Mack v. Studdard et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

MALCOLM CORNELIUS MACK PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:24-cv-04002-SOH-SGS

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER STUDDARD;

SHERIFF WAYNE EASLEY;

WARDEN JEFFIE WALKER;

LEAD NURSE KING; NURSE LISA;

NURSE LESLIE; JOHN DOE MEMBERS

OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE;

CAPTIAN ADAMS; and LT. GUTHRIE! DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Defendants Easley, Walker, Adams, and Guthrie’s (hereinafter
collectively “Miller County Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No.56). Plaintiff
responded. (ECF No. 85).

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the Honorable Susan O.
Hickey, United States District Judge, referred the instant motion to the undersigned for the purpose
of making a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons stated herein, the Court recommends
Miller County Defendants’ Motion be denied.

The Court issued its first Report and Recommendation in response to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment and filed it on even date. (ECF No. 100). That Report and

Recommendation includes an extensive procedural and factual background which the Court

' The Clerk of the Court is directed to change the spelling of Defendant Lt. Gunthrie on the docket
to Lt. Guthrie per his Answer. (ECF No. 15).

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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incorporates as if fully enumerated herein. Furthermore, Miller County Defendants presented the
same arguments in their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as they present in
their instant Motion, and the Court has adequately addressed and made recommendations
regarding those arguments in the first Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 100). Therefore,
it will not reiterate its full analysis herein but does incorporate those findings and analysis as if
fully stated herein. Additionally, some of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants were recommended
for dismissal in the Court’s first Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 100, pp.73-74). This
leaves for consideration, on the Miller County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, only
Plaintiff’s Claim Two for retaliation against Defendant Walker in her individual capacity and
Claim Five for violation of due process rights against Defendants Adams and Guthrie in their
individual capacity.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint along with a Motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) on January 10, 2024. (ECF Nos. 1-2). Plaintiff was granted IFP status on the same day.
(ECF No. 3). 	Plaintiff then filed a Supplement to his original Complaint on January 23, 2024.
(ECF No. 6). On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff
filed a Motion to Amend his Amended Complaint on April 3, 2024. (ECF No. 13). The Court
granted this Motion and directed the Clerk to file the Motion to Amend as a Supplement to
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 25). The Clerk did so, and that Supplement was filed
on May 16, 2025. (ECF No. 26).
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In his Amended Complaint and Supplement (ECF Nos. 7, 26),2 Plaintiff names as
Defendants: Correctional Officer Studdard; Sheriff Wayne Easley; Warden Jeffie Walker; Lead
Nurse King; Nurse Lisa; Nurse Leslie; Captain Adams; and Lieutenant Guthrie. (ECF No. 7). In
the Court’s first Report and Recommendation, it recommends dismissal of: Correctional Officer
Studdard, Sheriff Wayne Easley, Lead Nurse King, Nurse Lisa, Nurse Leslie, and the John Doe
Defendant the Court misinterpreted as a named Defendant. (ECF No. 100, pp. 73-74).
Additionally, in his Amended Complaint and Supplement, Plaintiff claims a total of five3
claims, but after the Court’s first Report and Recommendation only two remain: (1) in his Claim
Two, Plaintiff claims Defendant Walker retaliated against him by threatening to file criminal
charges against him after he filed grievances; and (2) in his Claim Six, Plaintiff claims Defendants
Adams and Guthrie violated his due process rights by denying him a disciplinary hearing before
housing him in administrative segregation for 141 days. (ECF No. 7). These remaining claims
are alleged against Defendants Walker, Adams, and Guthrie in their individual capacities only.
(ECF No. 100, pp. 73-74).
On April 11, 2025, Miller County Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment,
Brief in support, and Statement of Indisputable Facts. (ECF Nos. 56, 57, 58). On April 14, 2025,
the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 59). In this Order, Plaintiff was advised of his obligations under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 to respond. Id.
2 The Court will not consider Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF No. 1) or his Supplement to the
original Complaint (ECF No. 6) as his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7) superseded his original
complaint and supplements rending those documents without legal effect. In re Atlas Lines Inc.,
209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000).
3 Plaintiff lists claims one, two, three, five, and six in his Amended Complaint and Supplement
omitting a claim four. (ECF No. 7, 26).
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On May 5, 2025, Plaintiff called the Clerk’s Office to state he hand delivered his “Response
to Motion for Summary Judgment” to the “mail clerk” in the Texarkana Division. 	The docket
indicates the Texarkana Clerk’s Office was closed on May 5, 2025. The Court notes the Texarkana
Clerk’s Office is in the same building as the United States Postal Service, and no documents were
filed with the Court on May 5, 2025. Accordingly, the Court must presume Plaintiff meant he left
his filing with the United States Postal Service’s mail clerk.
On May 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts.” (ECF No. 74). There is no indication with this document whether it is in response
to one of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment or whether it is a supplement to his own
Motion for Summary Judgment. However, this document is unverified, and the facts alleged were
not considered by the Court herein unless such facts were asserted in one of Plaintiff’s other
pleadings which is properly supported pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).4
On June 18, 2025, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause directing Plaintiff to show
cause why he failed to respond to either of the Court’s Orders directing he file responses to Miller
County Defendants’ pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 82). Plaintiff responded
to the Court’s Order to Show Cause on June 23, 2025. (ECF No. 83). Plaintiff explained that he
did respond to the Court’s Orders by placing his Response in the mail on May 5, 2025, when he
first attempted hand delivery and the Clerk’s Office was closed. Id.
4 See Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (“To be considered on summary
judgment, documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit made on personal
knowledge setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence or a deposition that meets
the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 	Documents which do not meet those requirements
cannot be considered.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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On June 25, 2025, the Court entered an Order explaining to Plaintiff it did not receive any
