Raper v. Hildreth et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
CARRIE DAWN RAPER 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 1:23-cv-01034-SOH-BAB
POLICE CHIEF SHAUN HILDRETH, Warren
Police Department; and DETECTIVE ROBBIE ASHCRAFT,
Warren Police Department
DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Carrie Dawn Raper (“Raper”), pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 	Raper proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. 	Raper contends the Defendants
violated her constitutional right to remain silent and her right to counsel when she was interrogated
following her arrest on December 2, 2020. 	She maintains the arrest was in retaliation for the
exercise of her First Amendment rights.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O.
Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose
of making a Report and Recommendation. 	The case is before the Court on the Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment. 	(ECF Nos. 79-81). 	Raper has responded.1 	(ECF Nos. 86-87).2
1 In their reply, Defendants argue Raper’s response was untimely filed. 	(ECF No. 88). 	By Order,
Raper was directed to respond to the Motion by November 8, 2024. 	(ECF No. 83). 	Raper’s
response was not filed until November 12, 2024. 	(ECF Nos. 86-87). 	In her certificate of service,
Raper indicates she placed the document in the mail on November 4, 2024. 	(ECF No. 86 at 14).
While Raper is not incarcerated and does not benefit from the mail box rule and pro se parties are
not excused from complying with Court orders, the Court believe justice favors the resolution of
the case on the merits. 	The Court will consider Raper’s response to have been timely filed.
2 The USB drive Raper submitted to the Court contains an unfiled “edited” version of her response
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Defendants have filed a reply brief. 	(ECF No. 88).
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In her original Complaint, Raper alleged that from 2017 until May 31, 2022, Defendants
used “their power and resources to harass and terrorize me, causing me numerous health problems,
having to sell my home, and destroying my name in the community.” 	(ECF No. 1 at 4-5). 	Raper
said these acts included the following: In 2017, Raper said she was held on a false accusation and
denied an attorney. 	Id. at 5. 	She asserted Detective Nichols threatened her with being jailed for
72-hours without her medication. 	Id. 	Six hours later, after being forced to make a statement, she
was released with no charges. 	Id. 	Raper further alleged that after she was released Chief
Hildreth had two individuals “follow and stalk both myself and my home for the next year.” 	Id.
After she filed complaints, Raper says the harassment worsened. 	Id. at 6.
Raper said she was twice arrested on felony charges only to have the charges dropped for
lack of evidence. 	(ECF No. 1 at 6). 	Raper asserted she was illegally detained, searched, and
paraded in handcuffs out of the courtroom. 	Id. 	Raper indicated Detective Ashcraft knew it “was
impossible for me to have committed the crimes at issue.” 	Id. 	Raper alleged the Defendants
fabricated charges against her “because they knew that as long as I had an active criminal case
open that I could not file a federal lawsuit.” 	Id. at 6-7. 	Raper alleged these are just a few
examples of what she endured. 	Id. at 7. 	She maintains this all occurred over the span of five
years. 	Id.
brief. 	Raper is advised that if she intended for this document to be filed, she should not have
submitted it in USB drive form unless she had obtained permission from the Clerk to submit a
document for filing via that method. 	The Court has nevertheless reviewed the document and
found no material changes were made to the response brief.
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The Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8) contains no specific dates. 	Instead, Raper alleged
the Defendants denied her the right to an attorney and forced her to testify or make statements
against her will on more than one occasion. 	Id. at 4. 	When the form complaint called for Raper
to write the date and approximate time of the events giving rise to her claims, Raper responded:
“Because of the trauma inflected and the number of incidents that occur[r]ed I can only say that it
occurred around the time of the false accusations being made. 	Ask the defendants. 	They should
have all the Miranda waiver rights forms dated and signed.” 	Id. 	Raper said her husband as well
as other police officers were present during all the encounters. 	Id. 	As relief, Raper seeks
compensatory and punitive damages. 	Id.
