court ordered their
schools to remove the Ten Commandments posters from their classrooms. Their injuries
are therefore concrete and fairly traceable to Act 573 and their school districts’ actual
compliance with the law. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
B. Ripeness
Next, the Court must consider whether the issues raised in this lawsuit are ripe for
judicial consideration. The ripeness doctrine “requires the examination of both the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.” Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 of Cass Cnty. v. City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d
570, 572–73 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). “[A] case is more likely to be ripe if it poses
a purely legal question and is not contingent on future possibilities.” Id. at 573. The State
contends that the original Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe because they have never seen an
Act 573 display in their classrooms and do not know “what the displays will look like and
what the surrounding context will be.” (Doc. 165, p. 21).1 The Court disagrees. This case
is ripe because no guesswork or speculation is required to determine exactly how Act 573
1 They further claim that Plaintiff Rix admitted in his deposition that in some contexts, he
would have no objection to the introduction of the Ten Commandments in his children’s
classrooms. See Doc. 165, p. 16. He actually stated that he would find the posters
acceptable only if they were incorporated into a history curriculum where the “children
understand that the context is purely educational.” (Doc. 164-12, p. 58). The State does
not envision any curricular integration, or indeed, any teaching associated with the Ten
Commandments displays. See Doc. 166, ¶¶ 8 & 9.
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will be implemented by Arkansas school districts. Plaintiffs have provided the following
proof of how the displays look:
Classroom of Plaintiff U.J., Conway School District (Doc. 131, p. 18).
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Classroom of Plaintiff C.B., Conway School District (Doc. 131, p. 19).
Classroom of Plaintiff B.B., Lakeside School District (Doc. 131, p. 21).
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Notice that the displays are the same—which is not a surprise. They look exactly
as Act 573 requires and as the Legislature intended. The posters hang at the front of each
classroom—a “prominent” and “conspicuous” spot, per Section (a)(1) of the Act. The
posters contain the Ten Commandments text and nothing more. There is no explanation
as to why the Ten Commandments are displayed—which, again, is not a surprise,
because Act 573 states no educational reason to display the Ten Commandments.
Further, the plain text of Act 573 does not suggest that other documents be
posted alongside the Ten Commandments for educational reasons or mitigating context.
That is because the Legislature intends the posters to hang in all classrooms without
regard to the subject matter taught in class, the age of the students, or any other material
consideration. Nothing could possibly justify hanging the Ten Commandments—with or
without historical context—in a calculus, chemistry, French, or woodworking class, to
name a few. And the words “curriculum,” “school board,” “teacher,” or “educate” don’t
appear anywhere in Act 573. Accordingly, there is no need to strain our minds to imagine
a constitutional display mandated by Act 573. One doesn’t exist. This matter is ripe for
review.
C. Merits Claims
1. Establishment Clause
a. Binding Precedent of Stone v. Graham
The Supreme Court has already determined that a state law mandating the posting
of the Ten Commandments in public schools—without integrating such displays into the
curriculum “in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or
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the like”—violates the Establishment Clause. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980).
This precedent has not been explicitly overturned and is binding upon all lower courts––
including this one. 	The facts in the case at bar are identical in all material respects to
the law that was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Graham. As
will be discussed in further detail below, there is no genuine, material dispute of fact that
Act 573—like the nearly identical law in Stone—was enacted “to induce . . . schoolchildren
to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments.” Id. Much as
the State wishes Stone were a dead letter, it is not for the reasons previously stated in
the preliminary injunction order. See Doc. 71, pp. 10–15, 25–30.
No public-school Establishment-Clause case involving school-wide dissemination
of religious speech, whether pre- or post-Stone, has ever been reversed, including
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992); and Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305–06 (2000). 	In fact, the Supreme Court’s more
recent opinion in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, which disavowed the so-called
“Lemon test” derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971), 	cited
favorably to both Lee and Santa Fe, which had relied on Lemon. See 597 U.S. at 534,
541. In short, there is no reason to think the Supreme Court has thrown the baby out with
the bathwater. Abandoning the Lemon test does not mean that public-school children’s
religious liberties are now in a state of limbo and ripe for state exploitation.
According to the Kennedy Court, state-mandated religious speech in public
schools is still “problematically coercive” if students are required to engage with it. See id.
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at 541. Kennedy involved a state actor’s private prayers, and “permitting private speech
is not the same thing as coercing others to participate in it.” Id. “The prayers for which Mr.
Kennedy was disciplined were not publicly broadcast or recited to a captive audience.
Students were not required or expected to participate.” Id. at 542 (emphasis added). By
contrast, Act 573 requires that the Ten Commandments be posted in every public-school
classroom, K–12, without exception. It is a coercive law that results in universal
participation by students. Because Kennedy is inapposite, it fails to provide the State with
legal cover to do as it pleases.