responses to Miller County Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. 	Plaintiff was again
ordered to send a response, and his deadline was extended to July 9, 2025. (ECF No. 84).
On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled: “Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 85). Additionally, in the document Plaintiff states it
is his “Response in opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 59
and 66).” Id. Documents 59 and 66 are the Court’s Orders to respond to Miller County Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment.
On July 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Leave to File Declaration out of Time.”
(ECF No. 89). This document does not indicate whether it is intended to support Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment or his Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.
However, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file this “Declaration” and he did so on September
22, 2025. 	(ECF No. 99). 	In the Declaration it is clear it is in support of his own Motion for
Summary Judgment. Id. (hereinafter “Second Declaration”). However, this Second Declaration
is the only properly verified document, pursuant to Rule 56(c), that Plaintiff presented during any
of the summary judgment briefing. He attaches 157 pages of exhibits in support of his verified
statements in the Second Declaration. 	(ECF No. 99-1). 	Just as the Miller County Defendants
incorporated their Motion for Summary Judgment and evidence into their Response to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 70, p. 2), the Court, will also consider Plaintiff’s Second
Declaration and its attached summary judgment evidence, (ECF No. 99, 99-1), with his Response,
(ECF No. 85), to Miller County Defendants’ Motion.
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The Court will also provide procedural background on discovery in this matter as Plaintiff
argues in opposition to Miller County Defendants’ Motion that he was unable to complete
discovery sufficiently to respond to the Motion.
The Court entered its Initial Scheduling Order on October 7, 2024, ordering production of
initial disclosures. (ECF No. 35). These initial disclosures were to include:
A copy of all incident reports documenting incidents referenced in the Plaintiff’s
complaint, including any color photographs, and video footage of the same and shall also
provide Plaintiff with a copy of all medical requests, grievances, and photographs in the
Plaintiff’s file, as well as any written policies, which relate to the facts recited in Plaintiff’s
complaint.
(ECF No. 35, p. 1). 	Miller County Defendants filed a Notice of Defendants’ Disclosures to
Plaintiff on November 14, 2024, stating they produced to Plaintiff a copy of his Miller County
Detention Center (hereinafter “MCDC”) inmate file including: arrest and booking information;
requests and grievances; jail medical file; and incident reports. 	(ECF No. 39). 	Miller County
Defendants also produced the MCDC Handbook in its entirety and the Miller County Sheriff’s
Office Detention Division Policies 6.01 Inmate Rules and Discipline, 6.02 Prohibited Acts and
Disciplinary, and 9.01 Inmate Rights, Complaints and Grievances. Id. Miller County Defendants
also stated in this Notice that they were unaware of any other documents, photographs or video
footage, related to the facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. Id.
Plaintiff filed his first Motion to Compel on February 11, 2025. 	(ECF No. 44). 	In this
Motion, Plaintiff requested, among other discovery, the names of all medical staff, all incident
reports, all medical records, all communications between Defendants and other MCDC employees
regarding Plaintiff, and all grievances. Id. The Court granted this Motion to Compel on February
13, 2025, and the Order extended the discovery deadline to April 14, 2025, to allow Defendants to
respond to Plaintiff’s discovery request. (ECF No. 46).
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Plaintiff filed a second Motion to Compel on March 27, 2025. (ECF No. 51). The Court
denied this Motion by Order dated May 21, 2025. (ECF No. 76). The Court found Plaintiff failed
to show any Defendant failed to adequately answer or respond to any of his discovery requests.
Id.
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an inmate at the MCDC in Texarkana, Arkansas. (ECF
No. 7). Plaintiff indicates in his Amended Complaint he was a pretrial detainee during the time at
issue. 	Id. at 2. 	Plaintiff’s Arrest-Booking Sheet indicates he was booked into the MCDC on
November 9, 2023, for a felony failure to appear and a warrant was served on December 29, 2023,
on Plaintiff at the MCDC for Second Degree Battery. (ECF Nos. 68-1, p. 1; 58-2). Finally, in his
Deposition taken by Miller County Defendants,5 Plaintiff indicates he was a pretrial detainee at all
times in issue here. (ECF No. 58-6, p. 35). Miller County Defendants did not dispute Plaintiff’s
status as a pretrial detainee. (ECF Nos. 56-58).
While no claims remain regarding Plaintiff’s altercation with Officer Studdard, it is helpful
to understand the alleged facts surrounding that altercation as those facts relate to both of Plaintiff’s
remaining claims. Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint:
On Dec. 4, 2023 in Max C Pod around 1030-11 am Officer Studdard removed me
from #9 cell. I asked him can he get my court documents notarized. He insisted
the don’t do them on Mondays. 	I simply asked him simply could he check. 	He
responded “OK Bubba.” 	I then asked him to never call me that, it is racist. 	I
proceeded to inform him in case he didn’t know. By simply telling him to ask other
Black Inmates in the Pod. Out of no where, he grabbed me by the back of my head
5 Both Miller County Defendants’ counsel and Medical Defendants counsel deposed Plaintiff on
different occasions. 	Miller County Defendants attached their full deposition in support of their
Motion for Summary Judgment at ECF No. 58-6. 	Medical Defendants attached selected pages
from their deposition of Plaintiff to their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
at ECF No. 68-2.
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and pushed me down the 16 flights stairs with excessive force. 	As I kept my
balance to the end. Asking again not to put his hands on me. He grabbed me by
my collar, then punched me in my mouth busting my bottom lip. I had no choice
but to defend myself. After the altercation I helped him up. Once he got up, he
choked me. He never requested to restrain me one time until we exited C-Pod. My
hands was in the air showing no sign of restrain. As we exit C-Pod he asked me to
get on the floor he wrapped me like a Rattlesnake in a Taekwondo Position choking
me to were I couldn’t breath.
(ECF No. 7, p9.4-5) (errors in original).
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Once a party
moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-
moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue
of material fact exists.” 	Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.
1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. “A case founded
on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 610.
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
In their Brief in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Miller County Defendants
assert the following arguments: (1) Miller County Defendants are not liable for Officer Studdard’s
conduct; (2) Plaintiff’s housing in administrative segregation was not punitive under facility rules;
