Bowen v. Hill et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
CARL A. BOWEN 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:24-CV-01090-BAB
LT. CECILY HILL; LT. RUSSEL ASHLEY;
CAPTAIN WORLEY; JUDGE BAKER;
JEFFREY RODGER; and JUDGE SINGLETON 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	He proceeds pro se and in
forma pauperis. 	Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Union County Detention Center
(“UCDC”) in El Dorado, Arkansas.
The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 	However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document
will be dispositive of certain of Plaintiff’s claims, this document will be filed as a Report and
Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief United States District
Judge Susan O. Hickey. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No.
6) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
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a governmental entity. 	Upon consideration, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Complaint be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names five Defendants: Judge Baker, District Judge
of Union County; Jeffrey “DA” Rodgers, the district attorney for Union County; Judge Singleton,
the circuit judge of Union County; and Lieutenant Russel, Lieutenant Hill, and Captain Worley all
of the UCDC. 	Plaintiff alleges these Defendants violated his Due Process rights, his Sixth
Amendment rights, and his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 	He explains these violations
specifically as:
Judge Baker is the first appearance judge who violate my Due Process by placing me in
Jail for charges I wasn’t even under arrest on which was later filed after my 8.6 Rule was
violated. 	I wrote a complaint many about the [situation] Capt. Worley failed to Investigate
due to being the highest ranking uniform on shift to see the matter, so I was booked in the
County Jail under wrong dates, and times. 	Lt. Hill booked me in, Lt. Russel wouldn’t fix
the dates because I informed her as well. 	I complained to the “DA” which he failed to fix
the matter, Judge Singleton is my sentencing Judge who failed to [enforce] the rules by law
in this matter. 	I lost my job I’m currently still sitting in Jail for the double jeopardy, and
my charges not being filed on a timely matter I became mentally disturb because the Capt.
Worley refuse to do her job.
(ECF No. 6) (errors in original). 	Plaintiff asserts his claims against all Defendants in both their
individual and official capacities.
For relief, Plaintiff requests: “I would like to be freed away from this corrupted system”
and for compensation for each of wrongful incarceration. 	Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. 	The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). 	This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” 	Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). 	However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
While Plaintiff makes multiple factual allegations against each Defendant regarding the
timing of his booking into the UCDC, the crux of his Complaint is a challenge to his arrest,
sentence, and imprisonment. 	As such, his claims fail as a matter of law to state a cognizable claim
pursuant to Section 1983.
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A. Habeas
First, all of Plaintiff’s claims, against all Defendants, attempt to gain relief from his
criminal conviction, sentence, and imprisonment. 	He specifically seeks freedom from his
incarceration as relief. 	(ECF No. 6, p. 9). 	Plaintiff may not use Section 1983 as a substitute for
habeas relief, instead, he must pursue such claims through the proper avenue of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
See e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Section 2254 is the only means
by which ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court’ may raise challenges to
the validity of his conviction or sentence or to the execution of his sentence.”) (quoting Crouch v.
Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2001)). 	Plaintiff is plainly challenging his incarceration as he
argues he should not be incarcerated since there were no valid charges. 	Such a claim fails to state
a cognizable Section 1983 claim.
B. Heck
Additionally, Plaintiff may not recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction,
sentence, or imprisonment. 	Such claims are barred unless “the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus.” 	Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 	As evidenced by
Plaintiff’s claims, he is still imprisoned on the sentence he complains of, and he has produced no
evidence or allegations in his Complaint to meet the Heck requirements.
The 	claims 	against 	all 	Defendants 	should 	be 	dismissed 	based 	on 	the 	foregoing.
Additionally, three defendants are entitled to dismissal on the basis of judicial or prosecutorial
immunity as set out below.
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C. Immunities
Next, Judge Baker, Judge Singleton, and Prosecuting Attorney Rodgers are all immune
from Plaintiff’s suit. 	First Judges Baker and Singleton enjoy complete judicial immunity. 	“Few
doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges for liability
for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” 	Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967) (explaining the common law principle of judicial immunity was not abolished by
Section 1983). 	The Supreme Court “has pronounced and followed this doctrine of the common
law for more than a century.” 	Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985). 	Judicial
immunity is only overcome in two narrow situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial; and
(2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012).
Moreover, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error,
was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only
when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 	Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
356-57 (1978) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff did not allege Judges Baker and Singleton acted outside their jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s factual complaints against Judges Baker and Singleton relate to the use of incorrect
arrest and booking dates, and his alleged invalid charges and sentencing. 	Clearly, court
appearances, appearance dates, and sentencing, fall within a judge’s normal judicial activity. 	See
Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1091 (explaining that judicial immunity applies if the act
complained of is one normally performed by a judge and if the complaining party is dealing with
the judge in his judicial capacity).
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Next, Jeffrey Rodgers, as a prosecuting attorney, also enjoy immunity from suit. 	The
Supreme Court established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages
under Section 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” 	Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). 	This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” 	Id. at 430. 	Furthermore, immunity
is not defeated by “[a]llegations of unethical conduct and improper motive in the performance of
prosecutorial functions.” 	Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). 	“[A]
prosecutor is immune from suit even if he knowingly presented false, misleading, or perjured
testimony . . . or withheld or suppressed exculpatory evidence.” 	Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d
1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s only complaint against Defendant Rodgers is that he failed to fix Plaintiff’s
book-in dates from the UCDC. 	This is insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against
Defendant Rodgers or overcome Defendant Rodgers prosecutorial immunity.
D. Official Capacity
Finally, all official capacity claims asserted by Plaintiff must fail as a matter of law.
Without a cognizable constitutional violation alleged, there can be no official capacity claim
against the employers. 	See Morris v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020); Sanders v.
City of Minneapolis, Minn., 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended that the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status of Referral: 	The referral is terminated.
DATED this 5th day of March 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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