Muldrew v. Courtney

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
QUARTAVIS DEMONTEZ MULDREW, 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:24-CV-04111-SOH-BAB
DETECTIVE JIMMY COURTNEY, 	DEFENDANT.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Quartavis Demontez Muldrew, a prisoner, has initiated a lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 	See (ECF No. 1). 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
(ECF No. 3). 	The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to
General Order 2024-02. 	But not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the
undersigned. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 	Accordingly, for the purpose of preservice review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief United States
District Judge Susan O. Hickey and referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation
pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § § 636(b)(1) and (3).
Upon that review and for the reasons described below, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 11), be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as duplicative
of Muldrew v. Courtney, Case No. 4:24-CV-04085-SOH (W.D. Ark.) (“Muldrew I”) and for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initially filed a civil rights complaint in this District asserting claims against
Hempstead County and Nevada County officials. 	Comp., Muldrew I, 4:24-CV-04085 (W.D.
Ark. Aug. 8, 2024) (ECF No. 1). 	Upon initial review of that complaint pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court concluded that those claims were improperly joined in the same
action. 	Id. (ECF No. 6). 	Thus, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, this Court ordered that
Plaintiff’s claims against the Nevada County officials—Officer Karen Ghormley and Deputy
Steven Otwell—be severed from the original action and that a new action be opened identifying
those Nevada County officials as defendants.1 	Id. 	This Court also ordered that Plaintiff submit
an amended complaint in Muldrew I only asserting his claims against the Hempstead County
officials—namely, Turner Reed and Jim Wise. 	Id.
Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint in Muldrew I, adding a defendant—
Jimmy Courtney—and asserting three grounds for relief: (1) Plaintiff says he experienced a
mental breakdown while detained at the Hempstead County Detention Center (“HCDC”), but
James Wise denied his request to meet with a therapist, and housed him in a freezing, bug-infested
cell for five days, only allowed him to wear a “turtle suit,” and denied his request to call his
lawyer; (2) On February 9, 2024, Turner Reed arrested him at his child’s mother’s house, provided
him with pants to wear, searched those pants during booking at the HCDC, located contraband
and subsequently charged him with possession of a controlled substance in violation of his
constitutional rights; and (3) While Plaintiff was detained at the HCDC, Jimmy Courtney searched
his child’s mother’s house, locating additional contraband and then charged him with possession
of the contraband, in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. (ECF No. 7).
Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint in Muldrew I asserted three different claims
against three different defendants involving three different sets of facts—the conditions of his
1 Consistent with this Order, the clerk’s office opened Muldrew v. Ghormley, Case No. 4:24-CV-
04093-BAB (W.D. Ark.) (“Muldrew II”).
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confinement at the HCDC (claim one), Turner Reed’s search of the pants he was wearing
immediately following his arrest (claim two), and Defendant Courtney’s search of his child’s
mother’s house at some later date following his incarceration (claim three)—this Court ordered
that these claims also be severed from each other in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 	Id. (ECF
No. 10). 	Consistent with this Order, the Clerk opened two new cases: Muldrew v. Reed, Case
No. 4:24-CV-4110-BAB (W.D. Ark.) (“Muldrew III”) identifying Turner Reed as a defendant;2
and this action, Muldrew v. Courtney, Case No. 4:24-CV-4111-SOH-BAB (W.D. Ark.)
(“Muldrew IV”) identifying Jimmy Courtney as the defendant.
In Muldrew I, this Court ordered Plaintiff to submit a second amended complaint only
asserting his conditions of confinement claims against Jim Wise. 	See Order, Muldrew I, 4:24-
CV-04085 (ECF No. 10). 	In response, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in Muldrew I
asserting claims against Karen Ghormley. 	Id. (ECF No. 11). 	Because that amended complaint
plainly did not belong in Muldrew I, this Court ordered that it be stricken from the docket and
filed into Muldrew II. 	Id. (ECF No. 12). 	This Court again ordered Plaintiff to submit a second
amended complaint in Muldrew II consistent with his prior orders. 	Id. (ECF No. 12).
Plaintiff did not do that. 	Instead, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in Muldrew
I against Jimmy Courtney in his official capacity alleging that the search of his child’s mother’s
home while he was incarcerated at the HCDC violated his constitutional rights. 	See Sec. Amend.