(3) 	no 	Miller 	County 	Defendant 	personally 	committed 	any 	act 	that 	violated 	Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights; (4) Miller County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity against
Plaintiff’s due process claim regarding his administrative segregation because it was not punitive
in nature; and (5) Plaintiff failed to state any official capacity claim for due process because he
admitted he was placed in administrative segregation after he was injured in a fight with a
correctional officer. (ECF No. 57).
In Plaintiff’s Response he argues many facts are in dispute. (ECF No. 85). Unfortunately,
Plaintiff failed to swear any of these facts under penalty of perjury or have this document notarized.
Accordingly, the Court cannot consider any of these disputes of fact herein. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); see also Shanklin, 397 F.3d at 602. 	However, the Court can consider Plaintiff’s legal
arguments made in his Response: (1) being held in segregation for over 140 days without a timely
hearing violates Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); (2) Plaintiff was threatened for
exercising his rights and placed in dangerous situations in violation of Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825 (1994), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); and (3) Defendants are not entitled to
summary judgment because they failed to provide key evidence, specifically: video, x-rays,
grievances, and officer names. (ECF No. 85, p. 4).6 Furthermore, as explained above the Court
6 Plaintiff made additional arguments, but these arguments related to the claims previously
recommended for dismissal by the Court and these arguments are duplicative of the arguments
previously addressed in that Report and Recommendation. 	(ECF No. _100). 	Furthermore,
Plaintiff cannot raise claims for the first time on summary judgment. See Hildreth v. City of Des
Moines, 773 App’x. 334, 335 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co., 382
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will consider the facts properly presented by Plaintiff in his Second Declaration in response to
Miller County Defendants’ Motion. (ECF Nos. 99, 99-1).
A. 	Arguments by Miller County Defendants
Since Miller County Defendants did not organize their summary judgment arguments in a
way that correlates with Plaintiff’s claims in his Amended Complaint and Supplement, the Court
will address the arguments as they were presented.
1. 	Miller County Defendants are not liable for Studdard’s conduct
Miller County Defendants argue they are not personally liable for Officer Studdard’s
actions upon which Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is based. 	The Court need not analyze this
argument as Plaintiff only alleged his claims of excessive force, in his Claim One, against Officer
Studdard. (ECF No. 7, pp. 4-5). The Court recommends Officer Studdard and Plaintiff’s Claim
One be dismissed from this action in its first Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 100, pp. 14-
17).
2. 	Plaintiff’s housing was not punitive under MCDC rules
Miller County Defendants next argue Plaintiff was housed in administrative segregation
pursuant to the MCDC rules for nonpunitive purposes. Defendants make this argument with one
sentence in their Brief and without citing any summary judgment evidence. (ECF No. 57, p. 4).
Even though the Court has previously analyzed this claim, in its first Report and Recommendation,
F.3d 1312. 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)). Liberal pleading does not require that, at summary judgment
stage, defendants must infer all possible claims that could arise out of facts set forth in the
complaint.” Gilmour, 382 F.3d at 1315. Here, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint (ECF No. 1),
a Supplement to his original Complaint, (ECF No. 6), his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7), and
finally his Supplement to his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26). Plaintiff did not allege any facts
of a knee injury or threats by the “lead nurse” in any of these documents. Accordingly, the Court
will not consider Plaintiff’s attempted denial of medical care claims related to a knee injury or
threats made by the “lead nurse” raised in his Response to Miller County Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 7, 26, 85).
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it will do so again using the summary judgment evidence produced by Miller County Defendants
in support of their Motion with the initial burden, and also providing Plaintiff with a consideration
of the facts in the light most favorable to him as the nonmovant.7
In his Claim Five, Plaintiff alleges Miller County Defendants Adams and Guthrie violated
his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights on December 4, 2023, by prolonging his disciplinary for
25 days without a hearing. (ECF No. 7, p. 12). Specifically, Plaintiff states:
I received a disciplinary from Hall and Gunderson on December 5, 2023 around
9:30 in Max E-Pod. 	The Disciplinary Committee has prolonged my case for 25
days. Not giving me a solution for my in-house case. No 1 has even came to talk
to me. I asked numerous of times. I even been threatened if I asked to speak to
anyone about this, I will be wrote up. Today, Capt. Adams told an officer to tell
me not to mention anything about the Protective Custody Inmates an he'll dismiss
the disciplinary Inmates Rights & Procedure Section G-1003 says a hearing must
be held at a reasonable time. Capt. Adams told me today “Im not about to lose my
Job for you.” Then laughed in my face. They want me to lie with them I got written
up last week for disobeying staff orders. 	Which I never did because Officer
Edwards was trying to figure out what happened. I was explaining to him how they
house me with Inmates Im not suppose to. He explained that to Capt. Adams at the
disciplinary hearing, that I never did nothin. 	Capt. Adams still gave me the
disciplinary. Because I advise him I felt he wasn’t doing his job. Told other officers
I should of not mention the wrong inmate housing he would of just gave me 15
days. 	My point to him Capt. Adams is you’ll placed me on 23/1 lockdown for
defending myself. 	Which I’ve been on since December 4, 2023-still going. 	He
basically acknowledge like it was okay for the guard to push me down the stairs by
stating “when he pushed you down the stairs, you shouldn’t of grabbed his shirt.” .
. . .
(ECF No. 7, pp. 12-13) (errors in original).
a. 	Summary Judgment Evidence
While 	Defendants 	Adams 	and 	Guthrie 	specifically 	argue 	Plaintiff’s 	housing 	in
administrative segregation was not punitive under facility rules, therefore, he was not entitled to a
disciplinary hearing, (ECF No. 57, p. 4), the summary judgment record is replete with conflicting
7 Compared to its first analysis where Plaintiff was the movant and the Miller County Defendants
received the most favorable light consideration. (ECF No. 100, p. 42).
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evidence regarding Plaintiff’s housing status. 	The only summary judgment produced by Miller
County Defendants related to Plaintiff’s due process claims is the relevant policy and procedures
of the MCDC. 	Miller County Defendants attached the MCDC Inmate Handbook in support of
their Motion. The pertinent parts include:
(ECF No. 58-5, p. 3). 	Additionally, Miller County Defendants produced the MCDC’s Inmate
Rules and Discipline SOP 06.01 which reads in pertinent part:
. . .
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2. LEVELS OF RULE VIOLATIONS
a. There are four levels of Rule Violations:

