Pettit v. Walraven et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
JASON S. PETTIT 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 	4:25-cv-04105-SOH-SGS
SHERIFF BOBBY WALRAVEN; JAIL
ADMINISTRATOR GINA BUTLER;
CORRECTION OFFICER WILLIE
SEYMOUR
DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Jason S. Pettit, currently an inmate of the Little River County Detention Center
(hereinafter “LRCDC”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se
and in forma pauperis. 	The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge.
However, because not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned,
and at least some of Plaintiff’s claims require dismissal, the Court enters its findings as a Report
and Recommendation, and the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief United States District
Judge Susan O. Hickey. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). 	Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 	Based on this review, for the reasons outlined below, the Court recommends
Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on December 31, 2025, along with an application to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	The Court granted Plaintiff IFP status on the same day.
(ECF No. 3).
Plaintiff notes in his Complaint he is a convicted prisoner serving a sentence in the LRCDC
during all times at issue here. 	Further, Plaintiff names three Defendants in his Complaint: (1)
Bobby Walraven, Sheriff of Little River County; (2) Gina Butler, Jail Administrator of the
LRCDC; and (3) Willie Seymour, Correctional Officer at the LRCDC. 	(ECF No. 1, pp. 2-3).
Plaintiff then asserts two claims in his Complaint. 	In Claim One, Plaintiff claims Defendant
Seymour violated his constitutional rights through the conditions of his confinement and by
denying him medical care on “12-21 and 12-22.” 	(ECF No. 1, p. 4). 	Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges:
I was complaining of Rectal Bleeding and I was told I had to show the officers the blood
in the toilet and on the tissue so I did on the day shift WAITED around 3 hours and shift
changed and I asked why I havent been taken to hospital and night shift informed me I had
to show them as well my back and stomach was severely aching and I said I had already
showed Day Shift and I needed medical ATTENTION. 	Finally an hour later I was taken
to the hospital and on the way officer Johnston said that his senior officer Willie Seymour
said they were having my rectum examined by finger and camera and I said whatever the
doctor says I need to do. 	The medical staff ran a CT scan with contrast and a CT scan of
my spine without contrast . . . and while I was waiting on the results Seymour called
Johnston 2 times and told him do not leave the hospital without the Doctor inserting a
finger in my anus. 	Then another call was made from Johnston on my CT scan results and
Seymour said did the doctor insert his finger in my anus (ass) Johnston said no they were
waiting on the CT results After I was told by the ER Doctor that I had upset the arthritis in
my back and was diagnosed with [diverticulitis] and we were waiting on meds to be put
into my IV Seymour said again that the doctor needed to put his finger in my ass again!
Then while I was gone Willie Seymour was in my Barracks after lights out talking about
my medical history falsely to another inmate telling him he was making sure I got a finger
stuck in my ass and laughing all loud about it. 	The discussing of false accounts of me
lying to go to the hospital multiple times is wrong and telling the other inmates he was
making sure the doctor stuck his finger in my ass is some kind of sexual perversion. 	Then
the next night Dec 22 Willie Seymour was up in control and a different inmate was in the
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hall taking meds and he said are you still sick to the other inmate you arent shitting blood
like Pettit are you. 	That is Hippa violations and violates my pride and Injuries my self
esteem.
(ECF No. 1, pp.5-6) (errors in original). 	Plaintiff asserts this Claim One against Defendant
Seymour in his individual capacity only. 	Id. at p. 5.
In Claim Two, Plaintiff claims Defendants Walraven and Butler violated his constitutional
rights through the conditions of his confinement on December 22-23, 2025. 	Specifically, Plaintiff
asserts:
After the whole incident on claim 1 and all of the officer Seymour calling repetitively to
have a doctor to put a finger in my ass multiple times though the doctor’s qualified
professional that has a degree in medical didn’t need to put a finger in my rectum Seymours
persistence of that I tried to call PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act) and report the
activity of that officer and the phones will not dial the number so the Chief and
Administrator was called to fix it and Administrator Butler came in on Dec 23 and left
without fixing or investigating the issue her office created by this conduct she was also
informed on the night of the 22nd that the PREA Number did not work and she didn’t fix it
or talk to me or investigate this matter at all. 	So I cant be protected from the odd fixation
with the officer employed here to be reprimanded. 	I don’t feel safe here anymore. 	For
some reason these guards are allowed widespread freedom to do anything to make us
uncomfortable and trying to have my ass fingered multiple times is a odd violation for
some kind of gratification by Admin butler and Sheriff Walravens Employee
(ECF No. 1, pp. 7-8) (errors in original). 	Plaintiff asserts Claim Two against Defendants
Walraven and Butler in both their individual and official capacities. 	Id. at 9. 	Specifically, for
his official capacity claim, Plaintiff asserts:
This jail is supposed to be an official ADC Holding facility but you cant call the PREA
Number even after they were notified about it they did not fix the issue.