Comp., Muldrew I, 4:24-CV-04085-SOH (W.D. Ark. Dec. 19, 2024) (ECF No. 14). 	Thus, this
Second Amended Complaint became the operative pleading in Muldrew I. See Schlafly v. Eagle
2 Later, Muldrew III was dismissed in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) after Plaintiff
later filed a notice saying that he wanted to “drop” the lawsuit against Turner Reed. Notice,
Muldrew III, 4:24-CV-04110 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 19, 2024).
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Forum, 970 F.3d 924, 934 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Generally, an amended complaint supercedes [sic]
an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect.”) (quoting Acuity
v. Rex, LLC, 929 F.3d 995, 999 (8th Cir. 2019)).3 	Upon preservice review of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint in Muldrew I, this Court recommended that the case be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 	Report and Recommendation, Muldrew I, 24-
CV-04085 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2025).
Plaintiff did not file any objections to that Report and Recommendation, and the deadline
for filing objections has passed. 	Id. 	Instead, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in this case,
alleging that while he was incarcerated, Defendant Courtney searched his child’s mother’s house
in violation of his constitutional rights, located contraband, and charged him with possession of
that contraband.4 	(ECF No. 11). 	These are substantively the same allegations Plaintiff asserts
in the Second Amended Complaint in Muldrew I. See Sec. Amend. Comp., Muldrew I, 24-CV-
04085 (ECF No. 14). 	The only difference is that in this case, Plaintiff identifies Defendant
Courtney in his individual and official capacities. 	(ECF No. 11). 	Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is now before the Court for preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court
must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious,
3 To the extent that Plaintiff would like to pursue claims against Jimmy Wise, his remedy is to file
a new action in this District pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	But Plaintiff is warned that any such
complaint may be subject to preservice review to determine whether it states a plausible claim for
relief. 	See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
4 Plaintiff also submitted a Motion to Appoint Counsel. 	See (ECF No. 11). 	This Motion will
be addressed by separate order.
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or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	A pro se complaint, moreover, is to be
given liberal construction, meaning “that if the essence of an allegation is discernable, even though
it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way
that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” 	Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). 	However, “they still must allege sufficient facts to
support the claims advanced.” Id. at 914 (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.
1989)).
DISCUSSION
This Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be dismissed without
prejudice for two reasons: (1) it is duplicative of Muldrew I; and (2) it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
A. Duplicative of Muldrew I
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts substantively the same claim for relief as the
Second Amended Complaint in Muldrew I. 	See Sec. Amend. Comp., Muldrew I, 24-CV-04085-
SOH (ECF No. 14). 	In both cases, Plaintiff asserts that while he was incarcerated, Defendant
Courtney searched his child’s mother’s house in violation of his constitutional rights and that the
search resulted in him being charged with possession of contraband. Compare (ECF No. 11) with
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Muldrew I (ECF No. 14). 	The only difference is that in Muldrew I, Plaintiff explicitly identifies
Defendant Courtney in his official capacity only, whereas in this case, Plaintiff identifies
Defendant Courtney in his official and individual capacities. 	In conducting the court’s preservice
review of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), however, this
Court nevertheless analyzed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint as if he had brought
individual capacities claims against Defendant Courtney. 	See Report and Recommendation,
Muldrew I, Case No. 4:24-CV-04085 (ECF No. 17). 	Accordingly, for the purposes of the Court’s
preservice review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, there is no substantive difference between
the two pleadings—the facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim are identical, and thus the Court’s
analysis of that claim would therefore also be identical. 	Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is
therefore duplicative of Muldrew I.
District courts “may dismiss a duplicative complaint raising issues directly related to issues
in another pending action brought by the same party.” 	Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th
Cir. 1992). 	Further, a dismissal of an inmate’s complaint as duplicative constitutes a “strike”
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 	Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2001).
Because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is duplicative of another action, this Court recommends
that 	Plaintiff’s 	duplicative 	Amended 	Complaint 	be 	dismissed 	as 	frivolous. 	See 	28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
B. Failure to State a Claim
Even if the Amended Complaint were not duplicative of Muldrew I, this Court would
nevertheless recommend dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff brings his claim against Defendant Courtney in his individual and official
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capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	To establish a plausible § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must
allege a violation of a constitutional right committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
Andrews v. City of West Branch, Iowa, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006). 	Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint fails to assert a plausible § 1983 claim.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that
[i]n 	order 	to 	recover 	damages 	for 	allegedly 	unconstitutional 	conviction 	or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentenced invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 	A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). 	In determining whether Heck applies, district courts must
“disregard the form of relief sought and instead look to the essence of the plaintiff’s claims.” 	See
Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996).
