Phillips v. Parker et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HARRISON DIVISION
JONATHAN DEWAYNE PHILLIPS 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 3:24-cv-03054-CDC
JAIL ADMINISTRATOR HETTIE PARKER,
Searcy County Jail; and JAILER MONTANA
FLINT, Searcy County Jail 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Jonathan D. Phillips (“Phillips”), an inmate of the Searcy County Jail, filed this
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Phillis proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 	However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document
will be dispositive of Phillips’ claims, this document will be filed as a Report and Recommendation
and the case will automatically be reassigned to United States District Judge Timothy L. Brooks.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Complaint (ECF No. 2) under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint
in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
I. 	BACKGROUND
According to the allegations of the Complaint, Phillips is incarcerated in the Searcy County
Jail awaiting transport to the Arkansas Division of Correction. 	(ECF No. 2 at 3). 	On August 14,
2024, at approximately 2:00 am while he was sleeping, Phillips asserts he was bitten by a brown
recluse spider. 	Id. at 4. 	Initially, Phillips thought he was just itchy because of his blanket and he
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scratched the area “raw.” 	Id.
On August 19, 2024, when Phillips was taking a shower, he “noticed three holes in my
leg.” 	(ECF No. 2 at 4). 	He requested medical attention. 	Id. 	He was seen by a doctor on
August 21, 2024, and prescribed antibiotics. 	Id. 	On August 22, 2024, at 4:30 pm, Defendant
Flint brought him two pills. 	Id. 	Phillips asked if they were his antibiotics and was told they
were. 	Id. 	Later the night shift brought Phillips his antibiotics. 	Id. When Phillips asked what
Defendant Flint had given him earlier in the afternoon, he was told it was another inmate
Tamsulosin which has possible side effect of dizziness, headaches, blurred vision, and high blood
pressure. 	Id. at 5. 	Phillips says he was experience all of these side effects. 	Id. 	Phillips says
Defendant Flint should not have been distributing medication because he is not a nurse. 	Id.
Phillips submitted a grievance regarding the issue. 	Id. 	The head jailer on the night shift called
the doctor who advised that the medication would not hurt Phillips just make it easier for him to
go to the bathroom. 	Id.
Phillips requested and was provided with copies of his medical request and grievance by a
non-party jailer. 	(ECF No. 2 at 5). 	Thereafter, because other inmates started requesting copies,
Defendant Parker told the jailer not to give out copies of medical requests and grievances. 	Id.
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff
has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v.
Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
However, even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin
v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant
acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999).
Phillips’ claims are subject to dismissal. 	First, Defendant Parker cannot be held liable
based solely on her supervisory position at the jail. 	Under § 1983 a supervisor cannot be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate based solely on the fact that she has general
responsibility for supervising the operations of the facility. 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662, 676
(2009); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010). 	In other words, Defendant Parker is
only liable for her own individual actions which resulted in the deprivation of Phillip’
constitutional rights. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 	In this case, Phillips has made no factual statements
regarding Defendant Parker’s conduct other than that she told a jailer not to provide inmates with
copies of grievances and requests. 	The Court knows of no constitutional right violated by this
action.
Second, there is no constitutional right to have medication distributed only by trained
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medical personnel. 	See e.g., Franklin v. Loe, No. 1:20-cv-1027, 2020 WL 3520313, *2 (W.D.
Ark. June 29, 2020); Booker v. Herman, No. 1:06-cv-178, 2006 WL 2457230, *5 (N.D. Ind. Aug.
22, 2006) (“While it might be a good practice, tradition, or even state law to require that only
medical staff can deliver medication, the Constitution does not prohibit guards from distributing
medication to inmates.”).
Third, to succeed on his denial of medical care claim, Phillips must demonstrate (1) that he
had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that Defendant Flint actually knew of, but
deliberately disregarded, that serious medical need. 	Ivey v. Audrain Cty., 968 F.3d 845, 848 (8th
Cir. 2020). “A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” 	Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations
omitted). 	“To demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, a
serious medical need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal recklessness:
disregarding a known risk to the [detainee’s] health.” 	Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th
Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 	The Eighth Circuit has stated that
this “onerous standard requires a showing more than negligence, more than even gross negligence,
but less that purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of serious harm
to the inmate.” 	Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
Phillips alleges Defendant Flint gave him a single dose of the wrong medication. 	Phillips
has not alleged Defendant Flint acted knowingly or intentionally in giving him the wrong
medication or even that Defendant Flint was aware the medication was not Phillips. 	In the
absence of such allegations, the mistaken administration of a single dose of the wrong medication,
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even though the consequences could have been severe, fails to state a plausible claim of deliberate
indifference on the part of Defendant Flint. 	See e.g., Spann v. Roper, 453 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th
Cir. 2006) (nurse did not act with deliberate indifference in forcing inmate to take another inmate’s
medication because it was a mistake). 	No plausible denial of medical care claim is stated.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that:
(1) 	the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted;
(2) Plaintiff be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a §
1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial consideration; and
(3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
dismissal would not be taken in good faith.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status of Referral: 	The referral terminates upon the filing of this Report and
Recommendation.
RECOMMENDED this 31st day of January 2025.
s/ Christy Comstock
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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