Jones v. Shook et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
AIDEN JONES 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 2:24-cv-02061-TLB-MEF
CAPTAIN JACOB SHOOK
(Jail Administrator);
LIEUTENANT SAMANTHA SMITH
(Assistant Jail Administrator);
EMILY HANUSKA
(Detention Deputy);
KATHEY EZELL
(Detention Deputy); and
LIEUTENANT JOHN GRIFFITH 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28
U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge,
referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening for the second time pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.0F
1 Under § 1915A, the Court must screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 8, 2024. (ECF No. 2). After seeking an extension of
time to file his in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application, he was granted IFP status on June 25, 2024.
(ECF Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10). Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Crawford County Justice Center,
1 Enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
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but his Complaint centers on his incarceration in the Johnson County Detention Center (“JCDC”)
from October 2023 to January 2024. (Id. at 8).
A. The Original Complaint
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff raises numerous claims in his lengthy
Complaint. The majority, however, name only the Johnson County Detention Center as the party
responsible for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Johnson County Detention Center is
not a person or a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d
1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (jails are not legal entities amenable to suit); see also Ketchum v. City
of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that “departments or subdivisions”
of local government are not “juridical entities suable as such”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty.
Jail, 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail and
sheriff’s department as parties because they are not suable entities). Because the Johnson County
Detention Center is not subject to suit under § 1983, the Court will only address those claims
attributed to suable persons or entities.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kathey Ezell, a Detention Deputy, “cut off Plaintiff’s
communication abilities on the phone and the NCIC communication machine.” (ECF No. 2 at 11).
Plaintiff states that Defendant Ezell took this action after placing Plaintiff in lockdown for calling
Ashley Zachary.1F
2 Plaintiff does not indicate how long he was in lockdown. Plaintiff says he was
not told that he could not contact Ms. Zachary until the following day at his bond hearing for his
2 Plaintiff does not identify Ms. Zachary in the body of his Complaint. Plaintiff filed two other
cases in this District at the same time as this case. In Jones v. Patton, Case No. 2:24-cv-02060-
PKH-MEF, Plaintiff identified several state cases relevant this his federal filings. The Court takes
judicial notice that Ms. Zachary is Plaintiff’s former girlfriend and was granted a domestic order
of protection against Plaintiff in Zachary v. Jones, Case No. 36DR-23-256. Plaintiff is currently
the Defendant in at least three open criminal cases in Johnson County, one for felony criminal
mischief and trespass, one for violation of a no-contact order, and one for harassment and
cyberbullying. All three cases involve Ms. Zachary.
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pretrial release. 	(Id. at 10). 	Plaintiff alleges this lack of communication impeded his ability to
contact his attorney or anyone outside the jail, and violated his right to prepare his legal defense,
as well as his “Sixth Amendment right to access to legal counsel and a fair trial.” (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lieutenant Samantha Smith, Assistant Jail Administrator,
systematically denied him access to legal materials, instructing him to consult his public defender.
(ECF No. 2 at 12). He alleges she denied him this access despite knowing that he was representing
himself in a domestic relations case in state court. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges this “severely limited”
his “ability to effectively prepare his legal defense, initiate legal actions and access the courts.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lieutenant John Griffith “rejected and returned” paperwork
brought to him by his family without justification. (ECF No. 2 at 13). He alleges he had to invoke
the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice so that the facility would allow him access to his
documents. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Emily Hanuska, a Detention Deputy, oversees the food
planning for the facility, and the meals provided to inmates are “grossly insufficient and do not
conform to any recognized dietary standards.” (ECF No. 2 at 14). Plaintiff alleges he weighed
165 pounds upon arriving at JCDC, and he weighed 145 when he left. (Id. at 15). He alleges this
is evidence of the “malnutrition and the insufficient caloric and nutritional content of the provided
meals.” (Id. at 16).
Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations as to Defendant Captain Jacob Shook, Jail
Administrator, in his Complaint.
