Justice v. Hanuska et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
JONATHAN DAKOTA JUSTICE 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 2:24-cv-02062-TLB-MEF
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER EMILY HANUSKA
(Johnson County Detention Center);
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ELIZABETH WOOLSEY
(JCDC);
LIEUTENANT SAMANTHA SMITH
(JCDC)
JAIL ADMINISTRATOR JERMEY BENNETT
(JCDC) 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28
U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, Chief United States District Judge,
referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 24).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 10, 2024, while incarcerated in the Crawford County
Detention Center. (ECF No. 1). He alleges that he was denied medical care from February 20,
2024, through April 6, 2024, while incarcerated in the Johnson County Detention Center
(“JCDC”). (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges he was exposed to the flu virus on February 20, 2024, when
a correctional officer came to work sick. 	(Id.). 	He alleges he became ill and experienced a
“horrible cough” and “violent coughing fits” causing him to get light-headed and nearly pass out.
(Id.). He was told the jail did not provide cough drops to inmates. (Id.). He asked if his mother
could buy some and donate them to the jail for use by himself and other inmates. 	(Id.). 	This
request was denied by Defendant Hanuska. (Id. at 5-6). When he started coughing up blood he
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was taken to the Johnson County Regional Medical Center, where he was told his coughing had
ruptured capillaries in his lungs. (Id. at 6). He was given a steroid shot, and the emergency room
doctor wrote him a prescription for three medication and had them sent to the pharmacy used by
the jail. (Id.). The doctor told him he needed to start taking them immediately. (Id.). Defendant
Hanuska was unavailable to pick up the medication the following day. (Id.). He asked if his family
could pick them up and bring them, but Defendants Woolsey and Smith told him it was against
jail policy for anyone other than Hanuska to pick them up. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff alleges that another
inmate’s family had picked up and dropped off prescriptions from that same pharmacy earlier that
week. (Id.).
Plaintiff filed a grievance which was sent to Defendant Bennett. 	(ECF No. 1 at 6).
Defendant Hanuska marked the grievance as substantiated, but Plaintiff still did not receive his
prescriptions. (Id. at 7). After four weeks, Plaintiff had still not received his medication. (Id.).
Two months after he was “neglected, ignored and discriminated against,” Defendants Hanuska and
Smith ordered a “shakedown” of his belongings. 	(Id.). 	He then filed this lawsuit to hold them
accountable. (Id.). Hours after placing it in the mail he was told he was being transferred, and he
was not permitted to bring his commissary items with him. (Id.). He later learned that a previous
attempt to send out a Section 1983 complaint had been hindered by Defendants. (Id. at 8). Based
on Plaintiff’s Complaint, it does not appear that he ever received his prescribed medication.
Plaintiff proceeds against all Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.
(ECF No. 1 at 3-4). He seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000. (Id. at 9).
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on April 7, 2025. 	(ECF No. 24).
They argue summary judgment in their favor is appropriate because: (1) Defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity on the individual capacity claims; (2) there was no deliberate indifference
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to Plaintiff’s medical needs; (3) to the extent Plaintiff is making a retaliation claim,0F
1 he did not
plead sufficient facts to support such a claim; and (4) Plaintiff failed to identify any official
capacity claims against the county. (Id. at 5-10). Defendants also note that Turnkey Health took
over responsibility for inmate medical care as of April 1, 2024. (Id. at 8). Defendants provided
an affidavit from Sheriff Hughes as the custodian of records. Plaintiff’s emergency room discharge
records were attached to Hughes’ affidavit. (ECF No. 26-1).
On April 8, 2025, the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to submit his Summary
Judgment Response and providing directions for Plaintiff to follow in doing so. 	(ECF No. 27).
The Order advised Plaintiff that he must specifically refer to any documents he wished to use in
his Response, and that the Court would not look through the case for documents to support his
factual statements. The Order also advised Plaintiff that he must submit a Separate Statement of
Disputed Facts, identify the number of any disputed Defendants’ fact paragraph and explaining
why he disputed that statement. (Id.).
Plaintiff failed to submit a separate Statement of Disputed Facts as directed. 	He filed a
single page Response containing two paragraphs. The first paragraph is labelled “Evidence.” He
repeats some of the claims of his Complaint, and refers to an attached grievance, to which he
alleges he did not receive any response. (Id.). His second paragraph is labelled a “Statement of
Facts in Dispute.” (Id.). Plaintiff makes no reference to a retaliation claim in either paragraph.1F
2
Plaintiff attached a grievance dated March 29, 2024, and states he had not received his
prescriptions from his emergency room visit on March 1, 2024. (Id. at 2). No grievance response
is attached, although it appears that Defendant Hanuska reviewed the grievance on April 4, 2024,
1 Defendants note that they consider the complaint to be primarily regarding Plaintiff’s
prescriptions, but they reserve the right to further brief the retaliation issue based on Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgment Response. (ECF No. 25 at n. 1).
