Blankenship v. Gentry et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
ROY GLENN BLANKENSHIP 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:22-cv-04055-SOH-BAB
SHERIFF ROBERT GENTRY;
CHRIS WALCOTT; NURSE
TAMMY FOWLER;
TERRY HERNANDEZ; and
ANNA MEJIA 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendants Gentry, Walcott, Hernandez, and Mejia’s (hereinafter
County Defendants) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50) and Defendant Fowler’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53). 	Plaintiff has responded. 	(ECF Nos. 64).
Defendants did not reply. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the
Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred the instant motion to the
undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
For the reasons outlined below, the undersigned recommends both Defendant Fowler’s
(ECF No. 53) and the County Defendants’ (ECF No. 50) Motions for Summary Judgment be
granted and all of Plaintiff’s claims, save for his retaliation claim, should be dismissed with
prejudice.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Corrections – Cummins Unit
in Grady, Arkansas. 	His claims in this lawsuit stem from alleged civil rights violations which
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occurred during his incarceration at the Sevier County Detention Center (“SCDC”) in DeQueen,
Arkansas. Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on June 27, 2022. (ECF No. 1). In his Complaint,
Plaintiff noted he was a convicted prisoner at the times in issue here, with his date of conviction
as April 14, 2022. (ECF No. 1, p. 2). Then, Plaintiff alleges his Claim One occurred in May 2022
and his Claim Two occurred in February 2022. (ECF No. 1, pp. 4, 6). Accordingly, Plaintiff was
a convicted inmate at the time of his Claim One and a pretrial detainee at the time Claim Two
occurred.
Plaintiff names five defendants in his Complaint: Sheriff Robert Gentry; Jail Administrator
Chris Walcott; Program Coordinator Terry Hernandez; and Program Coordinator Anna Mejia
(hereinafter “County Defendants”), and Nurse Tammy Fowler. (ECF No. 1, pp. 2-3).
In Claim One, Plaintiff states the County Defendants and Defendant Fowler violated his
constitutional rights on May 25, 2022 by denying him medical care for stomach ailments and
retaliated against him for filing a previous lawsuit. Id.at 4. Plaintiff alleges this Claim One against
the County Defendants and Defendant Fowler in both their individual and official capacities. Id.
In Claim Two Plaintiff claims the County Defendants and Defendant Fowler denied him
medical care and subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement on February 20,
2022 when they intentionally exposed him to COVID-19. 	Id. at 6. 	Plaintiff alleges this Claim
Two against all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages in his Complaint. 	Plaintiff
specifically seeks:
I want to be compensated for my injuries, [maybe] permanent, for putting my life in
jeopardy. I want to sue them for $2,000,000 for this and for retaliating against me for suing
them. I want them to give other inmates in the future adequate medical treatment and to
be held liable if they do not.
(ECF No. 1, p. 9).
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During the discovery phase of this litigation, Defendant Fowler filed a Motion to Compel.
(ECF No. 29). 	Plaintiff failed to respond to this Motion. 	Subsequently, the Court granted
Defendant Fowler’s Motion. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3), the Court
deemed all of Defendant Fowler’s Requests for Admission admitted. (ECF Nos. 34, 47) (admitting
Fowler’s Request for Admissions Nos. 1 – 10).
The discovery period in this matter closed on May 15, 2023. (ECF No. 36). On March 6,
2024, Plaintiff filed his first Motion to Compel Discovery.0F
1 	(ECF No. 48). 	The Court denied
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel because the Court cannot compel County Defendants to produce
discovery which does not exists. (ECF No. 59).
County Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on March 8, 2024. 	(ECF
No. 50). The County Defendants argue in their Motion for Summary Judgment that: (1) Plaintiff’s
Claim Two regarding COVID-19 fails as frivolous because Plaintiff makes contradictory
allegations in his deposition; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his new claim made in his deposition;
(3) all County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (4) Plaintiff failed to show the
COVID-19 exposure subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement pursuant to
Stearns; (5) Plaintiff failed to show that any County Defendant caused any of his alleged
constitutional violations; and (6) Plaintiff failed to state an official capacity claim against County
Defendants. (ECF No. 51).