1) Minor infractions: a violation or rules of such a nature that no disciplinary report
is necessary, loss of some privileges for up to 10 days;

2) Minor violations: any rule violation that goes beyond corrective effectiveness of
a verbal warning but would not warrant maximum sanctions: Loss of some or all
privileges for up to 15 days may be incurred.

3) Major violations: any rule violation of such magnitude that disciplinary action
may include loss of good time and/or disciplinary confinement up to 30 days per
incident in Disciplinary Segregation.

4) Major violations: any rule violation of an even greater magnitude that
Disciplinary action may include loss of good time and/or disciplinary
Confinement up to 60 days in Disciplinary Segregation.

b. In the case of MINOR INFRACTIONS, the Corrections Officer may elect to
verbally counsel the inappropriate behavior and note it on the incident report. The
report shall be placed in the inmate's file. However, the Correctional Officer may
elect to initiate a Disciplinary Report for any incident other than a minor infraction

and willful minor infractions. The Correctional Officer shall remember that
facility order and security must be maintained, and act accordingly.

¢. In response to minor infractions, a Correctional Officer may Impose informal
disciplinary sanctions such as the loss of an Inmate privilage for a short
duration (a.g. video visitation, telephone and voluntary lockdown In room).
All such actions shall ba documented as an 8-hour lockdown In the inmate's
comment section In Crime Star,

d. Restriction of an inmate to his or her cell for informal discipline shall be

limited to 8 hours and shall terminate at shift change. Any informal
discipline shall be notated in the inmate's comment section In Crime Star.

®. No inmate shall be the subject of informal discipline more than twice in any
seven-day period. (If the inmate commits another infraction within the 7
days, then a report shall be written, and disciplinary action shall be taken.)

f. Inmates on informal discipline shall receive the same food, clothing exchange and
television as any other inmate in the housing area.

q. Informal discipline does not require supervisor review or approval, nor does
it allow for an appeals process.

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3. DISCIPLINARY REPORTS
1, When a violation of Facility Rules Is alleged to have taken place the employea(s)
who witnessed the alleged violation shall prepare a disciplinary report, The

disciplinary report shall be completed and forwarded to the Detention Facility
Captain or designee (shift supervisor), The Report must contain at a minimum:

1) Date and time of violation:

2) Place of violation;

3) Date reported:

4) Specific Rute(s) violated:

5) Details of the incident; (tell a story of how it happened}
6) Actions taken by staff;

T) Names of witnesses (as security allows).

b, The Detention Facility Captain or designee (shift supervisor) shall cause an
investigation to be conducted of the alleged violation(s), with a written report

forwarded to the disciplinary committee. The investigation report shall contain ata
furunmiunn:

1) Statements obtained from witnesses or a signed form from witness(s) refusing
to make statement;

2) Charging employees account of the Incident:
3) Accused inmate’s account of the incident:

4) Response to Incident Report, if applicable.

4. PRE-HEARING ACTIONS

a. At the discretion of the shift supervisor or higher authority, the accused inmate
may be placed in Administrative Segregation for the purpose of maintaining
facility security and order, Such Administrative Segregation shall be noted on
the Investigation Report, and the inmate's pre-hearing status shall be
reviewed by classification, within 72 hours, excluding weekends and
holidays.

b. An inmate charged with a rule violation shall receive a written statement of

the charge(s}, including a description of the incident and specific rules
violated, at least 24 hours In advance of the Disciplinary Hearing.

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¢, The Correctional Officer shall document that the notification of charge(s) was
delivered. Such documentation shall be forwarded to the Disciplinary Committee
chairperson and shall become part of the Disciplinary Hearing Record.

d. The Disciplinary Committee chairperson shall be required to ensure that the
accused inmate properly understands the charges against him/her and the
possible disciplinary action that may result from the disciplinary hearing.

@, The Disciplinary Hearing may be held within 24 hours after the inmate is
formally notified of the charges, with the inmate's written consent. Such
written consent shall become part of the Disciplinary Hearing Record.

f. The accused inmate shall be present at the Disciplinary Hearing, unless the right
is waived in writing, or due to disruptive and/or unmanageable behavior on the
part of the inmate which threatens security, Inmates may be excluded during
testimony of any person whose testimony must be given in confidence. The
reasons for the accused inmate's absence or exclusion shall be documented and
made part of the Disciplinary Hearing Record.

§. DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
a. The Disciplinary Hearing should be scheduled within (7) working days of the
incident, excluding weekends and holidays. If extenuating circumstances exist,
the hearing time may be extended to (10) working days of the incident,
excluding weekends and holidays. Examples of extenuating circumstances may
include but not be limited to the following:
1) Preparation of defense by the accused

2} Illness or other unavailability of the accused and/or witness(es) for medical
reasons

3) Further investigation of relevant factual matters
4) Unacceptable or unmanageable behavior on the part of the accused

§) Pending criminal court prosecution of the accused, conflicting dates

7. ADMINISTRATIVE/DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION

a. Inmates may be placed in non-punitive confinement for security and safety
reasons of as prescribed by medical personnel. All such confinement shall be
considered administrative and not disciplinary in nature. IT 1S NOT TO BE
REFERRED TO AS ‘THE HOLE’,

