Muldrew v. Courtney

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
QUARTAVIS DEMONTEZ MULDREW, 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:24-CV-04085-SOH-BAB
DETECTIVE JIMMY COURTNEY, 	DEFENDANT.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Quartavis Demontez Muldrew, a prisoner, has filed a federal lawsuit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 generally alleging that Defendant Jimmy Courtney violated his constitutional
rights in the search of someone else’s home. 	See (ECF No. 14). 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in
forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	(ECF No. 3). 	Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § § 636(b)(1) and
(3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the
undersigned for the purposes of making a Report and Recommendation on preservice review of
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 	Upon that review and
for the reasons outlined below, this Court recommends that this matter be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s original complaint asserted claims against Hempstead County and Nevada
County officials. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Upon initial review of Plaintiff’s original complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court ordered that Plaintiff’s claims against the Nevada County
officials be severed from his claims against the Hempstead County officials in accordance with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 	(ECF No. 6). 	This Court also ordered Plaintiff to submit an amended
complaint asserting only his claims against the Hempstead County officials. 	Id. 	In response,
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Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint asserting three claims for relief. 	(ECF No. 7). 	First,
Plaintiff claims that on February 9, 2024, while detained at the Hempstead County Detention
Center (“HCDC”), he experienced a mental breakdown. 	Plaintiff says that James Wise denied
his request to meet with a therapist, housed him in a freezing, bug-infested cell for five days
wearing only a “turtle suit,” and denied his request to call his lawyer. 	Id. 	Second, Plaintiff
claims that on February 9, 2024, Turner Reed arrested him at his child’s mother’s house, provided
him with pants to wear, searched those pants during booking at the HCDC, locating contraband.
See id. 	Plaintiff says he was later charged with a crime for possession of the contraband
substance. 	Plaintiff claims that the search of those pants violated his constitutional rights. 	Id.
Third, Plaintiff says that while he was detained at the HCDC, Defendant Courtney searched his
child’s mother’s house, locating additional contraband. 	Plaintiff says that he was subsequently
charged with (and convicted of) possession of this contraband, namely, a firearm. 	Plaintiff
claims that this search violated his constitutional rights, as well. 	Id.
Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserted three different claims against three
different defendants involving three different sets of facts—the conditions of his confinement at
the HCDC (claim one), Turner Reed’s search of the pants he was wearing immediately following
his arrest (claim two), and Defendant Courtney’s search of his child’s mother’s house at some
later date following his incarceration (claim three), this Court ordered that these claims also be
severed from each other in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 	(ECF No. 10). 	As to this matter,
the Court ordered Plaintiff to submit a second amended complaint only asserting his claims
against Defendant Courtney by November 15, 2024. 	(ECF No. 10). 	Later, this Court extended
the deadline until December 9, 2024. 	(ECF No. 12). 	When Plaintiff did not file the second
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amended complaint by that deadline, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this matter
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with court orders. 	(ECF
No. 13). 	On December 19, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”),
(ECF No. 14), and Motion to Appoint Counsel, (ECF No. 15).1
The SAC asserts one claim for relief against Defendant Courtney. 	(ECF No. 14).
Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Courtney searched someone else’s residence—his
child’s mother’s house—and located a firearm. 	Plaintiff asserts that he was charged with
possession of the firearm even though he did not reside at that residence and the search occurred
after he was incarcerated. 	Id. 	Given the circumstances, Plaintiff says it could have been
anyone’s gun. 	Id. 	He says he was wrongfully charged with possession of a firearm and is now
in custody for a crime he did not commit. 	He names Courtney as a defendant in his official
capacity only. 	Id., p. 6. 	He requests monetary damages and for the charges to be expunged
from his record. 	Id., p. 10.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court
must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious,
or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
1 Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, (ECF No. 15), will be addressed by separate order.
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	A pro se complaint, moreover, is to be
given liberal construction, meaning “that if the essence of an allegation is discernable, even though
it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way
that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” 	Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). 	However, “they still must allege sufficient facts to
support the claims advanced.” Id. at 914 (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.
1989)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings his claim against Defendant Courtney pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	To
establish a plausible § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 	Andrews v. City of West Branch, Iowa,
454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006). 	In this case, there are several problems with Plaintiff’s § 1983
claim.
A. Official Capacity Claim
First, “[p]ublic servants may be sued under section 1983 in either their official capacity,
their individual capacity, or both.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th
Cir. 1999) (citing Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997)). 	Here, Plaintiff names
the Defendant Courtney in his official capacity only. 	(ECF No. 14, p. 6). 	“A suit against a
government official in his or her official capacity is another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.” 	Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). 	Put differently, “the real party
in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official.”
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Baker, 501 F.3d at 925 (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)). 	In this case, therefore,
Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Defendant Courtney is, in fact, a claim against his
employer.
The SAC does not make clear whether Defendant Courtney is a police officer and thus an
agent of the City of Hope, Arkansas or whether he is a county law enforcement officer and thus an
agent of Hempstead County, Arkansas. 	See (ECF No. 14). 	This distinction is not material,
however, because under § 1983, a municipality, such as a city or a county, cannot be held liable
“solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Bolderson v. City of Wentzville, 840 F.3d 982, 985 (8th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 	Rather, “[l]iability for
a constitutional violation will attach to a municipality only if the violation resulted from an official
municipal policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise an
official or employee.” Id. at 985 (citing Atkinson v. Cty. of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201,
1214 (8th Cir. 2013)).
“An action can constitute official municipal policy only if the decisionmaker in question
possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Id.