Defendants 	filed 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss. 	(ECF 	No. 	13 	& 	20). 	The 	undersigned
recommended dismissal of the following claims: 	all Fifth Amendment claims that Defendants
violated Raper’s right against self-incrimination; all Sixth Amendment right to counsel claims;
and all claims stemming from events occurring prior to April 28, 2020, based on the statute of
limitations. 	(ECF No. 28). 	It was further recommended that Raper should be directed to filing
a Second Amended Complaint containing only those claims stemming from events arising after
April 28, 2020. 	Id. 	The Report and Recommendation was adopted by the Honorable Timothy
L. Brooks. 	(ECF No 32). 	Plaintiff was directed to file her Second Amended Complaint. 	Id.
II. BACKGROUND
The Second Amended Complaint is the operative pleading in this case. 	(ECF No. 38). 	In
this document, Raper alleges she was arrested on December 2, 2020, by Warren police officers
and immediately requested her attorney Eugene Clifford (“Clifford”). 	Id. at 4. 	If she waited for
her attorney and refused to answer questions, Raper told James she would be detained for 72 hours.
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Id. 	Raper alleges her husband James had already contacted Clifford who in turn contacted the
Warren Police Department (“WPD”) and told Raper not to answer any questions and she would
be released on her own recognizance that day. 	Id.
According to Raper, Defendant Ashcraft “then told me that if I answered their questions
that I would be able to go before the judge that day but stated it may take 24 hours or more if I did
not.” 	(ECF No. 38 at 4). 	Raper alleges that based on her prior experiences with Detective
Nichols that to “go home I would be forced to answer questions anyway until my lawyer could
move on any legal action since he was in Little Rock.” 	Id.
After she received her instructions from Clifford, Raper alleges she was placed in an
interrogation room, forced to sign an attorney waiver, and questioned about the charge she was
arrested on. 	(ECF No. 38 at 7). 	After they were done, she was taken backed to court and released
on her own recognizance. 	Id. 	With respect to Defendant Hildreth, Raper alleges: “Shaun
Hildreth and his officers did this after years of complaints made by myself to all proper channels
about police mistreatment and stalking by a Warren police officer.” 	Id. 	Raper states her
complaints are documented in the mayor’s office. 	Id. 	She also indicates she filed a complaint
with Sergeant Moore of the WPD. 	Id. 	She states that the charges were dropped. 	Id.
Raper alleges she suffers from PTSD and that the actions of the Defendants caused
debilitating setbacks for her. 	(ECF No. 38 at 5). 	As relief, she seeks monetary damages for her
medical expenses, time, travel, lawyer fees, and pain and suffering. 	Id. 	She also states that they
were forced to sell their home and move out of Warren. 	Id.
According to the undisputed summary judgment record, on July 10, 2020, Officer Brian
Gorman (“Gorman”) of the Warren Police Department received a call from dispatch about a
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storage buildings that had been broken into at Johnny’s Mini Storage on E. Church Street, Warren,
Arkansas. 3 	(ECF No. 81-2). 	Gorman spoke to the owner of the facility, Tanya Johnson
(“Johnson”), who told him that one of the tenants had notified her that their storage unit had been
broken into. 	(ECF Nos. 81-1 & 81-2). 	Johnson discovered three units, numbers 2, 3, and 4, had
been broken into. 	(ECF Nos. 81-1, 81-2 & 81-3). 	The three units had been accessed through the
back where large holes were cut out of the back wall of the units. 	(ECF Nos. 81-1, 81-2, 81-3 &
81-4).
On July 15, 2020, Defendant Ashcraft spoke with Denise Smith (“Smith”) who stated that
on July 4, 2020, she witnessed a Caucasian female walking from Clingman Street to the storage
buildings on E. Church Street and eventually climbing through the overgrowth and thicket behind
the storage buildings. 	(ECF Nos. 81-1, 81-2 & 81-5). 	Smith described the female as
approximately 5’6,” medium build, wearing a ball cap, dark hair up in a ponytail, medium tone t-
shirt, dark leggings, and light color shoes. 	Id. 	Smith identified Raper from a six-person photo
lineup as the person she saw on July 4, 2020. 	(ECF Nos. 81-1, 81-2 & 81-6). 	At the time, Raper
lived at 37 Rea Circle which intersected with Clingman Street. 	(ECF Nos. 81-1 & 81-2).