The State’s other references to caselaw also fall flat. For example, the State claims
that posting the Ten Commandments in public schools is no different than erecting a
monument of the Ten Commandments on the lawn of a government building—as was the
case in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)—or saying a collective prayer at the
start of a town council meeting—as was the case in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572
U.S. 565, 590 (2014). Neither case is helpful to the State. According to the Supreme
Court, a monument bearing state-sanctioned religious speech is “passive” rather than
coercive because the public can avoid it if they choose. By the same token, the public
can avoid listening to prayers at the start of a legislative meeting by staying out of the
room. Children cannot similarly avoid reading the Ten Commandments posted in their
classrooms for thirteen years of compulsory schooling.2
2 Arkansas law requires parents to send their minor children, ages five to seventeen, to
school and to “ensure the attendance of the child.” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-201(a). A child
who fails to attend school will receive academic punishments, id. § 6-18-222(a)(1)(A)(i),
and a truant student’s parents “shall be subject to a civil penalty” of up to $500 in circuit
court, plus court costs and fees, id. § 6-18-222(a)(5)(A).
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The State hedges its position by arguing that even if Act 573 is, in fact, coercive,
it’s only a little coercive because no student will be required to stand at the front of the
class and publicly “affirm or reject” the Ten Commandments or “be tested on them.” (Doc.
180, p. 17). The State offers no law to support the argument that a little coercive religious
indoctrination is fine. The Supreme Court has clearly held that where “the text [of the Ten
Commandments] confront[s] . . . students every day,” the Establishment Clause is
violated. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691.
Given that Act 573 is coercive, the only thing left to consider is why it was enacted
in the first place. The State’s lawyers claim at various points in their briefing that Act 573’s
purpose is “to acknowledge the historical importance of the Ten Commandments.” (Doc.
165, p. 10). This claim finds no support in the record. First, the word “historical”—or any
form of that word—appears only twice in Act 573, and both times it is used to describe
the ancient quality of the sacred text, not how the text will be used in schools. See Act
573, § (a)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (describing the text as “a historical representation of the Ten
Commandments”).
Second, the State makes three important factual stipulations about Act 573:
(1) “Act 573 does not direct teachers to provide instruction about the Ten
Commandments or about the displays.”
(2) “Act 573 does not require classroom instruction, and it does not
require that the Ten Commandments be incorporated into public
school curriculum.”
(3) “There is no requirement for teachers, other school officials, or
students to interact with, bring attention to, or even acknowledge the
posters in any way.”
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(Doc. 166, ¶¶ 8 & 9 (State’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts)). In other words,
the State admits there is no educational purpose in displaying the Ten Commandments—
no teaching, no learning, and no curricular integration.
The Court is “reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the State[ ], . . .
when a plausible secular purpose . . . may be discerned from the face of the statute.”
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–95 (1983). But here, a plausible secular purpose is
expressly disavowed. Act 573’s purpose is only to display a sacred, religious text in a
prominent place in every public-school classroom. And the only reason to display a
sacred, religious text in every classroom is to proselytize to children. The State has said
the quiet part out loud.
Given the State’s factual admissions coupled with the plain language of Act 573,
there is no need to delve into the motivations of individual legislators who voted in favor
of Act 573. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comm. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249
(1990). However, the State attached full transcripts of the House and Senate floor
debates on Act 573 to its summary judgment briefing. See Doc. 180-9 (Arkansas Senate
Transcript, March 19, 2025); Doc. 180-8 (Arkansas House of Representatives Transcript,
April 2, 2025). Presumably, the State intended the Court to read the transcripts, and doing
so confirms that the Legislature understood Act 573’s religious purpose. For example:
• 	One Senator stated that the Act’s “valuable” purpose was “for everyone [to be]
reminded once a day that there is a God and we’re not him.” (Doc. 180-9, pp. 2–
3).
• 	Another Senator opined that “educating our young people on the tenets of morality”
through the Ten Commandments was a necessary “counterattack . . . to that total
secularization of Western society.” Id. at p. 17.
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• 	A third Senator thought displaying a religious text in public schools was “just
sharing with our children our culture.” Id. at p. 18.
• 	And a fourth Senator saw the Ten Commandments as “the moral compass of our
nation,” something “good for our kids to see . . . visually.” Id. at p. 19.
• 	The Act’s sponsor in the House observed that asking students to read the Ten
Commandments every day was no different than asking them to say the Pledge of
Allegiance. See Doc. 180-8, p. 18.
• 	Another Representative announced, “the Ten Commandments is the foundation of
our society,” id. at p. 31.
• 	A third Representative celebrated that Act 573 would enable “a large number of
students who don’t go to church” to have “at least have some exposure,” to God’s
commandments. Id. at p. 49.
