Hankins v. Bryant et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

DEMARIO LASHUN HANKINS PLAINTIFF

V. Civil No. 4:24-cv-04119-SOH-SGS

WILLIAM J BRYANT; RICHARD TURNER;

JEFFIE WALKER; PENNY KILCREASE;

CHRISTIAN STUDDARD; TROOPER DALE

YOUNG; JUDGE THOMAS POTTER; DAVID

COTTEN;' KEITH MOORE; JOSHUA PENDERGRASS;

JUDGE CARLTON JONES; MARY PANKEY;

DONALD LOWREY; CALEB YOUNG;

STEPHEN KING; CHELSEA FOSTER;

LISA DAVIDSON; CAPTIAN GOLDEN ADAMS;

and SHERIFF DAVID WAYNE EASLEY DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is: (1) Defendants Bryant, Cotten, Jones, Potter, and Young’s* Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff responded. (ECF No. 53). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge, referred
the instant motions to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
After thorough consideration, the Court recommends Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted

in part and denied in part.

1 The Clerk of the Court is directed to change the spelling of Defendant David Cotton to David
Cotten pursuant to his Motion to Dismiss at ECF No. 50.

The moving Defendant Young in the instant Motion to Dismiss is Trooper Dale Young and not
Defendant Inmate Caleb Young. The Court will refer to Trooper Dale Young herein as Defendant
Young.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on December 3, 2024. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff then
paid his filing fee in full on December 6, 2024. Plaintiff was not at the time of filing his original
Complaint—nor is he currently—incarcerated.
In his original Complaint, Plaintiff named the following Defendants: William J. Bryant,
Richard Turner, Jeffie Walker, Penny Kilcrease, Correctional Officer Studdard, Trooper Dale
Young, Judge Thomas Potter, Prosecutor David Cotten, and the Miller County Jail. (ECF No. 2).
On December 9, 2024, the Clerk of the Court issued summons on all named Defendants
from the original Complaint. (ECF No. 5). On December 26, 2024, Plaintiff returned these
summonses, along with Proof of Service, executed by himself, stating all Defendants were
properly served on December 18, 2024. (ECF No. 8).
On January 8, 2025, Defendant Bryant filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.
(ECF No. 11).
On January 24, 2025, Defendants Young and Potter filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure
to state a claim. (ECF No. 18).
On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint. (ECF
No. 26). No objections were filed.
On April 1, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his original Complaint. (ECF
No. 42). Accordingly, Defendants’ original Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 11, 18) were denied
as moot, and Defendants were instructed they may reassert their Motion to Dismiss after Plaintiff
filed his Amended Complaint. Id.
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A. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on April 22, 2025. (ECF No. 43). In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff names nineteen Defendants. He named eight of the original Defendants:
William Bryant; Christian Studdard; Trooper Dale Young; David Cotten; Judge Thomas A. Potter;
Penny Kilcrease; Richard Turner; Jeffie Walker; and twelve newly named Defendants: Keith
Moore; Joshua Pendergrass; Sheriff David Wayne Easley; Judge Carlton Jones; Mary Pankey;
Donald Lowrey; Caleb Young; Stephen King; Chelsea Foster; Lisa Davidson; and Captain Golden
Adams. (ECF No. 43). Plaintiff did not reassert Miller County Jail as a Defendant in his Amended
Complaint, so this Defendant was terminated from the docket heading upon the filing of the
Amended Complaint.
The Court notes Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is not on the Court’s approved Section
1983 Form; however, it is well organized and clearly articulates Plaintiff’s factual allegations and
claims. (ECF No. 43, pp. 4-6). Plaintiff makes the following specific factual allegations in a
section titled “FACTUAL BACKGROUND:”
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On May 6", 2022, Plaintiff was pulled over in Texarkana, Texas by Arkansas State
Trooper Dale Young for minor traffic infractions. Trooper Young, despite having no
jurisdiction in Texas, arrested Plaintiff without a valid warrant or probable cause and
illegally transported him across state lines to Miller County Jail in Arkansas.

Upon arrival at the jail, Plaintiff was denied access to counsel, deprived of a judicial
hearing. and placed in a freezing cold holding cell for hours. When Plaintiff tapped on the
door requesting a phone call, Correctional Officer Christian Studdard removed Plaintiff
without explanation, brought him to a fingerprinting room, and after Plaintiff asked to
speak to a supervisor, Studdard pepper sprayed him multiple times, punched him, and
choked him for several minutes. Plaintiff was then beaten and restrained with the
assistance of inmate Caleb Young, who was improperly directed by staff to intervene.
Deputy Pendergrass later authored a false felony report based on Studdard’s fabricated
account. This led to Plaintiff's malicious prosecution, all while Sergeant Keith Moore and
Officer Donald Lowrey failed to intervene, provide medical care, or report the assault.

Nurses Stephen King, Lisa Davidson, and Chelsea Foster all failed to provide medical
attention after Plaintiff sustained head trauma, facial swelling, migraines, and injuries to
his ribs, eyes, and respiratory system. He was placed in solitary confinement without
medical evaluation.