On August 6, 2020, Darla Dalsanto, who rented one of the units that was broken into,
reported that she was missing six baseball bats that were signed by various MiLB players. 	(ECF
Nos. 81-1, 81-2 & 81-7). 	The case file for the storage building break-in was submitted to
Prosecuting Attorney Thomas Deen (“Deen”) who on August 26, 2020, advised Ashcraft to submit
an affidavit for the arrest of Raper. 	(ECF No. 81-8). 	Ashcraft prepared an affidavit for Raper’s
arrest on the charge of breaking or entering. 	(ECF No. 81-1). 	A bench warrant was issued.
3 Raper has stipulated to all paper and video evidence presented by Defendants. 	(ECF No. 87).
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(ECF No. 81-9).
On December 2, 2020, Raper was in district court on an unrelated charge when she was
served with the arrest warrant. 	(ECF Nos. 81-9 & 81-10). 	At approximately 10:53 am, Raper
was transported to the WPD where she was booked in at around 10:54 am. 	(ECF No. 81-12). 	At
approximately 12:00 pm, Ashcraft began interviewing Raper regarding the charges. 	(ECF No. 11
(video exhibit)). 	The interview was video recorded. 	Id. 	At the beginning of the interview,
Ashcraft reads Raper her rights and she signs and initials a form indicating she understands her
rights. 	(ECF Nos. 83-11 & 81-13). 	She also signs a waiver of her rights saying she does not
want a lawyer currently and is willing to make a statement and answer questions. 	(ECF No. 81-
13). 	The waiver also includes this statement: “No promises or threats have been made to me and
no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.” 	Id. 	Raper signed right below
this statement. 	Id.
Ashcraft then proceeded to question Raper about the break in. 	(ECF No. 11). 	Raper
denied any involvement. 	Id. 	At the conclusion of the interview, Ashcraft indicated she would
try to get in touch with the judge to schedule Raper’s first appearance. 	Id. 	Ashcraft also arranged
for Raper to make phone calls. 	Id. 	Raper had her first appearance that day. 	(ECF No. 81-14).
Raper was released on her own recognizance at 1:15 pm. 	(ECF No. 81-12).
The criminal information was not filed against Raper until February 5, 2021, State v. Raper,
No. CR-2021-004, Bradley County Circuit Court. 	(ECF No. 15). 	On May 31, 2022, the charges
were nol prossed. 	(ECF No. 81-16).
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III. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
"Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” 	Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d
602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." 	Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. 	"They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." 	Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). 	"A case founded on speculation or suspicion
is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." 	Id. (citing, Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 	“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 	Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants read the Second Amended Complaint as only asserting Fifth Amendment
claims of denial of Raper’s right to counsel and her right against self-incrimination.4 	(ECF No.
4 The Court does not read the Second Amended Complaint so narrowly. 	At the very least, Raper
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80 at 2). 	Defendants move for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) Raper’s self-
incrimination claim fails because she has not alleged that any compelled statements were used
against her at a criminal trial; (2) Raper’s right to counsel claim fails because she voluntarily and
intelligently waived her right to counsel; (3) Ashcraft is entitled to qualified immunity; and (4)
Raper failed to state a claim against Defendant Hildreth and has not alleged he had any personal
involvement in the alleged actions.
For her part, Raper argues that all her complaints stated the same violations of rights.
(ECF No. 86 at 1). 	She maintains that “Ashcraft, under Shaun Hildreth either knowing or lack of
proper training, did knowingly through threat and coercion (EVEN AFTER COUNSEL HAD
CONTACTED THE DEFEDANTS) not only forced me to sign a statement and do a video tape,
even when the defendants knew I had counsel.” 	Id. at 2. 	According to Raper, both Defendants
use and bend the law as they please. 	Id.
A. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Because of her complaints about police misconduct of the WPD, which Raper maintains
she made to all proper channels including the Mayor Office and Sergeant Moore, Raper argues she
has been harassed and false charges brought against her. 	(ECF No. 38 at 7). 	Although
Defendants failed to address this claim in their Motion, the Court concludes the claim fails as a
matter of law. 	Based on the summary judgment record, there was probable cause or at least
arguable probable cause for Raper’s arrest.5
has asserted a First Amendment retaliation claim.
