Chambers v. Cantrell et al

5:24-cv-05237ArwdDec 18, 2024

Full text

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
DEVELL CHAMBERS 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 5:24-cv-05237-CDC
SHERIFF JAY CANTRELL, Washington
County, Arkansas; DEPUTY MURPHY,
Washington County Detention Center (WCDC);
CORPORAL HENSON, WCDC; and
CORPORAL SANDYBROOK, WCDC 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Devell Chambers (“Chambers”), an inmate of the Washington County Detention
Center (WCDC), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Chambers proceeds pro se
and in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 	However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document
will 	be dispositive of Chambers’ claims, this document 	will 	be filed as a Report 	and
Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to United States District Judge
Timothy L. Brooks. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No.
4) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Chambers filed this case on November 15, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Chambers was advised
that his Complaint was deficient because it did not describe how each named Defendant personally
violated his constitutional rights. 	(ECF No. 2). 	He was explicitly told that he must “include in
his factual allegations how each Defendant personally violated his rights.” 	Id.
Chambers was given explicit instructions on what his Amended Complaint must contain.
(ECF No. 2). 	The instructions included the following:
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the
Court: 	(1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of
the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what the Defendant did or failed
to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation
of Plaintiff=s constitutional rights; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered
because of that Defendant=s conduct. 	See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72,
377 (1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he has named as a Defendant.
Plaintiff is CAUTIONED that he must affirmatively link the conduct of each
named Defendant with the specific injury he suffered. 	If he fails to do, the
allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
(ECF No. 2 at 1-2).
On December 2, 2024, Chambers filed his Amended Complaint. 	(ECF No. 4).
According to the allegations of Claim One of Amended Complaint, during August and September
inside pods A3, B4, and A7, excessive force was used against him; he was denied medical care;
and he was denied food. 	Id. at 4. 	His factual allegations are:
My wrists were damaged and once I was removed. 	I wasn’t seen by medical for
my breathing and wasn’t feed a meal!
Cpl. Murphy put me on lockdowns.
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Corporal Henson wrote me a bogus ticket.
Corporal Sandybrook cursed me out, telling me he was going to take me to the
whole.
Id. at 4-5.
In the area of the complaint form where Chambers was asked if he was asserting an official
capacity claim, he wrote: “Because I was put in the []hole and lost my trustee status and removed
from the AA program that I so much needed.” 	Id. at 5.
In Claim Two, Chambers indicates his constitutional rights were violated by the use of
excessive force and the denial of medical care. 	(ECF No. 4 at 6). 	His factual allegations follow:
My wrist was damaged.
Cpl. Henson, Deputy Murphy.
My wrist was damaged.
(ECF No. 4 at 6).
In the area of the complaint form where Chambers was asked if he was asserting an official
capacity claim, Chambers wrote: “Wrongfully treat[ed] and treated not as a human being.” 	Id. at
7.
Claim Three is essentially a duplicate of Claim Two. 	(ECF No. 7-8). 	The only difference
is he includes Defendant Sandybrook in factual statement. 	Id. at 8. 	Chambers checks a box
indicating that he is asserting an official capacity claim. 	Id. at 8. 	However, in the form where
he is asked to describe the custom, policy, or widespread practice that he believed violated his
constitutional rights, Chambers wrote nothing.
Chambers is in convicted status. 	(ECF No. 4 at 2). 	As relief, Chambers seeks both
compensatory and punitive damages for his “mistreatment and racial discr[i]mination and not
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receiving proper medical treatment for my wrist.” 	Id. at 9.
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff
has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v.
Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
However, even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin
v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant
acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999).
Chambers’ claims are subject to dismissal. 	First, Defendant Cantrell cannot be held liable