Judges Potter and Carlton Jones, Prosecutor David Cotton, and Sheriff David Easley all
took deliberate actions to deprive Plaintiff of due process, deny reasonable bail, and
suppress evidence. Plaintiff was never afforded a valid first judicial appearance. The
“RECORD OF FIRST JUDICIAL APPEARANCE” is demonstrably forged, signed by
an unidentified judge, and falsely claims that Plaintiff refused to sign or that he appeared
in court—when in fact, he was held in solitary confinement without access to legal

counsel.

Despite multiple FOLA requests and court motions, Sheriff Easley obstructed production
of Studdard’s personnel file, which contained a documented history of prior excessive
force incidents (¢.g., Mack v. Studdard; pushing Inmate Mack down 16 flights of stairs, et
cetera). Nurse King, Lisa Davidson, and Chelsea Foster ignored documented signs of
physical trauma and pain.

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(ECF No. 43, pp. 6-7) (errors in original).
Plaintiff also includes a section in his Amended Complaint where he lists each Defendant
with a short statement as to why he is suing that Defendant. The Court includes only those sections
referencing the moving Defendants Bryant, Cotten, Jones, Potter, and Young herein:
Defendant Trooper Dale Young, a current or former, Arkansas State Trooper. Plaintiff
sues Defendant Young in his individual capacity for Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest in Texas
which Plaintiff claims is beyond Defendant Young’s jurisdiction. Additionally, Plaintiff
claims Defendant Young racially profiled Plaintiff and fabricated charges against him in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 43, p. 4).
Defendant Judge Thomas A. Potter was a Miller County District Court Judge during the
time at issue. Plaintiff alleges Judge Potter presided over his initial appearance and acted
outside of the protection of judicial immunity. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Judge Potter
participated in administrative misconduct, fabrication of court records, and conspiratorial
coordination with the prosecutor. Plaintiff only sues Judge Potter in his individual
capacity. (ECF No. 43, p. 4).
Defendant Judge Carlton Jones was the Miller County Judge that presided over Plaintiff’s
sentencing and probation proceedings. Plaintiff alleges Judge Jones upheld and executed
unconstitutional proceedings without addressing jurisdictional defects or misconduct.
Plaintiff only sues Judge Jones in his individual capacity. (ECF No. 43, p. 5).
Defendant Prosecutor David Cotten was a Miller County prosecutor on Plaintiff’s criminal
case. 	Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cotten fabricated evidence and failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence in violation of “Brady v. Maryland.” Plaintiff sues Defendant Cotten
in his individual capacity only. (ECF No. 43, p. 5).
Plaintiff does not list Defendant Bryant in his enumerations of Defendants in his Amended
Complaint. Instead, Plaintiff only list him in the case heading on the first page of his Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 43).
Plaintiff then enumerates, ten counts against various Defendants. (ECF No. 43, pp. 13-35).
Again, Plaintiff fails to allege any of these counts against Defendant Bryant, but he does allege
multiple counts against Defendants, Young, Potter, Cotten, and Jones. The Court lists here only
those counts which Plaintiff alleges claims and facts against the moving Defendants.
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In Count I, Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully seized and falsely arrested in violation of
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights. Plaintiff alleges Count I against Defendant Young.
(ECF No. 43, p. 13). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Young:
(ECF No. 43, p. 14).
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In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges he was maliciously prosecuted, and evidence was fabricated
against him, in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, by Defendant Cotten.
(ECF No. 43, p. 24). Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant Cotten:
(ECF No. 43, p. 25).
In Count V, Plaintiff claims he was denied due process in violation of his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments by Defendant Potter, Jones, and Cotten. (ECF No. 43, p. 26). While
Plaintiff lists Defendant Cotten in the heading of his Count V, he does not make any specific
allegations against Defendant Cotten under Count V. He does however make specific allegations
against Defendant Potter and Jones. Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant Potter:
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(ECF No. 43, p. 26). Then he specifically alleges Defendant Jones:
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(ECF No. 43, p. 27
In Count VI, Plaintiff claims he was discriminated against in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights by Defendants Young, Cotten, and Potter. (ECF No. 43, p. 29). Again, while
Plaintiff lists Defendant Cotten in the heading of his Count VI, he fails to state any specific
allegations against Defendant Cotten in his Count VI. Plaintiff does, however, make specific
allegations against Defendants Young and Potter. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Young:
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(ECF No. 43, pp. 29-30). Plaintiff then specifically alleged Defendant Potter:
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In Count VII, Plaintiff claims all moving Defendants violated his constitutional rights
through a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. (ECF No. 43, p. 30). Plaintiff specifically alleges
“all Defendants knowingly conspired to violate his civil rights, deprive him of liberty, and obstruct
justice by jointly participating in coordinated acts that led to his unlawful arrest, detention, assault,
false prosecution, and continued deprivation of freedom.” (ECF No. 43, p. 30). Plaintiff then lists
the specific actions he claims support his conspiracy claim:
(ECF No. 43, pp. 30-31).
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In Count IX, Plaintiff claims his procedural and substantive due process rights were denied
in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by Defendants Potter and Cotten. (ECF
No. 43, p. 33). Plaintiff fails to allege any specific allegations against Defendant Potter within
Count IX, instead he makes allegations against the Defendants in general:
(ECF No. 43, p. 34).
In Count X, Plaintiff claims Defendants Cotten and Potter committed a fraud on the Court
and a civil conspiracy to obstruct justice in violation of his due process rights, his rights to access
the courts, and his right to a fair judicial proceeding. (ECF No. 43, p. 34). Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges:
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(ECF No. 43, p. 35).
For relief, Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of vacating his
criminal sentence, expunging his felony conviction, enjoining further prosecution from the facts
described in the Amended Complaint, and requiring Defendants to disclose all evidence relevant
