Jones v. French et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
JOE FRANK JONES 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:24-cv-01066-SOH-BAB
CLERK FRENCH; and
CAPTAIN WORLEY 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Joe Frank Jones., filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Plaintiff
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. 	The case was directly assigned to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge. 	However, because not all parties to the action have consented to the
jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document will be dispositive of Plaintiff’s claims, this
document will be filed as a Report and Recommendation and the case will automatically be
reassigned to Chief United States District Judge Susan O. Hickey. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). 	Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP
Motion”) on September 23, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1, 2). 	The Court directed Plaintiff to file a
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completed IFP Motion and he did so on October 10, 2024 and November 5, 2024. 	(ECF No. 5,
7). 	The Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP Motion on November 6, 2024 	(ECF No. 8). 	Plaintiff is
currently incarcerated at the Union County Detention Center (“UCDC”) as a pretrial detainee.
(ECF No. 1).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff lists two claims against two Defendants: Clerk French and
Captain Worley. 	(ECF No. 1). 	In his Claim One, Plaintiff alleges Defendant French violated his
constitutional rights on September 9, 2024 by opening his mail outside of his presence. 	(ECF No.
1, p. 4). 	Plaintiff describes the opened mail as federal mail and states it was delivered to him
taped shut. 	Id. 	Plaintiff sues Defendant French in his individual capacity only. 	Id. at 5.
Next, Plaintiff claims, in his Claim Two, that Defendant Worley, on September 10, 2024,
told him she watched the camera and saw Defendant French open his mail and tape it shut. 	(ECF
No. 1, p. 6). 	Plaintiff sues Defendant Worley in her individual capacity only. 	Id. at 7.
Plaintiff does not allege any injury from either of Defendants’ actions. 	For relief, Plaintiff
seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 	(ECF No. 1, p. 9).
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. 	In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which
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relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)). 	However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim.
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
First, Plaintiff does not fully explain what type of mail was opened outside his presence.
Further, Plaintiff describes the item at issue as “my federal mail.” (ECF No. 1, p. 4). 	Based on
the circumstances here, the Court is able to infer Plaintiff intended to allege Defendant French
opened Plaintiff’s mail from this Court.0F
1
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme
Court concluded that prison officials may open and inspect a prisoner's mail outside his presence
unless the mail is privileged legal mail. 	Id. at 576-77, 94 S.Ct. 2963. 	Thus, the threshold
question for the Court is whether correspondence from the court is “privileged legal mail,” and
this Court finds it is not. 	Privileged legal mail is defined as “mail to or from an inmate's attorney
and identified as such.” 	Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997). 	“Mail to and
from a court or opposing counsel does not fall under this narrow definition of privileged legal mail
and, therefore, may be opened outside of the inmate's presence.” 	Barron v. Jones, No. 3:20-CV-
1 Plaintiff has a separate case before this Court at Civil Number 1:24-cv-01059-BAB which was
filed on September 5, 2024. 	The Clerk of Court mailed Plaintiff documents in that case on
September 5, 2024.
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00311-DPM-PSH, 	2020 	WL 	6200187 	at 	* 	2 	(E.D. 	Ark. 	Oct. 	22, 	2020), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 6750353 at *1 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 17, 2020) (citing Burgess
v. Dormire, No. 05-4111-CV-S-SOW, 2006 WL 1382317, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 17, 2006)), see
also Moore v. Rowley, 126 F. App'x 759, 760 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (concluding that prisoner
had no constitutional right to have his bankruptcy petition mailed without first being inspected).
For these reasons, Plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation regarding the opening of
his “federal mail” outside his presence.
Furthermore, if Plaintiff is attempting to allege an access-to-courts claim, he has also failed
to state a cognizable claim. 	In order to state an access-to-courts claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate
he suffered prejudice or actual injury because of the prison officials' conduct. 	See Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 351-2 (1996); see also Farver v. Vilches, 155 F.3d 978, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam); Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir. 1997) (to prevail on access-to-
courts claim, inmate must show actual injury or prejudice even if denial of access to library is
complete and systematic); McMaster v. Pung, 984 F.2d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 1993). 	“To prove a
violation of the right of meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner must establish the state has not
provided an opportunity to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner's sentence or conditions of
confinement in a court of law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the hindrance of a
nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.’” 	Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d
826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citations omitted). 	Plaintiff has not alleged any
injury or prejudice from the opening of his federal mail.1F
2
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim against either
2 The Court notes Plaintiff is adequately prosecuting Civil Case Number 1:24-cv-01059-BAB at
this time.
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Defendant, and his claims should be dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended:
(1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted;
(2) Plaintiff be warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus, the Clerk be directed to place a § 1915(g) strike
flag on the case for future judicial consideration; and
(3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal
would not be taken in good faith.
Status Referral: The referral in this matter should be terminated.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 6th day of December 2024.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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