Defendant Fowler also filed her Motion for Summary Judgment on March 8, 2024. (ECF
No. 53). Defendant Fowler argues in her Motion for Summary Judgment that: (1) Plaintiff failed
1 Plaintiff referenced difficulties he was having with discovery in a Motion to Appoint Counsel on
December 6, 2022. (ECF No. 28). The Court advised Plaintiff in its Order on this Motion that he
should reference the Initial Scheduling Order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the
appropriate process of bringing discovery disputes before the Court. (ECF No. 30).
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to exhaust his new claim made in his deposition; (2) it is undisputed Plaintiff was not housed with
OVID-19 positive inmates; (3) Plaintiff failed to answer Defendant Fowler’s discovery and all her
request for admissions were deemed admitted by the Court; (4) Defendant Fowler was not
deliberately indifferent to any serious medical need; and (5) Plaintiff failed to allege any official
capacity claim against Defendant Fowler’s employer. (ECF No. 55).
On March 18, 2024, the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to respond to both
County Defendants and Defendant Fowler’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 57). In
this Order, Plaintiff was given specific instructions on how to file a response to a motion for
summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 	Plaintiff was also provided
examples of what type of documents could be submitted to support his response and create issues
of fact, including an affidavit or sworn statement. Finally, Plaintiff was provided with instruction
on what constitutes a valid affidavit or sworn statement. Id.
Plaintiff initially failed to respond to the Court’s Order to respond. On April 9, 2024, the
Court entered an Order to Show Cause directing Plaintiff to show cause why he failed to respond
to all Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 61).
On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff responded to the Order to Show Cause. (ECF No. 62). In this
Response, Plaintiff reasserts his discovery arguments made in his March 6, 2024 Motion to
Compel. 	Specifically, he states he does not believe Defendants assertion that no video footage
related to his claims exists and also that the Defendants are withholding from him incident logs
and full names and addresses of witnesses. Id. Plaintiff complains that the Court is not compelling
Defendants to produce this information. Plaintiff states he has nothing to prove his claims because
Defendants will not provide him with “anything” he requested. Id.
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As Plaintiff still did not respond to either of Defendants Motions, the Court again entered
an Order to Show Cause directing Plaintiff to respond to both of the Motions for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 63). Plaintiff was again instructed that he could use legal arguments, records,
or affidavits to meet proof with proof in his response. The Court even went as far as to instruct
Plaintiff he could use his own statements, based on personal knowledge, in a document signed
under penalty of perjury or sworn and subscribed by a notary public in response to Defendants
Motions. Id.
On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document titled: “This is an Affidavits.” (ECF No. 64).
This document is signed by Plaintiff and contains the seal of Lynda McGhee Notary Public, Miller
County, Arkansas, but it does not contain the signature of Lynda McGhee. The Court construes
this Document as Plaintiff’s Response to both Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment.
Finally, Plaintiff filed another Motion for Appointment of Counsel and to Compel
Discovery on November 18, 2024. (ECF No. 66). Plaintiff asserts the same arguments he did in
his previous motions regarding video footage, jail logs, and names and addresses of witnesses.
The Court denied both motions. (ECF Nos. 67, 68).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While the summary judgment record here is robust and all Defendants have produced
declarations, affidavits, Plaintiff’s relevant grievances and jail file with medical records, the Court
need only the following limited facts admitted or undisputed by Plaintiff on the record to make
this report and recommendation.
A. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations in his Verified Complaint
Plaintiff specifically alleges the following in his Claim One:
This was my grievance on May 25, 2022 stating, I’ve had stomach problems ever since the
Sheriff, Jail admin and all the staff including Nurse Tammy Fowler cause me to get Covid
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by locking me and several other people down with positive Covid inmates. I have really
bad stomach pains and trouble digesting food now and have lost almost 20lbs since Feb.
2022. 	I was eventually given a special diet tray because of significant weight loss until
Sheriff Gentry, Chris Wolcott, Jerry Hernandez, and Anna Mejia said they wasn’t going to
cater to me and took my diet trays. So I told them I would greive it, because they were Dr.
prescribed ever since they intentionally gave me Covid by locking me down with pos.
testing Covid inmates SO they made me see the Dr. for the first time since I been here in
over a yr and he told me he was taking my diet trays because Gentry, & Walcott said I
couldn’t have them unless I had previous records of my stomach problems which I don’t
because my stomach problems started here after I was given Covid19. I also asked the Dr.
to run some test or something and was denied. So I filed this grievance and Anna Mejia
resolved it and didn’t escalate it so I asked her why and she said I had already got a 1983
form filed and I couldn’t file another one or receive one ‘Per Chris Wolcott’ Jail add. That
if I wanted a 1983 form then I would have to go through the courts and just add it to my
other grievances and I told her that wasnt right I had to file separate for different grievances
and was denied again. 	I feel like I’m being retaliated against for the previous lawsuit I
have on them.
