Dickson v. Hempstead County, Arkansas

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
TONYA DICKSON 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:23-cv-04071
HEMPSTEAD COUNTY, ARKANSAS 	DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 13. Plaintiff
has responded to the Motion. ECF No. 18. Defendant also filed a Reply Brief. ECF No. 19. This
matter has been referred to the undersigned, and it is now ripe for consideration.
1. 	Background:
Plaintiff, Tonya Dickson (“Dickson”), an African American, was hired by Defendant,
Hempstead County, Arkansas (“Hempstead”) at the Hempstead County Library (“Library”) in
January 2019 as a clerk. ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff’s responsibilities as a clerk including general
customer service of patrons, checking books in and out, reshelving books, and other various
clerical duties as assigned in the library. ECF No. 15, ¶ 4.
On December 1, 2022, the Director of the Library, Courtney McNiel (“McNiel”) met with
Plaintiff. ECF No. 15, ¶ 13. During this meeting, McNiel gave Plaintiff a verbal warning based
on issues of Plaintiff standing around in one place for prolonged periods with no work tasks, mis-
shelving a significant percentage of books and patron complaints involving patrons being
uncomfortable with religious conversations or “praying over” them while they were visiting the
library. Id. Citing a lack of improvement on attention to job duties, McNiel and Library Board
Member Jacob Jones met with Plaintiff, and she was terminated on January 19, 2023. ECF No. 15,
¶ 18.
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Plaintiff brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-
101, et seq. (“ACRA”) alleging race discrimination in her termination of employment on January
19, 2023.
2. 	Applicable Law:
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
or defenses. 	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–324 (1986). 	Summary judgment is
proper under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id.
When the summary judgment movants demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over
any material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show there is a genuine factual issue for
trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment
evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73
F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.1996). A court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2007).
3. 	Discussion:
To survive a motion for summary judgment on race discrimination claims, a plaintiff must
either 	provide 	direct 	evidence 	of discrimination or 	create 	an 	inference 	of
unlawful discrimination under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 	Bone v. G4S Youth Servs, LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir.
2012) (citing Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 853 (8th Cir. 2012)); Wierman v.
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Casey's Gen Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2011). Because Dickson has not offered any direct
evidence of discrimination, her claims will be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework.
Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
If a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Wierman, 683 F.3d at
993. If the defendant can do so, the prima facie case is rebutted and no inference of
unlawful discrimination is created, unless the plaintiff can produce sufficient evidence to create a
genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact 	as 	to 	whether 	the 	articulated 	reason 	is 	pretext 	for
unlawful discrimination. 	Id. 	To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must point to enough
admissible 	evidence 	to 	raise 	genuine 	doubt 	as 	to 	the 	legitimacy 	of 	the 	defendant's
motive. DePriest v. Milligan, 823 F.3d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
As stated above, Plaintiff bears the initial McDonnell Douglas burden of establishing
a prima facie case of race discrimination. 	She must demonstrate that: (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was meeting her employer's
legitimate 	job 	expectations; 	and 	(4) 	the 	circumstances 	give 	rise 	to 	an 	inference
of discrimination (for example, if a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was
treated differently). Takele v. Mayo Clinic, 576 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2009); Tolen v. Ashcroft,
377 F.3d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 2004). In establishing a prima facie case, “the plaintiff's burden ‘is
not onerous.’ ” McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). However, a failure to establish any
element of a prima facie case defeats a Title VII discrimination claim. Tatum v. City of Berkeley,
408 F.3d 543, 550-51 (8th Cir. 2009).
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Defendants concede that Plaintiff, an African American, is a member of a protected class
and that there was an adverse employment action. However, Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff
was not meeting the Library’s legitimate job expectations; and (2) there are not sufficient facts to
give rise to an inference of unlawful race discrimination. For the purposes of this discussion, the
Court will assume Plaintiff was meeting her legitimate job expectations. The remaining question
is whether Plaintiff can establish the fourth element, namely, the circumstances give rise to an
inference of discrimination.
Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth prima facie element by showing the
circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. Specifically, Defendant states Plaintiff
cannot point to any similarly situated employees, who are not in the protected class, who were
treated differently. Defendant argues Dickson does not have any evidence that any of the other
employees at the Library had been malingering around the library, ignoring or neglecting assigned
work tasks, mis-shelving significant numbers of books, or engaging with patrons in unwelcome
religious conversation. ECF No. 13-1.
Dickson’s evidence to support an inference of discrimination was her testimony that she
recalled one instance of a co-worker who mis-shelved a single book and had an interaction with a
patron that needed correction. ECF 13-2, pg. 24. Dickson also testified other employees were on
their cell phones, Facebook, and social media. ECF No. 13-2, Pg. 17. Plaintiff bears the burden
of 	showing 	that employees used 	for 	comparison 	are similarly situated in 	all 	relevant
respects. Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 1998). 	“The test for determining
whether employees are similarly situated to a plaintiff is a rigorous one.” Rodgers v. U.S. Bank,
N.A. 417 F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir. 2005). Dickson must show that she and the employees outside
of her protected group were “similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Id. “[T]he individuals
used for comparison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same
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standards, 	and 	engaged 	in 	the 	same 	conduct 	without 	any 	mitigating 	or 	distinguishing
circumstances.” Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir.2000).
Applying this standard, Dickson fails to identify similarly situated workers, or that the
degree and frequency of her violations were similar to the limited evidence she brought
forth. 	Further, there is no evidence of racially motivated comments made to or about Dickson and
she puts forth no other circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination.
Plaintiff has offered no other evidence demonstrating that the circumstances of her
termination give rise to an inference of discrimination. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to
establish the fourth prima facie element. 	As Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, there is no need to consider the claim under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.
4. 	Conclusion:
Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 13) be GRANTED and that the claims of Plaintiff be DISMISSED.
The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The Parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).
DATED this 6th day of September 2024.
/s/ 	Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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