Fargis, Jr v. Minors

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
JOHN ALVIN FARGIS, JR. 	PETITIONER
v. 	Case No. 4:24-cv-04089
J. MINORS, Warden, Southwest 	RESPONDENT
Arkansas Community Corrections
Center
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On September 3, 2024, Petitioner John Alvin Fargis, Jr. (“Fargis”) filed the instant Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. J. Minors, the Warden for
the Southwest Arkansas Community Corrections Center (“Respondent”) filed a Response on
November 21, 2024. ECF No. 9. This matter is now ripe for consideration.
This Petition was referred for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations
for the disposition of the case. The Court has reviewed the Petition and Response and finds this
Petition should be DENIED. Further, the Court finds that no evidentiary hearing is necessary.1
1. 	Procedural Background2:
Fargis is an inmate incarcerated at the Southwest Arkansas Community Corrections Center
in Texarkana, Arkansas. In his Petition, Fargis challenges judgments in two Union County cases
in which he was charged with possession of between 2 and 10 grams of methamphetamine – 70CR-
21-546 (“Case 21-546”), and 70CR-23-10 ("Case 23-10”).
1 "A federal court may dismiss a claim without an evidentiary hearing where the allegations are frivolous,
where the allegations fail to state a constitutional claim, where the relevant facts are not in dispute, or
where the dispute can be resolved on the basis of the record." Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316,
1318-19 (8th Cir.1984).
2 The “Procedural Background” is taken from the docket and the documents filed in this case.
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In case no. 21-546, Fargis pled guilty on November 2, 2021, to possession of between 2
and 10 grams of methamphetamine and was sentenced to five years’ probation plus court costs and
fees. ECF No. 9-1, pp. 9-10 (plea statement), pp. 11-12 (terms of plea agreement), 13-14
(sentencing order), 15-18 (conditions of probation). The sentencing order was entered on
November 5, 2021. ECF No. 9-1, p. 13. A series of revocation proceedings followed, eventually
resulting in Fargis being sentenced, on June 27, 2024, to 36 months’ imprisonment followed by
60 months suspended imposition of sentence. ECF No. 9-1, pp. 15-50. It appears Fargis was
released from imprisonment sometime between June and October of this year, as the docket
reflects that the State petitioned to revoke his release on October 21, 2024. ECF No. 9-1, pp. 52-
54. That revocation proceeding is pending as of the date of this Report and Recommendation.
See https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/70CR-21-546 (last visited January 3, 2025).
On April 27, 2023, Fargis pleaded guilty in Case 23-10 to possession of between 2 and 10
grams of methamphetamine and was sentenced, as he had been in Case 21-546, to five years’
probation plus court costs and fees. ECF No. 9-2, pp. 4-5 (plea agreement), pp. 5-8 (plea
statement), pp. 9-12 (conditions of probation), pp. 13-16 (sentencing order). The sentencing order
in Case 23-10 was entered on May 26, 2023. 3 The State, as it did in Case CR-21-546, petitioned
to revoke Fargis’s probation, and, as a result, he was sentenced on June 27, 2024, to 36 months’
imprisonment followed by 60 months’ suspended imposition of sentence, to be served concurrently
with his sentence in Case 21-546. ECF No. 9-2, pp. 19-20 (sentencing order). The State petitioned
3 Docket Union County Circuit Court No. 70CR-23-10, at https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/70CR-23-10 (last
visited Jan. 3, 2025).
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to revoke Fargis’s supervised release and that revocation proceeding is pending as of the date of
this Report and Recommendation. See ECF No. 9-2, pp. 21-24 (revocation petition).4
In Fargis’s Petition, he raises four claims: (1) the possession charge in Case 21-546 arose
from an illegal warrantless search, ECF No. 1, pp. 5, 9-10; (2) his guilty plea in Case 21-546 was
involuntary, ECF No. 1, pp. 8-10; (3) the possession charge in Case 23-10 arose from an illegal
search, ECF No. 1, pp. 8-9; and (4) the State’s latest petition to revoke in both cases arose from an
illegal search, ECF No. 1, p. 13.
On November 21, 2024, Respondent timely responded to the Petition. First, Respondent
argues Fargis’s claims are time-barred and should be dismissed. Additionally, and in the
alternative, Respondent argues Fargis’s claims are barred under Stone v. Powell, 426 U.S. 465
(1976), and his involuntary guilty-plea claim is inexcusably procedurally defaulted. ECF No. 9.
2. 	Applicable Law:
Fargis seeks habeas review of a state-court conviction in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. ECF No. 1. In the interests of finality and federalism, a federal habeas court is constrained
by statute to exercise only a “limited and deferential review of underlying state-court decisions.”
See, e.g., Whitehead v. Dormire, 340 F.3d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 2003). 	The “AEDPA erects a
formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in
state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (2013).
A federal court reviewing a state-court merits ruling of a federal question may grant
habeas-corpus relief only if the state’s adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly stablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
4 Docket Union County Circuit Court No. 70CR-23-10, at https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/70CR-23-10 (last
visited Jan. 3, 2025).
