Hatten v. USA

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:24-cv-00078-BSM Document17 _ Filed 11/03/25 Page 1 of 12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

DELTA DIVISION
BRADLEY DEATON PLAINTIFFS
and RAYMOND HATTEN
V. CASE NO. 2:23-CV-00120-BSM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEFENDANT

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Bradley Deaton and Raymond Hatten suffered injuries that landed them in the
Regional One trauma center in Memphis, Tennessee. Their injuries occurred while serving
as deck hands on the John T. Janoush (“John T.”’), which was attempting to navigate through
the lock at dam number four on the Arkansas River. Deaton and Hatten were struck by a line
that snapped. Both men had to be lifted from a barge in a make-shift basket and transported
to the hospital by ambulance.

Deaton and Hatten are suing the United States Army Corps of Engineers for
negligently operating the lock. The United States filed a third-party claim against plaintiffs’
employer, Jantran, Inc., for providing inadequate lines to plaintiffs and for failing to properly
train them.

Having conducted a seven-day trial and listened to 24 witnesses who generated more
than 1800 pages of testimony, the negligence causing Deaton’s and Hatten’s injuries is
apportioned as follows: forty-five percent to the Corps of Engineers and fifty-five percent

to Hatten.

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I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Background

There are eighteen dams on the Arkansas River and each one has a locking system that
allows vessels to navigate through them. The dams and locks are built and maintained by the
Corps of Engineers, which employs lock operators to manage how vessels proceed when they
reach the dam. When a vessel traveling downstream reaches a dam, the operator is
responsible for opening the upstream gate to the lock chamber and directing the vessel’s pilot
to move into the lock chamber. Once the vessel is in the chamber, the operator closes the
gate and lowers the water in the chamber until it is level with the water downstream of the
dam. The operator then opens the downstream gate and lets the vessel continue its journey.
This process is done in the reverse when a vessel reaches a dam when traveling upstream.

Dam number four is typical of many of the dams on the Arkansas River. Its lock
chamber is 600 feet long and 110 feet wide. Although this appears to be fairly large, it is not
large enough to accommodate many of the barge tows that travel on the river. For example,
on the day at issue, the John T. was towing (actually pushing) twelve barges. The barges
were tethered together two by six, which created a tow, not including the John T. itself, that
was 800 feet long by 105 feet wide.

To get through the dam, barges larger than the lock chamber have to make two trips.
First, the lock operator opens the upstream gate. The towboat pilot pushes the tow into the
chamber. The lock operator tells the pilot where to stop. Once the tow reaches its designated
location inside the lock chamber, the deck mates tie the first six barges to the chamber wall

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and then untie the first group of six barges from the second group of six barges. The first
group of six barges is called the “first cut” while the second group of six barges is called the
“second cut.” Once the first and second cuts are separated, the towboat pilot pulls the second
cut out of the chamber and the lock operator closes the lock gates. Once the upstream gates
are closed, the water in the chamber is lowered until it reaches the level of the water
downstream of the dam.

While the first cut is still tied to the wall inside the chamber, a towboat employee who
is standing on the chamber wall throws one end of a line down to a deck mate on the barge
so it can be attached to a deck fitting called a kevel. The towboat employee on the chamber
wall attaches his end of the line to a tow haulage device on top of the chamber wall. The tow
haulage, commonly called a mule, is used to pull the first cut of barges out of the chamber.
This is necessary because the first cut is not attached to the towboat. Once the first cut is
attached to the mule, the first cut is untied from the chamber wall and the mule pulls the first
cut out of the chamber.

There are fittings on the wall outside the chamber to which the first cut of barges is
to be tied. These are called wall pins. The first set of pins is twenty-five feet outside of the
chamber. The second set is fifty feet outside the chamber. The third set is seventy-five feet
outside the chamber. Additional pins are located every twenty-five feet down the wall. Once
the first cut clears the downstream gates, it is tied to these wall pins. The lock operator
closes the downstream lock gates and raises the chamber’s water level until it is level with

the water upstream of the dam.

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Once the water in the chamber is level with the water upstream of the dam, the lock
operator opens the upstream lock gates and the towboat pushes the second cut into the
chamber, which is large enough to accommodate the second cut and the tow boat. The water
inside the chamber is lowered until it is level with the water downstream of the dam. The
downstream chamber gates are opened and the towboat pushes the second cut until it meets
the first cut. The two cuts are then reconnected. This completes the double trip and the tow
boat, along with its barges, continue their journey.

On occasion, a first cut has difficulty clearing the downstream gates notwithstanding
the help it gets from the tow haulage. When this occurs, the lock operator may perform a
flushing procedure in which he opens valves that cause water to flow into the chamber and
expel the first cut of barges.

B. March 21, 2022

On the day of the accident that injured Deaton and Hatten, the John T. had traveled
north and was returning south on the Arkansas River. It had already made a trip through
locks one to eighteen and back from lock eighteen through lock five. Approximately thirty
minutes before it reached lock four, Michael Guilliams, a level four deck hand on the John
T., was awakened. Deaton and Hatten were on the first cut of six barges. Deaton was
manning the bow and Hatten was manning the stern.