• 	A 	fourth 	Representative 	noted 	that 	reading 	and 	meditating 	on 	the 	Ten
Commandments teaches children to appreciate the “virtues and qualities that we
should all aspire to as Christians.” Id. at p. 73.
• 	Finally, a fifth Representative wondered what all the fuss was about—since, in his
mind, the Establishment Clause did not even apply to the States. See id. at pp.
58–59.
b. Relevance of “Historical Practices and Understandings” Test
The State asks the Court to evaluate this case through the lens of American
history. In support of this framing, the State cites Town of Greece and Kennedy for the
proposition that Act 573 should be judged only “by ‘reference to historical practices and
understandings.’” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 535 (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576).
However, the Kennedy Court did not endorse using this test in every context—particularly
where religious speech was clearly coercive and the audience was composed of public-
school children. See id. at 541–42. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs gamely review the history—
just in case it’s necessary.
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Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Steven K. Green, submitted a thorough report to the Court on
the history of public schooling in America, see Doc. 168-4, and also testified live at the
preliminary injunction hearing on July 18, 2025. At the time of the hearing, the State had
not retained a history expert, which was odd considering that an attorney had advised the
Legislature during debate on Act 573 that the law would face a legal challenge that would
“ultimately turn on the history and tradition test.” (Doc. 180-8, p. 28).3 It was only after the
Court issued its preliminary injunction that the State retained a history expert named Dr.
Mark David Hall, who wrote a report for the Court on his research regarding the role of
the Ten Commandments in public schooling.
Having reviewed both experts’ reports and Dr. Hall’s deposition testimony,4 there
are several key areas of agreement. First, they agree that the government had little to do
with public elementary and secondary school education until at least the twentieth
century. See Doc. 164-1, p. 22 (Dr. Hall’s Report); Doc. 168-4, pp. 25–26 (Dr. Green’s
Report). Second, in the early- to mid-nineteenth century before the advent of modern
public education as we know it, there were a number of early-elementary primers and
spelling books in wide circulation in many states, and these primers and spellers featured
religious messages and Bible verses, including the Ten Commandments. See id. Third,
these early primers “fell into disuse” sometime during the nineteenth century, before the
3 Also, the Act’s sponsor invited a purported historian to testify before the House in favor
of Act 573 and provide the members with facts about the historical significance of the Ten
Commandments in public schools and other public spaces. See id. at pp. 6–10, 20–22.
To the Court’s knowledge, that historian was never retained by the State for this lawsuit.
4 Dr. Green was not deposed.
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rise of public education. (Doc. 178-1, pp. 3–4 (Hall Dep.); Doc. 168-4, p. 26 (Green
Report)). Fourth, there is no longstanding, widespread history of permanently displaying
the Ten Commandments in public-school classrooms. (Doc. 168-28, p. 21 (Hall Rebuttal
Report) (stating he was “unaware of any source that documents permanent displays
(religious or otherwise) in the Nation’s public school classrooms over the last two hundred
years”); Doc. 168-4, p. 29 (Green Report)).5
Discussing history is both unhelpful and irrelevant when the challenged law is
coercive, applied universally in the public-school context, and has no educational, secular
purpose. Even so, there are no historical practices and understandings to support the
posting of the Ten Commandments in the public-school context.
2. Free Exercise Clause
In addition to the Establishment Clause violation, Plaintiffs have also proven that
Act 573 violates their Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment. The “government
burdens the free-exercise rights of parents when it requires them to submit their children
to instruction that poses ‘a very real threat of undermining’ the religious beliefs and
practices that the parents wish to instill.” Mahmoud, 606 U.S. at 530 (citation omitted).
The parent-Plaintiffs describe their Free Exercise injuries precisely and personally in their
depositions. See Docs. 164-4–164-16. And the State does not materially dispute their
contention that exposing their children to the State’s mandated displays of the Ten
5 Indeed, Dr. Hall stated he would “find it hard to imagine” any educational purpose for
hanging the Ten Commandments in, say, a math or science classroom. See Doc. 178-1,
p. 3 (Hall Dep.).
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Commandments will interfere with their ability to provide religious instruction and will
induce their children to suppress their own religious or non-religious beliefs.
Focusing for a moment on the claims of the parent-Plaintiffs whose children attend
schools in the Conway and Lakeside School Districts, their testimony provides vivid
details about the deleterious effects both they and their children experienced when Ten
Commandments displays were hung in their classrooms. During the eleven days that the
Ten Commandments were displayed in Conway’s public schools, the Berrys were
“astonished by how quickly [C.B.] absorbed that much of the poster” since “C.B. does not
fully understand what some of the language means.” (Doc. 164-9, p. 16 (A.C. Berry
Dep.)). Likewise, after Ms. Jaeger’s minor child saw the display in Lakeside’s public
schools, Ms. Jaeger was forced to explain what the “sabbath” was, define the concept of
polytheism, and describe what it means to “covet” someone’s wife. (Doc. 168-6, p. 3
(Jaeger Response to Interrogatories)). Ms. Jaeger would have preferred to discuss these
concepts at an appropriate time of her choice, but because of Act 573, the State imposed
its preferred religious doctrine upon Ms. Jaeger’s child without her consent.
