Yoram Razz v. State of Israel, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
YORAM RAZZ 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 2:24-cv-2114-TLB-MEF
STATE OF ISRAEL,
c/o Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu;
DANIEL PERRY,
Sheriff of Crawford County, Arkansas;
JOSHUA WINFORD, Chief of Police, Dyer, Arkansas;
JOSEPH SAUNDERS, Fire Chief, Dyer, Arkansas;
JONATHAN WEAR, Chief of Police,
Van Buren, Arkansas; and
ALDI, USA 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Yoram Razz (“Razz”), proceeding pro se, has commenced this civil rights action
against the sovereign State of Israel, four officers employed by local-government entities situated
in Crawford County, Arkansas, and ALDI, Inc., a corporate grocery retailer. The Hon. Timothy L.
Brooks, United States District Judge, has referred the case to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 636(b)(1) and (3). 	All defendants, other than the State of Israel, have filed motions to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. Razz
has moved for default judgment against the State of Israel.
More specifically, the Separate Defendants Joshua Winford (“Winford”), Chief of Police
of Dyer, Arkansas, and Joseph Saunders (“Saunders”), Fire Chief of Dyer, Arkansas, filed a Motion
to Dismiss with Incorporated Brief in Support on September 24, 2024. (ECF No. 4). Razz filed
his Response in opposition to this motion on October 7, 2024. (ECF No. 10). Separate Defendant
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Jonathan Wear (“Wear”), Chief of Police of Van Buren, Arkansas, filed a Motion to Dismiss and a
Brief in Support on October 4, 2024. (ECF Nos. 8, 9). Razz filed his Response in opposition on
October 29, 2024. (ECF No. 29). Separate Defendant ALDI, Inc. (“ALDI”) filed its Motion to
Dismiss and a Brief in Support on October 16, 2024. (ECF Nos. 20, 21). Razz filed a Response
in opposition to ALDI’s Motion to Dismiss on November 8, 2024. (ECF No. 33). ALDI sought
and was granted leave to file a Reply (ECF Nos. 39, 44), and its Reply was filed on November 18,
2024. 	(ECF No. 45). 	Separate Defendant Daniel Perry (“Perry”), Sheriff of Crawford County,
Arkansas, filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Brief in Support on October 25, 2024. (ECF Nos. 26,
27). Razz filed his Response in opposition on December 2, 2024. (ECF No. 46). In addition to
the foregoing motions, Razz has moved for the entry of default judgment against the State of Israel
(ECF Nos. 49, 51) and to waive the requirement of Hebrew translation against the State of Israel
(ECF No. 52). These motions are ripe for decision. After careful consideration, and for the reasons
discussed, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Separate Defendants’ motions to dismiss
(ECF Nos. 4, 8, 20, and 26) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF
No. 49) and to waive the requirement of Hebrew translation (ECF No. 52) be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Razz describes himself as a “former Israeli citizen, now United States citizen[,]” who has
resided in Alma, Arkansas since January 2012. 	(ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.1). 	He alleges that the Israel
Security Agency, also known as Shin-Bet, has instigated a decades-long campaign of surveillance
and harassment of him by various law-enforcement entities in each locale where he has lived since
immigrating to the United States in October 1987, including, most recently, in Crawford County,
Arkansas. (Id., ¶¶ 1.1, 4.6). Characterizing Shin-Bet as a “foreign spy agency,” Razz alleges that
the agency began its campaign of surveillance against him in Israel in 1957, after Razz, then two
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years old, “was executed by Lethal-Injection” under an “Israeli-Nazi Euthanasia program to
eliminate sick or weak children,” but he “miraculously and inexplicably awoke on the way to the
morgue.” (Id., ¶¶ 1.1, 4.4). Asserting that Shin-Bet intends to harm or kill him, Razz explains that
the agency has a “strong desire to avenge against him because he humiliated the … Spy Agency
by surviving their Lethal-Injection and by leaving Israel for good – instead of fighting with [the
Israeli Defense Forces] as Israeli men are expected.” (Id., ¶ 4.18).