to this action. Plaintiff also request compensatory damages in the amount of $1,500,000 and
punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and deter similar misconduct.
(ECF No. 43, pp. 36-37. Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees and costs. Id.
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B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
On May 14, 2025, Defendants Bryant, Cotten, Jones, Potter, and Young filed their Motion
to Dismiss. (ECF No. 50). In this Motion, Defendants argued: (1) Plaintiff’s claims that challenge
his conviction are bared by Heck v. Humphrey; (2) Defendants Potter and Jones are entitled to
judicial immunity; (3) Defendant Cotten is entitled to prosecutorial immunity; (4) Defendant
Young is entitled to qualified immunity; (5) all Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity in
their official capacities; and (6) Plaintiff failed to assert any factual allegations against Defendant
Bryant therefore he should be dismissed. (ECF No. 51).
C. Plaintiff’s Response
Plaintiff responded on May 29, 2025, to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 53).
In his Response, Plaintiff argues his claims should not be dismissed because: (1) his claims are not
barred by Heck v. Humphrey; (2) judicial immunities and prosecutorial immunities do not shield
Defendants from accountability; and (3) the state Defendants are not entitled to sovereign
immunity against Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff also alleges a systemic abuse
by multiple actors within Miller County and a systemic effort to conceal misconduct, manipulate
court records, deny medical care, fabricate evidence, and coerce a plea through extrajudicial
means. He goes on to argue the public interest strongly favors accountability and injunctive relief
against the moving Defendants. Finally, Plaintiff argues he sufficiently pled all his claims pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) so they should not be dismissed at this juncture.
(ECF No. 53).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
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8(a)(2). “In order to meet this standard and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the Court will liberally construe a
pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support his claims. See
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
In determining whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft, 566 U.S. 678. These include
“legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are]
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id.. Second, the Court must determine whether the
complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A plaintiff is required to plead facts that
show more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court notes there are many Defendants that have not yet been
served in this matter and many claims and Defendants not currently before the Court on the instant
Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff does not proceed in forma pauperis, and he was not incarcerated
when he filed this case. Therefore, the Court may not screen his Complaint pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court also will not sua sponte dismiss claims or
Defendants that have not yet been served. See Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1042-43 (8th Cir.
1991). Accordingly, the Court will only address those claims specifically challenged by the
moving 	Defendants 	in 	the 	instant 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss. 	Furthermore, 	any 	references 	to
“Defendants” collectively herein is only to those Defendants moving in the instant Motion—
Defendants Potter, Jones, Cotten, Young, and Bryant.
The Court will address each of Defendants arguments from their Brief in Support of Motion
to Dismiss. (ECF No. 51). While Defendants made general arguments that certain legal principles
apply to all of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court will only address those claims specific to the moving
Defendants herein. Finally, the Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s arguments in his
response but only includes those applicable to the moving Defendants and challenged claims
herein. Accordingly, the Court will address in turn: (1) Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed
to allege any claims or facts relating to Defendant Bryant; (2) Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s
Count I, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and X as asserted against moving Defendants are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey;3 (3) Defendants Potter and Jones are entitled to absolute judicial immunity against
Plaintiff’s Counts V, VI, VII, IX, and X; (4) Defendant Cotten is entitled to prosecutorial immunity
3 Defendants argue all of Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, however, as
previously noted, the Court will address only those claims asserted against the moving Defendants
herein.
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for Plaintiff’s Counts IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and X; (5) Defendant Young is entitled to qualified
immunity from Counts I, VI, and VII; and (6) all moving Defendants are entitled to sovereign
immunity from Plaintiff’s official capacity claims asserted against them.
A. Heck v. Humphrey
First, Defendants argue all of Plaintiff’s claims against them should be dismissed as barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (ECF No. 51, pp. 6-7). Plaintiff argues in his response
that his claims do not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, therefore, they are not
barred by Heck. (ECF No. 53, p 3).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question
by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus 	A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated
is not cognizable under § 1983.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Thus, pursuant to Heck, a Section 1983 claim
stemming from an allegedly unlawful detention, arrest, or prosecution does not arise until (or
unless) the detainee has successfully challenged that detention or prosecution through habeas or
some other proceeding. Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002).
1. 	Defendant Young
Defendant Young is correct that Heck v. Humphrey generally precludes recovery of
damages for an unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment when the underlying criminal
conviction has not been first overturned, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. 	Such claims are
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barred unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at
486-87. While many of Plaintiff’s claims asserted in his Amended Complaint against some
nonmoving Defendants are in fact barred by Heck as explained in the Court’s separate Report and
Recommendation issued on this same date, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Young are not of the type barred by Heck. There are exceptions to Heck v. Humphrey. The Heck
court noted that if a successful claim would not demonstrate the invalidity of an outstanding
