Mullins v. Sieger et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
SHARDA MULLINS. 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:24-cv-01050
GEAN SIEGER; JERRY MANESS;
LEROY MARTIN; and OFFICER SCOTT DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant
to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief
United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a
Report and Recommendation. 	Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order. (ECF No. 20). Defendants Maness, Martin, and Sieger responded.0F
1 (ECF No.
25). The matter is now ripe for consideration.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas on August 6, 2024.
(ECF No. 2). The case was transferred to this Court on August 7, 2024. The Court subsequently
granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and served Defendants Maness, Martin, and Sieger.
(ECF Nos. 7, 10). On August 27, 2024, the Court entered an Order consolidating this case with
Civil No. 1:24-cv-01054 and Civil No. 1:24-cv-01055. 	(ECF No. 16). 	The Court then ordered
Plaintiff to Amend his Complaint in this lead case to incorporate all claims made in the three
consolidated cases. (ECF No. 17).
1 Defendant Scott was not yet served when the instant motion was filed so all reference to
Defendants herein will be specifically to Defendants Maness, Martin, and Sieger.
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Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint and the instant Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order on September 16, 2024. (ECF No. 21, 22). Plaintiff added an additional Defendant in his
Amended Complaint. 	(ECF No. 21). 	As all parties were not yet served and Plaintiff made
allegations he was being denied emergent medical care at the Columbia County Detention Center
(“CCDC”), the Court entered an Order on September 17, 2024 directing Defendant Martin, Sheriff
of Columbia County, to respond to Plaintiff’s claims made in the Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order. (ECF No. 22). The Court also indicated Plaintiff’s Motion would be set for
hearing. 	However, after receiving Defendants’ thorough response, the Court determined no
hearing was needed to issue this Report and Recommendation.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs requests for injunctive relief which
includes both preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Federal courts may issue
an order for a temporary restraining order without first hearing from all parties only if “specific
facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury,
loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). By contrast, courts may issue preliminary injunction only on notice to
the adverse party. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). 	As the Court provided notice to the Defendants and
allowed them time to respond, it will consider Plaintiff’s Motion as one for a preliminary
injunction. 	However, this distinction is of little import here since courts apply the same legal
standard for issuing a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. See S. B. McLaughlin
& Co., Ltd. V. Tudor Oaks Condominium Project, 877 F.2d 707, 708-09 (8th Cir. 1989). Required
considerations include: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the balance
between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other interested parties;
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(3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Dataphase
Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981).
While no single factor, alone, is dispositive, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
“the two most critical factors for a district court to consider in determining whether to grant a
preliminary injunction are (1) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and (2)
whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted.” Chicago Stadium
Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1976). Further, a “mere possibility” irreparable harm
will occur is insufficient. Sessler v. City of Davenport, Iowa, 990 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2021).
“A movant must show he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”
to establish the need for injunctive relief. 	Id. (emphasis added). 	The burden of proof for a
preliminary injunction rest on the movant. Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995). In
addition, the Eighth Circuit has instructed that “in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief
must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in
dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” 	Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges in his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order that Defendants are
continuously denying him medical care. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges:
On 9-6-2024 I had to be rushed to Magnolia Regional Medical Center from Columbia
County Jail in Magnolia, Arkansas because my blood pressure had fell to 79/63. I’ve been
asking for help for my chest pains which have been on-going since Ive arrived here at
Columbia County Jail. I’ve passed out 3 different times causing injury to the back of my
head and lower and upper back. Since Ive been released from the hospital I haven’t been
given any medical attention and/or treatment; so therefore Im in another process of filing
another 1983 Form due to medical neglect, cruel and unusual punishment, improper
treatment, on going pain and suffering; due to not getting the proper help for my heart
condition, which is worsening as well as my health conditions worsening. 	I’ve told Jail
[administrator] and staff, as well as the Doctor which comes here whenever there are
enough inmates to see in-order to make it worth his and there while; that the medications
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aren’t working nor do they ever check my blood pressure or blood sugar while doctor is
here or when he isn’t.
(ECF No. 20). (errors in original). 	Plaintiff alleges in his Motion that he is enduring pain and
suffering from his alleged heart condition. 	The Court presumes this is the irreparable harm
Plaintiff alleges. However, it is less clear what injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks in his Motion. The
Court presumes Plaintiff seeks treatment of his alleged heart condition. Id.
Defendants argue in their Response that they are providing Plaintiff with medical care, he
simply disagrees with the specific care he is receiving. 	(ECF No. 26). 	Defendants attached to
their Brief in Support of Response Plaintiff’s medical records from the CCDC as well as his
medical records from the September 6, 2024, emergency room visit referenced in his Motion.
(ECF Nos. 26-3, p. 1-36; 26-4, pp. 1-5). The Court notes Plaintiff has many health concerns, as
evident in the medical records attached to Defendants’ Response and his claims in his Amended
Complaint, however, the only medical condition at issue in Plaintiff’s Motion is that which
occurred on September 6, 2024.
While Plaintiff claims he has not received any medical care for chest pains since he arrived
at the CCDC, that he has passed out three times injuring himself, and has not received any medical
attention since returning to the CCDC from the emergency room on September 6, 2024, the
medical records, inmate requests and notes, and emergency room records presented by Defendants
contradict Plaintiff’s allegations.