Razz acknowledges previous litigation in which he unsuccessfully advanced claims of
Israeli-influenced surveillance and harassment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and
state law-enforcement entities in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 2, 10). The
particular litigation to which Razz refers is reported in Raz v. Mueller, et al., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1057
(W.D. Ark. 2005), aff’d, 215 F. App’x 571 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“Mueller”), a case in
which Razz asserted that upon his arrival in the United States in October 1987, the FBI had
immediately “assumed the continuation” of Shin-Bet surveillance which began in Israel due to
Razz’s political views concerning, inter alia, the Israeli-Arab conflict. After a three-day bench
trial in the Western District of Arkansas in July 2005, District Judge Jimm L. Hendren dismissed
the case with prejudice in a 48-page Memorandum Opinion and Order which thoroughly
considered the testimony and evidence pertaining to Razz’s claims of unwarranted surveillance
spanning October 1987 through 2004 in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. 	See id., at 1060,
1063-1079.1 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in Raz v. Mueller, 215 F. App’x
571 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
1 Judge Hendren concluded that “all of Raz’s claims fail[ed] on [his] threshold point,” that the FBI
had placed him under continual surveillance from 1987 until the trial in 2005, and that it had done
so because of his political views about Israel. He further concluded that the FBI had demonstrated
that compelling governmental interests supported its various investigations of Razz; that it had
chosen the least restrictive means to further those interests; and that the FBI was not implicated in
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Relying on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602, et seq., Razz now seeks to hold the State of Israel accountable for the same allegations of
surveillance and harassment that he unsuccessfully litigated in Mueller, as well as new allegations
that Shin-Bet has instigated and orchestrated illegal surveillance and harassment of him by law
enforcement and others in Crawford County since 2012.2 (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1.1, 2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.5,
4.18, 4.19). Relatedly, Razz seeks relief from the remaining defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for their alleged ties to and participation in Shin-Bet’s campaign of surveillance and
harassment in Crawford County since 2012. Under the non-commercial tort exception to foreign
sovereign immunity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(5), Razz seeks compensatory damages in the amount
of $370,000,000.00 from the State of Israel. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 8.2). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he
seeks compensatory damages totaling $137,000,000.00 from the Separate Defendants for their
alleged individual involvement in “surveillance, voyeurism, and sting operations” carried out
under Shin-Bet’s control in Crawford County. (Id., ¶¶ 8.3-8.7). Finally, he seeks injunctive relief
against Separate Defendants Sheriff Perry and Police Chief Winford. (Id., ¶¶ 9.1-9.3).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
adverse events that Razz had experienced when he lived in Bienville Parish, Louisiana in October
1998. Id. at 1076-1078.
2 Razz also states that he intends to seek a new trial in the Mueller case and to move for
consolidation with the instant case. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4.15).
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678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations” to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. In other words, the allegations pleaded must show “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A court considering a motion to dismiss must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the non-moving party.
See Farm Credit Servs. of Am., FLCA v. Haun, 734 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013); Coons v. Mineta,
410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005); Abels v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 259 F.3d 910, 914 (8th
Cir. 2001). A court need not, however, credit conclusory allegations or “naked assertion[s] devoid
of further factual enhancement.” Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Communications, LLC,
696 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may consider documents or
exhibits attached to a complaint, as well as matters of public record referenced in the complaint.
See Owen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 533 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 2008); Quinn v. Ocwen Fed. Bank
FSB, 470 F.3d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 2006).
Finally, in evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim,
the court holds “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, ... to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014)
(alteration in original) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	Even with this
construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.” Martin
v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
As noted above, Razz has previously filed numerous cases in federal courts in Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas against state and federal law-enforcement officials.3 In these cases, Razz
has alleged that, since his arrival in the United States in October 1987, he has been subjected to
relentless and tortious surveillance, investigation, and sting operations influenced by Shin-Bet.
Notably, in actions Razz filed in the Western District of Arkansas in 2002, and in the Northern
District of Oklahoma in 2005, Razz contended that, since his arrival in the United States in 1987,
the FBI had assumed the continuation of surveillance of Razz that had begun in Israel due to his
political criticism of Israel, and that the FBI had enlisted local law enforcement in its campaign
against him. See Raz v. United States, No. 4:05-cv-433-JHP-FHM, ECF No. 1-1, at 28 (N.D. Okla.