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Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 	28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court
that adjudicated the claim on the merits. 	See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
Under § 2254(d)(2), a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court based on a factual
determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless it is objectively unreasonable in
light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 	In making this determination, factual findings by the state courts are
presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 	Id.; 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1).
3. 	Discussion:
A. Statute of Limitations
On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter
“AEDPA”) was signed into law. 	A one-year statute of limitations was enacted for motions to
vacate, set aside or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 	In general, a movant for
collateral relief has one year from “the date on which the judgment became final” to file a petition
challenging his or her conviction.
Fargis’s claims do not rely on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law, the removal of
a state-imposed impediment to filing, or a newly discovered factual predicate, so AEDPA’s one-
year statute of limitations began to run at the conclusion of direct review in each case. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The conclusion of direct review for a petitioner who pleaded guilty
in an Arkansas state court is 30 days from the entry of judgment. Camacho v. Hobbs, 774 F.3d
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931, 934-45 (8th Cir. 2015). So, in Case 21-546 and Case 23-10, the conclusion of direct review
was December 6, 2021, and June 26, 2023, respectively. At the very latest, Fargis was required to
file his Petition relating to Case 21-546 by December 6, 2022, and Case 23-10 by June 26, 2024.
Fargis waited until September of 2024 to file this Petition. Therefore, Fargis’s Petition is time-
barred under the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations unless there are grounds to support tolling
of the limitations period.
The limitations clock may be statutorily or equitably tolled, but neither of these situations
applies here. Fargis never “properly filed [an] application for state post-conviction or other
collateral review” in either Case 21-546 or Case 23-10, so statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2) does not apply.5 As for equitable tolling, a petitioner is only entitled to this tolling if
“he shows . . . that he has been pursuing his rights diligently” and “that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way” to prevent timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645
(2010). While the diligence required for equitable tolling is “not maximum feasible diligence,”
reasonable diligence is required. See id. at 653. Fargis’s Petition does not establish he acted with
any due diligence in pursuing the timely filing of this Petition. 	Fargis’s Petition also does not
demonstrate that any extraordinary circumstance beyond his control made it impossible for him to
file the Petition before the statute of limitations ran. See, e.g., Runyan v. Burt, 521 F.3d 942, 945
(8th Cir. 2008). Therefore, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation applies in this case, and
Fargis’s Petition is untimely and must be dismissed.
B. Stone-barred claims
A Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings unless the
state fails to provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims, meaning that the state
5 Fargis alleges he raised an illegal search claim in a petition filed under Arkansas’s habeas-corpus statute, see ECF
No. 1, pp. 2-3, but the electronic dockets in Cases 21-546 and 23-10 do not show any such filing.
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provides “no procedure by which the prisoner could raise his Fourth Amendment claim, or the
prisoner was foreclosed from using that procedure because of an unconscionable breakdown in the
system.” Palmer v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423, 437 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Rule 16.2 of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, under which a defendant can file a motion to suppress
evidence “obtained by means of an unlawful search and seizure,” provides a full and fair
opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment illegal search claims. See, e.g., Travis v. Norris, 306
Fed. App’x 334, 2009 WL 50193 at *1 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“Arkansas provided Travis
with an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his Fourth Amendment claim and thus it is not
cognizable on federal habeas review.”).
Here, Fargis could have used Rule 16.2 to challenge the searches that led to his charges,
but he did not do so. Thus, Fargis’s claims 1, 3 and 4 are Stone-barred, and may not be considered
even if his Petition had been timely filed.
C. Procedural Default
Finally, Fargis’s claim that his guilty pleas were involuntary are procedurally defaulted,
because he did not raise the claim in accordance with Arkansas’s procedural rules for raising such
claims, and it would be too late now to do so. Kemp v. Kelley, 924 F.3d 489, 499 (8th Cir. 2019)
(procedural default doctrine). Fargis could have moved to withdraw his pleas prior to entry of
judgment under Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1 (a) or challenged the voluntariness of his pleas through a
petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1(a)
(providing that a defendant may move to withdraw his or her plea prior to entry of judgment to
correct a “manifest Injustice,” including that the plea was involuntary); see also, e.g., Gonder v.
State, 2024 Ark. 63, at 6, 686 S.W.3d 786, 790 (noting availability of “a petition to withdraw [a]
plea or a petition for Rule 37 postconviction relief” to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea).
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Accordingly, Fargis’s claims regarding his guilty pleas cannot be addressed unless he
“shows cause and prejudice or that he is actually innocent of the charges.” Stephen v. Smith, 963
F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir 2020) (quotation omitted). “Cause requires a showing of some impediment
external to the defense, which prevented the petitioner from presenting or developing the factual
or legal basis of a claim. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986). The miscarriage-of-
justice exception applies only to the “extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent [.]” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 321 (1995) (citation and quotation omitted). Fargis does not identify any external impediment
that kept him from developing his claims, and he admits possessing the drugs that led to each of
his chares. Thus, Fargis cannot establish either exception to the procedural default doctrine.
4. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Court recommends the instant Petition (ECF No.
1) be DENIED and dismissed with prejudice. 	The Court further recommends no Certificate of
Appealability issue in this matter.
The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The Parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).
DATED this 7th day of January 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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