(ECF No. 1, pp. 4-5) (errors in original). 	For his official capacity component of Claim One,
Plaintiff alleges County Defendants locking him up with COVID-19 positive inmates denied him
a safe and secure environment and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. Also, he claims
he was denied proper medical treatment because the doctor did not do his job. Finally, Plaintiff
claims he was retaliated against for filing grievances. (ECF No. 1, p. 5).
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges:
In the month of Feb. 2022 inmates in Sevier Co. tested positive for Covid 19 and other
inmates including me tested neg. but were forced to be housed in the same housing unit
until me & several others eventually got Covid, which led to me having sevier stomach
problem where its hard for me to digest a lot of foods and have lost almost 20 pounds since
Feb.
(ECF No. 1, p. 6) (errors in original). For his official capacity allegation Plaintiff states: “The way
Positive Covid Inmates are housed with others The lack of medical treatment at this facility.” Id.
at 7.
B. Plaintiff’s Sworn Deposition Testimony
In Plaintiff’s deposition he testified he was moved—on an unknown date—from
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his original housing in the SCDC to a quarantine pod with all the other inmates that tested negative
for COVID-19. 	It was Plaintiff’s understanding that this move was to accommodate all of the
COVID-19 positive inmates. There were too many positive inmates for the small quarantine pod,
so the COVID-19 negative inmates were moved into the smaller quarantine pod while the positive
inmates were moved out into the larger pods. (ECF No. 50-1, p. 8). Plaintiff also testified “the
nurse and sheriff” made him clean the quarantine pod when he was moved there. 	Plaintiff
explained he believed he caught COVID-19 from cleaning the quarantine pod and this was the
intention of the Defendants in forcing him to clean the quarantine pod. 	(ECF No. 50-1, p. 9).
Finally, when questioned by County Defendants’ attorney in his deposition, Plaintiff explicitly
testified he was not moved into a pod with COVID-19 positive patients and that is not what caused
him to contract COVID-19:
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(ECF No. 50-1, p. 46). The Court notes this testimony was not elicited in a way to indicate the
Plaintiff was confused or subjected to wily questioning by defense counsel. 	The Plaintiff
consistently maintained throughout his deposition testimony that he was not housed with COVID-
19 positive inmates, and that he complained of intentional exposure to COVID-19 through the
cleaning of the quarantine pod. See generally, (ECF No. 50-1).
C. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment
While Plaintiff did not sign his Response under penalty of perjury or have it adequately
notarized, the Court finds it noteworthy to acknowledge that he did reiterate his testimony from
his deposition in his Response:
I will swear to my statements about how I was put into a Quarentine housing after I had
tested Neg to Covid and made to clean up the pod, to deliberately cause me to get Covid.
I also have other witnesses to these facts, Denise Hale, Jimmy Evens, and two guards that
were working at the time, but have no way of contacting them until I get out of prison.
They deliberately caused me and several others to get Covid even though they knew it to
be a potentially deadly virus.
(ECF No. 64) (errors in original).
D. Facts Admitted by Plaintiff During Discovery
Finally, as previously explained, Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendant Fowler’s
discovery request—despite the Court Order directing him to do so—resulted in all Defendant
Fowler’s Request for Admission deemed admitted. 	Such admissions include:
• 	Plaintiff did not suffer any injury due to any treatment received or any delays in receiving
treatment during his incarceration at the SCDC.
• 	Plaintiff was not denied medical care by any Defendant.
• 	No medical doctor ever told Plaintiff he was injured as a result of the care and treatment,
or action or inaction of Defendant Fowler.
• 	Defendant Fowler did not deny Plaintiff medical care.
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• 	No medical provider has ever told Plaintiff the care he received from Defendant Fowler
was beneath the standard of care.
• 	No medical provider ever told Plaintiff he suffered long-term damage as a result of
Defendant Fowler’s care and treatment.
(ECF No. 53-5, pp. 8-9; ECF Nos. 34, 47).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record "shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "Once
a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the
non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.
1999).
The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. "A case founded
on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 610.
