London Luxury LLC v. Walmart Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
LONDON LUXURY, LLC 	PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT
V. 	CASE NO. 5:22-CV-5059
WALMART, INC. 	DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are the following:
• 	Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant London Luxury, LLC’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
Costs, and Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest (Doc. 472) and Brief in Support
(Doc. 	473); 	Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff 	Walmart, 	Inc.’s 	Response 	in
Opposition (Doc. 497); and London Luxury’s Reply (Doc. 501);
• 	Walmart’s Motion to Extend Stay of Execution and Approve Security (Doc. 492)
and Brief in Support (Doc. 493); and
• 	London Luxury’s Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal (Doc. 503), Brief in
Support (Doc. 504), Supplement (Doc, 510), and Addendum (Doc. 511).
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Pre- and
Post-Judgment Interest is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; Walmart’s
Motion to Extend Stay of Execution and Approve Security is GRANTED; and London
Luxury’s Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal is also GRANTED.
I. 	ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, INTEREST, AND SANCTIONS
Walmart and London Luxury sued one another for breach of contract, and Walmart
separately sued London Luxury for tortious interference. Following an eleven-day trial,
the jury returned its verdicts on April 9, 2024, siding with London Luxury on the contract
claim and awarding it $101,218,680.00 in compensatory damages for Walmart’s breach.
Separately, the jury awarded Walmart $350,000.00 for London Luxury’s tortious conduct
during the performance of the contract. In post-trial motion practice, the Court denied
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Walmart’s Rule 50(b) and 59 requests. See Doc. 512. Accordingly, London Luxury is the
prevailing party on its contract claim,1 and Arkansas Code § 16-22-308 permits the Court
to award the company “a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and
collected as costs.” Whether and how much to award in fees are decisions that are left to
the Court’s discretion. TCBY Sys., Inc. v. RSP Co., 33 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 1994); First
United Bank v. Phase II, 347 Ark. 879, 901 (2002).
To put into context the roles that various lawyers played in the course of this multi-
year litigation, the Court sets forth the following timeline of events:
• 	January 5, 2022: The complaint was filed in New York state court by London
Luxury’s lawyers from the New York firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP.
• 	January 24, 2022: Walmart removed the case to the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
• 	March 28, 2022: All Quinn Emanuel lawyers withdrew and a new set of
lawyers from the New York firm of Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP entered their
appearances for London Luxury.
• 	April 4, 2022: The Southern District of New York transferred the case to this
district.
1 Walmart makes a perfunctory argument that London Luxury should not be considered
the prevailing party because it originally based its breach-of-contract claim, at least in
part, on a document that was not a contract at all. Although Walmart is right about that, it
omits the fact that only two months after the lawsuit was filed, London Luxury explicitly
withdrew its reliance on this document as a basis for its breach-of-contract claim. London
Luxury’s lawyers wrote a letter to the presiding judge at the time, the Honorable Cathy
Seibel, United States District Judge for Southern District of New York, explaining their
client’s position. See Doc. 51. In response, Judge Seibel issued a text-only order
confirming her understanding that neither party would rely on this particular document to
prove the existence of a contract. See Doc. 55. And they never did. Litigation continued
for approximately two more years until a jury determined that Walmart breached the
contract. This claim was at the heart of the parties’ dispute, and London Luxury claimed
a multi-million-dollar victory. It is therefore clear that London Luxury meets the definition
of a prevailing party under Arkansas law.
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• 	April 25, 2022: London Luxury hired local counsel McDaniel Wolff, PLLC,
based in Little Rock, and lawyers from that firm entered their appearances.
• 	June 1, 2022: The Court held a Rule 16 case management hearing by
videoconference, which the McDaniel Wolff and Debevoise & Plimpton
lawyers attended on behalf of London Luxury.
• 	August 25, 2022: London Luxury advised the Court in a motion (Doc. 120)
that its lawyers from Debevoise & Plimpton would soon be replaced by
lawyers from a different firm.
• 	Mid-September 2022: The Debevoise & Plimpton attorneys withdrew, and
lawyers from the New York firm of Holwell Shuster & Goldberg, LLP (“HSG”)
entered their appearances.