July 29, 2005) (containing Arkansas filings). And after the Western District of Louisiana barred
Razz from filing any additional complaints without written permission, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the denial of permission to file a complaint challenging traffic stop and arrest in Benton, Louisiana,
noting that the complaint contained “the same type of incredible claims and allegations that led to
the dismissal of [his] previous actions,” and it stated “[t]hese incredible assertions also no doubt—
3 See Raz v. United States, No. 5:99-cv-00202-DEW-RSP (W.D. La. Aug. 16, 1999); Raz v. Storey,
et al., No. 5:99-cv-1850-DEW-RSP (W.D. La. Mar. 13, 2001), affirmed by Raz v. Storey, et al., 34
F. App’x 151 (per curiam) (5th Cir. 2002); In re Raz, No. 01-31457, 48 F. App’x 104 (per curiam)
(5th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of permission to file complaint seeking “injunction to stop a
chronic and illegal FBI surveillance,” noting the “factual allegations set forth in Raz’s proposed
complaint can fairly be characterized as irrational and wholly incredible.”); Raz v. Oakes, et al.,
No. 5:01-cv-00399-DEW-RSP (W.D. La. Dec. 19, 2001), affirmed by Raz v. Oakes (U.S.
Marshall’s Service), No. 02-30054, 48 F. App’x 481 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (noting, inter
alia, that Raz's “passing references to the private defendants in his brief are mere conclusions and
speculation about the broad and pervasive conspiracy Raz believes is targeting him and which may
aptly be characterized as fanciful, fantastic, and delusional”); Raz v. Louisiana State University
Medical Center, No. 01-31340, 48 F. App’x 481 (5th Cir. 2002) (appeal has no arguable merit and
is dismissed as frivolous).
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in addition to [his] ‘contumacious’ behavior—led to the pre-filing sanction in the first instance.”
In re Raz, 252 F. App’x 609, 610 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit further observed:
Although the allegations regarding the discrete events at issue—an
allegedly unlawful traffic stop, search, and arrest—are not in and of
themselves incredible or delusional, this event is—according to
Raz—simply another event in the same “massive, unrelenting, and
life-destroying” conspiracy involving the FBI, state and local law
enforcement, and Israel’s counterintelligence organization, Shin-
Bet. 	Consequently, Raz’s ongoing and incredible tale about this
conspiracy casts doubt on his specific allegations regarding the
events at issue.
Id., 252 F. App’x at 610 n. 2 (emphasis added).
A. 	The Current Allegations
The present action is another verse in the same old Razz song. 	His wholly incredible
allegations begin with his assertion that he “was executed by Lethal-Injection” under an “Israeli-
Nazi Euthanasia program to eliminate sick or weak children,” but he “miraculously and
inexplicably awoke on the way to the morgue,” and that Shin-Bet wants to harm or kill him because
of its “strong desire to avenge against him because he humiliated the … Spy Agency by surviving
their Lethal-Injection and by leaving Israel for good – instead of fighting with [the Israeli Defense
Forces] as Israeli men are expected.” (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1.1, 4.4, 4.18).
As with the other defendants, including law enforcement and private businesses, in his
many previous lawsuits, Razz now alleges that Sheriff Perry and Police Chief Winford are working
under the “initiative, instructions and control of the Israeli spy organization Shin-Bet” and are
“collaborators” in Shin-Bet’s “diabolic plot” to “trap [him] into arrest and/or have him killed[.]”
(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1.1, 4.1, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17). To help accomplish this diabolical plot, Razz alleges
that Shin-Bet “illegally installed a battery of secret video and audio bugs inside and outside Razz’s
house” in Alma, Arkansas, and “connected [them]” to the Crawford County Sheriff’s Office and
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the office of the Dyer Chief of Police, where he suspects that a deputy in the Crawford County
Sheriff’s Office leads a team of deputies who watch him around the clock. (Id., ¶¶ 4.1, 4.5, 4.6,
4.8, 4.12). Razz also believes that Sheriff Perry monitors his telephone conversations and internet
communications, and he suspects the Sheriff may be using a high-tech camera that can see through
Razz’s walls. (Id., ¶¶ 4.9, 4.9.1, 4.11, 4.12).