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).
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Under § 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in his official
capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his official
capacities. 	The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend on
whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. See Gorman
v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 	“Claims against
individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they
work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the
only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Personal capacity claims
“are those which allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in the course of their
duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified immunity may be raised as a
defense” to these individual capacity claims. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff
must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).
IV. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, it is imperative to establish what claims are currently before the Court
for consideration in this Report and Recommendation. The Court will only address those claims
asserted by Plaintiff in his Complaint. Neither Plaintiff, nor the Defendants, may raise new claims
first asserted in a motion for summary judgment proceeding. See Burgs v. Sissel, 754 F.2d 526,
528 (8th Cir. 1984) (While pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a pro se litigant is not
excused from complying with substantive and procedural law); Haggins v. City of St. Paul, Civil
No. 09-537, 2010 WL 1380134, at *13 (D. Min. Mar. 1, 2010) (declining to consider claims not
raised in pleadings). 	While both County Defendants and Defendant Fowler make arguments in
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their Motions regarding Plaintiff’s statements in his deposition purporting to amend his COVID-
196 claim, such attempt is improper. 	Plaintiff had ample opportunity to amend his Complaint
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Initial Scheduling Order had he wished
to do so.
Additionally, no Defendant moved for dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim made within
Claim One in his Complaint.
Accordingly, the two claims before the Court on summary judgment are: (1) Plaintiff’s
denial of medical care claim related to his stomach ailments in Claim One; and (2) Plaintiff’s denial
of medical care and conditions-of-confinement claim related to his allegation he was intentionally
housed with COVID-19 positive inmates when he was testing negative asserted in Claim Two.
(ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s claim made for the first time in his deposition that he was intentionally
exposed to COVID-19 through the forced cleaning of a quarantine pod is not properly before this
Court.
A. Qualified Immunity
First, County Defendants allege they are entitled to qualified immunity. 	Qualified
immunity “shields [a] government official from liability in a section 1983 action unless the
official’s conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009). Qualified immunity
protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 	Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 	“At summary judgment, qualified immunity shields a law
enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983 action unless: (1) the facts viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2)
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the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106,
1109 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
As the Court previously explained, it only need consider the admitted and undisputed facts
on this summary judgment record to determine Plaintiff’s claims do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation against the County Defendants. See Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.35 637, 642 (8th
Cir. 2017) (explaining the court may start with either prong of the qualified immunity test and may
end the analysis if either is not met).
Defendant Fowler, a non-county employee did not claim qualified immunity. However, as
explained below, and using the same admitted and undisputed facts on this record before it, the
Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state cognizable constitutional violations against Defendant
Fowler.
B. Claim One – Denial of Medical Care for Stomach Ailments
In prisoner litigation, courts in the Eighth Circuit analyze denial of medical care claims for
pretrial detainees and convicted inmates both under the deliberate indifference standard of the
Eighth Amendment. See e.g., Morris v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 2020) (pretrial detainee
has the same rights to medical care under the Due Process Clause as an inmate has under the Eighth
Amendment). 	The Court therefore examines Plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment's
deliberate indifference standard. Id.
To succeed on this type of claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he had an objectively
serious medical need, and (2) that the County Defendants actually knew of, but deliberately
disregarded, that serious medical need. See Ivey v. Audrain Cty., Mo., 968 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir.
2020). 	“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
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treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations
omitted). 	“To demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, a
serious medical need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal recklessness:
disregarding a known risk to the [detainee’s] health.” Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th
Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	The Eighth Circuit has stated that this
“onerous standard requires a showing more than negligence, more than even gross negligence, but
less than purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of serious harm to
the inmate.” 	Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
Deliberate indifference may also be manifested by “prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). However, the “Constitution does not require jailers
to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.” 	Jenkins v. Cty. of
Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009).
The record before the Court includes an admission by Plaintiff that no Defendant ever
denied 	him medical care. 	(ECF No. 53-5, p. 8; ECF Nos. 34, 47). 	Furthermore, Plaintiff also
admitted he suffered no injury while housed at the SCDC due to any denial or delay of medical
care. Id.
Accordingly, there is no material issue of fact as to whether any Defendant was deliberately
indifferent to any serious medical need of Plaintiff’s while he was housed at the SCDC. Thus, the
County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claim for denial of medical
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care and Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable denial of medical care claim against Defendant
Fowler.