• 	March 27, 2023: An attorney from the Washington, DC firm of Fairmark
Partners, LLP entered his appearance in this case, pro hac vice. The
attorney never filed anything more, nor did he appear for any court
proceeding.
• 	March 	25–April 	9, 	2024: 	Attorneys 	from 	HSG 	and 	McDaniel 	Wolff
represented London Luxury in an eleven-day jury trial. HSG attorneys
Brendan DeMay and Priyanka Timblo presented all aspects of London
Luxury’s case to the jury.
Given the preceding timeline, the following chart summarizes the names, locations,
and dates that law firms representing London Luxury appeared in this case:
LAW FIRM 	LOCATION 	DATE
APPEARED
DATE
WITHDRAWN
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP
New York, NY 	1/5/22 	3/28/22
Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP 	New York, NY 	3/28/22 	9/15/22
CASE TRANSFERRED IN FROM SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 4/4/22
McDaniel, Wolff, PLLC 	Little Rock, AR 	4/25/22 	N/A
Holwell Shuster &
Goldberg, LLP (HSG)
New York, NY 	9/27/22 	N/A
Fairmark Partners, LLP 	Washington, DC 	3/28/23 	N/A
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A. HSG’s and McDaniel Wolff’s Fees and Costs
As 	noted 	above, 	McDaniel 	Wolff’s 	lawyers 	entered 	their 	appearances
approximately two years before the trial, at around the time the case was first transferred
to this Court from the Southern District of New York. HSG’s attorneys became involved
in the case about five months later and quickly took the lead in litigating this case,
ultimately prevailing over Walmart at trial. London Luxury was awarded every penny it
requested in damages.
Counsel’s representation before and during trial was professional and organized;
the issues were complex and vigorously contested; and the positive result London Luxury
achieved is undeniable. Over the course of eighteen to twenty-four months, the Court
became very familiar with the high-quality lawyering displayed by HSG and McDaniel
Wolff.
According to London Luxury’s Motion for Fees, HSG entered into a contingency
fee arrangement in which London Luxury agreed to pay HSG 33.33% of all gross amounts
recovered from Walmart. Assuming Walmart pays only the amount of the verdict,
$101,218,680.00, London Luxury would be obligated to pay HSG $33,739,222.60.00 of
the collected verdict as fees. London Luxury therefore asks the Court to award it an
amount in fees that will entirely cover what it will owe to HSG under the contingency fee
arrangement. 	According to London Luxury, it would be “inequitable” to award fees in a
lesser amount. 	See Doc. 473, p. 13. The Court disagrees. 	Awarding London Luxury
more than $33 million for HSG’s services would result in a windfall to London Luxury,
which would, in itself, be inequitable and run counter to the intent of the Arkansas fee-
shifting statute. Instead, the Court will begin its calculation a reasonable fee using the
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“lodestar,” which is “the number of hours [they] reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
“As a general rule, a reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate, that is,
‘the 	ordinary 	rate 	for 	similar 	work 	in 	the 	community 	where 	the 	case 	has 	been
litigated.’” Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Emery v.
Hunt, 272 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2001)). The Court also gives due consideration to the
applicable factors set forth by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Chrisco v. Sun Industries,
Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229–30 (1990), and cited to with approval by the Eighth Circuit, see
All-Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511, 521 (8th Cir. 2009), namely:
the amount of time counsel invested in the lawsuit; the appropriateness of counsel’s rates,
given the experience and ability of the attorneys; the time and labor required to perform
the legal services properly; the amount potentially at issue in the case; the results
obtained; the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved; and the prevailing rate
customarily charged in this area for similar legal services.
