USA v. WRIGHT

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	PLAINTIFF
VS. 	1:19-CR-10015-01-SOH
TRACY WRIGHT, JR. 	DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the pro se Motion to Reduce Sentence filed herein by Defendant
TRACY WRIGHT JR. (“WRIGHT”). ECF No. 43. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§
636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickory, Chief United States District Judge, referred
this case to the undersigned for consideration. ECF No. 49. The Government has responded to
the Motion. ECF No. 48. The matter is now ripe for decision.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2020, WRIGHT pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.
ECF Nos. 20 and 21. On June 30, 2020, he appeared before Judge Hickey for sentencing. Judge
Hickey found a total offense level of 21 with a criminal history category V. 	The United States
Sentencing 	Guideline 	(“USSG”) 	recommended 	range 	of 	punishment 	of 	70-87 	months
imprisonment. WRIGHT was sentenced to 70 months in prison, the bottom of the USSG
recommended range. ECF Nos. 37 and 38.
On December 13, 2023, Judge Hickey, acting sua sponte, reduced WRIGHT’s sentence to
57 months, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3882(c)(2).1 ECF No. 41. In making this sentence reduction
Judge Hickey specifically considered the policy statement set forth in the USSG § 1B1.10, the
1 Specifically, the USSG range applicable to WRIGHT’s sentence had been lowered and made retroactive following
his original sentencing.
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sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and lowered WRIGHT’s criminal history category from
V to IV, resulting in a guideline range of 57-70 months. ECF No. 41-1. He was again sentenced at
the bottom of the USSG recommended range.
II. 	INSTANT MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE
On January 9, 2024, WRIGHT filed the instant Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and § 603 of the First Step Act. ECF No. 43. On June 28, 2024, the Court
entered a text Order appointing Bruce D. Eddy, Federal Public Defender, to represent WRIGHT
with respect to the Motion. ECF No. 45. On October 4, 2024, the Federal Public Defender filed a
Notice of Intent Not to File a Supplemental Motion for Reduction of Sentence. ECF No. 47. The
Government responded on October 29, 2024. ECF No. 48.
In his Motion WRIGHT argues his sentence should be further reduced because his two
prior “controlled substance offenses” should not have counted when the Court calculated his base
offense level under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). He argues these prior convictions for possession of
cocaine with purpose to deliver and possession of methamphetamine or cocaine with purpose to
deliver do not qualify as controlled substance offenses because Arkansas's definitions of cocaine
and methamphetamine are broader than the federal definition. WRIGHT also states the factors of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), when properly considered weigh in favor of reduced sentence.
The Government argues WRIGHT has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies within
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). ECF No. 48, p. 3. The Government also argues that on
the merits of WRIGHT’s claims, he has failed to establish his entitlement to an additional sentence
reduction.
III. 	DISCUSSION
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: 	For compassionate release and a sentence
reduction under the First Step Act, a defendant must establish (1) “extraordinary and compelling
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reasons” and (2) that release would not be contrary to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.2 However,
before seeking relief, a defendant must first make the request with the BOP and exhaust his
administrative remedies there. This requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule. See United
States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2021). The Government raised lack-of-exhaustion in
its response, so the rule must be enforced. See id. Based on the record before this Court, it does
not appear WRIGHT ever requested compassionate release from the warden of the facility where
he was serving his sentence, which means he has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
Accordingly, this motion is premature and this Court lacks jurisdiction.
b. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons to Reduce Sentence: Even if the Court assumes
WRIGHT has exhausted the available administrative remedies and that this Court has jurisdiction,
the instant Motion should be denied. 	Pursuant to Section 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court “may”
grant a motion for sentence reduction only if the following three requirements are met: (1) there
are extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting the reduction; (2) the reduction is consistent
with the applicable policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission; and (3)
the district court considers the factors set forth in § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable. If
the district court finds all these requirements are met, then § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) provides that a
district court “may reduce” the sentence. The use of “may” is “quintessential discretionary
language.” United States v. Sutton, 962 F.3d 979, 986 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ruffin, 978
F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020) (“This last requirement confirms an overarching point: The district
court has substantial discretion. The statute says that the district court “may” reduce a sentence if
it finds the first two requirements met; it does not say that the district court must do so. Even if
2 Error! Main Document Only.18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) mandates that any sentence imposed reflect the seriousness
of the offense, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with appropriate
rehabilitation.
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those conditions are met, therefore, a district court may still deny relief if it finds that the
“applicable” 3553(a) factors do not justify it.”) (internal citations omitted).
In support of his motion, Wright asserts his convictions for prior “controlled substance
offenses” were wrongly considered when the Court calculated his base offense level under
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. He relies on United States v. Byron Lee, No. 4:21-CR-00306-M-01 (E.D. Ark.
Feb. 16, 2023).3 	In Lee, United States District Judge Brian Miller determined that Arkansas’s
definitions of both methamphetamine and cocaine were broader than the federal definitions of the
same.
WRIGHT has not presented an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief. USSG §
1B1.13(c) sets out the definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” WRIGHT’s claim
does not fall under any of them. 	To the extent WRIGHT is arguing Judge Miller’s ruling
constitutes a change in the law – it does not4 – the Guidelines specifically reject WRIGHT’s
argument. Section 1B1.13(c) provides that, except for reasons that do not apply here, “a change
in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive)
shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling
reason exists under this policy statement.”5
3 This case does not appear to be a reported decision.
4 Judge Miller’s ruling is both non-binding and unrelated to Defendant’s case. It involved the definition of “serious
drug offense” under the ACCA, not the definition of “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines.
5 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c) (emphasis added). The subsections also provides that “if a defendant otherwise establishes
that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction under this policy statement, a change in the
law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered for
purposes of determining the extent of any such reduction.” 	However, WRIGHT has not otherwise established
extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief.
The lack of extraordinary and compelling reasons also defeats his reliance on rehabilitation. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d)
(“[R]ehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of this policy
statement [but] may be considered in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what extent
a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted.”).
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Further, compassionate release, in this case, is not warranted after considering the §
3553(a) factors. Judge Hickey specifically indicated she was “taking into account the policy
statement of USSG §1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” when she
reduced WRIGHT’s sentence from 70 to 57 months on December 13, 2023. ECF No. 41.
Defendant’s current 57-month sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with sentencing goals.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, I recommend that WRIIGHT’s Motion to Reduce Sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (ECF No. 43) be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of January 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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