Walker v. Washington Regional Medical Center

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
PATRICK WALKER 	PLAINTIFF
V. 	CASE NO. 5:23-CV-05126
WASHINGTON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 	DEFENDANT
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Washington Regional Medical Center’s (“WRMC”)
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) and Brief in Support (Doc. 7); Plaintiff Patrick Walker’s
Response (Doc. 15); and WRMC’s Reply (Doc. 18). WRMC’s Motion has been fully
briefed and is ripe for review. For the reasons explained below, the Motion is DENIED.
Mr. Walker—who was employed by WRMC from January 2021 until November
2022—filed suit on August 2, 2023, alleging that he “was terminated as a result of ongoing
age discrimination;” that he was “disparately treated” in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1976 (“ADEA”); and that WRMC’s actions were “intentional.” Doc.
2, ¶¶ 1, 10, 12, 29, 34, 38, 43. In its Motion, WRMC argues that Mr. Walker’s Complaint
fails to state a plausible claim for relief and should be dismissed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 7, p. 1). Specifically, WRMC contends that Mr. Walker
“failed to allege any facts . . . to indicate that age was a factor in his termination.” Id. at p.
4.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). The purpose of this requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
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(2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To pass muster,
the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A pleading containing mere “labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” and are “not entitled
to the assumption of truth.”).1
The ADEA declares it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual . . .
because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). “In order to establish a prima
facie case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a plaintiff must show:
(1) she is over 40; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) substantially younger, similarly situated employees were
treated more favorably.” Faulkner v. Douglas Cnty. Nebraska, 906 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir.
2018) (emphasis added). Or, without direct evidence of age discrimination, a plaintiff must
1 In his Response, Mr. Walker cites Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), to
support the proposition that the Court must liberally construe all the allegations pleaded
in his Complaint. See Doc. 15, p. 1. This proposition is known as Conley’s “no set of facts”
standard, see id. (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”), and it was explicitly abrogated by the Supreme Court
in Twombly, 550 U.S at 546 (citation omitted) (“The ‘no set of facts’ language has been
questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough by courts and commentators, and
is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard . . . .
Conley described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims,
not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint's survival.”).
Plaintiff’s counsel is so advised.
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show that “there is some additional evidence that age was a factor in the employer's
termination decision.” Rahlf v. Mo-Tech Corp., 642 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing
Ward v. Int'l Paper Co., 509 F.3d 457, 460 (8th Cir.2007)). “When . . . a plaintiff relies on
circumstantial rather than direct evidence of age discrimination, the case is considered
under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).” Id. Ultimately, “[a] plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which
may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged
employer decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009).
Here, Mr. Walker has met his initial pleading burden under Rule 12(b)(6). His
Complaint states sufficient facts to satisfy the first three elements of his ADEA claim. See
Doc. 2, ¶¶ 34 (“Plaintiff . . . was 54 at the time of his termination); id. at ¶ 19 (“Plaintiff’s
job performance was good. Plaintiff had no disciplinary issues. His performance review
received in 2022 was positive and Plaintiff received a raise.”); id. at ¶ 40 (“At all relevant
times, Plaintiff could perform the essential function of the position for which he was
hired.”); id. at ¶¶ 20–21 (“On November 2, 2022, Plaintiff attended a business meeting
with the Defendant’s upper management. Plaintiff was told he had a choice to resign . . .
or be terminated . . . .”).
WRMC argues in its Motion that Mr. Walker has not sufficiently pleaded the fourth
prima facie element. 	But Mr. Walker meets the pleading standard laid out in Faulkner,
chapter and verse. Compare Faulkner, 906 F.3d at 734 (“a plaintiff must show: . . . (4)
substantially younger, similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.”), with
Doc. 2, ¶¶ 27–28 (“Defendant has younger employees with similar titles to the Plaintiff
who perform the same type of job duties. These younger similarly situated employees
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were allowed to remain employed and were not terminated.”). 2 	Mr. Walker could have
(and perhaps should have) included more details about the alleged comparators, but for
now he has pleaded enough factual content to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face’” for intentional discrimination under the ADEA. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant WRMC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
6) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 11 th day of December, 2023.
_____________________________
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 See also Doc. 2, ¶¶ 36-38.
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