“While courts should be guided by [these] factors, there is no fixed formula in
determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees.” Phelps v. U.S. Credit
Life Ins. Co., 340 Ark. 439, 442 (2000). And “when the trial judge is familiar with the case
and the service done by the attorneys,” as is true here, “the fixing of a fee is within the
discretion of the court.” Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Stewart Bros. Hardware Co.,
285 Ark. 352, 354 (1985).
HSG’s own lodestar calculation yields a fee award of $17,361,981.00. But that
assumes the Court would consider approving partner billing rates of more than $1,200.00
an hour—which it will not. Rather, the Court finds it appropriate to award HSG’s counsel
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the rate that a highly skilled, highly experienced litigator would charge in the Northwest
Arkansas legal market for complex, specialty litigation. Based on HSG’s counsel’s
experience, positive results, thorough trial preparation, management of voluminous
amounts of electronic discovery and difficult privilege-log issues, and significant time and
labor required to perform the legal services properly, the Court awards HSG and
McDaniel Wolff a rate of $375.00 per hour for partners; $200.00 per hour for associates;
and $75.00 per hour for paralegals. Both firms’ claimed hours are reasonable—given the
complexity of the trial, amounts at issue, and quality of the attorneys’ legal services—and
are approved.
In total, London Luxury is awarded the following attorneys’ fees for the services of
HSG and McDaniel Wolff:
LAW FIRM 	POSITION 	RATE/HR 	HOURS 	LODESTAR
HSG
Partner 	$ 375 	7,011.2 	$ 2,629,200.00
Associate 	$ 200 	11,298.8 	$ 2,259,760.00
Paralegal 	$ 75 	2,699.4 	$ 	202,455.00
TOTAL 	$ 5,091,415.00
McDaniel Wolff
Partner 	$ 375 	566.6 	$ 212,475.00
Associate 	$ 200 	256.5 	$ 	51,300.00
Paralegal 	$ 75 	260.4 	$ 	19,530.00
TOTAL 	$ 283,305.00
McDaniel Wolff’s attorneys also submitted invoices documenting the costs they
expended on behalf of London Luxury in litigating this case. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d) provides that “costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to
the prevailing party.” Taxable costs are set forth in detail at 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and include
fees of the clerk and marshal, fees for printed and electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case, fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses, fees for copies of any materials necessarily obtained for use in the case,
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docket fees, and compensation of court-appointed experts and interpreters. In addition to
the taxable costs listed in § 1920, the prevailing party may recover as attorneys’ fees “out-
of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by attorneys.” Pinkham v.
Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294–95 (8th Cir. 1996).
The 	Court 	has 	reviewed 	all 	of 	McDaniel 	Wolff’s 	line-item 	requests 	for
reimbursement; the costs correspond to charges for court fees, transcripts, photocopies,
postage, and reasonable travel expenses (airfare, lodging, mileage, and meals) to attend
hearings related to this case. See Docs. 473-13 & 473-14. Accordingly, London Luxury is
also awarded $7,633.60 in costs.
B. Fees for Counsel from Fairmark Partners
A careful review of the docket shows that on March 27, 2023, an attorney from
McDaniel Wolff moved on behalf of a Fairmark attorney, Jamie Crooks, for permission for
him to appear pro hac vice. See Doc. 149. However, the Court was not aware that anyone
from Fairmark Partners performed work in this case until the Motion for Fees was filed.
According to the declaration of London Luxury’s Chief Managing Officer, Gordon A.
Lewis, it appears that the DC-based Fairmark firm “served as limited-purpose conflicts
counsel to London Luxury from approximately March 2023 to August 2023,” specifically
in connection with a third-party subpoena issued to HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Doc. 473-15,
p. 3 & n.3).
Three Fairmark invoices are attached to Mr. Lewis’s declaration, see Doc. 473-18,
but neither the invoices nor the declaration provides the Court with information about the
billing attorneys’ backgrounds, their years of experience, the specific rates they charged
London Luxury, or the services they performed. The first Fairmark invoice, dated April 24,
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2023, requests a total of $15,884.00 in fees; however, none of the billers are identified—
not even by their initials—and the billing rates range from $650.00 per hour on the low
end to $850.00 per hour on the high end. Id. The same is true of the second Fairmark
invoice dated July 17, 2023. Id. The third invoice dated October 2, 2023, is unlike the
other two in that it does not even include a breakdown of the hours billed and rates
charged. See id. The Court is skeptical that this set of attorneys is entitled to any fees for
this litigation, but in any event, the Court has insufficient information from which to award
a reasonable fee for Fairmark’s legal services and, thus, declines to award any fee.