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(ECF No. 58-4, pp. 7-14).8
Miller County Defendants also attached the MCDC’s Prohibited Acts and Disciplinary
Sanctions SOP 06.02 which states: “The following list of rules and sanctions ensure fair and
consistent inmate treatment regarding rules violations and prescribed penalties . . . .” (ECF No.
58-4, 17). 	A list then follows of different rule violations and the corresponding maximum
disciplinary days or sanctions. The applicable rule violations listed include:
8 The Court omitted some text from this policy and procedure regarding the procedural
requirements of disciplinary hearings and appeals as it is undisputed Plaintiff did not receive any
such hearing, and those procedures are irrelevant for the issue before the Court—whether Plaintiff
was entitled to a disciplinary hearing. 	The Court recognizes Miller County Defendants’ denial
that Plaintiff was denied a disciplinary hearing in their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, however, as noted previously that denial was not sworn nor supported by any
summary judgment evidence, so the Court does not consider it an adequate dispute of fact. (ECF
No. 72, p. 2). 	Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1993)
(conclusory statements without specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute cannot support
summary judgment).
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(ECF No. 58-4, 17). Finally, in concluding this document the final note on criminal referrals is
explained:
(ECF No. 58-4, p. 22). Notably, this final portion of the MCDC’s Prohibited Acts and Disciplinary
Sanctions SOP 6.02 was omitted from Plaintiff’s version when he submitted it in support of his
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 99-1, p. 72).
In Plaintiff’s Second Declaration, Plaintiff states under penalty of perjury, he was placed
in administrative segregation without receiving a fair or timely disciplinary hearing and the
prolonged confinement and lack of procedural safeguards deprived him of liberty in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 	(ECF No. 99, p. 3). 	Plaintiff also attached the MCDC Inmate
Handbook, MCDC’s Inmate Rules and Discipline SOP 06.01, and at least portions of the MCDC’s
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Prohibited Acts and Disciplinary Sanctions SOP 06.02 to his Second Declaration. (ECF No. 99-
1).
In Plaintiff’s Deposition, taken by Miller County Defendants’ counsel, Plaintiff testified
that his placement in administrative segregation was a direct punishment for the altercation with
Officer Studdard, and that he received not only a written disciplinary notice for his actions, but
also a criminal second degree battery charge from Miller County Prosecutor which was later
dropped. (ECF No. 58-6, pp. 46-47, 64-65). He also testified he was never afforded a disciplinary
hearing pursuant to MCDC policy and procedure or federal law. Id. Finally, Plaintiff testified:
(1) it was Defendants Adams and Guthrie that oversaw the Disciplinary Committee and
disciplinary hearings; (2) Defendant Guthrie that sent Plaintiff the disciplinary notice he received;
and (3) Defendant Adams that held his disciplinary notice on his desk instead of providing him a
hearing. (58-6, pp. 46-48, 71).
Notably, the summary judgment record (including both those exhibits produced by Miller
County Defendants on the instant Motion and those exhibits produced in connection with
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff) is devoid of any disciplinary documents,
officer incident reports, or documentation on criminal charges related to the altercation with
Officer Studdard. 	Additionally, there are no housing records for Plaintiff, before or after the
altercation, on the summary judgment record.9
Plaintiff did, however, attach his grievances, regarding his housing at the MCDC along
with the Miller County Defendants’ responses to such grievances, to his Second Declaration. On
9 One exception to this is a single Management Status Record offered by Plaintiff indicating
Plaintiff was housed in “R&D H3” from February 21, 2024 to February 22, 2024 on suicide watch.
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 156).
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December 13, 2023, Plaintiff files a Greivance specifically mentioning he signed for an “in house
case:”
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 86)10. Then, on the same day, Plaintiff asked why he cannot appeal any of his
cases. 	Defendant Adams responded almost a month later stating Plaintiff had no disciplinary
cases:
10 All highlighting and handwritten notes on these grievances are presumably Plaintiff’s as they
are included in the original documents attached to Plaintiff’s Second Declaration.
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 88). Plaintiff made the same request on December 14, 2025, and he received
the same response from Defendant Adams. Id. at 90.
On December 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Grievance alleging cruel and unusual punishment,
and the response indicated his housing was based on his behavior:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 94). On December 31, 2023, when Plaintiff complained he still had not received
a disciplinary hearing the Grievance was initially closed without a response but then reopened with
Plaintiff’s appeal. The response to the appeal indicated the Disciplinary Committee would review
Plaintiff’s appeal:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 96). On the same day, Plaintiff filed another grievance regarding his housing:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 97). On January 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the conditions of
his confinement in administrative segregation, and the response again indicated his housing
assignment was based on his behavior:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 99). 	Plaintiff next complains about being on lockdown on January 7, 2024.
Defendant Adams responds telling Plaintiff he is on “cuff restriction” but has all his privileges:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 101). On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff complains his solitary confinement is a
violation of his due process rights:
(ECF No. 99-1, p. 102). Plaintiff again challenges his cell placement on January 12, 2024:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 103). Finally, on February 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding his
housing in which Defendant Guthrie responded clarifying Plaintiff was serving disciplinary time:
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(ECF No. 99-1, p. 113).
b. 	Due Process Analysis
It is undisputed here that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the time at issue. (ECF
No. 58-6, pp. 33-35). 	Pretrial detainees are presumed innocent and cannot be punished for the
crime for which they have been charged. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979). “[T]he
effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective
that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any
inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id. at 540. Conditions or restrictions
that are “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective” such as institutional order and
security do not amount to punishment. Id. at 539; see also Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d 644, 647
(8th Cir. 1992) (“We do not quarrel with the prison’s need to segregate individual inmates from
the general prison population for non-punitive reasons; for example . . . where there is a threat to
the safety and security of the institution”). “Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish by
the prison officials, whether an inmate is segregated for ‘punitive’ reasons or for administrative
purposes generally will turn on whether the detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
government objective.” Brown, 969 F.2d at 648.
If the conditions or restrictions are deemed punishment, the pretrial detainee is entitled to
due process. When a detainee “is deprived of privileges or placed in a special confinement status