criminal judgment, it should be allowed to proceed. Id.
In footnote seven, the Supreme Court in Heck explained that a damages action for an illegal
search does not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, n. 7.
Specifically, the Court said:
a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if
the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal
trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction. Because of
doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless
error, such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the
plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful. In order to recover compensatory damages,
however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the search was unlawful, but
that it caused him actual, compensable injury, which, we hold today, does not
encompass the “injury” of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has
been overturned).
Id. (internal citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit has interpreted this footnote to create a general
exception from Heck for Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims. See e.g.
Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir. 2000) (when Plaintiff was convicted of drug possession,
his § 1983 claim that the drugs were “planted” by officers was barred by Heck, but his claim that
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his initial stop and detention at a detoxification center were without probable cause could proceed);
Simmons v. O’Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Because harmless error analysis is
applicable to the admission at trial of coerced confessions, judgment in favor of Simmons on this
§ 1983 action challenging his confession will not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his
conviction.”).
Plaintiff alleges Count I for Unlawful seizure and false arrest; Count VI for racial
discrimination; and Count VII for conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights against Defendant
Young. All of Plaintiff’s claims asserted against Defendant Young relate to Defendant Young’s
traffic stop of Plaintiff, detaining Plaintiff, arresting Plaintiff, and transporting Plaintiff to the
MCDC for incarceration. These claims and allegations do not appear to be related to Plaintiff’s
criminal charge and conviction for assaulting Defendant Studdard after arriving at the MCDC.4
Accordingly, at this stage, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Young, do not appear to be of the
type that would imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Counts I,
VI, and VII as asserted against Defendant Young, at this juncture, are not barred by Heck.
2. 	Defendants Potter, Jones, and Cotten
Even though Plaintiff offered extensive arguments as to why his claims against Defendant
Cotten are not barred by Heck, the Court need not address those claims here. As explained below,
Defendant Cotten is immune from all claims asserted against him. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims
against him fail as a matter of law and no analysis of whether those claims are Heck barred is
necessary.
4 Defendant Young did not provide the Court with any information regarding a charge or criminal
conviction related to Plaintiff’s initial stop and seizure, and the Court was unable to find one in the
Arkansas State Court records.
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Plaintiff did not offer arguments as to why he believed his claims against Defendants Potter
and Jones are not barred by Heck, however, just as with Cotten, all of Plaintiff’s claims asserted
against Defendants Potter and Jones fail as a matter of law based on immunities.
B. Judicial Immunities
Defendants Potter and Jones argue they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity as
Arkansas State Court judges. (ECF No. 51, p. 8). The Court agrees. “Few doctrines were more
solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967)
(explaining the common law principle of judicial immunity was not abolished by Section 1983).
The Supreme Court “has pronounced and followed this doctrine of the common law for more than
a century.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985). Judicial immunity is only overcome
in two narrow situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial; and (2) if the action, although
judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11-12 (1991); Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012). Moreover, “[a] judge will
not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was
in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff 	alleges 	his 	Count 	V 	for 	Denial 	of 	Due 	Process; 	Count 	VI 	for 	Racial
Discrimination; Count VII for Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights; Count IX for Denial of
Procedural and Substantive Due Process; and Count X for Fraud on the Court and Civil Conspiracy
to Obstruct Justice all against Defendant Potter and Count V and Count VII against Defendant
Jones.
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1. 	Count V – Denial of Due Process and Count IX Denial of Procedural and
Substantive Due Process
In Count V Plaintiff claims Defendants Potter and Jones failed to ensure he was brought
before a judge within “72 hours” of his arrest, that Defendant Potter ratified or allowed the use of
fabricated documents, and Defendant Potter allowed Plaintiff’s bail to be set excessively high
without ensuring Plaintiff had counsel. (ECF No. 43, p. 26). In Count IX, Plaintiff simply reasserts
these same factual allegations against Defendant Potter. Id. at 33-34.
Plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to a prompt initial appearance pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment; to counsel for his criminal defense pursuant to the Sixth Amendment; and to be free
from excessive bail pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. See Wayland v. City of Springdale, 933
F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008);
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987). However, Defendants Potter and Jones are
immune from Plaintiff’s claims in Count V and IX.
Plaintiff argues Defendant Potter is not entitled to judicial immunity because his actions
were not judicial in nature. (ECF No. 53, p. 6). Plaintiff relies on Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219 (1988) (holding a state judge did not enjoy absolute immunity against a Section 1983 damages
claim for his actions in demoting and dismissing a probation officer) and Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 (1978) (holding state judge was absolutely immune from federal claims for his action in
granting a petition to sterilize a young girl) in support of his arguments that Defendant Potter acted
outside the bounds of judicial authority with administrative failures and without jurisdiction when
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he: conducted proceedings off the record; falsified court records; and denied counsel at a critical
stage. (ECF No. 53, p. 6).5
In Stump, the Supreme Court explains:
the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the
nature of the act itself, i.e. , whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,