C. Fees for Counsel from Debevoise & Plimpton
Attorneys from Debevoise & Plimpton were involved in the case from March 28 to
September 25, 2022, approximately six months. When the case was transferred from the
Southern District of New York to this Court, the attorneys from Debevoise & Plimpton did
not enter their appearances as pro hac vice counsel until May 26, 2022. Those attorneys
also appeared on London Luxury’s behalf by videoconference at the Court’s June 1 case
management hearing. It seems that shortly after that, and certainly by late August 2022,
London Luxury was looking to substitute Debevoise & Plimpton for HSG.
In the brief period that Debevoise & Plimpton’s attorneys appeared in the case, the
firm submitted a single invoice to London Luxury for $57,177.45 in fees, which were
purportedly discounted by 70%. See Doc. 473-17.2 The only information provided about
2 The bill also contains a line-item for “charges and disbursements” totaling $1,468.74.
But the Court cannot tell what these charges and disbursements were for or whether they
qualify as reimbursable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Accordingly, the Court declines to
include this amount in its total fee and cost award.
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the attorneys and staff listed on the invoice is their names and titles (partner, associate,
discovery/data manager, or managing attorney).
Examining the New York billing rates charged by the Debevoise & Plimpton
attorneys (before the 70% discount), it appears that two partners charged $1,950.00 per
hour, 	three 	associates 	charged 	between 	$1,100.00 	and 	$1,275.00 	per 	hour, 	the
“discovery/data manager” charged $475.00 per hour, and two “managing attorneys”—
who, despite the title, are not likely to be licensed attorneys, given the rates they charge—
billed at $520.00 per hour and $385.00 per hour. Must be nice to live and bill like a New
Yorker, but this Court will not consider a fee award based on those rates in this case.
No fees will be awarded for time billed by the “discovery/data manager” or the
“managing attorneys.” The Court cannot tell whether the individuals with these titles were
equivalent to paralegal, law students, docket clerks, or legal secretaries. Furthermore,
based on the rates charged by the “managing attorneys”—which are the lowest rates on
the bills—the Court doubts that they are performing skilled attorney work. As for the
partners and associates, they appeared before this Court in a few filings and in one case
management hearing, so their work is a known quantity. Therefore, the Court has
calculated the lodestar for work performed by the partners and associates using low-end
hourly rates for the Northwest Arkansas legal market, which results in the following award:
LAW FIRM 	POSITION 	RATE/HR 	HOURS 	LODESTAR
Debevoise &
Plimpton
Partner 	$ 200 	21.8 	$ 	4,360.00
Associate 	$ 100 	118.9 	$ 11,890.00
TOTAL 	$ 16,250.00
D. Fees for Counsel from Quinn Emanuel
Unlike Debevoise & Plimpton’s lawyers, Quinn Emanuel’s lawyers never appeared
before this Court in any respect, and the Court was not provided with specific information
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about the nature of the legal services provided by the lawyers in that firm, their respective
backgrounds and years of experience, or their billing rates. The Court cannot evaluate
the quality of their legal work or assess any of the Chrisco factors. As a result, London
Luxury’s request for reimbursement of Quinn Emanuel’s legal fees is denied in its entirety.
E. Pre-judgment Interest
“Prejudgment 	interest 	is 	compensation 	for 	recoverable 	damages 	wrongfully
withheld from the time of the loss until judgment.” Dorsett v. Buffington, 2013 Ark. 345, at
*11 (2013). It “ensure[s] that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss,” City of
Milwaukee v. Cement Div. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195 (1995), by requiring that
“[o]ne who has had the use of money owing to another . . . pay interest from the time
payment should have been made,” Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257–58 (1924).
“State law governs whether a diversity litigant may recover pre-judgment interest.”
Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Edwards, 243 F.3d 457, 462 (8th Cir. 2001). In Arkansas,
awarding pre-judgment interest is appropriate “if the amount of damages is definitely
ascertainable by mathematical computation, or if the evidence furnishes data that make
it possible to compute the amount without reliance on opinion or discretion.” Dorsett, 2013
Ark. 345 at 11. A method must exist “for fixing the exact value of a cause of action at the
time of the occurrence of the event that gives rise to the cause of action.” Yazdianpour v.