in order to punish him for past misconduct, then due process requires some kind of hearing
beforehand.” Brown-El, 969 F.2d at 647. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974),
the Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees are entitled to an impartial due process hearing on
disciplinary matters. 	See also Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2008). 	These
procedures include written notice of the charges, a brief period to prepare, a written statement of
the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action, and the ability for the inmate to call
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witnesses and present documentary evidence. Id.; see also Dible v. Scholl, 506 F.3d 1106, 1110
(8th Cir. 2007).
Just as in its first Report and Recommendation, the Court agrees with the Miller County
Defendants that the law does not require a due process hearing for nonpunitive segregation.
Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d at 647. However, the Court’s original opinion explained in its First
Report and Recommendation was not changed by the instant round of briefing—the issue of
whether Plaintiff’s placement here was punitive is a genuine issue of material fact. As evidenced
from the enumerated summary judgment evidence, the record is replete with conflicting
indications of Plaintiff’s housing status during the time at issue. 	Plaintiff proffered sworn
testimony he was served with a disciplinary the day after the altercation with Officer Studdard and
being placed in segregation. 	(ECF No. 58-6, pp. 46-47, 64-65). 	Additionally, the MCDC
employee responses on Plaintiff’s grievances indicate conflicting indications of whether Plaintiff
was serving disciplinary time or was simply in administrative segregation for nonpunitive
purposes. (ECF No. 99-1, pp. 88, 94, 96, 99, 102-103, 113).
Furthermore, the summary judgment record is completely devoid of any proffered
nonpunitive reason Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation. 	The MCDC Policy and
Procedure states that all placements in administrative segregation shall be fully documented. (ECF
No. 58-4, pp. 13-14). Moreover, the additional evidence produced by Miller County Defendants,
that was omitted by Plaintiff, also indicates any inmate misconduct to be considered for criminal
prosecution would require a disciplinary report. 	(ECF No. 58-4, p. 22). 	The Court finds the
absences of this summary judgment evidence noteworthy as any disciplinary reports, incident
reports, and documentation of Plaintiff’s housing should have been maintained in his jail file
according to MCDC’s stated Policy and Procedures. 	Plaintiff’s jail file was ordered for initial
disclosure production by the Court in its Initial Scheduling Order. (ECF No. 35). Furthermore,
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Miller County Defendants filed a Notice stating they produced such jail file to Plaintiff in their
initial disclosures. (ECF No. 39). Such records should clearly indicate whether Plaintiff’s housing
was punitive or not, yet neither party produced them in support of their summary judgment
motions.
The Court is not in the business of second guessing the management or housing of the
MCDC population as it relates to legitimate governmental objectives. However, Miller County
Defendants failed to proffer any summary judgment evidence to contradict Plaintiff’s sworn
testimony that he was given a disciplinary for the altercation with Officer Studdard, placed in
segregation based on this disciplinary, but denied a disciplinary hearing. Moreover, some of the
responses of the MCDC employees to Plaintiff’s grievances indicate his housing status was the
result of his recent behavior or that he was serving disciplinary time. (ECF No. 99-1, pp. 99, 103,
113). Lastly, while the proffered MCDC policy and procedures clearly state avenues for Plaintiff
to be placed on nonpunitive or punitive segregation, the summary judgment record does not
indicate which he was in fact placed under. Why neither party produced those disciplinary and
housing records for the summary judgment record is confounding to the Court. 	Such records
would likely resolve the current issues of fact if they were maintained in accordance with the stated
MCDC policy and procedures.
Accordingly, the Court finds there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff
was in segregation for punitive reasons, therefore requiring due process. For this reason, Plaintiff’s
Claim Five as alleged against Defendant Adams and Guthrie, in their individual capacities, should
survive for further litigation.
3. 	Miller County Defendants were not personally involved in Plaintiff’s claims
Miller County Defendants raised this same argument in response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 71). The Court analyzed this argument in detail as it applied to
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Defendants Easley and Walker in its first Report and Recommendation. The Court held Plaintiff
failed to allege personal involvement of Defendant Easley in any claims asserted and failed to
allege any personal involvement of Defendant Walker in his Claim Six for conditions of
confinement. 	(ECF No. 100, pp. 30-32, 69). Accordingly, those claims, and Defendant Easley
were recommended for dismissal. 	However, the Court found Plaintiff did adequately allege a
claim of retaliation in his Claim Two against Defendant Walker, and a due process violation in his
Claim Five against Defendants Adams and Guthrie. 	(ECF No. 100, pp. 24-26, 42-62).
Furthermore, as enumerated above Plaintiff clearly testified in his deposition of Defendants Adams
and Guthrie’s personal involvement in his due process allegations, (ECF No. 58-6, pp. 46-48, 71),
and Defendants Adams and Guthrie responded to Plaintiff’s grievances related to his housing
status as well, (ECF No. 99-1, pp. 88, 96, 101-02, 113). 	Finally, in his Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Walker threatened him with pursuing new criminal charges regarding
the altercation with Officer Studdard, (ECF No. 7, p. 6), and he attached the cited grievances to
his Second Declaration, providing additional facts clarifying his claim that Defendant Walker
threatened him with “new free world charges” related to the force incident with Officer Studdard.
(ECF No. 99-1, pp.83, 85). 	Moreover, Plaintiff provided testimony in his sworn Second
Declaration that clarifies Defendant Walker’s threats of new charges came after Plaintiff filed
grievances and were intended to deter Plaintiff from “seeking redress.” (ECF No. 99, p. 3).
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under
color of state law and that he violated a right secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8 th Cir. 1999). 	The deprivation must be
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intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional
right under Section 1983. 	Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986).
A claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a respondeat superior
theory of liability. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 654, 694 (1978). “[A]
supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional
activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d
1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (“general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is
insufficient to establish the personal involvement required to support liability”). “Liability under
section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To
establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of
personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.”
Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442
F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006)); see also Kulow v. Nix, 28 F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 1994) (“if any
claim of medical indifference . . . is to succeed, it must be brought against the individual directly
responsible for [Plaintiff’s] medical care.”).
The Court is satisfied that the current summary judgment record, viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, sufficiently states personal involvement and causal connection to state a