Plaintiff proceeds against all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (ECF
No. 2 at 9). He seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, “non-economic compensatory damages,”
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compensatory and punitive damages, costs of this litigation, and any other relief the Court deems
just and proper.
On August 13, 2024, the undersigned entered a preservice screening Report and
Recommendation. (ECF No. 14). It was recommended that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Hanuska, concerning the adequacy of the inmate diet provided in JCDC, remain for further review.
It was further recommended that all of Plaintiff’s claims against all other Defendants be dismissed
without prejudice. (Id.).
On August 23, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a Motion to Amend his Complaint and requested
an extension of time to file. (ECF No. 15). This Motion was granted on August 30, 2024. (ECF
No. 16). On September 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document labelled “Plaintiff’s Supplement to
Complaint.” (ECF No. 18). The Hon. Timothy L. Brooks, U.S. District Judge, directed the Clerk
to docket this as Plaintiff’s timely-filed Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 19).
“It is well-established that an amended complaint supercedes an original complaint and
renders the original complaint without legal effect.” In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees
Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005). The Court will, therefore, consider only the allegations
in the Amended Complaint for the purpose of preservice screening. In his Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff does not provide any dates other than to state that he did not receive mail until January 9,
2024, the day before his release on a nolo-contendere plea. (ECF No. 19). His allegations appear
to focus on his time in isolation in E-pod, which he identifies as a period of 11 days. The Court
will, therefore, infer that the allegations in the Amended Complaint focus on his 11-day isolation
in E-pod.
B. The Amended Complaint
Under sections labelled “Jacob Shook,” Plaintiff raises several complaints.
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• 	Plaintiff alleges he was punitively reassigned to E-pod after he was charged with a
violation of a no-contact order. 	Plaintiff alleges he thought the no-contact order
only applied to him after he was released, and alleges he was deliberately not told
that it applied during his incarceration. (ECF No. 18 at 2). Instead, he alleges that
“they … waited for him to be charged with the offence.” 	(Id.). 	Based on these
statements and his allegations in his original Complaint, the Court will infer that,
in 	violation 	of 	a 	protective 	order, 	Plaintiff 	contacted 	Ms. 	Zachary 	while
incarcerated in JCDC. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shook was responsible for
his re-assignment, “as he is the jail administrator and is the one who assigns inmates
to various pods based on there [sic] charges.” (Id.).
• 	Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied due process as a pretrial detainee because
his “communications” were cut off for the 11 days he was in lockdown. 	(Id.).
Plaintiff alleges he was moved to isolation only after he was charged. (Id. at 4).
• 	He alleges the lockdown cell was punitive because it had no light in it, so he sat in
darkness for 23 hours a day for the 11 days with no access to communications. He
alleges only that one cell was devoid of light. (Id. at 2-3).
• 	Plaintiff alleges the conditions in E-pod were punitive in nature and violated his
rights as a pretrial detainee. (Id. at 3).
• 	Plaintiff alleges his Fourth Amendment Rights were violated upon intake into
JCDC when he was subjected to a “degrading search procedure as the search was
conducted with no individualized suspicion of contraband.” (Id. at 4). He further
alleges he attempted to refuse the search but was told he would not see the judge
for a bond hearing if he refused the search. (Id.). Plaintiff does not identify who
was personally involved in the search.
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• 	Plaintiff alleges he was pro se in one of his cases but was denied legal mail for it
because the mail was not brought or sent by an attorney. (Id.).
Plaintiff does not identify how Defendant Shook was involved these claims, other than to
state that he is responsible for upholding JCDC policies because he is the jail administrator. (Id.
at 2). He further alleges that Shook is “fully aware of who he hires and has a duty to train.” (Id.).