2 The Court will interpret this to mean that Plaintiff is not pursuing a retaliation claim.
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and marked it closed the same day. (Id.). Plaintiff’s Exhibit B is his discharge instructions from
the 	Johnson 	County 	Medical 	Center. 	(Id. 	at 	3). 	He 	was 	diagnosed 	with 	bacterial
bronchopneumonia and prescribed an antibiotic, an expectorant, and a cough suppressant. (Id.).
The prescription was marked sent electronically to Rose Drug of Clarksville. 	(Id. at 10). 	The
medical records indicate that Plaintiff was seen in the emergency room on March 8, 2024, and
discharged on March 9, 2024. (Id. at 11).
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony provided some additional clarification for his claims. He
states he was transferred to the Crawford County Detention Center on April 6, 2024. (ECF No.
26-6 at 48). He did not put in a request to see the doctor prior to being taken to the emergency
room, because it cost money and he was “pretty healthy” and “I knew I would be able to pass it in
a matter of days, a week or so, whatever.” (Id. at 34). He had stopped running a fever “and all
that kind of stuff” by the time he went to the hospital. (Id. at 40). It was the cough that remained.
(Id. at 41). He put in a verbal request with Turnkey at the pill window, but he did not file a written
request. (Id. at 64). He states he was still coughing when he was transferred to Crawford County.
(Id. at 47). His primary claim in this case is that he did not receive his prescriptions. (Id. at 61).
He has no issues with how quickly he was taken to the hospital when he coughed up blood. (Id.
at 37). Plaintiff saw the doctor in Crawford County to renew his blood pressure medication, and
the doctor prescribed some antibiotics for his cough. He believes that was on April 10, 2024. (Id.
at 48).
Plaintiff testified that Defendant Hanuska was “over medical” at the time, and made sure
pills were on the pill cart for the other officers to hand out. 	(ECF No. 61 at 67). 	He stated he
asked her twice about his prescriptions and she stated, “I don’t know what you’re talking about.”
(Id. at 68). 	Plaintiff testified that Defendant Woolsey was typically the officer who handed out
pills. (Id. at 70). Two other officers who are not named as Defendants also tended to hand out
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pills. (Id. at 71). Plaintiff testified that he asked all of them about his prescriptions, and they said
they would check into it. (Id.). He testified that he talked to Defendant Smith, and she told him
that as far as she knew, he did not have any prescriptions to pick up. (Id. at 76). Plaintiff testified
that his then-girlfriend tried to pick up the medication on an undated Saturday and was told by the
pharmacy that she could not do so. (Id. at 77). Plaintiff does not indicate if the prescriptions were
filled and available to pick up. Finally, Plaintiff testified that no doctor had diagnosed him with
anything permanent because of the delayed prescriptions. (Id. at 80).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” 	National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165
F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 	“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
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adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Failure to Obey the Court’s Order and Local Rules of Civil Procedure
Plaintiff failed to submit a separate Statement of Disputed Facts as directed by the Court.
Local Rule 56.1(a) requires any party moving for summary judgment to submit a separate
statement of undisputed material facts. 	Local Rule 56.1(b) requires the non-moving party
opposing the summary judgment motion to file a separate statement of disputed facts. 	Pro se
inmates are advised of this requirement in the Order directing them to file a summary judgment
response. Pro se inmates are also advised of this requirement in the District’s Prisoner Litigation
Guide, which contains an example to help them understand the concept of using the same
paragraph numbering as that used by the moving party in their own statement of disputed facts.
Due to Plaintiff’s failure, Defendants’ Statement of Facts is deemed admitted pursuant to
Local Rule 56.1(c). In determining whether there are genuine disputes of material fact, however,
the Court has also considered the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s verified Amended Complaint.
A verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for summary judgment purposes. See, e.g.,
Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t., 241 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001). “[A] complaint signed and
dated as true under penalty of perjury satisfies the requirements of a verified complaint . . ..” Id.
As the Court in Roberson pointed out, “[a]lthough a party may not generally rest on his pleadings
to create a fact issue sufficient to survive summary judgment, the facts alleged in a verified
complaint need not be repeated in a responsive affidavit to survive the summary judgment motion.
Id. The Court will, therefore, “piece[] together [Plaintiff’s] version of the facts from the verified
complaint . . ..” McClanahan v. Young, No. 4:13-cv-04140, 2016 WL 520983, *1 (D.S.D. Feb. 5,
2016).
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B. 	Denial of Medical Care
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits deliberate
indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th
Cir. 2012). To prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants acted
with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976).
The deliberate indifference standard includes “both an objective and a subjective
component: ‘The [Plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious
medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those
needs.’” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132
F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)).
To show that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need Plaintiff must show he
“has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or has an injury “that is so obvious
that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 	Schaub v.
VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
For the subjective prong of deliberate indifference, “the prisoner must show more than
negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions
does not give rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Popoalii v. Correctional Med. Servs,
512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal
recklessness, which demands more than negligent misconduct.” Id.
