5:24-cv-05237•Chambers v. Cantrell et al
Full text
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION DEVELL CHAMBERS PLAINTIFF v. Civil No. 5:24-cv-05237-CDC SHERIFF JAY CANTRELL, Washington County, Arkansas; DEPUTY MURPHY, Washington County Detention Center (WCDC); CORPORAL HENSON, WCDC; and CORPORAL SANDYBROOK, WCDC DEFENDANTS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff, Devell Chambers (“Chambers”), an inmate of the Washington County Detention Center (WCDC), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chambers proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. However, because not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document will be dispositive of Chambers’ claims, this document will be filed as a Report and Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to United States District Judge Timothy L. Brooks. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and General Order 2024-02. The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
2 I. BACKGROUND Chambers filed this case on November 15, 2024. (ECF No. 1). Chambers was advised that his Complaint was deficient because it did not describe how each named Defendant personally violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 2). He was explicitly told that he must “include in his factual allegations how each Defendant personally violated his rights.” Id. Chambers was given explicit instructions on what his Amended Complaint must contain. (ECF No. 2). The instructions included the following: In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what the Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff=s constitutional rights; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant=s conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he has named as a Defendant. Plaintiff is CAUTIONED that he must affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific injury he suffered. If he fails to do, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 2 at 1-2). On December 2, 2024, Chambers filed his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 4). According to the allegations of Claim One of Amended Complaint, during August and September inside pods A3, B4, and A7, excessive force was used against him; he was denied medical care; and he was denied food. Id. at 4. His factual allegations are: My wrists were damaged and once I was removed. I wasn’t seen by medical for my breathing and wasn’t feed a meal! Cpl. Murphy put me on lockdowns. Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
3 Corporal Henson wrote me a bogus ticket. Corporal Sandybrook cursed me out, telling me he was going to take me to the whole. Id. at 4-5. In the area of the complaint form where Chambers was asked if he was asserting an official capacity claim, he wrote: “Because I was put in the []hole and lost my trustee status and removed from the AA program that I so much needed.” Id. at 5. In Claim Two, Chambers indicates his constitutional rights were violated by the use of excessive force and the denial of medical care. (ECF No. 4 at 6). His factual allegations follow: My wrist was damaged. Cpl. Henson, Deputy Murphy. My wrist was damaged. (ECF No. 4 at 6). In the area of the complaint form where Chambers was asked if he was asserting an official capacity claim, Chambers wrote: “Wrongfully treat[ed] and treated not as a human being.” Id. at 7. Claim Three is essentially a duplicate of Claim Two. (ECF No. 7-8). The only difference is he includes Defendant Sandybrook in factual statement. Id. at 8. Chambers checks a box indicating that he is asserting an official capacity claim. Id. at 8. However, in the form where he is asked to describe the custom, policy, or widespread practice that he believed violated his constitutional rights, Chambers wrote nothing. Chambers is in convicted status. (ECF No. 4 at 2). As relief, Chambers seeks both compensatory and punitive damages for his “mistreatment and racial discr[i]mination and not Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
4 receiving proper medical treatment for my wrist.” Id. at 9. II. APPLICABLE STANDARD The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). III. DISCUSSION Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). Chambers’ claims are subject to dismissal. First, Defendant Cantrell cannot be held liable based solely on his supervisory position at the WCDC. Under § 1983 a supervisor cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate based solely on the fact that he has general Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
5 responsibility for supervising the operations of the facility. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662, 676 (2009); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010). In other words, Defendant Cantrell is only liable for his own individual actions which resulted in the deprivation of Chambers’ constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. In this case, Chambers has made no factual statements regarding Defendant Cantrell’s conduct. Indeed, Defendant Cantrell is not mentioned at all in the body of the Amended Complaint. The only reference to him is that he is listed as a Defendant. Second, in Claim One no factual allegations are made setting forth actions taken by Defendants Murphy, Sandybrook, and Henson that would amount to the use of excessive force, the denial of medical care, or the refusal to feed Chambers. “Section 1983 liability is personal.” Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 2009). “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The only allegation regarding Defendant Murphy is that he placed Chambers on lock- down. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that being placed in segregation or on disciplinary confinement did not violate a prisoner’s liberty interests unless the prisoner is subjected to “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. No such allegations are made. Moreover, being placed on lock-down does not equate to an excessive force or denial of medical care claim. The only allegation regarding Defendant Murphy is that he wrote Chambers a “bogus ticket.” Nothing explains any possible relationship between this act and the use of excessive force or the denial of medical care. Furthermore, the filing of a false disciplinary charge against an inmate is not actionable under § 1983 unless the disciplinary charge is in retaliation for the inmate’s Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