section 1983 claim of due process violation and retaliation respectively for the remaining
Defendants—Walker, Adams, and Guthrie.
4. 	Qualified Immunity
Miller County Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because (1) Plaintiff
has failed to prove any constitutional violations; (2) Plaintiff failed to allege any personal
involvement of any Miller County Defendant; and (3) even if the Court finds Plaintiff was due a
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disciplinary hearing, such a right was not clearly established at the time in issue. (ECF No. 57, p.
6).
Qualified immunity “shields [a] government official[] from liability in a § 1983 action
unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th
Cir. 2009). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “At summary judgment, qualified
immunity shields a law enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983 action unless: (1) the facts,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional
or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Watson
v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
The Court may use its discretion in determining which of these two prongs to address first.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a constitutional right was not clearly established
at the time of deprivation, then the Court need not determine whether the particular plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated based on the facts before it because the defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity regardless. 	See Dimock, v. City of Brooklyn, et. al, No. 24-1728, 2024 WL
5220190, *3 (8th Cir. Dec. 26, 2024).
For this analysis, the Court looks to the law at the time of the incident on December 4,
2023. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “clearly established law should not be defined at a
high level of generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (internal citation and quotation
omitted). 	A right is clearly established if it is sufficiently clear for every reasonable official to
understand the actions would violate a constitutional right. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)
(per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). The case precedent need not be directly on point, but
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it must place the constitutional question beyond debate. White, 580 U.S. at 79 (internal citation
and quotation omitted). The Eighth Circuit recently expounded on this standard by explaining “[a]
clearly established right is dictated either by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases
of persuasive authority.” 	Dimock, 2024 WL 5220190 at *2 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). 	The Dimcok Court went on to explain the legal principle must “clearly prohibit the
officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Id.
Plaintiff only has two claims remaining for which Defendants could assert qualified
immunity against—his retaliation claim, against Defendant Walker, and his due process claim
against Defendants Adams and Guthrie. 	Miller County Defendants did not move for qualified
immunity against Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.11 	(ECF No. 57, p. 6). 	Therefore, the Court will
address the arguments made by Miller County Defendants regarding Plaintiff’s due process claims.
11 Even if Miller County Defendants moved for qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s remaining
claim of retaliation, the Court would still recommend denial of summary judgment. 	Again,
considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has stated a claim for retaliation
against Defendant Walker. 	As explained in its first Report and Recommendation, in Plaintiff’s
Second Declaration, he states under penalty of perjury: “After I filed grievances and complaints
regarding the unlawful treatment and conditions, I was threatened by Warden Jeffie Walker. These
threats were made to intimidate me and deter me from exercising my constitutional rights to seek
redress.” (ECF No. 99, p. 3). Further, Plaintiff provided evidence these threats were for “new free
world charges” related to his altercation with Officer Studdard, and came after Plaintiff filed
grievances on the matter. (ECF No. 7, p. 6; 99-1, pp. 83, 85). Miller County Defendants did not
produce any summary judgment evidence to dispute Defendant Walker made this threat. 	Her
affidavit does not deny she made the threat or speak to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against her at
all. 	(ECF No. 58-1). 	Filing grievances is a protected activity. 	See Haynes v. Stephenson, 588
F.3d 1152, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 2009). Further, it was clearly established at the time in issue, that
retaliatory disciplinary charges for exercising constitutional rights can support section 1983
liability. 	See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir 2008). 	Accordingly, Defendant
Walker is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim at this juncture.
However, as explained in the Court’s first Report and Recommendation, had Miller County
Defendants submitted summary judgment evidence indicating Defendant Walker’s threat was even
partially motivated by Plaintiff’s actual rule violation or criminal activity, Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim would fail. See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2008). The Court notes
its finding in the first Report and Recommendation that Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony
created an issue of fact as to whether Defendant Walker’s threatening statements may have been
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Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must in a qualified
immunity analysis, Plaintiff was placed in segregation as punishment for his part in the altercation
with Officer Studdard and he was also served a written disciplinary notice regarding the
altercation. (ECF No. 58-6, pp. 46-47, 64-65). However, he was never provided a disciplinary
hearing. Id. Furthermore, Defendant Guthrie and Adams gave responses on Plaintiff’s grievances
that a jury could interpret to indicate Plaintiff was in fact serving disciplinary time in segregation.
(ECF No. 99-1, pp. 88, 96, 101-02, 113). As explained above, there are clearly genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Defendants Adams and Guthrie violated Plaintiff’s due process rights.
As to the second element, a pretrial detainee’s right to be free from punishment without
due process was clearly established in December 2023 when Plaintiff was placed in segregation
without a disciplinary hearing (facts according to Plaintiff). See Brown-El, 969 F.2d at 647 (When
a detainee “is deprived of privileges or placed in a special confinement status in order to punish
him for past misconduct, then due process requires some kind of hearing beforehand.”); see also
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66; Hartsfield, 511 F.3d at 830.
Accordingly, Miller County Defendants Adams and Guthrie are not entitled to qualified
immunity against Plaintiff’s due process claim based on the current record.
motivated in part by an actual rule violation. (ECF No. 100, pp. 25-26). However, for the purposes
of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the Court will not weigh evidence or make
credibility determinations. 	See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000) (explaining the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party
and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence as those are jury functions).
Such deposition testimony created an issue of fact on Plaintiff’s Motion and does the same here
on Miller County Defendants’ Motion, thus, precluding qualified immunity at this juncture.
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5. 	Plaintiff failed to state any official capacity claim for due process
The Court agrees as it explained in detail in its first Report and Recommendation and
recommended Plaintiff’s official capacity claim for due process be dismissed as it fails as a matter