As his last claim against Defendant Shook, Plaintiff states that, as the Chief Deputy Sheriff,
he “significantly hindered plaintiff’s ability to contact his public defender by having him
transported over 3 hrs away to Malvern in Hot Spring County.” (Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges this
hindered his ability to contact his public defender, as he had to wait to be brought to the phones at
Hot Spring County Jail. (Id.). He further alleges he was unable to contact his public defender for
over a month. 	(Id.). 	Notably, the Hot Spring County Jail staff are not Defendants in this case.
Plaintiff alleges that Shook was “fully aware” that a transfer would impede his right to counsel.
(Id.).
In the section labelled Samantha Smith, Plaintiff alleges that she denied him access to the
courts by stating that his mail had to come from an attorney regarding his protection order case.
(Id. at 5-6). He alleges she also refused to print a legal document for him. (Id. at 6),
In the section labelled John Griffith, Plaintiff alleges that he denied him access to
documents brought to Plaintiff by his family. As grounds for the denial, Griffith stated that mail
must be brought by an attorney. (Id. at 6-7). Plaintiff alleges other inmates were able to receive
mail similar to what was denied to Plaintiff. 	(Id. at 7). 	Plaintiff alleges he “had to invoke the
department of justice so that Jacob Shook would allow the mail.” (Id.).
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In a section labelled Kathy Etzell,2F
3 Plaintiff alleges that Etzell is directly responsible for
inmate’s access to the NCIC communications. 	When Plaintiff was placed in E-pod, Etzell
hindered Plaintiff’s ability to contact the outside world or use the kiosk with his inmate ID for 11
days. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges this was punishment for his charge of violating a protective order,
and it violated his rights as a pretrial detainee. (Id. at 8).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or
it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. 	Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
3 Plaintiff alleges this is a corrected version of the spelling.
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framework.” 	Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). 	However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. PreTrial Detainee – Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff alleges that the light in his E-pod cell was out, while other cell lights in E-pod
were not. As a pretrial detainee,3F
4 this Court analyzes Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Stearns v. Inmate Services Corporation,
957 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 525 n.16 (1979)). 	In
articulating the standard governing pretrial detainees’ claims related to conditions of confinement,
the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) held that the government may detain
defendants prior to trial and “may subject them to the restrictions and conditions of a detention
facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise
violate the Constitution.” Id. at 536-37. There are two ways to determine whether conditions of
confinement rise to the level of punishment. First, “a plaintiff could show that the conditions were
intentionally punitive.” Id. at 538. Alternatively, “if there is no expressly demonstrated intent to
punish, the plaintiff could also show that the conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate
government purpose or were excessive in relation to that purpose.” 	Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907
(quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-39). 	“Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention
amounts to punishment in the constitutional sense.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir.
1996). “There is a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.”
Id. 	“In considering whether the conditions of pretrial detention are unconstitutionally punitive,
4 There is some question as to whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at this point because he has
pleaded guilty to at least one criminal case, as discussed in State v. Reider, Case No. 2:24-cv-
02059-TLB, another of Plaintiff’s cases pending in this District. 	As the lack of dates provided
makes it impossible to discern the timeline in question, however, the Court will analyze his claims
under the standard for a pretrial detainee.
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[courts] review the totality of the circumstances of a pretrial detainee’s confinement.” Morris v.
Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2010).
In this case, the imposition upon Plaintiff was de minimis. Nothing in Plaintiff’s allegation
concerning a light being out for a short period of time permits the inference that anyone expressly
intended to punish him. Nor does he allege that he became ill or suffered any other injury because
the light in his cell was out for his 11-day stay in isolation.
B. PreTrial Detainee – Placement in Isolation
Threaded throughout Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is the argument that he is exempt
from any form of inmate disciplinary action because he is a pretrial detainee and cannot be
punished. Plaintiff’s argument misconstrues the law. Here, Plaintiff admits that he violated a no-
contact order by contacting Ms. Zachary while incarcerated in JCDC. 	He was then placed in
isolation for 11 days, which kept him from contacting Ms. Zachary again. “Security of the criminal
justice process, enforcement of a court’s orders, protection of victims and witnesses are legitimate
penological interests ...” Avery v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, No. 5:18-CV-05075, 2020 WL
714176, at *9 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 12, 2020), aff'd, 839 F. App’x 26 (8th Cir. 2021) (unpublished).