The hidden surveillance cameras, Razz alleges, have allowed the Dyer City Police to “set
police-radar ambush operations” near his home, to “run women in front of [his] house when he is
working in his yard,” and for “other Sting-Operations.” 	(ECF No. 1, ¶ 4.6). 	These “sting
operations” include contacting his dates, telling them Razz is a dangerous sexual predator, and
providing them with a remote-control alarm to be used while on a date with Razz to alert “officers
… hiding nearby” so that they could “swoop on Razz and arrest him.” (Id., ¶ 4.9.1).
Razz also suspects that, by use of information from the hidden surveillance cameras, the
Sheriff sought to have Razz taken to a hospital against his will in July 2024 just days after he had
collapsed in his home and become partially paralyzed. 	Razz believes his collapse and partial
paralysis was not a stroke, but instead, “it was a POISONING of some sort” by Shin-Bet. (ECF
No. 1, ¶¶ 5.7, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 7.1, 7.4). 	Fearing he would be taken to a hospital and probably
operated on over his objection, where “they would drill into his head and thus kill him,” he refused
to call 9-1-1 for medical assistance, but two days later he called a home-care company to request
services. (Id., ¶¶ 5.4, 5.11, 5.12). When the home healthcare worker arrived at Razz’s home, Razz,
who was bed-ridden, realized that the home healthcare worker could not get in the door, so in
apparent desperation, he called Fire Chief Saunders to assist in helping the home healthcare worker
into his home. (Id., ¶ 5.13). Fire Chief Saunders arrived and unlocked the door, entered the home
and went to Razz’s bedroom where the two exchanged greetings and discussed Razz’s situation.
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Razz told Fire Chief Saunders he was fine, that he did not need additional help, and Fire Chief
Saunders left. (Id., ¶ 5.14). According to the Complaint, the Fire Chief returned about an hour
later, with numerous others, and attempted to convince Razz to go to the hospital, but Razz refused,
so after checking Razz’s vital signs and obtaining his signature on a release, the Fire Chief and the
others left. (Id., ¶ 5.17).
Regarding Van Buren Police Chief Wear and the grocery retailer ALDI, Razz alleges that
when he shopped at the ALDI’s store in Fort Smith between 2014 and 2017, he was followed by
security guards and police, and female employees would perform work near him, such as cleaning
the floor or restocking shelves, “under hope that he would say or do something” to lead to his
arrest. (ECF No. 1-1, Appendix-5, ¶ 5.2). He asserts that in 2019, after his “lady friend” passed
away, Shin-Bet agents, ALDI, and the Van Buren Police conspired to obtain a psychiatric
commitment of Razz. (Id., ¶ 5.4). He began shopping in the ALDI’s store in Van Buren, and he
believes Shin-Bet agents were given control of the store’s security cameras. He alleges that over
a three-month period they brought women and minor girls to the store with whom they believed
Razz would like to flirt. 	(Id., ¶¶ 5.3, 5.4, 5.5). 	This somehow led to the involvement of the
Arkansas State Police, and an encounter at the store with an unknown State of Arkansas
supervisory employee, who assured Razz that she was just there to ensure compliance with the
law, and that she ultimately determined Razz was not mentally unfit, that he was an ordinary
shopper, and he was not committed. (Id., ¶¶ 5.5.1, 5.6). Razz claims this was an attempt by Shin-
Bet, ALDI, and the Van Buren Police to lock him in a psychiatric ward, and that when it failed,
“Shin-Bet lost face and left town,” but before they did so, they approached Razz and “tried … to
persuade him to return to Israel[,]” where he suspects they would have killed him. (Id., ¶ 5.7).
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Razz also alleges that a manager of the Van Buren ALDI store tried to dissuade him from
shopping there, and that he temporarily stopped shopping at ALDI for three months but returned
after learning that the manager had been transferred to another store. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 5.8, 5.9,
5.10). The Van Buren police, Razz believes, have also attempted to keep him from shopping in
Van Buren, by using “hundreds, if not thousands of women” as bait to create a pretext for his arrest
between 2020 and 2024. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 5.11). When those efforts failed, he says the Van Buren
police would harass him by sounding their sirens or blocking his car in parking lots. 	These
activities allegedly stopped after Razz began video recording the police, and he was thereafter able
to resume shopping. (Id., ¶¶ 5.12, 5.14, 5.15).