Safeblood Techs., Inc., 779 F.3d 530, 539 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sims v. Moser, 373
Ark. 491, 509 (2008)). “If the damages are not by their nature capable of exact
determination, both in time and amount, prejudgment interest is not an item of recovery.”
Id. (brackets omitted).
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Walmart argues that pre-judgment interest is inappropriate here because the jury’s
award of compensatory damages for breach of contract was not definitely ascertainable
by mathematical determination on the date Walmart cancelled the contract—which both
parties agree was October 22, 2021, the day Garrett Small of Walmart emailed London
Luxury to stop producing gloves. See London Luxury Tr. Exhibit PX-0582.
London Luxury responds that David Bones, its expert witness on damages, used
a demonstrative exhibit to explain to the jury how a simple mathematical calculation of
London Luxury’s actual and expected profits yielded the exact dollar amount of damages
for breach of contract. The demonstrative exhibit was a series of slides, one featuring
three columns. The first column showed the total profits that London Luxury would have
made if Walmart had fully performed and purchased all 7.2 million cartons of nitrile gloves
at $74.80 per carton. The second column showed the net profits that London Luxury
realized from the sale of 400,000 cartons of gloves to Walmart (before Walmart cancelled
the contract). And the third column showed the difference between the first column and
the second column: the total expected profits that London Luxury would have netted if 6.8
million cartons—the rest of the gloves in the total order—had been delivered to Walmart.
The jury apparently agreed with Mr. Bones’s calculation because it awarded
London Luxury the exact dollar amount of damages that Mr. Bones testified were owed
for the remaining gloves. In Walmart’s view, however, his calculation depended on a
figure he could not have known: London Luxury’s purchase price for the remaining 6.8
million cartons of gloves. Walmart contends that at the time of the breach, there was no
way of knowing that what price London Luxury would have paid for the remaining gloves,
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which means there was no way that Mr. Bones could have calculated with any degree of
certainty the profits that London Luxury would have realized on those gloves.
In the Court’s view, the price Mr. Bones used in his calculation, $60.00 per carton,
was not the product of wild speculation but was instead a figure reasonably derived from
the evidence in the trial record. London Luxury introduced into evidence a contract it
negotiated in July 2021 with a glove distributor called CoShield. See PX-0868. The CFO
of London Luxury, Gordon Lewis, testified that CoShield sourced gloves from two
Walmart-approved factories, one in Malaysia called CareGlove and the other in Thailand
called Mercator. See Doc. 475, pp. 224–25. Though London Luxury had relied on a
distributor called MNA to package and ship gloves for Walmart before July 2021, when
London Luxury signed its new contract with CoShield, the plan going forward, according
to London Luxury’s CEO Marc Jason, was to discontinue product sourcing from MNA and
move all production to CoShield’s factories, which had agreed to charge London Luxury
$60.00 per carton. See Doc. 478, p. 67. Mr. Jason described the CoShield contract as “a
game-changer for [London Luxury] to be working directly with probably two of the best
factories in all of Southeast Asia for gloves and to be working direct with no one in the
middle.” Id.
It is undisputed that in September of 2021, London Luxury had pivoted away from
MNA as a supplier and was shipping Walmart gloves that were produced in CoShield’s
partner factories. Mr. Lewis testified that London Luxury expected that the flow from
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CoShield “was just going to ramp up,” id. at p. 243, but that Walmart cancelled the parties’
contract in October, just as production was increasing.3
In deciding whether to award pre-judgment interest to London Luxury, it is
instructive to contrast the facts of this case with those in Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Industrial
Risk Insurers, 863 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2017), where the Eighth Circuit held that pre-
judgment interest was not readily calculable at the time of breach. Simmons involved
damage to an industrial warehouse after a severe storm. The owner of the warehouse,
Simmons, disagreed with its insurer over whether the building should be repaired or
entirely rebuilt. See id. at 795. Simmons decided on its own to rebuild the structure as it
saw fit, and the insurer reimbursed Simmons for only about half of its costs. Id. at 795–
96. The jury sided with Simmons but did not award it the $3.5 million in damages its
lawyers requested during closing argument; instead, the jury’s award was $2,817,380.11.
