Estes v. Payne

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
SHAUN JERMAINE ESTES 	PETITIONER
V. 	Civil No. 2:24-cv-02073-TLB-MEF
DEXTER PAYNE, Director,
Arkansas Division of Correction 	RESPONDENT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus
by a Person in State Custody filed on June 10, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1). 	The Respondent filed a
Response on December 19, 2024. 	(ECF No. 18). 	Petitioner filed a Reply on January 3, 2025.
(ECF No. 20). The matter is ready for Report and Recommendation.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Shaun Jermaine Estes (“Estes”), filed his pro se Petition on June 10, 2024. (ECF
No. 1). 	The Petition concerns his state criminal case, State v. Shaun Jermaine Estes, Case No.
66FCR-20-875, in the Circuit Court of Sebastian County, Arkansas (12th Judicial Circuit). (Id. at
1). Estes was charged by Criminal Information filed on April 10, 2024, with: (1) Possession of
Methamphetamine < 2g, occurring on December 9, 2020, in violation of A.C.A. § 5-64-
419(b)(1)(A), a Class D Felony; (2) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia – Store or Conceal –
Meth/Cocaine/Heroin/Fentanyl, occurring on December 9, 2020, in violation of A.C.A. § 5-64-
443(c), a Class D Felony; (3) being an Habitual Offender, in violation of A.C.A. § 5-4-501(a)(1);
and (4) Failure to Appear – Class C Felony, occurring on January 3, 2022, in violation of A.C.A.
§ 5-54-120. (ECF No. 18-1, Exhibit A to Respondent’s Response).
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Estes appeared with his retained counsel for a hearing on counsel’s motion to withdraw on
May 23, 2024. 	(ECF No. 18-4, Exhibit D to Respondent’s Response). 	As the Court began the
hearing and questioned Estes if he wished to terminate the services of his counsel, Estes stated,
“so, yes, I would like - - well, we was actually - - talking about a deal, so …” (Id. at 2). Counsel
informed the court “we are pretty close to coming to a deal for it.” (Id.) The court permitted the
attorneys, and Estes, to continue talking about a possible plea agreement. (Id. at 2-4). Some time
later, counsel for Estes announced to the court that a plea agreement had been reached, and the
court conducted a change of plea hearing. (Id. at 4-11).
During the change of plea hearing, the Circuit Judge, Hon. Stephen Tabor, informed Estes
of the offenses he was charged with; that as to each offense, the State alleged he was a habitual
offender with at least two prior felony convictions; and Estes was informed of the possible
penalties related to those offenses. (ECF No. 18-4 at 4-5). The court asked Estes if he understood
each of the charges and the possible penalties, and Estes responded that he did. (Id. at 5).
Two documents were presented to the court, a Plea Statement of Guilty and Terms and
Conditions of Suspended Sentence (ECF No. 18-2, Exhibit B to Respondent’s Response), and
Judge Tabor asked Estes if read and understood those documents. Estes stated that he had read
them; that he went over them with his attorney, who had answered any questions he had about
them; that he did not have any other questions about them for the court; and that he signed each of
the documents. (Id. at 6). Defense counsel also informed the court that he believed Estes read and
understood the two documents. 	(Id.). 	Upon the court’s inquiry, Estes denied being under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. (Id. at 7). Estes then entered a guilty plea to the offenses charged
against him, and he admitted having at least two prior felony convictions. (Id.). Estes stated that
he understood he was giving up his right to a jury trial by entering his guilty plea. 	(Id. at 7-9).
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Estes acknowledged that his guilty plea was entered based on a plea agreement with the State, and
he accurately stated the terms of that plea agreement regarding 15 years of imprisonment and five
years suspended after that. (Id. at 9). When asked by the court, Estes confirmed that nobody was
making him plead guilty against his will. (Id.). A factual basis for the offenses was presented,
and Estes agreed those facts were true. (Id. at 10). The court then imposed the sentences provided
for in the plea agreement: 15 years of imprisonment on the failure to appear offense, with an
additional five years suspended imposition of sentence, and 12 years of imprisonment on the other
offenses, with all sentences to run concurrently. (Id. at 10-11). A Sentencing Order was entered
by the court on May 28, 2024. (ECF No. 18-3, Exhibit C to Respondent’s Response). Estes did
not appeal, nor has he pursued any other post-conviction relief in state court. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3).