and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they delt with the judge in his
judicial capacity.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. The Court does not find Stump or Forrester warrant denying Defendants
Potter or Jones judicial immunity here. Clearly, court appearances, appearance dates, setting bail,
and appointing counsel during a criminal prosecution, fall within a judge’s normal judicial activity.
See Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1091 (explaining that judicial immunity applies if the
act complained of is one normally performed by a judge and if the complaining party is dealing
with the judge in his judicial capacity). See also Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Missouri, 948 F.3d
921, 928 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s finding that a state judge has absolute
judicial immunity to exercise his discretion regarding conditions of release including bail bonds).
See also Lamproe v. Storey, 2006 WL 1361005, at *3 (W.D. Ark. May 16, 2006) (citing Stump,
435 U.S. at 356-57; Brodnicki v. Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Accordingly, Defendants Potter and Jones are both entitled to judicial immunity. All
claims alleged against them under Counts V and IX should be dismissed.
5 Plaintiff did not allege any arguments regarding Defendant Jones and Counts V and IX in his
Response. (ECF No. 53).
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2. 	Count VI – Racial Discrimination
Plaintiff claims, in Count VI, that Defendant Potter discriminated against him based on his
race. (ECF No. 43, p. 30). Plaintiff claims Defendant Potter violated his right to equal protection
and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant
Potter failed to follow standard procedures and allowed fabricated records to justify Plaintiff’s
detention because he is black. Id. Plaintiff does not assert any additional factual claims in addition
to those he asserted in Counts V and IX other than the motivation being Plaintiff’s race.
This is the same analysis as the Court applied in Counts V and IX for due process.
Defendant Potter is immune to Plaintiff’s claims that he relied on fabricated documents in his
criminal case even if the motivation for allowing such documents was rooted in racial bias. See
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (judicial immunity applies “even when the judge is
accused of acting maliciously and corruptly 	”); see also Shanks v. Otsego Cty. N.Y., 2017 WL
4220463, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017) (judge immune from claims that he was guilty of abuse
of power, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and racial discrimination, so long as he was
acting within the jurisdiction of the court.). As previously stated, Plaintiff has not provided any
facts that Defendant Potter acted without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant
Potter is immune from Plaintiff’s Count VI and said claim should be dismissed as asserted against
Defendant Potter.
Furthermore, Plaintiff did not assert any specific facts or allegations in Count VI against
Defendant Jones. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted against Defendant Jones under Count VI and such claim should be dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).
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C. Counts VII and Count X– Conspiracy and Fraud
Next, Defendant Potter is also entitled to absolute judicial immunity against Plaintiff’s
claims in Counts VII and X on the same basis as previous explained in this section. While Counts
VII and X are distinct claims of conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Defendant
Potter’s actions complained of (fabricating and falsifying the judicial record and falsely indicating
Plaintiff appeared for an initial appearance) are the same actions as all previous claims discussed
in this section. Accordingly, Defendant Potter is immune from Plaintiff’s Counts VII and X for
conspiracy to violate his civil rights and to commit a fraud on the Court. See Woodworth v.
Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1091-92 (8th Cir. 2018) (judicial immunity extends to federal conspiracy
claims). See also Schlegel v. Holder, 2014 WL 12607718, at *3 (D. Minn. May 21, 2014) (even
allegations of conspiracy between a judge and prosecutor do not pierce a judge’s immunity) (citing
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiff failed to allege any claims or facts against Defendant Jones in Counts VII or X.
Accordingly, such counts fail to state a claim upon which relief may granted against Defendant
Jones and should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).
D. Injunctive Relief
While the Court is certain that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from his conviction and
sentence, as clearly stated in his section on relief, it is somewhat unclear whether those claims are
asserted against Defendants Potter and Jones specifically. (ECF No. 43, p. 36). However, in
giving Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint a liberal construction, the Court presumes Plaintiff asserts
these injunctive claims against both Defendants Potter and Jones.
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In the past, claims for injunctive relief “have been permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
judges acting in their official capacity.” Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court of Com. of Mass., 83
F.Supp.2d 204 (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)). “However, in 1996 Congress passed
the Federal Courts Improvement Act (“FCIA”), which legislatively reversed Pulliam in several
important respects.” Nollet, 85 F.Supp.2d at 210. As amended by the FCIA, Section 1983 now
precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Plaintiff does not allege that either of these prerequisites for injunctive relief are met. See
e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding injunctive relief against a quasi-
judicial official is barred if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a declaratory decree or the
unavailability of declaratory relief); Fox v. Lee, 99 F.Supp.2d 573, 575-576 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (claim
for injunctive relief dismissed where plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that either of the
prerequisites to injunctive relief were met); Ackermann v. Doyle, 43 F.Supp.2d 265, 273 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (dismissing action against judicial officers because plaintiff failed to allege that a declaratory
decree was violated or the declaratory relief was unavailable). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief against Defendants Potter and Jones his claims are subject to dismissal.
E. Prosecutorial Immunities – Cotten
Defendant Cotten argues he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity because all the actions
complained of by Plaintiff fall within Defendant Cotten’s core functions as a state prosecuting
attorney. (ECF No. 51, p. 9). The Court agrees.
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The Supreme Court established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for
