Jones v. McKittrick et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
AIDEN JONES
(a/k/a AJ) 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 2:24-cv-02127
CAPTAIN NICK McKITTRICK
(Johnson County Detention Center “JCDC”);
SERGEANT CODY HORN (JCDC);
DETENTION DEPUTY KATIE STEWART
(JCDC) 	DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action filed by the Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. 	All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the
undersigned. Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 70).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 10, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1). 	He filed an Amended
Complaint on October 31, 2024. (ECF No. 7). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
he was subjected to excessive force and false imprisonment by use of a restraint chair and then
denied medical treatment. (Id.). He alleges this occurred on September 27, 2024, to September
28, 2024. 	(Id.). 	He proceeds against all Defendants in their official and individual capacities.
(Id.). He seeks compensatory, punitive, and other damages. (Id. at 11). The other damages include
a declaratory statement, a permanent injunction against Defendants, and apology statements. (Id.).
Defendants filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 30, 2026. (ECF No.
70). Defendants argue that Defendant Johnson County is entitled to qualified immunity and partial
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s official capacity claims. 	(Id. at 2, 4). 	Defendants argue that
Case 2:24-cv-02127-MEF Document 83 Filed 10/07/26 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Plaintiff failed to allege “that any policy directed any employee or official of Johnson County to
violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Id. at 5). They further argue that:
Plaintiff 	has 	put 	forth 	no 	evidence 	of 	a 	prior, 	continuing,
widespread, similar, pattern of unconstitutional actions by these
Defendants. 	He testified in his deposition that “[i]t really should
have been more ... like a widespread practice claim” and that no
policy caused him to be treated this way. Further, he testified in his
deposition that he doesn’t have knowledge of the widespread
practice of using the restraint chair.
(Id. at 5). 	Defendants concede, without admitting fault or liability, that there are questions of
material fact concerning Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims. (Id. at 1, n. 1).
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Waive Response to Summary Judgment (ECF No. 76) on
September 9, 2026, in which he states that he agrees with Defendants and asks that the Court enter
judgment accordingly. (Id.).
Having changed his mind, on September 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Withdraw his
Waiver of Summary Judgment Response. (ECF No. 77). As grounds, he states that he has now
obtained new information from an inmate he met in the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”),
where he is now incarcerated. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff does not describe the information or identify the
witness in his motion. Plaintiff also filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, a brief in support, and a statement of disputed facts. (ECF Nos. 78, 79, 80). In these
documents he states that the other ADC inmate was in the Johnson County Detention Center for
19 months and stated that he saw the restraint chair used three times. Plaintiff alleges that two of
these circumstances were similar to his. (Id. at 2). The other inmate, identified as Shane McCoy
(Id. at 1), was not restrained in the chair. 	(Id. at 2-3). 	Plaintiff argues that this establishes an
unconstitutional pattern. Defendants filed a Reply to this Motion to Withdraw his initial Summary
Judgment Response on October 5, 2026. 	(ECF No. 81). 	They argue that Plaintiff’s Motion to
Withdraw should be denied and partial summary judgment granted to Johnson County because:
Case 2:24-cv-02127-MEF Document 83 Filed 10/07/26 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that “[i]t really should have been
more ... like a widespread practice claim” and that no policy caused
him to be treated this way. Further, he testified in his deposition that
he doesn’t have knowledge of the widespread practice of using the
restraint chair. He now attempts to conjure a widespread policy by
belatedly providing hearsay testimony from a witness that was not
disclosed in discovery (and not in the form of an affidavit) that
essentially simply describes two other instances of restraint chair
use (which are fairly common in a jail setting). This belated attempt
should be rejected.
(Id. at 3). The Court agreed with Defendants’ arguments, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw his
Response was denied on October 7, 2026. 	(ECF No. 82). The accompanying Response in
Opposition documents were struck from the record. (Id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” 	National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165
F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 	“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
Case 2:24-cv-02127-MEF Document 83 Filed 10/07/26 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Here, Plaintiff initially agreed that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to his
official capacity claims against Johnson County. His belated attempt to change his position has
been stricken. Johnson County is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims against the named Defendants.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 70) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Johnson County are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE. 	Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against the separate Defendants
remain for further review.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 7th day of October 2026.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 2:24-cv-02127-MEF Document 83 Filed 10/07/26 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>