It is well settled that “[a] prisoner’s mere difference of opinion over matters of expert
medical judgment or a course of medical treatment fail[s] to rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.” Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). An
“inmate must clear a substantial evidentiary threshold to show the prison’s medical staff
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deliberately disregarded the inmate’s needs by administering inadequate treatment.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). Despite this, issues of fact exist when there is a question of whether medical
staff exercised independent medical judgment, and whether the decisions made by medical staff
fell so far below the reasonable standard of care as to constitute deliberate indifference. See Smith
v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990).
Deliberate indifference may also be manifested by “prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. However, the “Constitution does not require jailers to handle every
medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.” Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minn.,
557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). “A prisoner alleging a delay in treatment must present verifying
medical evidence that the prison officials ‘ignored an acute or escalating situation or that [these]
delays adversely affected his prognosis[,]’” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted), unless the need for medical attention is obvious to a layperson, in which case
the plaintiff need not submit verifying medical evidence to show the detrimental effects of delay.
See Schaub, 638 F.3d at 919 (citing Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1999));
Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1995); cf. Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.
1995) (“noting that a delay in treatment, coupled with knowledge that an inmate is suffering, can
support a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation”).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff was diagnosed with bacterial bronchopneumonia on
March 9, 2024.2F
3 (ECF No. 26-1 at 6, 14). This diagnosis satisfies the objective first prong of the
deliberate indifference test. Plaintiff was not, however, diagnosed with anything prior to that date,
and testified that he did not think he was suffering from anything serious. 	Thus, his claims
3 Plaintiff was brought to the emergency room on March 8, 2024, but the discharge documents
were prepared on March 9, 2024.
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concerning flu symptoms and lack of cough drops for those symptoms prior to March 9, 2024, fail
to meet the objective first prong of the deliberate indifference test.
There is no evidence in the summary judgment record which satisfies the second subjective
prong 	of 	the 	test 	for 	any 	Defendant 	concerning 	his 	prescriptions 	for 	the 	bacterial
bronchopneumonia. First, other than a stamp on the emergency room discharge papers stating that
“Prescription sent to your pharmacy electronically,” there is no evidence in the summary judgment
record that the pharmacy used by JCDC ever received the prescriptions. 	To the contrary,
Defendant Hanuska stated in her affidavit that the pharmacy delivered some prescriptions to
JCDC, but that she routinely picked up inmate prescriptions as well. (ECF No. 26-3 at 1). JCDC
sergeants also picked up prescriptions on weekends. (Id.). Hanuska stated in her affidavit that the
prescriptions at issue in this case were never delivered to JCDC, and she did not receive them in
any of her normal pickups from the pharmacy. (Id. at 2). She further states that TurnKey Medical
took over responsibility for medical care and medicine administration on April 1, 2024. 	(Id.).
Similarly, Plaintiff testified in his deposition that his girlfriend attempted to pick up the
prescriptions on an unidentified Saturday and was unable to do so.
Second, Plaintiff created the delay when he failed to promptly file a written request
concerning his prescriptions when he did not receive them as expected. 	None of the named
Defendants in this case were involved in Plaintiff’s transport to the emergency room.3F
4 (ECF Nos.
26-2, 26-3, 26-4, 26-5). Plaintiff received his emergency room discharge papers on March 9, 2024,
and failed to submit any written request or grievance until March 29, 2024, only a few days prior
to his transfer to another facility on April 6, 2024. The JCDC policy concerning medical requests
clearly states: “Detainee medical requests must be written.” (ECF No. 26-1 at 43). Defendants
4 Defendant Hanuska stated in her affidavit that the staff member who transports the inmate who
was responsible for any hospital paperwork. (ECF No. 26-3).
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Smith and Wooley both stated in their affidavits that whenever an inmate approached them with a
medical issue, they would “direct the inmate to use the kiosk to file a grievance or request (due to
the large number of conversations with numerous inmates one has when entering the jail) in order
to make sure the problem was addressed.” (ECF Nos. 26-4 at 1; 26-5 at 1). Based on Plaintiff’s
jail record, he was familiar with the kiosk system. 	(ECF No. 26-1 at 17-40). 	Finally, Turnkey
Medical took over responsibility for medical care and medication on April 1, 2024. 	He was
transferred to Crawford County on April 6, 2024, eight days after he submitted his request. 	A
delay of eight days in providing medication for a non-emergency situation does not meet the
subjective second prong of the deliberate indifference test. 	See, e.g., Fourte v. Faulkner Cnty.,
Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 390 (8th Cir. 2014) (delay of eleven days in providing blood pressure
medication from the time the first prescription was written, and requiring a second prescription,
was mere negligence).
Third, Plaintiff has provided no verified medical evidence to show any detrimental effects
to his health prognosis because of any delay in receiving his prescriptions.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons and upon the authorities discussed above, it is RECOMMENDED that
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Referral Status: This case should not remain referred because all matters have been
recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
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reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 5th day of December 2025.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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