damages under Section 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430. Further, the immunity
includes “actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the
courtroom” but not to “administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to
. . . the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 273-74 (1993). Moreover, immunity is not defeated by “[a]llegations of unethical conduct
and improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial functions.” Sample v. City of Woodbury,
836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). “[A] prosecutor is immune from suit even if he knowingly
presented false, misleading, or perjured testimony . . . or withheld or suppressed exculpatory
evidence.” Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal citations
omitted).
Plaintiff argues Defendant Cotten’s actions complained of in Counts IV, V, VI, VII, IX,
and X fall outside the scope of prosecutorial immunity. (ECF No. 53, 6-7).
1. 	Count IV – Denial of Due Process and Malicious Prosecution and Count IX – Denial
of Procedural and Substantive Due Process
Plaintiff alleges in his Count IV that Defendant Cotten ignored exculpatory evidence and
failed to disclose evidentiary inconsistencies in his prosecution. Plaintiff also complains that
Defendant Cotten participated in the filing of a manipulated judicial record through the fraudulent
first appearance document. 	Finally, Plaintiff argues Defendant Cotten conducted his plea
negotiations under duress. (ECF No. 43, p. 25).
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In Count IX, Plaintiff reasserts his complaint that Defendant Cotten fabricated and falsified
judicial documents on his criminal docket including his initial appearance documents. (ECF No.
43, p. 33).
In Plaintiff’s Response, he argues investigatory and administrative functions such as
fabricating evidence, withholding exculpatory information, or coaching witnesses by a prosecutor
are not actions entitled to immunity. Therefore, Defendant Cotten should not be entitled to
absolute immunity. Plaintiff relies on Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) for this
argument. While the Supreme Court in Buckley held prosecutors acting as investigators and
conducting administrative functions were not entitled to absolute immunity for those actions, the
prosecutor’s actions in Buckley are distinguishable from Defendant Cotten’s actions here. Id.
In Buckley, the prosecutor was alleged to have fabricated evidence during the investigation
of bootprints left at a murder scene. The Buckley Court explained:
The question, then, is whether the prosecutors have carried their burden of
establishing that they were functioning as “advocates” when they were endeavoring
to determine whether the bootprint at the scene of the crime had been made by
petitioner’s foot. A careful examination of the allegations concerning the conduct
of the prosecutors during the period before they convened a special grand jury to
investigate the crime provides the answer. The prosecutors do not contend that they
had probable cause to arrest petitioner or to initiate judicial proceedings during that
period. Their mission at that time was entirely investigative in character. A
prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has
probable cause to have anyone arrested.
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 (internal citations omitted). Because the fabrication occurred prior to
indictment and prior to any advocacy role by the prosecutor, the Buckley Court found the
prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity because he was not yet acting as an advocate for
the state when he conducted the investigation. Id.
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Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cotten ignored and withheld exculpatory evidence during
Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution. (ECF No. 43, p. 25). Clearly, Defendant Cotten was acting as an
advocate for the State of Arkansas during Plaintiff’s prosecution and in his handling of evidence
for that prosecution. The Court finds Defendant Cotten’s actions, complained of by Plaintiff here,
are of the type “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler, 424
U.S. at 430. Thus, Defendant Cotten is entitled to absolute immunity against Plaintiff’s claims
regarding the malicious prosecution, and exculpatory evidence in Count IV. See Woodworth v.
Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining even Brady violations fall within the
scope of prosecutorial immunity).
Next, Plaintiff complains that Defendant Cotten filed false documents on the criminal
docket during his prosecution in Count IV and in Count IX. (ECF No. 43, p. 25). Again, Plaintiff’s
complaint relates to Defendant Cotten’s prosecution of Plaintiff, and Defendant Cotten enjoys
absolute immunity for his acts in prosecuting Plaintiff, even if those acts were unethical. See
Sample, 836 F.3d at 916.
Finally, still in Count IV, Plaintiff complains Defendant Cotten improperly conducted his
plea negotiations by putting him under duress. However, plea negotiations are a standard function
of prosecutors and conducting plea negotiations are covered by absolute immunity. See Myers v.
Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987) (prosecutor’s activities in plea bargaining context
warrant absolute immunity), overruled on other grounds by Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, (1991).6
6 The Court is also unconvinced by Plaintiff’s references to additional case law in his Response as
those cases were either inapplicable to the issue here or merely persuasive authority on issues
which the Eighth Circuit has clearly stated case law cited herein. See McDonough v. Smith, 588
U.S. 109 (2019) (a case regarding the statute of limitation on a Section 1983 fabricated-evidence
claim in which prosecutorial absolute immunity was not in issue); Rieves v. Town of Smyrna, 959
F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2020); Fogle v. Sokol, 957 148 (3rd Cir. 2020); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Counts IV and IX, as alleged against Defendant Cotten, should be
dismissed as Defendant Cotten is immune from any such liability.
2. 	Count V – Denial of Due Process
While Plaintiff lists Defendant Cotten as one of the Defendants he asserts his Count V
against, Plaintiff did not allege any facts or claims against Defendant Cotten within his Count V.
Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant
Cotten in Count V pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).
3. 	Count VI – Racial Discrimination
In Count VI, Plaintiff claims Defendant Cotten violated his equal protection rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1981. (ECF No. 43, p. 29). Specifically, Plaintiff claims
Defendant Cotten proceeded with felony charges despite clear exculpatory evidence and refused
to offer a misdemeanor reduction or recognize procedural irregularities that “routinely result in
dropped charges for white defendants.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cotten’s selective
prosecution and refusal to dismiss his charges reveal Defendant Cotten’s discriminatory intent. Id.
