King v. Sturgeon et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
ALVIN WESLEY KING,
also known as Wes King 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:25-CV-01036-SOH-MEF
SHERIFF TOMMY STURGEON,
Ashley County, Arkansas; and
JAIL ADMINISTRATOR JOHNNY GUY,
Ashley County Detention Center 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Alvin Wesley King (“King”), an inmate at the Ashley County Detention Center
(“ACDC”), has filed a federal lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, primarily alleging that the
conditions of his confinement violate his constitutional rights. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Plaintiff proceeds
pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	(ECF No. 3). 	The case was directly assigned to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to General Order 2024-02, but not all parties to the action
have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 	Accordingly, for
the purpose of preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the case will automatically be
reassigned to Chief United States District Judge Susan O. Hickey and referred to the undersigned
for a report and recommendation pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3).
Upon that review and for the reasons outlined below, the undersigned recommends that
King’s conditions of confinement claim concerning the conditions of the facility and the purported
lack of access to hygiene materials proceed, and that all other claims be dismissed without
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prejudice for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
I. 	BACKGROUND
King’s Complaint identifies Sheriff Tommy Sturgeon and Jail Administrator Johnny Guy
as Defendants in their individual and official capacities. 	(ECF No. 1, p. 5). 	The Complaint
explicitly asserts one claim for relief, namely, King claims that the conditions of his confinement
at the ACDC violate his constitutional rights. 	He asserts that he resides in housing unit #2 and
says that he has endured the following conditions from December 8, 2024, to “present,” which this
Court construes as the date of the filing of the Complaint, or April 28, 2025: (1) the toilets in cell
#15, #16, #17, and #18 do not flush and officials have placed plastic bags over them to suppress
the smell of feces and urine; (2) the smell of human waste sometimes emanates from the shower
area and cell #10 and that smell gets worse when the outside temperature rises; (3) there is warm
water in the shower area and in cell #9 and cell #2; (4) some cells have cold water, some have no
running water, some sinks do not drain properly, some toilets work properly and some do not, and
none of the lights work properly; (5) there is black and green mold in the shower area and in the
cells; (6) inmates receive hot water in plastic containers three times a week; and (7) combs, flex
pens, and shaving razors are not available for purchase on the commissary and officials do not
issue these items in a manner that affords all inmates an opportunity to obtain them. 	King says
that while officials handed out razors on April 20, 2025, officials have refused requests for flex
pens and combs and these items are not available for purchase. 	According to King, the
Defendants have failed to correct these conditions and exposure to the mold has caused him to
suffer from headaches and a spotty, red rash that itches.
In addition to King’s description of the conditions of his confinement, he makes several
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additional allegations related to his incarceration: (1) there are five trustees, four of whom are
Black, and one is White; (2) only one grievance can be submitted at a time; (3) ACDC officials
did not timely complete a certificate of inmate account and assets form for Plaintiff to submit along
with his IFP application; (4) he is charged $10 to visit a nurse, $10 to be examined by the doctor,
and $10 for medication, and he does not have the funds to pay these fees; (5) Defendant Guy will
not tell inmates when they will be transferred to the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”);
and (6) King was escorted to Sheriff Sturgeon’s office after inquiring about a deposition. 	King
says that he asked Sheriff Sturgeon if he were “aware of trespassing laws,” at which time he was
“violently and belligerently ejected from his office and intimidated and threatened with the
statement, ‘I’m going to put you in prison is what I’m going to do.’” 	(ECF No. 1, p. 12). 	Plaintiff
requests depositions of several persons, including Michael Vorhease, Tad Huntsman, Josh Pollack,
Prosecuting Attorney Sandra Bradshaw, and Circuit Judge Robert B. Gibson, III. 	Plaintiff
requests compensatory and punitive damages.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court
must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious,
or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	A pro se complaint, moreover, is to be
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given liberal construction, meaning “that if the essence of an allegation is discernable, even though
it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way
that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” 	Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). 	However, “they still must allege sufficient facts to
support the claims advanced.” 	Id. at 914 (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.
1989)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
King brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	To establish a plausible § 1983
claim, “a plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” 	Andrews v. City of West Branch, Iowa, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir.
2006). 	While the Complaint expressly asserts one claim alleging unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, as described above, the Complaint also includes claims related, more generally, to
jail operations. 	This Court, therefore, considers these claims separately.
Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement
Starting first with King’s unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim, he alleges he
experienced such conditions at the ACDC from December 18, 2024, to “present,” which this Court
understands to be the date he filed the complaint, April 28, 2025. 	King also states that he was
convicted of a crime and serving a sentence as of April 14, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1, p. 2). 	It appears,
therefore, that King was both a pretrial detainee and a prisoner during the events giving rise to his
claims. 	Accordingly, for the limited purposes of preservice review, this Court will consider his
conditions of confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment standard that applies to pretrial
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detainees as well as the Eighth Amendment standard that applies to prisoners.1
1. 	Pretrial Detainee
As a pretrial detainee, this Court analyzes King’s conditions of confinement claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	Stearns v. Inmate Servs. Corp., 957 F.3d 902,
906 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 525 n.16 (1979)). 	Under that standard,
“the government may detain defendants pretrial and ‘may subject [them] to the restrictions and
conditions of [a] detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to
punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” 	Id. at 907 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-37)).
There are two ways to determine whether conditions of confinement rise to the level of
punishment. 	Id. 	First, “a plaintiff could show that the conditions were intentionally punitive.”
Id. 	Alternatively, “if there is no expressly demonstrated intent to punish, the plaintiff could also
show that the conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose or were
excessive in relation to that purpose.” 	Id. 	“In considering whether the conditions of pretrial
detention are unconstitutionally punitive, [courts] review the totality of the circumstances of a
pretrial detainee’s confinement.” 	Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2010).
King describes being exposed to the smell of feces and urine, lack of warm water, and
green and black mold in the shower area (conditions (1)-(6) described above). 	He further claims
that “combs, flex pens, and razors” are not regularly provided to inmates and not available for
purchase on the commissary (condition (7)). 	He asserts that he was exposed to those conditions
1 Nothing in this Report and Recommendation should be construed as foreclosing any future
argument appropriately grounded in fact and law as those facts develop throughout these
proceedings.
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for over five months, that exposure to the mold has caused him to experience headaches and a red,
itchy rash, and that Defendants have failed to correct these conditions.
Accordingly, 	for 	the 	limited 	purpose 	of 	preservice 	review 	pursuant 	to 	28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a), King’s conditions of confinement claim may proceed. 	See Thurmond v.
Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining that there could be a case where
exposure to the “presence of mold or another environmental allergen” may give rise to unsanitary
prison conditions that violate the inmates’ rights); see also Lemmons v. Chambers, Case No. 23-
2318, 2023 WL 5164011, at *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 11, 2023) (concluding that plaintiff’s allegation that
he developed respiratory issues due to mold exposure in the jail during his seven month detention
was sufficient to survive preservice dismissal).
2. 	Convicted Prisoner
As a convicted prisoner, King’s unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim is
analyzed under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.” 	The
Eighth Amendment extends to conditions of incarceration and confinement. 	Kulkay v. Roy, 847
F.3d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017). 	To state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim, the inmate must
first show that the alleged violation is “objectively and sufficiently serious.” 	Id. (quoting Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994)). 	“An alleged violation is objectively and sufficiently
serious when the inmate ‘is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm.” 	Id. (internal quotation omitted). 	Second, the inmate must show “the defendant acted with
a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” 	Id. at 643 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). 	“In a case
challenging conditions of confinement, the requisite state of mind is ‘deliberate indifference’ to
inmate health or safety.” 	Id. 	“An official is deliberately indifferent if he or she actually knows
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of the substantial risk and fails to respond reasonably to it.” 	Id. (quoting Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d
868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007)). 	“Mere negligence or inadvertence does not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference.” 	Id.
Here, King asserts that the Defendants were aware of the conditions at the ACDC but did
nothing to correct them, and that he experienced these conditions for several months. 	Thus, for
the limited purpose of preservice review, the Court finds that King has established a plausible
conditions of confinement claim under the 8th Amendment. 	See Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d
134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[I]nmates are entitled to reasonably adequate sanitation, personal
hygiene, and laundry privileges, particularly over a lengthy course of time.”).
3. 	King’s Other Claims
The undersigned finds, however, that King’s remaining claims fail as a matter of law.
First, King claims that of the five trustees at the ACDC, four are Black and one is White. 	He does
not, however, assert how these allegations give rise to a claim for relief. 	To the extent, therefore,
that King endeavors to assert a claim based on these allegations, “[a] district court [] is not required
to divine the litigant’s intent and create claims that are not clearly raised [] and it need not conjure
up unpled allegations to save a complaint.” 	Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th
Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (cleaned up). 	Accordingly, this claim fails
as a matter of law.
