Radford v. Scott et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
JESSIE TERRELL RADFORD 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:25-CV-01012-BAB
SERGEANT HUNTER SCOTT;
OFFICER KYLE JENSEN;
ATTORNEY CARRIN HEART;
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY RAINWATER;
and JAILER JOSH OWENS 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	He proceeds pro se and in
forma pauperis. 	Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Columbia County Detention Center
(“CCDC”) in Magnolia, Arkansas.
The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 	However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document
will be dispositive of certain of Plaintiff’s claims, this document will be filed as a Report and
Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief United States District
Judge Susan O. Hickey. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No.
6) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
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a governmental entity. 	Upon consideration, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Complaint be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff names five Defendants: Sergeant Hunter Scott from the
Magnolia Police Department (“MPD”); Officer Kyle Jensen of the MPD; Attorney Carrin Heart,
public defender; Prosecuting Attorney Rainwater; and Jailer Josh Owens, from the CCDC.
Plaintiff alleges these Defendants violated his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. 	(ECF
No. 1). 	Specifically, Plaintiff alleges these Defendants framed him for a burglary charge, planted
“meth” in his property and falsely charged him with possessing controlled substances in the
CCDC; set his bond excessively high, and falsely imprisoned him.0F
1 	(ECF No. 1, pp. 1-3. 8).
Plaintiff asserts his claims against all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
Id. at 7, 11.
Plaintiff also submitted a Supplement to his Complaint in which he reasserts the same
claims and also makes additional factual allegations regarding Defendant Hart, his public defender,
and Prosecutor Rainwater’s conspiracy to wrongfully convict him. 	(ECF No. 6).
For relief, Plaintiff requests the Court expunge his criminal record, free him, and pay him
$1500 for each day he has been falsely imprisoned. 	Id. at 11.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
1 The Court notes Plaintiff provided detailed factual allegations related to his arrest, the search of
his person and property, and his incarceration. 	However, because all of his claims fail as a matter
of law despite the factual details, the Court finds it unnecessary to enumerate such additional facts
herein.
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issued. 	The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” 	Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). 	However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint is a challenge to his arrest, charges, and imprisonment.
As such, his claims fail, as a matter of law, to state cognizable claims pursuant to Section 1983.
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A. Habeas
First, all of Plaintiff’s claims, against all Defendants, attempt to gain relief from his arrest
and imprisonment. 	He specifically seeks freedom from his incarceration and as relief. 	(ECF No.
1, p. 11). 	Plaintiff may not use Section 1983 as a substitute for habeas relief, instead, he must
pursue such claims through the proper avenue of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 	See e.g., Singleton v. Norris,
319 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Section 2254 is the only means by which ‘a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court’ may raise challenges to the validity of his
conviction or sentence or to the execution of his sentence.”) (quoting Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d
720, 723 (8th Cir. 2001)). 	Plaintiff is plainly challenging his incarceration as he argues he should
not be incarcerated and he was framed and charged invalidly. 	Such a claim fails to state a
cognizable Section 1983 claim.
B. Heck
Additionally, Plaintiff may not recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction,
sentence, or imprisonment. 	Such claims are barred unless “the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus.” 	Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 	As evidenced by
Plaintiff’s claims, he is still imprisoned on the sentence he complains of, and he has produced no
evidence or allegations in his Complaint to meet the Heck requirements.
The claims against all Defendants should be dismissed based on the foregoing.
C. Official Capacity
Finally, all official capacity claims asserted by Plaintiff must fail as a matter of law.
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Without a cognizable constitutional violation alleged, there can be no official capacity claim
against the employers. 	See Morris v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020); Sanders v.
City of Minneapolis, Minn., 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended:
(1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted;
(2) Plaintiff be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk be directed to place a § 1915(g) strike
flag on the case for future judicial consideration; and
(3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal
would not be taken in good faith.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status of Referral: 	The referral is terminated.
DATED this 27th day of March 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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