In this case, Plaintiff says that the unconstitutional search of his child’s mother’s house
resulted in his incarceration for a crime he did not commit—namely, he claims he was not in
possession of the illegal contraband. 	(ECF No. 11, p. 5). 	It is unclear from the face of the
Amended Complaint whether he remains incarcerated on those charges or if those charges were
later dismissed. 	See id. 	To the extent that he remains incarcerated on those charges, to address
the merits of his claim would necessarily involve questioning the legitimacy of Plaintiff’s
incarceration. 	This is exactly the result Heck prohibits. 	Accordingly, if Plaintiff remains
incarcerated on those charges, he cannot bring a §1983 challenging the lawfulness of his
incarceration until or unless that incarceration has been determined to be unlawful through some
other mechanism.
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To the extent that those charges have been dismissed or to the extent that Plaintiff’s
challenge to the constitutionality of the search would not necessarily question the validity of his
conviction, 5 Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Courtney would nevertheless fail because
Plaintiff has not established that he has standing to challenge the constitutionality of that search
and, more to the point, he fails to assert what about that search was unconstitutional. 	Put
differently, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Courtney violated his constitutional
rights.
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, “a [party] may challenge an unconstitutional search only if the [party] had a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ in the places searched or things seized.” 	United States v. Juneau, 73 F.4th
607, 613 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967)). 	In
determining whether a party has standing to challenge a search, “[t]here is no single metric or
exhaustive list of considerations, but a [party’s] expectation of privacy must be grounded in
property law or understandings that are recognized by society.” 	United States v. Bettis, 946 F.3d
1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). 	While the Supreme Court has held that
5 In Heck, the Supreme Court explained that some section 1983 actions, “‘even if successful, will
not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment’ against a plaintiff and should
be allowed to proceed.” Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)). 	The Supreme Court further explained that
For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable
search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding
conviction. 	Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable
discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if
successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was
unlawful.
Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7).
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short-term 	guests 	for 	commercial 	transactions 	do 	not 	have 	standing 	to 	challenge 	the
constitutionality of the search, see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998), it appears that
neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit has squarely addressed whether short-term social
guests also lack standing. 	That said, Plaintiff does not claim that he was ever a short-term social
guest at his child’s mother’s house. 	Indeed, he asserts no facts suggesting that he stayed there
overnight, or for any period of time at all, nor does he allege that he stored his belongings at her
residence, or that he had any expectation of privacy in her home for any reason. 	Plaintiff,
therefore, has no standing to challenge the search of her residence.
Setting the question of standing aside, Plaintiff fails to allege why (or how) the search of
his child’s mother’s home was unconstitutional. 	See Juneau, 73 F.4th at 614 (“Fourth
Amendment standing need not be addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits . . . .”)
(internal citation omitted)). 	The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be
secure 	in 	their 	persons, 	houses, 	papers, 	and 	effects, 	against 	unreasonable 	searches 	and
seizures . . . .” 	U.S. Const. amend. IV. 	Thus, “[w]hile it is a basic principle of the Fourth
Amendment that warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable,
the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ and it follows that the
warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” 	United States v. Smith, 820 F.3d 356, 360
(8th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not claim that Defendant Courtney searched the residence without a
warrant or that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause. 	(ECF No. 11). 	Further, Plaintiff
does not allege that no exception to the warrant requirement applies—that is, he does not claim,
for example, that no one with apparent authority consented to the search of the home. 	See United
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States v. Nichols, 574 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The Fourth Amendment permits . . . a valid
warrantless search of a premises when officers obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who
shares authority over the area in common.”). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible
claim that Defendant Courtney conducted an unconstitutional search of Plaintiff’s child’s mother’s
residence. 	Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should also therefore be subject to dismissal for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
CONCLUSION
In sum, having reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court
recommends that: (1) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and
(2) Plaintiff is warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for
future judicial consideration.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
STATUS OF REFERRAL: No longer referred.
DATED this 5th day of February 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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