of law. (ECF No. 100, pp. 61-62).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Arguments
Now the Court will address each of Plaintiff’s arguments in response to Miller County
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff does not organize his arguments in a way
that corresponds with his own claims or Miller County Defendants’ arguments. 	The Court,
however, will address each argument as Plaintiff asserted it.
1. 	Due Process
Plaintiff argues being held in segregation for over 140 days without a timely hearing
violates Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The Court agrees Wolff v. McDonnell, requires
pretrial detainees an impartial due process hearing on disciplinary matters. 418 U.S. 539, 563-66
(1974). 	Furthermore, as the Court has previously explained herein and in its first Report and
Recommendation, it finds genuine issues of material fact on this summary judgment record
regarding Plaintiff’s due process claim against Defendants Adams and Guthrie and such claim
should proceed for further litigation.
2. 	Retaliation
Plaintiff argues he was threatened for exercising his rights and placed in dangerous
situations in violation of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78 (1987). The Court is unsure what Plaintiff is arguing with this assertion. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994), is an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement case and Tuner v. Safley,
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482 U.S. 78 (1987), is a case analyzing prison regulations of mail and inmate marriage regulations.
Neither are applicable to Plaintiff’s remaining claims, or any claims originally asserted.
However, to the extent Plaintiff is arguing for the survival of his retaliation claim, as the
Court 	has 	previously 	explained 	herein 	and 	more 	extensively 	in 	its 	first 	Report 	and
Recommendation (ECF No. 100, pp. 24-26), it finds genuine issues of material fact on this
summary judgment record regarding Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation against Defendant Walker for
threatening him. Such claim should proceed for further litigation.
3. 	Discovery
Finally, Plaintiff argues summary judgment should be disfavored because Miller County
Defendants failed to produce video, x-rays, grievances, and officer names. (ECF No. 85).
“The general rule is that summary judgment is appropriate only after the nonmovant has
had adequate time for discovery.” 	Jackson v. Riebold, 815 F.3d 1114, 1121 (8th Cir. 2016).
However, a nonmovant, opposing summary judgment through a continuance pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) “must file an affidavit affirmatively demonstrating . . . how
postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the
movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Id. Plaintiff must show: (1) that he
has set forth, in an affidavit, specific facts he hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts
sought actually exist; and (3) the sought after facts are essential to resist the summary judgment
motion. Id; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Plaintiff has failed to do so here.
First, Plaintiff has not presented a proper Rule 56(d) affidavit to warrant a continuance and
additional discovery. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 	As explained above, Plaintiff’s Response was not
properly verified nor did it contain any affidavits attached. (ECF No. 85). However, even if his
requests for additional discovery were in the form of an affidavit meeting the requirements of Rule
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56(d), his requests still fail because he has not shown the Court the discovery he seeks exist or that
it is essential to resist the pending motion for summary judgment. See Jackson,, 815 F.3d at1121.
Plaintiff’s requested x-rays are not related to any claims against the instant Miller County
Defendants. Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim was asserted against Defendants King, Leslie,
and Lisa. (ECF No. 7). The Court found in its first Report and Recommendation, that Plaintiff’s
denial of medical care claim should be dismissed because it fails as a matter of law. 	Without
repeating all the Court’s analysis here, no further discovery would redeem Plaintiff’s denial of
medical care claim. The summary judgment evidence clearly shows Medical Defendants were not
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Instead, Plaintiff simply disagreed with the
medical care he was provided. (ECF No. 100, pp. 34-42). Additionally, while no copies of x-rays
were submitted on the summary judgment record, the radiologist’s findings and reports
enumerating the results of Plaintiff’s x-rays were on the record and were reviewed by the Court.
(ECF No. 65-1, pp. 19, 21). 	Therefore, production of the x-rays would be superfluous to the
Court’s analysis on Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim.
Next, the Court is unsure what grievances were not produced as Plaintiff did not
specifically identify which he seeks. Additionally, he attached sixty-nine pages of grievances to
his Second Declaration. (ECF No. 99-1, pp. 77-146). Plaintiff did not indicate in his argument
what type of grievances or any particular grievances missing from this production. Therefore, the
Court finds Plaintiff has failed to specifically identify what grievances he seeks.
For the same reason, Plaintiff’s request for “officer names” fails as it is a vague request
and gives no indication how it would aide Plaintiff’s response to Miller County Defendants’
Motion.
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Plaintiff also fails to show any video exist. To the contrary, Plaintiff attached to his own
Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	the 	Miller 	County 	Defendants’ 	Answer 	to 	Plaintiff’s
Interrogatories, Request for Production, and Requests for Admissions. (ECF No. 99-1, pp. 24-26).
In this Answer, Miller County Defendants state there are no video recordings, photographs, or
other visual documentations related to the incidents involving Plaintiff including no surveillance
footage from the facility. Id. at 26).
Moreover, as enumerated in the Procedural Background Section above, Plaintiff was
provided ample opportunity to participate in discovery in this matter and he took advantage of that
opportunity. 	He received initial disclosures ordered by the Court, he made requests to all
Defendants, he filed Motions to Compel, and he received extensions of the discovery period all
prior to the filing of Miller County Defendants Summary Judgment Motion. (ECF Nos. 35, 39,
44, 46, 51, 76).
Finally, the Court finds it contradictory for Plaintiff to claim he does not have all discovery
needed to respond to Miller County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment when he filed his
own Motion for Summary Judgment including summary judgment evidence. (ECF Nos. 60-62,
99).
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has not satisfied Rule 56(d) and has not sufficiently
shown the Court additional discovery is necessary before he can adequately respond to Miller
County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I hereby RECOMMEND Miller County Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No.56) be DENIED in part and DENIED as MOOT in part and the
following claims and Defendants be allowed to proceed as follows:
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• 	Claim Two for retaliation against Defendant Walker, in her individual capacity, should
proceed for further litigation;
• 	Claim Five for violation of due process against Defendants Adams and Guthrie, in their
individual capacities, should proceed for further litigation;
• 	All other Claims have previously been recommended for dismissal in the Court’s first
Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 100). Accordingly, Defendants’ arguments related
to those claims should be DISMISSED as MOOT.
Referral Status: The referral in this matter should be terminated with the filing of
this Report and Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 28th day of January 2026.
/s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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