Second, King says that ACDC inmates are only permitted to submit one grievance at a
time. 	But the Eighth Circuit has made it clear that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to
a prison grievance procedure. 	Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 2002) (no claim
when “various defendants denied his grievances or otherwise refused to help him”); Buckley v.
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Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (no claim when defendants failed to timely and properly
respond to a grievance); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he
Constitution does not obligate the state to establish a grievance procedure.”). 	It follows, therefore,
that the Constitution does not require that a grievance procedure allow inmates to submit unlimited
grievances. 	See Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452 (“[P]risoners must understand that if they abuse the
system by repeatedly filing ill-founded grievances, reasonable limitations may be placed on their
access to the procedure, just as reasonable limitations may be placed on prisoners’ access to the
courts when they abuse the judicial process by repeatedly filing frivolous claims.”).
Third, King says that ACDC officials did not timely complete Plaintiff’s certificate of
inmate account and assets form for him to submit along with his IFP application. 	The Court
construes this claim as an access-to-the-courts claim. 	The Supreme Court has held “the
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates
in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” 	Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
346 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1997)). 	“To prove a violation of the right of
meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner must establish the state has not provided an opportunity
to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner’s sentence or conditions of confinement in a court of
law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably
meritorious underlying legal claim.” 	Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation and citations omitted). 	Plaintiff has failed to establish any such injury here.
This claims, therefore, similarly fails.
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Fourth, King says that he is unable to pay the fees for medical visits and medication.
Courts apply the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to failure to provide medical
care claims brought by pretrial detainees and prisoners. 	See Barton v. Tabor, 820 F.3d 958, 964
(8th Cir. 2016). 	King does not assert that he was denied any medical care (or even that his medical
care was delayed) because he did not have the funds to pay these fees. 	Moreover, King does not
assert that these fees violate some other constitutional right. 	Accordingly, King has failed to
assert a plausible claim for relief.
Fifth, King claims that Defendant Guy will not tell inmates when they will be transferred
to the ADC. 	As a threshold matter, this claim presupposes that Defendant Guy knows this
information, but simply chooses not to communicate it. 	In any event, King does not assert what
constitutional right Defendant Guy purportedly violated in refusing to provide this information,
assuming he was aware of it. 	Further, it is well established that a “prisoner enjoys no
constitutional right to remain in a particular institution, and [] generally prison officials may
transfer a prisoner for whatever reason or for no reason at all.” 	Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737
(8th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (cleaned up). 	Here, again, therefore,
King has failed to establish a plausible claim for relief.
Finally, King says that Sheriff Sturgeon “violently and belligerently ejected [him] from his
office and intimidated and threatened him with the statement, ‘I’m going to put you in prison is
what I’m gonna do.’” 	(ECF No. 1, p. 12). 	Verbal threats by themselves, however, are not
actional under § 1983. 	See Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Verbal abuse is
not normally a constitutional violation.”) (citing Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir.
1985)); McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Verbal abuse and name calling
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usually are not actionable under § 1983.”); Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir.
1992). 	While King claims that Defendant Sturgeon “violently” ejected him from his office, he
does not describe with any particularity what, specifically, Defendant Sturgeon did that was
purportedly “violent.” 	Cf. Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1378 (“[A] prisoner retains at least the right to be
free from the terror of instant and unexpected death at the whim of his allegedly bigoted
custodians.”) (quoting Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986)). 	King’s description
of Defendant Sturgeon’s conduct as “violent” is, therefore, wholly conclusory and insufficient to
establish a plausible claim for relief. 	See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009) (in
determining whether a complaint establishes a plausible claim for relief, while legal conclusions
may provide a framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations).
Accordingly, King has failed to assert that Defendant Sturgeon’s behavior constitutes a plausible
constitutional violation.2
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS:
(1) That King’s individual and official capacity claims against Defendants Sheriff Tommy
Sturgeon 	and 	Jail 	Administrator 	Johnny 	Guy 	regarding 	the 	conditions 	of 	his
confinement at ACDC PROCEED; and
(2) That all other claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a
claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
2 To the extent King requests depositions from specific individuals, moreover, those requests are
premature. 	Discovery has not yet commenced in this matter. 	Indeed, the Defendants have not
yet been served with this lawsuit.
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The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
STATUS OF REFERRAL: This case remains referred consistent with the Court’s
recommendations.
DATED this 19th day of May 2025.
/s/	
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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