Id. at 796. The peculiar and very specific award was the focus of the Eighth Circuit’s
discussion when deciding whether Simmons was entitled to pre-judgment interest. The
Court of Appeals noted that the jury “did not [ ] blindly accept every invoice Simmons
offered into evidence” and, therefore, “had to use its discretion to ascertain which experts
to believe, which expenses were covered under the policies, and whether the invoices
reflected reliable and fair dollar amounts.” Id. at 800 (internal quotation and citation
3 Mr. Lewis also testified that London Luxury had secured a back-up source of gloves in
case CoShield could not supply the entire order Walmart needed for a year-long term.
The back-up supplier was a company called Meditech, and, subject to Walmart’s
approval, it had agreed to sell London Luxury two million cartons of gloves at $59.50 per
carton—even lower than CoShield’s $60.00 price point. See PX-1997. The fact that
London Luxury had secured a back-up supplier of similarly priced gloves undercuts
Walmart’s argument that the trial evidence failed to prove that London Luxury was
capable of supplying Walmart with the remaining 6.8 million cartons and could do so at a
price of about $60.00 per carton.
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omitted). All this meant that the award of damages was not capable of exact mathematical
determination “until the jury spoke,” and not before. Id.
Unlike the jury in Simmons, the jury in the case at bar awarded exactly the amount
that London Luxury sought. This award was calculated using a simple mathematical
model developed by Mr. Bones that relied on the following trial evidence:
• 	the number of gloves that London Luxury delivered to Walmart prior to the
breach;
• 	the profits that London Luxury realized on the gloves it delivered;
• 	the number of gloves that were yet to be delivered in light of Walmart’s total
minimum purchase;
• 	the price-per-carton that London Luxury had negotiated with CoShield in an
express agreement; and
• 	the price-per-carton that London Luxury had negotiated with Walmart in an
express agreement.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount of damages owed to London Luxury was
“definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation” and that “the evidence furnishe[d],
data that ma[de] it possible to compute the amount without reliance on opinion or
discretion.” Dorsett, 2013 Ark. 345 at 11. Judging by the amount awarded to London
Luxury, the jury must have agreed with Mr. Bones’s mathematical method “for fixing the
exact value of [the] cause of action at the time of the occurrence of the event that gives
rise to the cause of action.” Yazdianpour, 779 F.3d at 539. It is therefore clear to see how
the jury calculated damages and equally clear that the jury did not rely on its discretion
when doing so, as the figure was capable of exact determination at the time of breach.
For all these reasons, the Court finds it appropriate to award pre-judgment interest
to London Luxury. Per Arkansas Code § 16-65-114(a)(1)(A), pre-judgment interest is
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calculated at the Federal Reserve primary credit rate, which was 5.5% per annum on the
date of the jury’s verdict, plus 2%, resulting in a rate of 7.5%. There are 901 days between
October 22, 2021, the day of breach, and April 10, 2024, the date of the jury’s verdict
awarding London Luxury $101,218,680.00 for breach of contract. Accordingly, the daily
rate of pre-judgment interest is $20,798.36.4 London Luxury is entitled to $18,739,321.40
in pre-judgment interest.5
F. Post-judgment Interest
Federal law governs the availability of post-judgment interest. See Travelers Prop.
Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat’l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 735 F.3d 993, 1007 (8th
Cir. 2013). An award of such interest is mandatory and “shall be calculated from the date
of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant
maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, for the calendar week preceding[ ] the date of judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)
(footnote omitted).
The jury verdict in London Luxury’s favor, totaling $101,218,680.00, was reduced
to a paper judgment on April 10, 2024. See Doc. 460. Post-judgment interest on that
amount began accruing as of that date. Subsequent to the entry of this Order, the Court
will file an amended judgment that incorporates additional awards of pre-judgment
interest and attorneys’ fees and costs. Post-judgment interest on the value of the
amended judgment will accrue on the date of entry and continue accruing until fully paid.
4 ($101,218,680.00 x 0.075)/365 = $20,798.36.