As previously explained, even if Defendant Cotten had evil intent or motives, such as
discrimination, his decisions to pursue Plaintiff’s prosecution and negotiate his plea deal were
clearly within the bounds of his prosecutorial role. See Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th
Cir. 1987) (prosecutor’s activities in plea bargaining context warrant absolute immunity),
overruled on other grounds by Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, (1991). See also Sample v. City of
118 (1997) (the prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity for actions in executing
certification of determination of probable cause for arrest warrant).
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Woodbury, 836 F.3d at 916 (immunity is not defeated by “[a]llegations of unethical conduct and
improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial functions”).
Furthermore, the same rules of prosecutorial immunity apply to Plaintiff’s claims under
Section 1981. See Hoffmann v. Wilcox, 2006 WL 1657804, at *3 (W.D. Ark. June 13, 2006) (citing
Hancock v. Washtenaw County Prosecutor’s Office, 548 F.Supp. 1255 (D.Mich, 1982) (applying
absolute immunity to case brought against a prosecutor under Section 1981).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Count VI, as it is alleged against Defendant Cotten, should be
dismissed as Defendant Cotten is immune from any such liability.
4. 	Counts VII and X – Conspiracy
Additionally, a prosecutor is immune from a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights when the alleged participation in the conspiracy consists of otherwise immune acts.
Rasonover v. St. Louise County, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 579-80 (8th Cir. 2006) (overruled on other
grounds). Because Defendant Cotten is absolutely immune for prosecuting Plaintiff and all of the
facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, he cannot be held liable for conspiring to violate
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights through said prosecution. Id.
F. Qualified Immunity – Young
Defendant Young asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s claims in
Count I. (ECF No. 51, pp. 9-10). The Court is unconvinced at this juncture.
Qualified immunity “shields [a] government official[] from liability in a § 1983 action
unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th
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Cir. 2009). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). A defendant “seeking dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) based on an assertion of qualified immunity must show that he is entitled to
qualified immunity on the face of the complaint.’” Murphy v. Schmitt¸ 143 F.4 th 914, 918 (8th Cir.
2025) (internal quotations omitted). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the
facts alleged by the plaintiff establish the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the right was
clearly established at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct. Id. (citing Greenman v. Jessen,
787 F.3d 882, 887 (8 th Cir. 2015).
The Court may use its discretion in determining which of these two prongs to address first.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a constitutional right was not clearly established
at the time of deprivation, then the Court need not determine whether the particular plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated based on the facts before it because the defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity regardless. See Dimock, v. City of Brooklyn, et. al, No. 24-1728, 2024 WL
5220190, *3 (8th Cir. Dec. 26, 2024).
For this analysis, the Court looks to the law at the time of the incident on May 6, 2022.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that “clearly established law should not be defined at a high
level of generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (internal citation and quotation
omitted). A right is clearly established if it is sufficiently clear for every reasonable official to
understand the actions would violate a constitutional right. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)
(per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). The case precedent need not be directly on point, but
it must place the constitutional question beyond debate. White, 580 U.S. at 79 (internal citation
and quotation omitted). The Eighth Circuit recently expounded on this standard by explaining “[a]
clearly established right is dictated either by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases
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of persuasive authority.” Dimock, 2024 WL 5220190 at *2 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). The Dimcok Court went on to explain the legal principle must “clearly prohibit the
officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Id.
First, the Court notes Plaintiff has alleged in Count I that Defendant Young violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure and his right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 43, p. 14). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Young:
(1) improperly initiated a traffic stop “more than 35 miles outside of Arkansas;” (2) Defendant
Young did not have authority to arrest him under Arkansas or Texas law because the minor traffic
violations of speeding, failure to show financial responsibility, and obstruction did not authorize
custodial arrest; and (3) Defendant Young transported Plaintiff to Arkansas in violation of Texas
law requiring a magistrate appearance. Id. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Young arrested him
without a valid warrant or probable cause. (ECF No. 43, p. 6). The Court interprets these
allegations to not only allege jurisdictional challenges to Defendant Young’s seizure but also
standard Fourth Amendment challenges to the constitutionality of Plaintiff’s stop, detention, and
arrest.
The Fourth Amendment provides for “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend IV.
Additionally, it is clearly established that warrantless arrests require probable cause. United States
v. Winarske, 715 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2013) (“A warrantless arrest by law enforcement is
reasonable where there is probable cause to believe that someone has committed or is committing
a crime.”). Furthermore, even arguable probable cause for a warrantless arrest can support
qualified immunity of an arresting officer. Ulrich v. Pope Cty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir.
2013). Lastly, if a police officer has probable cause to arrest an individual after witnessing him
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commit a traffic violation, then the issue of the police officer’s jurisdiction does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. See Rose v. City of Mulberry, Arkansas 533 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding
a city officer’s arrest of driver on a state highway without jurisdiction did not violate the drivers
Fourth Amendment rights because the officer witnessed the driver in driving recklessly therefore,
he had probable cause to arrest).
Accordingly, the Court finds the applicable law here clearly established, however, based