based solely on his supervisory position at the WCDC. 	Under § 1983 a supervisor cannot be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate based solely on the fact that he has general
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responsibility for supervising the operations of the facility. 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662, 676
(2009); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010). 	In other words, Defendant Cantrell
is only liable for his own individual actions which resulted in the deprivation of Chambers’
constitutional rights. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 	In this case, Chambers has made no factual
statements regarding Defendant Cantrell’s conduct. 	Indeed, Defendant Cantrell is not mentioned
at all in the body of the Amended Complaint. 	The only reference to him is that he is listed as a
Defendant.
Second, in Claim One no factual allegations are made setting forth actions taken by
Defendants Murphy, Sandybrook, and Henson that would amount to the use of excessive force,
the denial of medical care, or the refusal to feed Chambers. “Section 1983 liability is personal.”
Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 2009). 	“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal
link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” 	Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477
F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
The only allegation regarding Defendant Murphy is that he placed Chambers on lock-
down. 	In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that being placed in
segregation or on disciplinary confinement did not violate a prisoner’s liberty interests unless the
prisoner is subjected to “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” 	Id. at 484. 	No such allegations are made. 	Moreover, being placed on lock-down
does not equate to an excessive force or denial of medical care claim.
The only allegation regarding Defendant Murphy is that he wrote Chambers a “bogus
ticket.” 	Nothing explains any possible relationship between this act and the use of excessive force
or the denial of medical care. 	Furthermore, the filing of a false disciplinary charge against an
inmate is not actionable under § 1983 unless the disciplinary charge is in retaliation for the inmate’s
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exercise of a constitutional right. 	Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989).
Chambers has made no such allegations.
The only allegation against Defendant Sandybrook is that he cursed Chambers and said he
was going to take him to the hole. 	Again, these allegations have nothing to do with the excessive
force and denial of medical care claims. 	Moreover, as noted above, Chambers cannot sue over
being placed in disciplinary confinement unless he can establish an atypical and significant
hardship. 	No such allegations are made.
While the Court is required to liberally construe the Amended Complaint, even pro se
complaints are required to allege sufficient facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter
of law. 	Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (“When we say that a pro se
complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the
layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal frame work.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Though pro se
complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims
advanced.”) (citation omitted). 	Furthermore, “[a]lthough we must liberally construe plaintiff’s
factual allegations, we will not supply additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory that for
plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” 	Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (8th
Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 	In this case, despite being given an opportunity to amend his
complaint and being explicitly told he must allege facts showing how each defendant violated his
constitutional rights, the factual allegations are so sparse as to be virtually nonexistent.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that:
(1) 	the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted;
(2) Plaintiff/Petitioner be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted
as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to
place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial consideration; and
(3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
dismissal would not be taken in good faith.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status of Referral: 	The referral terminates upon the filing of this Report and
Recommendation.
RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December 2024.
s/ Christy Comstock
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Documenti2 Filed 12/18/24 Page 1 of 8 PagelD #:
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