B. 	The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Separate Defendants, Joshua Winford and Joseph Saunders (the “Dyer Defendants”) filed
their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on September 24, 2024, contending
that Razz has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based on the doctrine of
qualified immunity. 	(ECF No. 4). 	Noting that the primary allegations against them stem from
supposed surveillance and Saunders’s response to the medical emergency on July 23, 2024, they
point out that Razz was allowed to remain in his home after signing a release, and they assert that
“almost” transporting a medical emergency victim to the hospital is not a violation of Razz’s
constitutional rights. (Id. at 2-3).
Separate Defendant, Jonathan Wear (“Wear”), the Chief of Police of Van Buren, Arkansas,
filed his Motion to Dismiss and a Brief in Support on October 4, 2024. (ECF Nos. 8, 9). Wear
also contends that Razz has failed to state facts or a claim upon which relief may be granted, and
that Razz’s Complaint should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 8 at 2; ECF
No. 9 at 2-3).
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Separate Defendant, ALDI Inc. (“ALDI”) filed its Motion to Dismiss and a Brief in Support
on October 16, 2024. (ECF Nos. 20, 21). ALDI also relies on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing
that Razz has failed to state any cognizable claim against it, and that any alleged constitutional
violations by ALDI would be barred on the face of the Complaint by the applicable statute of
limitations. (ECF No. 21).
Separate Defendant, Daniel Perry (“Perry”), the Sheriff of Crawford County, Arkansas,
filed his Motion to Dismiss and a Brief in Support on October 25, 2024. 	(ECF Nos. 26, 27).
Sheriff Perry likewise argues that Razz’s Complaint fails to state facts or a plausible claim upon
which relief may be granted, and that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). 	Specifically, Sheriff Perry urges a finding that Razz’s claims are clearly baseless
involving unbelievable scenarios; that the Court should take judicial notice of and consider his
previous lawsuits alleging an international conspiracy of unwarranted surveillance almost identical
to those in the instant case; and that these allegations are frivolous, incredible, and subject to
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 27 at 3-6).
Initially, the Court notes that many of Razz’s allegations are not statements of facts, but
only statements of his beliefs, suspicions, speculations, and legal conclusions. For example, Razz
“suspects that the illegal surveillance equipment at his home is Israeli-Shin-Bet installed,” then
connected to local law enforcement who, “in essence,” serve as local agents of the Israeli spy
agency (ECF No. 1, ¶ 4.14) (emphasis added); that Sheriff Perry and Chief Winford are “working
hand in hand in running the Shin-Bet Surveillance, Voyeurism and Sting-Operations against Razz,”
but no further factual support for this conclusion is stated (Id. at ¶ 4.17); that he does not know
what caused his collapse and paralysis, but he knew it was not a stroke, and “believes it was a
POISONING of some sort,” and he “suspects that his July 20, 2024, collapse may not have been
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accidental and was indeed another Shin-Bet assignation attempt” (Id. at ¶ 5.7) (emphasis added);
that “[i]t is quite possible and even likely that the capture of the illegal Electronic Surveillance at
Razz’s house was relayed by [Sheriff Perry] to Shin-Bet Agents …” (ECF No. 56-1 at ¶ 5.18)
(emphasis added); that “it is possible” that some of the women to be used as bait in the sting
operations needed to be transported to ALDI by unmarked police cars (Id. at ¶ 5.19) (emphasis
added); and, that these “bait women” were “usually from the ‘Police-Family,’ such as wives,
daughters, nieces and other relatives of Policemen” (Id. at ¶ 5.22).
Just as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found in In re Raz, No. 01-31457, 48 F. App’x
104 (per curiam) (5th Cir. 2002), the factual allegations set forth in Razz’s current Complaint can
fairly be characterized as “irrational and wholly incredible.” And as in Raz v. Oakes, et al., No.