on the face of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint the Court cannot determine whether Defendant
Young had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s
individual capacity claims against Defendant Young in Count I, proceed at this juncture.
Defendant Young may reassert qualified immunity for reconsideration by the Court on summary
judgment.7
Plaintiff also alleges Count VI for racial discrimination and Count VII for Conspiracy
against Defendant Young. Defendant Young failed to move for dismissal of these Counts based
on qualified immunity. (ECF No. 51, pp. 9-10). Accordingly, the Court does not find Defendant
Young has established he is entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s Counts VI and VII
at this juncture. Defendant may reassert his qualified immunity defense at summary judgment
with specific arguments and legal support if he wishes to do so.
7 The Court notes Defendant Young’s reliance on Engleman v. Deputy Murray, 546 F.3d 944, 951
n. 5 (8th Cir. 2008) to support his claim for qualified immunity. The Court does not find Engleman
sufficiently analogous to the facts asserted by Plaintiff. In Engleman, the officers were executing
an Arkansas arrest warrant inside a home in the state of Oklahoma. Id. Here, the issue is a
warrantless arrest relating to a traffic violation.
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G. Sovereign Immunity
Finally, all Defendants argue they are entitled to sovereign immunity for all official
capacity claims asserted against them. (ECF No. 51, p. 10). First, the Court notes it is unclear if
Plaintiff is asserting official capacity claims against all moving Defendants. In his heading of his
Amended Complaint, he states he is suing each moving Defendant in both capacities. (ECF No.
43, p. 1). However, when he lists each moving Defendant later in his Amended Complaint, he
states he is suing them in their individual capacities only. (ECF No. 43, pp. 4-5). However,
providing Plaintiff a liberal construction of his Amended Complaint, the Court will proceed as if
he did intend to assert official capacity claims against all moving Defendants.
Defendant Young, as a state trooper, is an employee of the State of Arkansas. Further,
Defendants Potter, and Jones are both judges for the State of Arkansas. Finally, Defendant Cotten
is a prosecutor for the State of Arkansas. Plaintiff does not dispute his official capacity claims
against these Defendants are equivalent to claims against the State of Arkansas. (ECF No. 53).
States and state agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356 (1990); Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); McLean v. Gordon,
548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008). “This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”
Williams v. Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 276 (1986)). “Congress did not abrogate constitutional sovereign immunity when enacting
the law that was to become section 1983.” Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)), overruled on other grounds by Hafer v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21 (1991). “A suit against state employees in their official capacities is the functional
equivalent of a suit against the State.” 	Zajrael v. Harmon, 677 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 2013).
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Accordingly, any legal or equitable relief sought is barred and such claims should be dismissed
against all Defendants.
Plaintiff argues sovereign immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief to stop
ongoing constitutional violations. (ECF No. 53, p. 7). He goes on to classify his request for an
injunction to halt the enforcement of his probation sentence fits into this exception. The Court
disagrees. Plaintiff’s request to revoke his probation sentence is not a request for prospective
injunctive relief but instead is a request for declaratory relief determining his sentence was
unconstitutional. The exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity created by the doctrine of Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908), which allows a party to seek prospective injunctive
relief in federal court against state officials in their official capacities, does not apply to requests
for declaratory relief establishing past violations of federal law. Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief are
also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which provides that, except for habeas corpus
petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court
judgments and state proceedings. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); see also Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927,
931 (2005).
H. Defendant Bryant
Plaintiff has wholly failed to allege any facts or claims against Defendant Bryant past
listing him in the case heading of his Amended Complaint. Merely listing a Defendant in a case
caption is insufficient to support a claim against the Defendant. 	Krych v. Hass, 83 Fed. Appx.
854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)
(“court properly dismissed pro se complaint that was silent as to defendant except for his name
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appearing in caption)). Even in an official capacity suit under section 1983, “a plaintiff must show
either that the official named in the suit took an action pursuant to an unconstitutional
governmental policy or custom . . . or that he or she possessed final authority over the subject
matter at issue and used that authority in an unconstitutional manner.” Sexton v. Wayne,
4:13CV3171, 2014 WL 1767472, at *1 (D. Neb. May 2, 2014) (quoting Nix. Norman. 879 F.2d
429, 433 (8th Cir. 1989)).
Accordingly, Defendant Bryant should be dismissed as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted against him pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
and 12(b)(6)
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I RECOMMEND Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 50)
be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the Court RECOMMENDS:
1) 	Plaintiff’s Counts V, VI, VII, IX, and X as alleged against Defendant Potter be
DISMISSED and Defendant Potter be DISMISSED from this case;
2) 	Plaintiff’s Counts V and VII as alleged against Defendant Jones be DISMISSED and
Defendant Jones be DISMISSED from this case;
3) 	Counts IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and X as alleged against Defendant Cotten be DISMISSED and
Defendant Cotten be DISMISSED from this case;
4) 	Defendant Bryant be DISMISSED from this case;
5) 	All official capacity claims asserted against Defendants Potter, Jones, Cotten, and Young
be DISMISSED; and
6) 	Counts I, VI, and VII as alleged against Defendant Young, in his individual capacity only,
proceed for further litigation.
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The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
REFERRAL STATUS: This case shall remain referred.
DATED this 12th day of November 2025.
/s/
Spencer G. Singleton
HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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