5 In connection with their qualified immunity defense, Defendants do argue that probable cause or
at least arguable probable cause existed to arrest Raper. 	The Court, therefore, believes it is not
necessary to order supplemental briefing on this claim.
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To establish a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, Raper must show: (1) she engaged
in protected activity; (2) Defendants took adverse action against Raper which would chill a person
of ordinary firmness from continuing in the protected activity; (3) that the adverse action was
motivated at least in part by the protected activity; and (4) the Defendants lacked probable cause
or arguable probable cause. 	Thurairajah v. City of Ft. Smith, Ark., 925 F.3d 979, 984-85 (8th Cir.
2019).
“Criticism of public officials and the administration of governmental policies lies at the
heart of speech protected by the First Amendment.” 	Rinne v. Camden Cty., 65 F.4th 378, 383
(8th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). 	A citizen’s right to exercise First Amendment freedoms ‘without
facing retaliation from government officials is clearly established.’” 	Baribeau v. City of
Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 481 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kilpatrick v. King, 499 F.3d 759, 767
(8th Cir. 2007)).
Raper engaged in protected activity when complaining to the Mayor and others about the
actions of officers of the WPD. 	Raper’s arrest was an action that would chill continued activity
by a person of ordinary firmness. 	Thurairajah, 925 F.3d at 985. 	However, Raper’s claim is
defeated because she was arrested pursuant to a valid bench warrant after having been identified
by a witness as the person who went behind the storage buildings where a crime in fact occurred.
Raper has not alleged that Ashcraft had any reason to doubt Smith’s identification of her. 	Clay v.
Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1168 (8th Cir. 1987) (no indication officers had doubts about the
trustworthiness or reliability of statement). 	Smith was presented with a photo-array consisting of
six photographs; there is nothing suggestive about the photos presented. 	Pace v. City of Des
Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1055-57 (8th Cir. 2000) (nothing suggestive about phots presented to
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victim; identification sufficient credible to allow officer to believe that probable cause existed).
Further, a judge found probable cause existed based on Ashcraft’s affidavit and issued the bench
warrant. 	Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 2013) (“the fact that a neutral
magistrate issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively
reasonable manner.”); see also Fair v. Fulbright, 844 F.2d 567, 569 (8th Cir. 1988) (“an arrest
executed pursuant to a facially valid warrant generally does not give rise to a cause of action under
§ 1983.”).
Based on the record, as a matter of law, Raper cannot establish the lack of probable cause,
a necessary element in a retaliatory arrest claim. 	This conclusion is supported by Raper’s own
arguments. 	Raper states that “[b]ased upon these facts, and a big part of their argument, the
evidence clearly show[s] they [had] probable cause to gain a warrant and arrest me.” 	(ECF No.
87). 	This defeats her claim. 	Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
B. 	Malicious Prosecution Claim
To the extent the Second Amended Complaint can be read to be asserting a malicious
prosecution claim, this claim is also defeated by the existence of probable cause. 	The Supreme
Court has held that malicious prosecution is actionable under the Fourth Amendment. 	Thompson
v. Cark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022). 	To establish a malicious prosecution claim, Raper must show “(1)
the criminal proceeding was instituted without probable cause, (2) the defendant’s motive in
instituting the proceeding was malicious, and (3) the prosecution terminated in acquittal or
discharge of the accused.” 	Id. at 1338. 	As discussed above, Raper was arrested pursuant to a
validly issued warrant.
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C. 	Fifth Amendment Claims
1. 	Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment provides that a person may not be compelled to testify against
themselves. 	Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). 	“[I]t protects against any
disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could
lead to other evidence that might be so used.” 	Id. at 444-45.