5:01-cv-00399-DEW-RSP (W.D. La. Dec. 19, 2001), affirmed by Raz v. Oakes (U.S. Marshall’s
Service), No. 02-30054, 48 F. App’x 481 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), Razz’s “passing references
to the private defendants,” here ALDI, “are mere conclusions and speculation about the broad and
pervasive conspiracy Raz believes is targeting him and which may aptly be characterized as
fanciful, 	fantastic, 	and 	delusional.” 	Like 	his 	previously 	dismissed 	lawsuits 	alleging 	an
international conspiracy of surveillance and oppression against him by Shin-Bet, local law
enforcement, and other private businesses and actors, Razz’s current Complaint presents a nearly
identical story - a fanciful, fantastic, and delusional tale that rises to the level of the irrational and
wholly incredible - and it fails to state sufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief that is
plausible on its face.
Accordingly, Razz’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) for failing to state facts supporting a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	The
Separate Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss should be granted.
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C. 	The Motion for Default Judgment Against Israel
Razz seeks default judgment against Israel pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 	In cases brought against a foreign state, the entry of default judgment is
circumscribed by the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e), and the applicable standard parallels that
which is applicable to suits against the United States under Rule 55(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Przewozman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2024 WL 5263844, at 2
(D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2024). As a threshold matter, a court faced with a motion for default judgment
against a foreign sovereign must assure itself of its jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject
matter of the suit. Id.
The FSIA “establishes a comprehensive framework for determining whether a court in this
country … may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state.” Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,
504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992). 	The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction in any action against a
foreign state “depends on the [application] of one of the specified exceptions to sovereign
immunity” set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 493 (1983); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (conferring a broad grant of immunity “except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter”). The FSIA further establishes that “[p]ersonal
jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts
have [subject-matter jurisdiction] ... where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.”
28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
Section 1608(a) governs service of process on “a foreign state or political subdivision of a
foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1). The statute “sets out in hierarchical
order the … four methods by which ‘[s]ervice … shall be made.’” Republic of Sudan v. Harrison,
587 U.S. 1, 4 (2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)). The permissible methods are:
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(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any
special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or
political subdivision; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the summons and
complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of
judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by sending a copy of the
summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into
the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the
ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned, or
(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under paragraph (3), by sending two
copies of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a
translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of
mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the
court to the Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to the attention
of the Director of Special Consular Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one
copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send
to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the
papers were transmitted.
28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) (emphasis supplied).
Because the service rules set out in § 1608(a) apply to “a category of cases with sensitive
diplomatic implications,” the Supreme Court has stated that “the rule of law demands adherence
to strict requirements” of the statute. Republic of Sudan, 587 U.S. at 19. A plaintiff does not have
the privilege to choose from among the four methods of service or to unilaterally devise his own
method. Id. at 12 (noting that a foreign state is not deemed to have been properly served solely
because a service method is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice); see also Przewozman,
628 F. Supp. 3d at 314 (strict adherence to the terms of the statute is required, and neither
substantial compliance nor actual notice suffices); Azadeh v. Gov’t of the Islamic Rep. of Iran, 318
F. Supp. 3d 90, 100 (D.D.C. 2018) (plaintiff must follow the established hierarchy of service).
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Razz indicates that in September 2024 he attempted to serve the State of Israel by
personally sending a copy of the Complaint and Summons by registered U.S. Mail, with a return
receipt requested, addressed to: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Kiryat Ben-Gurion,
Building 3, Jerusalem, Israel 9195015. (ECF No. 47, 49, 49-1). Razz submitted a copy of a receipt
for outgoing mail to Israel, dated September 11, 2024, and a return receipt, which does not contain
a signature but does bear a handwritten notation that the mail was “Received on November 4,
2024.” 	(ECF No. 47-4). 	Razz implies this proves that the State of Israel has been served, has
failed to plead or otherwise defend within the time allotted by statute, and is in default. 	He is
mistaken.