On June 10, 2024, less than two weeks after his Sentencing Order was entered, Estes filed
his Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 	(ECF No. 1). 	He raises numerous grounds for relief,
including: a Due Process violation because the Court Clerk refused to file his pro se pre-trial
motions; a violation of his right to free expression; violation of his right to a fair and impartial
trial; and a violation of his right to “know the nature and cause of claims brought against me and
my right to face my accusers.” (Id. at 5-10). For relief, Estes wants “total exhonoration (sic) from
all charges and $250,000 for damages.” (Id. at 15).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a state court shall be entertained only on the ground that he is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Before seeking
federal habeas review, however, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, giving the
state the opportunity to correct alleged violations of a prisoner’s federal rights, “which means he
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must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court to alert that court to the claim’s
federal nature.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) and (c) (requiring
state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to exhaust all remedies available in the state courts).
When a habeas petitioner fails to raise his federal claims in state court, he deprives the state of “an
opportunity to address those claims in the first instance” and frustrates the state’s ability to honor
his constitutional rights. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991)). 	Therefore, when a habeas petitioner defaults his federal claims by
failing to raise them in state court in compliance with the relevant state procedural rules, federal
habeas review is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate “cause” for the default and “actual
prejudice” resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or alternatively, demonstrate that
failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 	Id.; Coleman,
501 U.S. at 750.
A thorough review of Estes’s petition and the record in this case conclusively shows that
his claims are inexcusably procedurally defaulted, and it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that his
§ 2254 Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Having acknowledged his understanding of the charges against him and the possible
penalties, and pursuant to a written Plea Agreement he read, understood, and signed, Estes
unconditionally pleaded guilty to the three offenses charged against him and his status as a habitual
offender. 	He admittedly did not appeal from his convictions and sentences, nor has he pursued
any other post-conviction relief in state courts. Estes now says, “I involuntarily made a guilty plea
on all three counts under threats, duress, and coercion,” and he asserts numerous grounds for
federal habeas corpus relief. (ECF No. 1 at 2, 5-11; ECF No. 1-1 at 2-6). Respondent argues that
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his claims are procedurally defaulted, and that his § 2254 Petition should be dismissed. (ECF No.
18). Respondent is correct.
A. 	Effect of Guilty Plea
First, it is well established that a defendant who enters a guilty plea waives all non-
jurisdictional defenses. 	A knowing and voluntary plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all
challenges to the conviction based on non-jurisdictional defects. 	See Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is
in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea . . ..”).
Estes confirmed that he read, understood, and signed the written Plea Agreement, and that
he had thoroughly discussed it with his counsel. 	(ECF No. 18-4 at 6, 9). 	He stated an
understanding of the three charges against him, his status as a habitual offender, and the possible
penalties. (Id. at 5). He denied being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and he knowingly
and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charged offenses and his status as a habitual offender. (Id. at
7). He expressed understanding that by doing so, he was giving up his right to a jury trial, his right
to confront witnesses, his right to call witnesses or to testify in his own behalf, and his right to
appeal any sentence imposed. (Id. at 7-9). He stated that nobody was making him plead guilty
against his will. (Id. at 9). And he admitted that the factual basis for the charges, presented to the
court by his counsel, was true. (Id. at 10). At no point during the change of plea hearing did Estes
raise any concerns related to his representation by counsel, or to any lack of understanding of the
charges, the possible penalties, or the negotiated plea agreement. Estes has failed to demonstrate
that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and intelligently made.
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B. 	Procedural Default
Not only are Estes’s claims foreclosed by his knowing and voluntary guilty pleas, but they
are also procedurally defaulted and may not be raised for the first time in this federal habeas corpus
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) provides that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that - - the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”
Courts have long recognized that federal habeas review cannot serve as “a substitute for ordinary
error correction through appeal.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 377 (2022).
Under principles of comity, “a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be dismissed
if the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to any of his federal claims.” Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Before a claim for relief can be considered in a federal
habeas petition, “both the factual grounds and legal theories on which the claim is based must have
been presented to the highest state court in order to preserve the claim for federal review.” Miller
v. Lock, 108 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 	State courts should have the
opportunity to review the rulings of lower state courts and correct any federal constitutional errors.
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982). 	The claims must be presented in a timely and
procedurally correct manner to allow review on the merits, and a failure to do so results in a
procedural default. Kemp v. Kelley, 924 F.3d 489, 499 (8th Cir. 2019); Kennedy v. Delo, 959 F.2d
112, 115 (8th Cir. 1992). “The failure to file a timely motion for post-conviction relief in the state
court is a procedural default that will bar habeas review absent cause and prejudice.” Griffini v.
Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)).