First, Plaintiff’s fainting incidents did not all occur in the CCDC. 	The only fainting
incident which occurred at the CCDC was on the night of September 6, 2024, and Plaintiff was
immediately assessed by CCDC employees, EMTs were called, and Plaintiff was transported to
the emergency room. (ECF No. 26-1, p. 3; ECF No. 26-2, p. 40). The discharge papers from the
emergency room on September 6, 2024, indicated Plaintiff suffered from “Fainting,” “Vagal
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Reaction,” 1F
2 and “Chest Pain, Uncertain Cause.” 	(ECF No. 26-4, pp. 1-5). 	A lab for a cardiac
panel, EKG, and images of his head and chest were done at the emergency room. However, there
was no injury to his head or back, and no heart ailment diagnosed in the discharge paperwork. The
discharge instructions in the emergency room papers indicated Plaintiff was to follow up with
doctor “if not better.” 	Id.at 2. 	There was no indication in the discharge paperwork to indicate
Plaintiff suffered from any condition subjecting him to imminent danger requiring immediate
attention.
After Plaintiff returned from the emergency room he was evaluated by the CCDC medical
provider, Dr. Davis, on September 10, 2024. (ECF No. 26-2, p. 1). The notes on this Medical Call
form state: “saw [patient] multiple times. He told me last week that he was supposed to have a
stint placed 3 years ago but he did not go back to see cardiologist. I am trying to get records to . .
. confirm this.” Id. Additional records note the CCDC medical staff subsequently attempted to
get Plaintiff’s cardiology records from the Arkansas Heart Clinic, Arkansas Heart Hospital, and
the “dept VM” but no patient on file at any of these facilities. 	(ECF No. 26-2, p. 41). 	Finally,
Plaintiff states in his September 15, 2024 Medical Call that he has told the “jail doctor” three times
about his chest pains. Id. Accordingly, these records clearly indicate Plaintiff is seeing and being
evaluated by the CCDC medical provider. 	Finally, Plaintiff’s medical records from the CCDC
show he is receiving medications and treatments from the CCDC medical staff on various medical
issues. 	(ECF Nos. 26-2, pp. 1-54; 26-3, pp. 1-36). 	Plaintiff did not file any reply or objection
disputing any of his medical records submitted by Defendants in their Response to his Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order.
2 Defined by the discharge paperwork as a temporary loss of consciousness associated with loss of
postural tone. Also noted: “This condition is not a sign of serious disease.” (ECF No. 26-4, p. 2).
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While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is suffering from various medical concerns which
require treatment, the standard required to secure injunctive relief under Dataphase has not been
met here. 	Plaintiff has failed to show he faces a threat of irreparable harm stemming from the
incident on September 6, 2024. Plaintiff was provided immediate care by EMTs and transport to
the emergency room. 	The emergency room evaluation and discharge did not indicate any
diagnoses presenting a situation that warrants the grant of injunctive relief at this time. Finally,
the medical provider at the CCDC appears to be evaluating and treating Plaintiff on a regular and
as needed basis.
Furthermore, based on the limited record presented for purposes of Plaintiff’s Motion, it
does not appear Plaintiff would be successful on a denial of medical care claim relating to the
September 6, 2024 incident. To succeed on this type of claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that
he had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that the Defendants actually knew of, but
deliberately disregarded, that serious medical need. See Ivey v. Audrain Cty., Mo., 968 F.3d 845,
848 (8th Cir. 2020). 	“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotations omitted). 	“To demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of, but deliberately
disregarded, a serious medical need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state akin to criminal
recklessness: disregarding a known risk to the [detainee’s] health.” 	Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d
1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	The Eighth Circuit has
stated that this “onerous standard requires a showing more than negligence, more than even gross
negligence, but less than purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of
serious harm to the inmate.” 	Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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Deliberate indifference may also be manifested by “prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). However, the “Constitution does not require jailers
to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.” 	Jenkins v. Cty. of
Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). 	“A prisoner alleging a delay in treatment
must present verifying medical evidence that the prison officials ignored an acute or escalating
situation or that these delays adversely affected his prognosis[,]” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336,
342 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted), unless the need for medical attention is obvious
to a layperson, in which case the plaintiff need not submit verifying medical evidence to show the
detrimental effects of delay. See Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 919 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing
Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966,
969 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding a three-week delay, “coupled with knowledge of inmate-patient’s
suffering, can support a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation”).
Here, after Plaintiff fainted, he was immediately transported to the emergency room,
treated, discharged to return to the CCDC, and provided with a follow-up appointment with the
CCDC medical provider. Plaintiff is entitled to adequate medical care under the Constitution, but
he is not entitled to the specific medical treatment of his choice. 	See Meuir v. Green Cty Jail
Employees, 487 F.3d 1115, 1118-9 (8th Circuit 2007).
Lastly, in assessing the public interest, it must be remembered that “federal courts do not
sit to supervise state prisons, the administration of which is of acute interest to the States.”
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976). Granting Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief, a
specific heart surgery, would amount to direct interference by the Court with the operation and
administration of the CCDC which is harmful to the CCDC and does not serve any public interest.
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Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing injunctive relief is warranted here. See Goff,
60 F.3d at 520; see also Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, I recommend Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No.
20) be DENIED.
Referral Status: This matter should remain referred.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 12th day of November 2024 .
/s/ 	Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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