No punishment can be inferred from these facts.
As to Plaintiff’s more general exemption argument, “there exists no basis in the Due
Process Clause or elsewhere in the Constitution for requiring that discipline not be imposed upon
a pretrial detainee for violations of institutional discipline without the particular procedural
mechanisms invoked by plaintiff here, including notice, a hearing or specific findings, a right to
counsel, and an independent investigation of the charges.” Swearengin v. Chamberlain, No. 4:22-
CV-403 SRW, 2022 WL 16527241, at *13 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2022) (quoting Smith v. Copeland,
892 F.Supp. 1218, 1233 (E.D. Mo. 1995)). 	Only when a condition or restriction of pretrial
confinement is “arbitrary or purposeless” is the action a punishment that violates Due Process if
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inflicted upon pretrial detainees. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. Maintaining the “security, good order and
discipline” of a facility is always a legitimate penological interest. Kaden v. Slykhuis, 651 F.3d
966, 968 (8th Cir. 2011). Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that, as pretrial detainee, he is exempt from
disciplinary action for breaking facility rules or violating court orders lacks merit.
C. Hiring, policies and training - Defendant Shook
Plaintiff fails to state any plausible constitutional claim against Defendant Shook.
“Liability under Section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation
of rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 370 (1976)). Plaintiff merely identifies Defendant Shook as the Jail Administrator for
JCDC, and responsible for hiring, upholding policies, and training. 	This allegation alone is
insufficient to support a claim. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 654, 694 (1978)
(a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based solely on a respondeat superior
theory of liability).
D. Denial of Access to Courts - Defendants Shook, Smith, Ezell, and Griffith
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible denial of meaningful access to courts claim against these
Defendants based on his allegations that he was not able to use the phone or NCIC device for 11
days while under lockdown; that paperwork brought to him by his family during his isolation was
returned; that he was not provided legal materials and was instead instructed to speak with his
public defender; and that he was transferred to another facility in order to impede access to his
public defender. The Supreme Court has held “the fundamental constitutional right of access to
the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817 (1997)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court “did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a
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law library or legal assistance.” 	Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 	Instead, prison officials must provide
“some means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of
fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Bear v. Fayram, 650 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.
2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	These means may include, but they are not
limited to, prison libraries, jailhouse lawyers, private lawyers on contract with the prison, or some
combination of these and other methods. Id.
Further, an inmate cannot prevail on an access-to-courts claim unless he can demonstrate
that he suffered prejudice or actual injury because of the prison officials’ conduct. See Lewis, 518
U.S. at 351-2; see also Farver v. Vilches, 155 F.3d 978, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam);
Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir. 1997) (to prevail on access-to-courts claim,
inmate must show actual injury or prejudice even if denial of access to library is complete and
systematic); McMaster v. Pung, 984 F.2d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 1993). “To prove a violation of the
right of meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner must establish the state has not provided an
opportunity to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner’s sentence or conditions of confinement in
a court of law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably
meritorious underlying legal claim.’” 	Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff states that he was represented by a public defender. Plaintiff fails to allege
that he suffered any prejudice or actual injury in any of his pending state cases. Instead, he merely
makes vague and conclusory allegations that his ability to prepare for his cases was impeded or
limited. See Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337 (even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient
to state a claim). 	Thus, he fails to state a plausible denial of meaningful access to courts claim
against these Defendants.
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E. Defendant Hanuska
Plaintiff makes no allegations against Defendant Hanuska in his Amended Complaint.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2)
Plaintiff/Petitioner is warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on
the case for future judicial consideration; and (3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith.
Referral Status: This case should not remain referred because all matters have been
recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 13th day of December 2024.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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