C. Claim Two – Intentional Exposure to COVID-19
In his Complaint, Plaintiff clearly alleges all Defendants intentionally housed him in the
same pod with inmates who tested positive for COVID -19 with the intention to expose him to
COVID-19. 	(ECF No. 1. pp. 4, 6). 	Plaintiff claims these actions denied him medical care and
exposed him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Id.
As already explained, it is undisputed and admitted by Plaintiff, he was not denied medical
care. 	Moving to Plaintiff’s conditions-of-confinement claim, the claim shall be analyzed under
the Stearns standard as Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the relevant time.
In Stearns v. Inmate Servs. Corp., et al., 957 F.3d 902 (8 th Cir. 2020), the Eighth Circuit
discussed the applicable Fourteenth Amendment analysis for conditions of confinement claims
brought by pretrial detainees. The Eighth Circuit stated:
In Bell v. Wolfish, [441 U.S. 520 (1979)], the Supreme Court articulated the standard
governing pretrial detainees’ claims related to conditions of confinement. The Court held
that the government may detain defendants pretrial and “may subject [them] to the
restrictions and conditions of [a] detention facility so long as those conditions and
restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” 	Id. at
536-37. The Court articulated two ways to determine whether conditions rise to the level
of punishment. A plaintiff could show that the conditions were intentionally punitive. Id.
at 538. Alternatively, if there is no expressly demonstrated intent to punish, the plaintiff
could 	also 	show 	that 	the conditions 	were not 	reasonably 	related 	to 	a legitimate
governmental purpose or were excessive in relation to that purpose. 	Id. at 538-39. 	If
conditions are found to be arbitrary or excessive, it is permissible to “infer that the purpose
of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon
detainees qua detainees.” Id. at 539.
Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907 (alterations in original) (citations to the S. Ct. omitted). The Due Process
Clause is only implicated when a detainee is forced “to endure genuine privations and hardship
over an extended period of time.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 542.
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In sum, the Constitution prohibits conditions that are intentionally punitive, are not
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose, or are excessive in relation to that
purpose. 	Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907. 	The Court must determine, in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, whether his conditions of confinement amounted to punishment. 	Id. at 908-09.
Conditions of confinement that are related to legitimate government interests do not amount to
punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-39.
To determine whether the conditions of confinement constitute punishment, the court
considers the totality of the circumstances including the duration of confinement in the harsh
conditions. Stearns, 957 F.3d at 909 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
While Plaintiff initially alleges in his Complaint all Defendants intentionally housed him
with COVID-19 positive inmates in order to give him COVID-19, (ECF No. 1, pp. 4, 6), he later
stated under oath in his deposition this housing situation never occurred. (ECF No. 50-1, pp. 8-9).
Plaintiff also explained why his housing assignment was changed—more inmates tested positive
than negative, so the jail officials moved the negative inmates into the smaller quarantine pod. Id.
The Court finds it is undisputed, on the summary judgment record before it, that Plaintiff
was never intentionally housed with COVID-19 positive inmates in order to give him COVID-19.
There can be no punitive intentions on the part of any Defendant under this set of undisputed facts.
Thus, pursuant to Stearns Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated through his conditions
of confinement. Stearns, 957 F.3d at 908-9.
Accordingly, County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Claim
Two and Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable condition-of-confinement claim in Claim Two
against Defendant Fowler.
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D. Official Capacity Claims
Since Plaintiff has failed to state any individual claim against any Defendant regarding his
conditions-of-confinement and denial of medical care claims, he cannot maintain an official
capacity claim against any Defendant or the Defendants’ employers. See Morris v. Cradduck, 954
F.3d 1055, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020) Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th
Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Furthermore, “[c]laims
against individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which
they work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights,
and the only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Plaintiff did not
cite or claim any policies or procedures of Sevier County or Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC
(Defendant Fowler’s employer) that violated his constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend County Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 50) and Defendant Fowler’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53) be
GRANTED and all claims, both individual and official capacity, related to denial of medical care
and conditions of confinement asserted against Defendant Fowler and County Defendants be
DISMISSED with prejudice. This leaves for further litigation only Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation
made in his Complaint against all Defendants. (ECF No. 1, p. 5).
Referral Status: This case should remain referred at this time.
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The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 18th day of December 2024.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 4:22-cv-04055-SOH Document 72 Filed 12/18/24 Page 17 of 17 PageID #:
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