(ECF No. 1, p. 9). 	For relief Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages and for
Defendant Seymour to be fired. 	Id. at 11.
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II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific
facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable constitutional claims in his Complaint. 	Rule
8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 	“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	The Court will consider well plead factual allegations in the
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Amended Complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of
the non-moving party. 	Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). 	However, while
the Court will liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient
facts to support his claims. 	See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
A. Denial of Medical Care
Plaintiff first asserts in his Claim One that Defendant Seymour violated his constitutional
rights by denying him medical care on December 21-22, 2025. 	In prisoner litigation, courts in
the Eighth Circuit analyze denial of medical care claims under the deliberate indifference standard
of the Eighth Amendment regardless of Plaintiff’s status as a pretrial detainee or convicted inmate.
See e.g., Morris v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2020) (pretrial detainee has the same
rights to medical care under the Due Process Clause as an inmate has under the Eighth
Amendment). 	The Court therefore examines Plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment's
deliberate indifference standard. 	Id.
In order to state a denial or delay of medical care claim, Plaintiff must allege (1) that he
had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that the Defendant Seymour actually knew of, but
deliberately disregarded, that serious medical need. 	See Ivey v. Audrain Cty., Mo., 968 F.3d 845,
848 (8th Cir. 2020). 	“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 	Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotations omitted). 	“To demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of, but deliberately
disregarded, a serious medical need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal
recklessness: disregarding a known risk to the [detainee’s] health.” 	Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d
1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	The Eighth Circuit has
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stated that this “onerous standard requires a showing more than negligence, more than even gross
negligence, but less than purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of
serious harm to the inmate.” 	Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for denial of medical care. 	Plaintiff asserted he suffered
from an objectively serious medical need as he was bleeding from his rectum and received a
diagnosis at the emergency room of diverticulitis and aggravated spinal arthritis. 	(ECF No. 1, p.
6). 	Also, Plaintiff alleged Defendant Seymour knew of his ailment. 	However, the analysis does
not end there. 	Plaintiff must also allege Defendant Seymour was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s medical need by denying or delaying that need. 	There are no factual allegations
showing Defendant Seymour or any other Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
medical needs. 	On the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that he was transferred to the emergency room
after notifying the guards of his bleeding.1 	He was then tested at the emergency room, diagnosed,
and prescribed medication. 	Id. 	These factual assertions clearly show Plaintiff’s medical needs
were not deliberately disregarded. 	See Ivey, 968 F.3d at 848.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege Defendant Seymour interfered with
1 The Court notes Plaintiff was forced to wait approximately three hours from the day shift to the
night shift before being transferred to the emergency room, however, he does not allege this delay
caused him any harm. 	Deliberate indifference may also be manifested by “prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the
treatment once prescribed.” 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). 	However, the
“Constitution does not require jailers to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate
might wish.” 	Jenkins v. Cty. of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). 	In order to
prove a constitutional violation based on a delay of medical treatment, the plaintiff must “present
verifying medical evidence that the prison officials “ignored an acute or escalating situation or that
[these] delays adversely affected his prognosis.” 	Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, p. 342 (8th Cir.
2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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his medical treatment or violated his HIPAA rights, these claim also must fail. 	Plaintiff failed to
allege any facts indicating Defendant Seymour’s calls to Officer Johnston interfered in his medical
treatment in any way. 	Additionally, HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act, does not create an express or implied private cause of action. 	See Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d
563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of HIPAA claim because HIPAA does not create a
private right of action). 	Meaning, Plaintiff, a private party, cannot bring a claim for relief under
HIPAA. 	Id.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a cognizable claim
for denial of medical care and such claims should be dismissed.
B. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff also asserts conditions of confinement claims in both his Claim One and Claim
Two. 	The Court will address each in turn.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment. 	U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 	The Eighth Amendment also prohibits
punishments that deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. 	Smith v.
Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). 	A prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation
must prove both an objective and subjective element. 	Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th
Cir. 2004) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 	“The defendant's conduct must
objectively rise to the level of a constitutional violation by depriving the plaintiff of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities. 	The defendant's conduct must also reflect a subjective state
of mind evincing deliberate indifference to the health or safety of the prisoner.” 	Revels, 382 F.3d
at 875 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 	Deliberate indifference is established
when the Plaintiff shows “the defendant was substantially aware of but disregarded an excessive
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risk to inmate health or safety.” 	Id. 	The standards against which a court measures prison
conditions are “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). 	The Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones. 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
As is the case with all Eighth Amendment claims, a prisoner must suffer some actual injury in
order to receive compensation. 	This injury must be greater than de minimis. 	Irving v. Dormire,
519 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008).
1. 	Defendant Seymour
Plaintiff 	claims 	Defendant 	Seymour 	violated 	his 	constitutional 	rights 	through 	the
conditions of his confinement by continuously making inappropriate comments about a rectal
exam. 	If true, the comments are disgraceful, however such comments do not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation. 	See Howard v. Everett, 208 F.3d 218, 2000 WL 268493, at *1 (8th Cir.
Mar. 10, 2000) (holding sexual comments and gestures, while reprehensible, did not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation without contact or touching). 	See also McDowell v. Jones, 990
F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining verbal threats and name calling, without more, are not
usually actionable under Section 1983); O’Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987)
(verbal threats and abuse do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation).2
2 To the extent Plaintiff may be asserting a claim of sexual harassment, pursuant to the Eighth
Amendment, against Defendant Seymour, such a claim would still fail based on the instant factual
assertions. 	See Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997) (“To prevail on a
constitutional claim of sexual harassment, an inmate must therefore prove, as an objective matter,
that the alleged abuse or harassment caused pain and, as a subjective matter, that the officer in
question acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). 	Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege an injury or any pain suffered other than vague claims
of embarrassment. 	(ECF No. 1, p. 6).
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2. 	Defendants Walraven and Butler
Next, Plaintiff claims Defendants Walraven and Butler violated his constitutional rights
through the conditions of his confinement by failing to ensure the Prison Rape Elimination Act
(“PREA”) hotline was accessible at the LRCDC.
There is no private cause of action under the PREA. 	Section 1983 does not create any
substantive rights. 	Rather, it provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights or rights
created under federal law. 	Tarsney v. O'Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 939 (8th Cir. 2000). 	The PREA
authorized the federal government to give grants to prisons and detention facilities that implement
procedures designed to reduce the number of prison rapes. 	34 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30309. 	While
there appears to be no Eighth Circuit decision on point, other courts have made clear that the PREA
does not create a private cause of action. 	Johnson v. Garrison, 859 F. App'x 863, 864 (10th Cir.
2021); Bowens v. Wetzel, 674 F. App'x 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2017); Krieg v. Steele, 599 F. App'x 213,
232-33 (5th Cir. 2015); Wilmoth v. Sharp, No. 6:15-cv-06057, 2018 WL 1092031, *3 (W.D. Ark.
Feb. 27, 2018). 	Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state any plausible constitutional claims based on the
unavailability of the PREA hotline.
Further, to the extend Plaintiff attempts to allege sexual harassment claims against
Defendants Walraven and Butler, such claims must fail for the same reasons the claims against
Defendant Seymour fail.
C. Official Capacity
Finally, all official capacity claims asserted by Plaintiff against any Defendant must fail as
a matter of law. 	Under Section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or
in his official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his
official capacities. 	The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend
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on whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. 	See
Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 	“Claims against
individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they
work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the
only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” 	Id. 	Here, that means
Plaintiff needed to allege a policy, procedure, or custom of Little River County caused his alleged
constitutional violations. 	Plaintiff has failed to do so here as he has not alleged any facts regarding
the policy, procedures, or customs of Little River County, nor has he stated a cognizable
constitutional violation.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 17 th day of February 2026.
/s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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