No Self-Incrimination Clause claim exists in this case. 	“Statements compelled by police
interrogations of course may not be used against a defendant at trial, but it is not until their use in
a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.” 	Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (citations omitted). 	“Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior
to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.” 	United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (citations omitted). 	Raper has not argued
that any compelled statements were used against her at a criminal trial. 	In fact, the charges at
issue were nol prossed. 	State v. Raper, No. 06CR-21-4 (case was dismissed prior to the scheduled
trial date of July 7-8, 2022).6
2. 	Right to Counsel
The Fifth Amendment provides the right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogations. 	Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (“Miranda thus declared that an
accused has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial
6 Arkansas Court Connect is a publicly available database maintained by the Arkansas Judiciary.
https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/06CR-21-4 (last visited May 8, 2025). 	The Court may
take judicial notice of court records. 	Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005)
(court may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records).
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interrogation”). 	“If the accused indicates that [s]he wishes to remain silent, “the interrogation
must cease.’ 	If [s]he requests counsel, ‘the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’”
Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)). 	The Supreme Court has said that:
[i]t is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be
voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case
“upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
Raper admits she waived her rights during the video interview but maintains she was
threatened and coerced into doing so prior to the interview. 	In support, she offers the affidavit of
her husband James and her own affidavit.7 	On December 2, 2020, James states he was contacted
by his wife who said she was arrested for felony breaking and entering. 	(ECF No. 88-7 at 98).
If she was jailed and requested a lawyer or did not make a statement, Raper told James that she
would be jailed for 72 hours without her medication.8 	Id. 	James then contacted Clifford who
indicated he would phone the WPD and call him right back. 	Id. 	Approximately 30 minutes later,
Clifford called and advised James that he had spoken to the WPD and to Raper. 	Id. 	Clifford
advised James that Raper would be released on her own recognizance. 	Id. 	James told Clifford
he believed Raper’s rights would be violated.9 	Id. at 98-99. 	After Raper’s release, James called
7 Raper submitted two affidavits by James. 	However, the first was limited to events occurring in
2017. (ECF No. 88-7 at 94).
8 In her Second Amended Complaint, Raper alleges Ashcraft told her she could be held for 24
hours or more if she requested her lawyer from Little Rock be there before she gave a statement
and she went before the judge. 	(ECF No. 38 at 4).
9 On November 12, 2024, Raper filed a USB drive containing some of her exhibits. 	These include
a complaint James submitted to Warren’s mayor on December 8, 2020, regarding the December
2, 2020, arrest and interview. 	(USB Drive; Ex. 5). 	The complaint was found to have no merit.
Id. at (Raper 000040-45). 	James also submitted three other complaints related to this incident.
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Clifford back and informed him that Raper had been forced to sign a waiver of rights and make a
statement in front of the camera. 	Id. at 99. 	At this point, Clifford indicated he would “need some
money” to represent Raper. 10 	Id.
Raper’s affidavit is limited to events occurring in 2017 including her complaints to the
mayor and Sergeant Moore. 	(ECF No. 88-7 at 101-103). 	However, Raper’s brief contains a
statement that it was submitted under penalty of perjury. 	(ECF No. 86 at 4). 	What follows is a
diatribe about police misconduct and the injustice of the court system towards pro se filers. 	In
fact, Raper goes so far as to state “[t]here is no case in modern times that survives summary
judgment when the defendant has an officer of the court just showing up and filing a motion, and
the plaintiff is pro SE.11” 	Id. at 6. 	Raper states that it would not matter if she had a video of
defendants’ actions, which she does, because the Court would still dismiss the case. 	Id.
However, the only video referred to by Raper in her affidavit is the one she took on the phone of
her husband’s arrest in 2017. 	Raper has also submitted an exhibit which contains several copies
of complaints filed against members of the WPD filed by other individuals and by either Raper or
James. 	(ECF No. 88; USB Drive; Exhibit 6).
The only video with respect to the December 2, 2020, arrest shows Raper walking calmly
into a room, sitting down with Ashcraft, making a statement that she knows her rights, listening as
her rights are read to her, signing a waiver of those rights, and a statement that she had not been
threatened, coerced, or promised anything in return for her statement. 	(ECF No. 81-11).
Id.