(citing Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2013)). 	To trigger municipal liability based
on custom, “the custom must be so pervasive among non-policymaking employees of the
municipality that it effectively has the force of law.” Id. at 986 (Ware v. Jackson Cnty., Mo., 150
F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998)). 	The custom “must be demonstrated by a continuing, widespread,
and persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct.” Id.
Setting aside for the moment the question of whether the search of Plaintiff’s child’s
mother’s home was unconstitutional, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Courtney
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searched that residence pursuant to some official unconstitutional municipal policy. 	Further,
Plaintiff asserts no facts suggesting that Defendant Courtney was acting in accordance with custom
in conducting a purportedly unconstitutional search of Plaintiff’s child’s mother’s home. 	Indeed,
he asserts no other instances in which law enforcement purportedly conducted an unconstitutional
search of a residence and then charged someone who did not reside at the home with possession
of contraband found during that search. 	See Bolderson, 840 F.3d at 986 (“An unconstitutional
custom or usage cannot arise from a single act.”) (citing McGautha v. Jackson Cnty., Mo.,
Collections Dep’t, 36 F.3d 53, 57 (8th Cir. 1994)). 	Finally, Plaintiff asserts no factual matter
suggesting that the purportedly unconstitutional search was the result of a failure to supervise or
train Defendant Courtney. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Courtney in his
official capacity should fail as a matter of law. 	Because Plaintiff asserts no other claims, the SAC
should be dismissed without prejudice on that basis.
B. Individual Capacity Claim
Second, even if Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendant Courtney in his individual
capacity, such a claim would similarly fail. 	In Heck, the Supreme Court held that
[i]n 	order 	to 	recover 	damages 	for 	allegedly 	unconstitutional 	conviction 	or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentenced invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 	A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). 	The doctrine first set forth in Heck is not limited to
requests for money damages. See Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996). Rather, in
determining whether Heck applies, district courts must “disregard the form of relief sought and
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instead look to the essence of the plaintiff’s claims.” 	Id.
In this case, the root of Plaintiff’s claim is that he is serving a sentence for a crime he did
not commit. 	(ECF No. 14, p. 6). 	To address the merits of this claim would necessarily involve
questioning the legitimacy of Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence. 	This is exactly the result Heck
prohibits. Because Plaintiff’s sole claim challenges the basis for his incarceration and that
incarceration has not been determined to be unlawful through some other mechanism, even if
Plaintiff had asserted an individual capacity claim against Defendant Courtney, that claim would
likewise fail.
Finally, to be sure, in Heck, the Supreme Court explained that some section 1983 actions,
“‘even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment’
against a plaintiff and should be allowed to proceed.” 	Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)). 	In footnote seven, the Supreme
Court explained further:
For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search
may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a
state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction.
Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and
especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not
necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, even if Plaintiff had intended the Court to construe his SAC as only challenging
the constitutionality of the search of his child’s mother’s house (and not his conviction and
sentence), Plaintiff’s claim would nevertheless fail because Plaintiff has not established that he has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of that search and, more to the point, he fails to assert
what about that search was unconstitutional.
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Consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, “a [party] may challenge an unconstitutional search only if the [party] had a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ in the places searched or things seized.” 	United States v. Juneau, 73 F.4th
607, 613 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967)). 	In
determining whether a party has standing to challenge a search, “[t]here is no single metric or
exhaustive list of considerations, but a [party’s] expectation of privacy must be grounded in
property law or understandings that are recognized by society.” 	United States v. Bettis, 946 F.3d
1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). 	While the Supreme Court has held that
short-term 	guests 	for 	commercial 	transactions 	do 	not 	have 	standing 	to 	challenge 	the
constitutionality of the search, see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998), it appears that
neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit has squarely addressed whether short-term social
guests also lack standing. 	That said, Plaintiff does not claim that he was ever a short-term social
guest at his child’s mother’s house. 	Indeed, he asserts no facts suggesting that he stayed there
overnight, or for any period of time at all, nor does not allege that he stored his belongings at her
residence, or that he had any expectation of privacy in her home for any reason. 	Plaintiff,
therefore, has no standing to challenge the search of her residence.
Setting the question of standing aside, Plaintiff fails to allege why (or how) the search of
his child’s mother’s home was unconstitutional. 	See Juneau, 73 F.4th at 614 (“Fourth
Amendment standing need not be addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits . . . .”)
(internal citation omitted)). 	The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be
secure 	in 	their 	persons, 	houses, 	papers, 	and 	effects, 	against 	unreasonable 	searches 	and
seizures . . . .” 	U.S. Const. amend. IV. 	Thus, “[w]hile it is a basic principle of the Fourth
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Amendment that warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable,
the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ and it follows that the
warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” 	United States v. Smith, 820 F.3d 356, 360
(8th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not claim that Defendant Courtney searched the residence without a
warrant or that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause. 	(ECF No. 14). 	Further, Plaintiff
does not allege that no exception to the warrant requirement applies—that is, he does not claim,
for example, that no one with apparent authority consented to the search of the home. 	See United
States v. Nichols, 574 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The Fourth Amendment permits . . . a valid
warrantless search of a premises when officers obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who
shares authority over the area in common.”). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible
claim 	that 	Defendant 	Courtney’s 	search 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	child’s 	mother’s 	resident 	was
unconstitutional. 	Plaintiff’s SAC, therefore, should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
CONCLUSION
In sum, having reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court
recommends that: (1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim; and (2) Plaintiff is warned that, in the future,
this dismissal may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk
is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial consideration.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
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objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 7th day of January 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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