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In Shinn, 596 U.S. at 378, the Supreme Court commented that state prisoners, like Estes in
the present case, “often fail to raise their federal claims in compliance with state procedures, or
even raise those claims in state court at all[,]” and that “[i]f a state court would dismiss these claims
for their procedural failures, such claims are technically exhausted because, in the habeas context,
state-court remedies are … exhausted when they are no longer available, regardless of the reason
for their unavailability.” But the Court also noted, “to allow a state prisoner simply to ignore state
procedure on the way to federal court would defeat the evident goal of the exhaustion rule.” Id.
(citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732). 	Thus, federal habeas courts must apply an important
“corollary” to the exhaustion requirement: the doctrine of procedural default, under which federal
courts generally decline to hear any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts
consistent with the State’s own procedural rules. Id. (citing Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 527
(2017) and Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000)).
Estes admits in his § 2254 Petition that he failed to raise any of his claims in state court in
accordance with state procedure, and the time to do so has passed. As the Respondent correctly
states, Arkansas law generally precludes an appeal from a guilty plea. Ark. R. App. P. – Crim. R.
1(a) provides, in pertinent part, “[e]xcept as provided by A.R.Cr.P. 24.3(b) there shall be no appeal
from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Estes entered an unconditional guilty plea to the charged
offenses, not a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Rule 24.3(b), so he had no right of appeal. His
claims that his guilty plea was involuntary and the result of ineffective assistance of counsel could
have been asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief under Ark. R. Crim P. R. 37.1. See Davis
v. Hobbs, 2011 Ark. 249, 2011 WL 2155374, at *4 (per curiam) (internal citations omitted).
Pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. R. 37.2(c)(i), any petition claiming such relief must be filed in the
appropriate circuit court within 90 days of the date of entry of judgment. 	Estes never filed a
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petition under Rule 37.1 in state court, and his time to do so (i.e., within 90 days from May 28,
2024) has expired. His claims are, therefore, procedurally defaulted.
C. 	Cause and Prejudice or Actual Innocence
Federal courts may excuse procedural default only if a prisoner can show cause for the
default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or if failure to
consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at
750. The latter circumstance is almost exclusively limited to a showing of actual innocence. See,
e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 502 (1991); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995).
Cause requires a showing that some external impediment prevented the defense from constructing
or raising the claim. 	For cause to exist, “the external impediment, whether it be government
interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the claim, must have prevented
petitioner from raising the claim.” 	Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 	To establish
prejudice, the prisoner must show not merely a substantial federal claim, such that the errors at
trial created a possibility of prejudice, but rather, that the constitutional violation “worked to his
actual and substantial disadvantage.” 	Id., 477 U.S. at 494. 	If no cause has been shown, the
prejudice element need not be addressed. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 502.
Estes complains that his counsel and the court told him that he could not appeal. (ECF No.
1 at 5). That information was correct, as Estes entered an unconditional guilty plea and had no
right to appeal under Ark. R. App. P. – Crim. R. 1(a). 	He also asserts he was told that “things
would get worse” if he tried to appeal or “if I said anything to the judge or on the record my
sentence would be enhanced.” (ECF No. 1 at 5-6). No proof is provided to support that assertion,
and the transcript of the change of plea hearing does not indicate that it occurred. 	Vague and
conclusory allegations unsupported by the facts are insufficient. See Hayes v. State, 280 Ark. 509,
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at *509-E-F, 660 S.W.2d 648, 652-653 (1983) (vague and conclusory allegations insufficient);
Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 66-67, 146 S.W.3d 871, 877 (2004) (conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by the facts do not provide a basis for either an evidentiary hearing or post-conviction
relief). Estes has failed to demonstrate that any external impediment prevented him from pursuing
post-conviction proceedings under Rule 37.1 in state court. 	There is, therefore, no showing of
cause to excuse the procedural default of the claims he now asserts. 	Since cause has not been
shown, the prejudice element need not be addressed. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 502.
Nor can Estes rely on the actual innocence gateway to overcome his procedural default.
He makes no allegation of actual innocence in his § 2254 Petition, and his knowing and voluntary
guilty plea, along with his admission of the truth of the factual basis supporting his guilty plea,
conclusively shows that he is not actually innocent of the offenses.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Estes’s claims for federal habeas corpus relief were never presented to the appropriate state
courts, thereby depriving the state courts of the opportunity to address his federal claims in the
first instance, and his claims are inexcusably procedurally defaulted. His numerous claims may
not be raised for the first time in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. For the reasons and upon
the authorities discussed above, it is RECOMMENDED that Estes’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
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reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 18th day of February 2025.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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