10 Clifford did not represent Raper in the criminal case. 	Id.
11 While the Court recognizes this will not change Raper’s mind about her perceived injustices, the
undersigned notes that any number of pro se cases have survived summary judgment and either
settled or have gone to trial.
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Although she is at times crying, particularly when she is told she has been identified as the
perpetrator, Raper repeatedly denies any involvement. 	Id. 	She asserts that not only did she not
break into the storage units but that she would not have broken into them because she was friends
with the owner.
Under Miranda, “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation” of the rights conveyed in
warnings “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” 	Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444, 475. 	In evaluating whether a waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently, the courts consider: (1) whether the waiver was the product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception and (2) whether the waiver was made with
a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it. 	Bell v. Norris, 586 F.3d 624, 630 (8th Cir. 2009). 	“Circumstances to be
considered include the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” 	United States v.
Nguyen, 608 F.3d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 2010). 	The courts also consider the amount of delay between
the waiver and the interrogation. 	Id. at 375. 	In determining “whether a confession was voluntary
under the totality of the circumstances requires consideration of (1) the specific interrogation
tactics used, (2) the details of the interrogation, and (3) the characteristics of the accused.” 	United
States v. Pierce, 152 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir. 1998).
Here, Raper had prior experience with the criminal justice system; she had spoken to her
lawyer who advised her to say nothing; she interjected at the beginning of her meeting that she
was aware of her rights; she was read to her rights; she verbally acknowledged she understood
each right as it was read; she signed and initialed her awareness of each right and her waiver of
the rights. 	Raper used Ashcraft’s first name during the interview indicating some familiarity
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exited between them. 	Raper’s lawyer was in Little Rock and she was arrested in Warren. 	Raper
indicated it would take her lawyer some time to arrange to travel to Warren. 	She did not want to
remain in jail overnight.
Other than telling Raper she had been identified by a witness as being present at the storage
buildings on July 4, 2020, Ashcraft used a calm voice in speaking with Raper, treated her
respectfully; no harsh language or tones were used; Raper was asked where she had been and what
she had been doing on July 4th; she was told to have her friends or relatives she was with on July
4th contact Ashcraft to give statements; Ashcraft was not argumentative; no promises were made;
no threats were made; the court proceeding were explained to her. 	Ashcraft reviewed the bench
warrant with her. 	The entire interview lasted only thirteen minutes. 	Ashcraft arranged for Raper
to be seen in Court that day so she could be released on bond. 	Ashcraft also arranged for her to
make phone calls.
Raper did not confess or make any incriminating statements during the interrogation.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the Court does not believe any reasonable juror could
conclude Raper’s waiver was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intellectually. 	The simple
fact is Raper did not want to remain in jail and waived her rights to ensure she would be released
that day after having spent approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes in jail. 	The Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
D. 	Personal Involvement on the Part of Defendant Hildreth
With respect to Defendant Hildreth, there are no allegations that he was personally
involved in obtaining the bench warrant or interrogating Raper. 	Instead, Raper believes he is
liable because he has allowed his officers to use unlawful tactics without any corrective action
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being taken. 	“To establish personal liability of [a] supervisory defendant[], the plaintiff must
allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his
constitutional rights.” 	Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal
punctuation marks and citation omitted); see also Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir.
2014) (supervisor may he held liable for his direct action or his failure to properly supervise and
train the offending employee). 	In this case, Raper’s verbiage is not backed up with factual
allegations. 	The fact that the WPD has been sued before for alleged constitutional violations does
not equate to liability under the facts of this case. 	There are no such allegations made here.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
E. 	Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 	See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818, (1982). Qualified immunity balances two important interests, the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is “a mistake of
law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” See Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (for the proposition qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in judgment,
whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law”)).
Having found that the facts in this case do not make out a constitutional violation, we need
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not delve further into issue of qualified immunity. 	This is true, because where no constitutional
violation exists, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 	See, e.g., Krout v. Goemmer, 583
F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (unless the facts having make out a violation of a constitutional right
the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity).
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF Nos. 79-81) be GRANTED and the case DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
Status of Referral: 	The referral terminates upon the filing of this Report and
Recommendation.
DATED this 13th day of May 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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