The invalidity of Razz’s attempted service method is apparent when viewed in the light of
applicable statutory text and the Supreme Court’s admonition that the statute sets forth a hierarchy
of service methods, and that strict compliance with the service rules is required. Republic of Sudan,
587 U.S. at 4, 19. The four methods of service established in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) do not include
the option for a plaintiff to serve a foreign state by personally mailing a copy of the Summons and
Complaint directly to the foreign state’s prime minister by registered U.S. Mail with a return
receipt requested. Further, although the method of service in § 1608(a)(1) was unavailable to Razz,
given that he and Israel had no “special arrangement for service[,]” the State of Israel is a party to
an “applicable international convention on service of judicial documents[,]” namely, the
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (“Hague Service Convention”), 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No.
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6638.4 Therefore, in the hierarchy of § 1608(a), Razz was required to serve the State of Israel in
accordance with § 1608(a)(2) and the Hague Service Convention.
Israel’s formal declarations and reservations with respect to the Hague Service Convention
clearly state that judicial documents may be served only through Israel’s Directorate of Courts,
and only where an application for service emanates from a judicial authority or diplomatic or
consular 	representative 	of 	the 	Contracting 	State. 	HCCH|Declarations/Reservations,
https://www.hcch.net/en/notifications/?csid=405&disp=resdn (last accessed Feb. 24, 2025). Israel
further has noted its opposition to the use of postal channels as a method of serving the sovereign
state itself, and its political subdivisions, agencies, authorities and instrumentalities, and officials
or agents. 	Id. 	Thus, mailing a copy of the Summons and Complaint to the Prime Minister by
registered U.S. Mail, with a return receipt requested, did not constitute valid service upon Israel.
Because Razz’s attempted service upon the State of Israel was defective, his motion for
default judgment should be denied for want of personal jurisdiction. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b)
(“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the
district courts have jurisdiction ... where service has been made under [28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)].”);
see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (“Personal jurisdiction ... is
an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district court, without which the court is powerless to
proceed to an adjudication.”).
Where service is ineffective, a court has discretion to dismiss the action or retain the case
to allow an opportunity to cure the defect. Haley v. Simmons, 529 F.2d 78, 78-79 (8th Cir. 1976).
Dismissal may be warranted if, as is the case here, permitting a subsequent attempt to serve the
4 See https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17 (last accessed Jan.
31, 2025) (listing the member states).
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defendant would be futile. See Cardenas v. City of Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2011)
(dismissal based on expiration of statute of limitations); Delaney v. Ashcraft, No. CV 05-6045,
2006 WL 8440417, at 6 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 13, 2006), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV
05-6045, 2006 WL 8440418 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 1, 2006) (same). Permitting a subsequent attempt to
serve the State of Israel in this case would be futile, most notably because the allegations in the
Complaint, liberally construed, demonstrate neither a waiver of sovereign immunity nor a basis
for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against Israel.
“Foreign sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in this case because explicit statutory
language makes it so.” Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 581
U.S. 170, 177 (2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604 (“[A] foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided” by the FSIA’s
exceptions) and § 1605(a) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction” of federal
and state courts if the exception at issue here is satisfied)). “Accordingly, even if the foreign state
does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity defense, a District Court still must determine
that immunity is unavailable under the Act.” 	Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 493-494, n. 20.
Otherwise, subject-matter jurisdiction does not lie.
The Complaint cites the non-commercial tort exception to sovereign immunity in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(5). 	(ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.1). 	This provision waives sovereign immunity for certain torts
committed in the United States by a foreign state or by any official or employee of the foreign state
acting within the scope of employment.5 	Id. 	Addressing the analogous waiver of sovereign
5 Federal courts have jurisdiction over these claims if they properly allege the following elements,
which require that a claim be: (1) against the foreign state, (2) for money damages, (3) for personal
injury or death (or property loss or damage not covered by another exception), (4) occurring in the
United States, and (5) caused by the tortious act or omission of the foreign state or of any official
or employee of the foreign state, (6) while acting within the scope of his or her office or
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immunity of the United States under the FTCA, the Supreme Court, citing Bolivarian Republic,
stated that in the “unique context” where “all elements of a meritorious claim are also
jurisdictional,” the jurisdictional standard requires more than showing the existence of a non-
frivolous claim. 	Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 217-218 (2021). 	Rather, “a plaintiff must
plausibly allege all jurisdictional elements” of the claim, “not only to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted but also for a court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Id.;
see also Bolivarian Rep., 581 U.S. at 173-174 (holding that the jurisdictional standard for the
FSIA’s expropriation exception to sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3), requires more than
a “nonfrivolous” argument; “the relevant factual allegations must make out a legally valid claim”
and “[a] good argument to that effect is not sufficient.”).