5 $20,798.36 x 901 = $18,739,321.40.
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G. Sanctions
London Luxury separately asks the Court to impose sanctions on Walmart for
discovery abuses. London Luxury made this request during trial, and the Court declined
to impose sanctions. The Court’s opinion on the matter has not changed.
The privilege-log issues that the parties and the Court grappled with both prior to
and during trial were extremely complex and time-consuming due to the nature of
electronic discovery and the facts of the case. The Court was required to parse its
discovery rulings to account for various nuances and issued ten separate privilege-log
orders as more and more documents were submitted for in camera inspection. In sum,
the Court finds that Walmart’s behavior with respect to discovery was not in bad faith, and
the request for sanctions is denied.
II. 	STAYING EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT AND APPROVING SECURITY
Walmart requests a stay of execution on the judgment against it while it appeals
the jury’s verdict. In support of this request, Walmart has produced a letter of credit in the
amount of $105,000,000.00 issued by Wells Fargo & Company. Rule 62(b) provides that
a party may obtain a stay pending appeal “by providing a bond or other security.” London
Luxury does not object to Walmart’s proposed security, and the Court further finds that
there is no danger of Walmart being unable to pay the amount of the judgment following
the appeal, plus interest.
The Court finds that both the type and amount of security proposed by Walmart
are sufficient to secure the amount of the judgment during the pendency of the appeal.
Once the amended judgment is entered, execution will be stayed pending the conclusion
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of the expected appeal, and Walmart will be required to submit its letter of credit to the
Clerk as security.
London Luxury originally requested a stay of execution on Walmart’s judgment
against it because London Luxury filed for bankruptcy. However, it appears that in
October 2024, the bankruptcy case was resolved and the automatic stay lifted. See Doc.
510. London Luxury states that it is prepared to post a supersedeas bond in the amount
of $386,000.00 and has prepared a sample bond. See Doc. 504-1. Walmart does not
object to London Luxury’s proposed security, and the Court approves both London
Luxury’s request for a stay and the form of the bond.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that London Luxury’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
Costs, and Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest (Doc. 472) is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART as follows:
(1) The 	Court 	awards 	London 	Luxury 	pre-judgment 	interest 	totaling
$18,739,321.40;
(2) the Court awards London Luxury post-judgment interest as described in this
Order;
(3) London Luxury’s separate request for discovery sanctions is DENIED; and
(4) London Luxury is awarded attorneys’ fees and costs for prevailing on its claim
for breach of contract in the total amount of $5,398,603.60, as detailed below:
LAW FIRM 	FEES 	COSTS 	TOTAL
HSG 	$ 5,091,415.00 	N/A 	$ 5,091,415.00
McDaniel Wolff 	$ 	283,305.00 	$ 7,633.60 	$ 	290,938.60
Debevoise & Plimpton 	$ 	16,250.00 	$ 	0.00 	$ 	16,250.00
Fairmark Partners 	$ 	0.00 	N/A 	$ 	0.00
Quinn Emanuel 	$ 	0.00 	N/A 	$ 	0.00
TOTAL 	$ 5,398,603.60
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Walmart’s Motion to Extend Stay of Execution
and Approve Security (Doc. 492) is GRANTED. The Court APPROVES as security on
appeal a letter of credit issued by Wells Fargo & Company in favor of the Clerk of Court
in the amount of $105,000,000.00 and containing provisions describing when the funds
secured by the letter of credit would be due. See Doc. 492, p. 3. Once the Letter of Credit
is presented to the Clerk, any proceeding to enforce the judgment against Walmart will
be STAYED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d) until Walmart’s appeal is exhausted and a
mandate is issued by the appellate court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that London Luxury’s Motion to Stay Judgment
Pending Appeal (Doc. 503) is GRANTED. London Luxury is ORDERED to file a
supersedeas bond with the Clerk of Court in the amount of $386,000.00 to secure the
judgment against it on appeal. Once the bond is presented to the Clerk, any proceeding
to enforce the judgment against London Luxury will be STAYED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 62(d) until the appeal is exhausted and a mandate is issued by the appellate court.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 31st day of March, 2025.
________________________________
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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