6 exercise of a constitutional right. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989). Chambers has made no such allegations. The only allegation against Defendant Sandybrook is that he cursed Chambers and said he was going to take him to the hole. Again, these allegations have nothing to do with the excessive force and denial of medical care claims. Moreover, as noted above, Chambers cannot sue over being placed in disciplinary confinement unless he can establish an atypical and significant hardship. No such allegations are made. While the Court is required to liberally construe the Amended Complaint, even pro se complaints are required to allege sufficient facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (“When we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernable . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal frame work.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Though pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.”) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[a]lthough we must liberally construe plaintiff’s factual allegations, we will not supply additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory that for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (8th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). In this case, despite being given an opportunity to amend his complaint and being explicitly told he must allege facts showing how each defendant violated his constitutional rights, the factual allegations are so sparse as to be virtually nonexistent. Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
7 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, I recommend that: (1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) Plaintiff/Petitioner be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial consideration; and (3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court. Status of Referral: The referral terminates upon the filing of this Report and Recommendation. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December 2024. s/ Christy Comstock CHRISTY COMSTOCK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
8 Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
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Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Documenti2 Filed 12/18/24 Page 1 of 8 PagelD #: <pagelD> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION DEVELL CHAMBERS PLAINTIFF Vv. Civil No. 5:24-cv-05237-CDC SHERIFF JAY CANTRELL, Washington County, Arkansas; DEPUTY MURPHY, Washington County Detention Center (WCDC); CORPORAL HENSON, WCDC; and CORPORAL SANDYBROOK, WCDC DEFENDANTS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff, Devell Chambers (“Chambers’’), an inmate of the Washington County Detention Center (WCDC), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chambers proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. However, because not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document will be dispositive of Chambers’ claims, this document will be filed as a Report and Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to United States District Judge Timothy L. Brooks. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and General Order 2024-02. The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO 2 I. BACKGROUND Chambers filed this case on November 15, 2024. (ECF No. 1). Chambers was advised that his Complaint was deficient because it did not describe how each named Defendant personally violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 2). He was explicitly told that he must “include in his factual allegations how each Defendant personally violated his rights.” Id. Chambers was given explicit instructions on what his Amended Complaint must contain. (ECF No. 2). The instructions included the following: In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what the Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff=s constitutional rights; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant=s conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he has named as a Defendant. Plaintiff is CAUTIONED that he must affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific injury he suffered. If he fails to do, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 2 at 1-2). On December 2, 2024, Chambers filed his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 4). According to the allegations of Claim One of Amended Complaint, during August and September inside pods A3, B4, and A7, excessive force was used against him; he was denied medical care; and he was denied food. Id. at 4. His factual allegations are: My wrists were damaged and once I was removed. I wasn’t seen by medical for my breathing and wasn’t feed a meal! Cpl. Murphy put me on lockdowns. Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: <pageID> 3 Corporal Henson wrote me a bogus ticket. Corporal Sandybrook cursed me out, telling me he was going to take me to the whole. Id. at 4-5. In the area of the complaint form where Chambers was asked if he was asserting an official capacity claim, he wrote: “Because I was put in the []hole and lost my trustee status and removed from the AA program that I so much needed.” Id. at 5. In Claim Two, Chambers indicates his constitutional rights were violated by the use of excessive force and the denial of medical care. (ECF No. 4 at 6). His factual allegations follow: My wrist was damaged. Cpl. Henson, Deputy Murphy. My wrist was damaged. (ECF No. 4 at 6). In the area of the complaint form where Chambers was asked if he was asserting an official capacity claim, Chambers wrote: “Wrongfully treat[ed] and treated not as a human being.” Id. at 7. Claim Three is essentially a duplicate of Claim Two. (ECF No. 7-8). The only difference is he includes Defendant Sandybrook in factual statement. Id. at 8. Chambers checks a box indicating that he is asserting an official capacity claim. Id. at 8. However, in the form where he is asked to describe the custom, policy, or widespread practice that he believed violated his constitutional rights, Chambers wrote nothing. Chambers is in convicted status. (ECF No. 4 at 2). As relief, Chambers seeks both compensatory and punitive damages for his “mistreatment and racial discr[i]mination and not Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: <pageID> 4 receiving proper medical treatment for my wrist.” Id. at 9. II. APPLICABLE STANDARD The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). III. DISCUSSION Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). Chambers’ claims are subject to dismissal. First, Defendant Cantrell cannot be held liable based solely on his supervisory position at the WCDC. Under § 1983 a supervisor cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate based solely on the fact that he has general Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: <pageID> 5 responsibility for supervising the operations of the facility. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662, 676 (2009); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010). In other words, Defendant Cantrell is only liable for his own individual actions which resulted in the deprivation of Chambers’ constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. In this case, Chambers has made no factual statements regarding Defendant Cantrell’s conduct. Indeed, Defendant Cantrell is not mentioned at all in the body of the Amended Complaint. The only reference to him is that he is listed as a Defendant. Second, in Claim One no factual allegations are made setting forth actions taken by Defendants Murphy, Sandybrook, and Henson that would amount to the use of excessive force, the denial of medical care, or the refusal to feed Chambers. “Section 1983 liability is personal.” Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 2009). “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The only allegation regarding Defendant Murphy is that he placed Chambers on lock- down. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that being placed in segregation or on disciplinary confinement did not violate a prisoner’s liberty interests unless the prisoner is subjected to “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. No such allegations are made. Moreover, being placed on lock-down does not equate to an excessive force or denial of medical care claim. The only allegation regarding Defendant Murphy is that he wrote Chambers a “bogus ticket.” Nothing explains any possible relationship between this act and the use of excessive force or the denial of medical care. Furthermore, the filing of a false disciplinary charge against an inmate is not actionable under § 1983 unless the disciplinary charge is in retaliation for the inmate’s Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: <pageID> 6 exercise of a constitutional right. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989). Chambers has made no such allegations. The only allegation against Defendant Sandybrook is that he cursed Chambers and said he was going to take him to the hole. Again, these allegations have nothing to do with the excessive force and denial of medical care claims. Moreover, as noted above, Chambers cannot sue over being placed in disciplinary confinement unless he can establish an atypical and significant hardship. No such allegations are made. While the Court is required to liberally construe the Amended Complaint, even pro se complaints are required to allege sufficient facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (“When we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernable . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal frame work.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Though pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.”) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[a]lthough we must liberally construe plaintiff’s factual allegations, we will not supply additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory that for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (8th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). In this case, despite being given an opportunity to amend his complaint and being explicitly told he must allege facts showing how each defendant violated his constitutional rights, the factual allegations are so sparse as to be virtually nonexistent. Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: <pageID> 7 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, I recommend that: (1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) Plaintiff/Petitioner be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial consideration; and (3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court. Status of Referral: The referral terminates upon the filing of this Report and Recommendation. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December 2024. s/ Christy Comstock CHRISTY COMSTOCK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Document 12 Filed 12/18/24 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: <pageID> Case 5:24-cv-05237-TLB Documenti2 Filed 12/18/24 Page 8 of 8 PagelD #: <pagelD>
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