DEVELL CHAMBERS PLAINTIFF
Vv. Civil No. 5:24-cv-05237-CDC

SHERIFF JAY CANTRELL, Washington

County, Arkansas; DEPUTY MURPHY,

Washington County Detention Center (WCDC);

CORPORAL HENSON, WCDC; and

CORPORAL SANDYBROOK, WCDC DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Devell Chambers (“Chambers’’), an inmate of the Washington County Detention
Center (WCDC), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chambers proceeds pro se
and in forma pauperis (“IFP”).

The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document
will be dispositive of Chambers’ claims, this document will be filed as a Report and
Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to United States District Judge
Timothy L. Brooks. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.

The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No.
4) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of

a governmental entity.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
I. 	BACKGROUND
Chambers filed this case on November 15, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Chambers was advised
that his Complaint was deficient because it did not describe how each named Defendant personally
violated his constitutional rights. 	(ECF No. 2). 	He was explicitly told that he must “include in
his factual allegations how each Defendant personally violated his rights.” 	Id.
Chambers was given explicit instructions on what his Amended Complaint must contain.
(ECF No. 2). 	The instructions included the following:
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the
Court: 	(1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of
the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what the Defendant did or failed
to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation
of Plaintiff=s constitutional rights; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered
because of that Defendant=s conduct. 	See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72,
377 (1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he has named as a Defendant.
Plaintiff is CAUTIONED that he must affirmatively link the conduct of each
named Defendant with the specific injury he suffered. 	If he fails to do, the
allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
(ECF No. 2 at 1-2).
On December 2, 2024, Chambers filed his Amended Complaint. 	(ECF No. 4).
According to the allegations of Claim One of Amended Complaint, during August and September
inside pods A3, B4, and A7, excessive force was used against him; he was denied medical care;
and he was denied food. 	Id. at 4. 	His factual allegations are:
My wrists were damaged and once I was removed. 	I wasn’t seen by medical for
my breathing and wasn’t feed a meal!
Cpl. Murphy put me on lockdowns.
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3
Corporal Henson wrote me a bogus ticket.
Corporal Sandybrook cursed me out, telling me he was going to take me to the
whole.
Id. at 4-5.
In the area of the complaint form where Chambers was asked if he was asserting an official
capacity claim, he wrote: “Because I was put in the []hole and lost my trustee status and removed
from the AA program that I so much needed.” 	Id. at 5.
In Claim Two, Chambers indicates his constitutional rights were violated by the use of
excessive force and the denial of medical care. 	(ECF No. 4 at 6). 	His factual allegations follow:
My wrist was damaged.
Cpl. Henson, Deputy Murphy.
My wrist was damaged.
(ECF No. 4 at 6).
In the area of the complaint form where Chambers was asked if he was asserting an official
capacity claim, Chambers wrote: “Wrongfully treat[ed] and treated not as a human being.” 	Id. at
7.
Claim Three is essentially a duplicate of Claim Two. 	(ECF No. 7-8). 	The only difference
is he includes Defendant Sandybrook in factual statement. 	Id. at 8. 	Chambers checks a box
indicating that he is asserting an official capacity claim. 	Id. at 8. 	However, in the form where
he is asked to describe the custom, policy, or widespread practice that he believed violated his
constitutional rights, Chambers wrote nothing.
Chambers is in convicted status. 	(ECF No. 4 at 2). 	As relief, Chambers seeks both
compensatory and punitive damages for his “mistreatment and racial discr[i]mination and not
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4
receiving proper medical treatment for my wrist.” 	Id. at 9.
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff
has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v.
Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
However, even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin
v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant
acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999).
Chambers’ claims are subject to dismissal. 	First, Defendant Cantrell cannot be held liable
based solely on his supervisory position at the WCDC. 	Under § 1983 a supervisor cannot be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate based solely on the fact that he has general
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5
responsibility for supervising the operations of the facility. 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662, 676
(2009); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010). 	In other words, Defendant Cantrell
is only liable for his own individual actions which resulted in the deprivation of Chambers’
constitutional rights. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 	In this case, Chambers has made no factual
statements regarding Defendant Cantrell’s conduct. 	Indeed, Defendant Cantrell is not mentioned
at all in the body of the Amended Complaint. 	The only reference to him is that he is listed as a
Defendant.
Second, in Claim One no factual allegations are made setting forth actions taken by
Defendants Murphy, Sandybrook, and Henson that would amount to the use of excessive force,
the denial of medical care, or the refusal to feed Chambers. “Section 1983 liability is personal.”
Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 2009). 	“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal
link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” 	Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477
F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
The only allegation regarding Defendant Murphy is that he placed Chambers on lock-
down. 	In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that being placed in
segregation or on disciplinary confinement did not violate a prisoner’s liberty interests unless the
prisoner is subjected to “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” 	Id. at 484. 	No such allegations are made. 	Moreover, being placed on lock-down
does not equate to an excessive force or denial of medical care claim.
The only allegation regarding Defendant Murphy is that he wrote Chambers a “bogus
ticket.” 	Nothing explains any possible relationship between this act and the use of excessive force
or the denial of medical care. 	Furthermore, the filing of a false disciplinary charge against an
inmate is not actionable under § 1983 unless the disciplinary charge is in retaliation for the inmate’s
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6
exercise of a constitutional right. 	Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989).
Chambers has made no such allegations.
The only allegation against Defendant Sandybrook is that he cursed Chambers and said he
was going to take him to the hole. 	Again, these allegations have nothing to do with the excessive
force and denial of medical care claims. 	Moreover, as noted above, Chambers cannot sue over
being placed in disciplinary confinement unless he can establish an atypical and significant
hardship. 	No such allegations are made.
While the Court is required to liberally construe the Amended Complaint, even pro se
complaints are required to allege sufficient facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter
of law. 	Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (“When we say that a pro se
complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the
layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal frame work.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Though pro se
complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims
advanced.”) (citation omitted). 	Furthermore, “[a]lthough we must liberally construe plaintiff’s
factual allegations, we will not supply additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory that for
plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” 	Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (8th
Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 	In this case, despite being given an opportunity to amend his
complaint and being explicitly told he must allege facts showing how each defendant violated his
constitutional rights, the factual allegations are so sparse as to be virtually nonexistent.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that:
(1) 	the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted;
(2) Plaintiff/Petitioner be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted
as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to
place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial consideration; and
(3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
dismissal would not be taken in good faith.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status of Referral: 	The referral terminates upon the filing of this Report and
Recommendation.
RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December 2024.
s/ Christy Comstock
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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