Considering the applicable standards, the Complaint does not plausibly allege a waiver of
sovereign immunity under the non-commercial tort exception. 	To support this exception to
sovereign immunity, the Complaint alleges that “Shin-Bet has been conducting an unrelenting and
very violative and illegal Electronic Surveillance of Razz in the United States since October 1987
(For Thirty Seven (37) years Continuously!).” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.1). It further alleges that “Shin-
Bet illegally installed a battery of secret Video and Audio bugs inside and outside Razz’s house
and had them connected to the Crawford County Sheriff’s Office … and to the office of the Dyer
Chief of Police.” (Id., ¶ 4.8). At the same time, however, the Complaint makes clear only that
“Razz suspects that the illegal surveillance equipment at his home is Israeli-made and Israeli-Shin-
Bet installed; then connected to the premises of the American co-conspirators of Shin-Bet (Sheriff
employment, (7) under circumstances in which a private individual would be liable. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330(a), 1604, 1605(a)(5), 1606. 	“[W]here state law provides a rule of liability governing
private individuals, the FSIA requires the application of that rule to foreign states in like
circumstances.” FNC Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983).
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Perry and Chief of Police Winford) who, in essence, serve as local agents of the Israeli Spy
Agency.” (Id., ¶ 4.14) (emphasis added). None of these allegations constitute well-pleaded facts
entitled to the presumption of truth. They are merely legal conclusions and opinions couched as
facts. What is left in the Complaint against the State of Israel are numerous naked assertions and
conclusions that are bereft of necessary factual content, such as the following: “Since October
1987 Shin-Bet has continued its Surveillance and Voyeurism of Razz in cooperation with local
law-enforcement collaborators”; that Shin-Bet has “baselessly claimed that Razz stalk women and
attack them” and “is a Drug-Dealer”; that unidentified “Shin-Bet … agents have visited …
Arkansas officials in the matter of the Surveillance, Voyeurism and Sting-Operations against
Razz”; and, that “Shin-Bet … attempted to have Razz seized and locked in a close Psychiatric
Institution.” (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1.1, 4.1, 4.18). These allegations are not rejected solely on the ground
that they are unrealistic, bizarre, fantastic, or nonsensical, but also because the conclusory nature
of the allegations disentitles them to the presumption of truth. The allegations throughout Razz’s
Complaint are not statements of fact, but merely reflections of his beliefs, conjecture, suspicions,
speculations, and conclusions, and they do not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief against
the State of Israel under the non-commercial tort exception.6
6 The Complaint also contains a single cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, which is the terrorism exception
to sovereign immunity. 	It is assumed that the lone reference is a typographical error, as this
provision has no applicability on the face of the Complaint. 	Section 1605A waives sovereign
immunity for personal injury or death caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support if: (1) the foreign state was
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the act or as a result of it; (2) the claimant
or victim was a U.S. national, member of the armed forces, a U.S. government employee or
contractor; and (3) the claimant afforded the foreign state an opportunity to arbitrate, if the act
occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought. 	28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a).
The Secretary of State currently designates four countries—Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Syria—
as 	state 	sponsors 	of 	terrorism. 	See 	“State 	Sponsors 	of 	Terrorism,”
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. 	The State of Israel is not, and has never been,
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The Complaint does not plausibly allege a waiver of sovereign immunity that would
provide subject-matter jurisdiction over Razz’s cause against the State of Israel. The Complaint
should, therefore, be dismissed as to the State of Israel.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons and upon the authorities discussed above, it is RECOMMENDED that the
Separate Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 4, 8, 20, and 26) be GRANTED, and that
Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED.
It is also RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Rule 55(a) Request to Enter Default Against
State of Israel (ECF No. 49) be DENIED. 	The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that
Plaintiff’s Motion to Waive Requirement of Hebrew Translation (ECF No. 52) be DENIED as
moot.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 6th day of March 2025.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, and no plausible qualifying acts are alleged here. The
presumption of immunity, therefore, has not been overcome.
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