The State counters that “Plaintiffs have [no] evidence that the displays have
caused their students to affirm or disavow any beliefs or required them to engage in a
formal religious exercise or required them to do anything prohibited by their religious or
non-religious beliefs.” (Doc. 180, pp. 15–16). However, the law does not require a child
to experience a crisis of faith or a total religious conversion to establish a First Amendment
injury. See Mahmoud, 606 U.S. at 569. Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries are serious enough.
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The presence of these displays alone will compromise the parents’ efforts “to raise their
children in accordance with their religious faith.” Id. at 542 (citation modified).6
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahmoud, “the government is
generally free to place incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as it does so
pursuant to a neutral policy that is generally applicable.” 606 U.S. at 564. However, when
a law is religiously motivated—as is the case here—and “substantially interferes with the
religious development” of the parents’ children in the compulsory public-school setting—
as was the case in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972)—“strict scrutiny is
appropriate regardless of whether the law is neutral or generally applicable.” Mahmoud,
606 U.S. at 564–65.
Act 573 is subject to strict scrutiny because it is denominationally preferential and
burdens parent-Plaintiffs’ right to direct their children’s religious upbringing. Accordingly,
it is the State’s burden to demonstrate that its impositions on Plaintiffs’ “protected rights
serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at
532. The State acknowledges that its sole reason for enacting Act 573 was to display the
Ten Commandments in all public schools. The purpose, therefore, is to expose children
6 The State also argues that Act 573 is unobjectionable because the Legislature
“specifically crafted” the Commandment text to be “non-sectarian.” (Doc. 165, p. 9).
However, that claim is misleading at best. The text was not “crafted” at all; members of
the Legislature did not sit down with interested religious groups to broker an egalitarian
textual compromise. As the State well knows, the only reason the Legislature chose this
particular text was because it appeared on the stone monument in Van Orden that the
Supreme Court found constitutional. See 545 U.S. at 691. The State overlooks the fact
that it was not the text that mattered in Van Orden but the non-coercive setting. That
setting is not present with respect to Act 573.
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to Protestant Christian scripture. “[T]he government may not favor one religion over
another, or religion over irreligion, religious choice being the prerogative of individuals
under the Free Exercise Clause.” McCreary County. v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844,
875–76 (2005). Furthermore, as Act 573 applies broadly to every classroom in every
Arkansas public school, it is not tailored in any respect and fails strict scrutiny.
D. Irreparable Harm, Balance of the Equities, and the Public Interest
Act 573 must be permanently enjoined. Failing to do so would violate the
Establishment Clause rights of all Arkansas public-school children and their parents and
also violate Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights. The law serves no educational purpose, as
the State admits, and consequently deprives Plaintiffs of their rights. Such deprivations,
“even for minimal periods of time, constitute irreparable injury.” Ingebretsen v. Jackson
Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976)). Further, the balance of the equities and the public interest favor Plaintiffs, given
the certain infringement of their First Amendment rights, and the school districts’ and the
State’s lack of expected harm if a permanent injunction issues. Finally, “it is always in the
public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Brandt v.
Rutledge, 47 F.4th 661, 672 (8th Cir. 2022). All factors weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.
E. Scope of Relief
Only district-wide relief—across all Defendant school districts—will satisfy the
Supreme Court’s definition of “complete relief.” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 852
(2025). As this Court previously explained, “restricting the scope of a preliminary
injunction to just the individual child-Plaintiffs’ classrooms or schools is unlikely to avoid
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constitutional injury.” (Doc. 71, p. 34 n.16). An injunction limited to the child-Plaintiffs’
classrooms would be too narrow to address the realities of their experiences. The Court
rejects the State’s invitation to create “Ten Commandment-free bubbles” around each
child-Plaintiff; that would entail removing and re-hanging posters each time a child-
Plaintiff entered or exited a classroom. A narrow injunction would put the child-Plaintiffs
at risk of repeated “accidental” encounters with the Act’s scriptural displays, which is
unacceptable.
V. 	CONCLUSION
The downside of a constitutional democracy is that its citizens must contend with
the “occasional tyrannies of governing majorities.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). “When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). It appears that with the passage of Act 573, the
State may have lost sight of the fact that “a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion.” Id.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 168) is
GRANTED, 	the 	State’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	(Doc. 	164) 	is 	DENIED.
Defendants are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from complying with Act 573.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 16 th day of March, 2026.
___________________________________
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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