The John T. pushed the first cut of barges into the lock, the barges were tied off to the
chamber wall, and then Guilliams used his handheld radio to instruct the pilot of the John T.
to pull clear of the chamber. Guilliams then climbed onto the chamber wall and gave the

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lock ticket to Frankie Staton, the Corps’s lock operator. The lock ticket told the operator
how many barges the John T. was pushing, their tonnage, and what was on the barges. The
chamber door was closed and the water lowered according to plan. Once the water in the
chamber reached the level of the water downstream of the dam, Guilliams attached one end
of a line to the mule and threw the other end down to the stern, where Hatten was posted.
The mule line was attached to the stern kevel and the mule began pulling the first cut out of
the lock.

The parties dispute how hard the wind was blowing but it is undisputed that it is
common for the wind to blow on the Arkansas River and that it was not blowing so hard that
anyone working on the John T. asked Staton to call off the double trip operation. It is also
undisputed that, as the lock operator, Staton was responsible for managing the operations at
dam four and for insuring the safety at that dam, and that Staton saw no reason to halt the
double trip operation. Moreover, although the Corps absolutely disagrees with all testimony
tending to show that Staton was negligent by failing to communicate with the crew of the
John T., plaintiffs’ witnesses unambiguously testified that they never heard from Staton
during the operation at lock four.

Plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that they could tell the mule was not pulling fast enough
for the first cut to clear the downstream lock gates. It is also undisputed that the stern of the
first cut failed to sufficiently clear the lock gates. The testimony was that a clearance of
twenty-five feet would have been safe but that the stern of the first cut cleared the gates by
only two to ten feet. Had the John T. cleared the gates by twenty-five feet, its barge kevels

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would have lined up with the pins on the wall because the kevels on the first cut’s barges
were located every twenty-five feet from bow to stern.

Although Deaton disputes this, the evidence shows that Deaton, who was standing
near the kevel on the bow of the first cut, walked back to the mid kevel, which is twenty-five
feet from the bow. He did this because the first cut did not clear the lock chamber
sufficiently for him to attach a line from the bow kevel to the pin on the wall that he would
normally use. For this reason, he attached a line from the mid kevel to the pin on the wall
closest to it.

On his radio, Deaton then called for Staton to feather the lock gates. Feathering the
gates is when the lock operator opens and closes the gates to get the water moving in order
to push a cut out of the chamber. Deaton and Guilliams testified that Staton never responded
to Deaton’s request. It is also undisputed that the gates were never feathered. Staton’s
decision not to feather the gates was appropriate because the first cut was too close to the
gates for Staton to feather them.

Without notifying the crew of the John T., Staton began flushing the chamber. The
witnesses dispute whether Staton properly followed the two, four, six procedure when he
opened the valves and began the flushing process. This procedure advises that the lock
operator first open the lock valves to two feet to see if that moves the tow out of the lock.
If two feet does not work, then the lock operator opens the valves to four feet. If that does
not work, the lock operator opens the valves to six feet. Plaintiffs contend that Staton
disregarded this procedure and opened the valves and flooded the chamber too quickly.

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At some point after Staton opened the valves, the first cut began moving downstream
out of the chamber but then, suddenly, began surging back upstream toward the chamber.
Plaintiffs contend that the first cut’s rapid surge back toward the chamber was directly caused
by Staton opening the chamber valves and flooding the chamber too quickly. This is
supported by the testimony of David Drummonds, who testified that flushing procedures are
always followed by a surge of water back towards the lock. Indeed, “‘anytime the water is
dumped out to move barges down[stream], it’s always going to come back regardless . . . the
slower the water is let into [the chamber] to push the barges out, the less [the] surge back
[is].” Finally, he testified that the faster the water is let into the chamber, the “ harder [it will
come] back into the chamber.”

Staton’s failure to communicate with the crew of the John T. appears to have played
an even more critical role in the first cut’s surge back toward the chamber. This is true
because, when Staton began flushing the chamber, Deaton had already tied off the mid kevel
to the wall pin closest to it. Based on where the first cut was located, the mid-kevel was at
least fifteen feet from the wall pin. Therefore, once the first cut started moving downstream,
that line would have excess slack in it. Deaton was expecting the gates to be feathered or at
least for Staton to inform him of the next move. But, without notice, Staton began flushing
the chamber.

This is critical because, once Deaton attached the line between the mid-kevel and the
wall pin, he never touched it again and this was the line that snapped when the first cut began
rushing back into the chamber. It appears that when Deaton attached that line, Staton began

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opening valves for the flushing procedure, and Deaton never had a chance to detach the line
or check it down to take out the slack. When Staton opened the valves, the first cut moved
downstream. The speed of the flush, coupled with slack in the line, appears to have caused
the line to act almost like a rubber band. So much tension was put on the line when it was
flushed downstream that it ultimately snapped back and caused the first cut to surge back
toward the chamber. This, along with the wind, and the issues discussed by Drummond,
caused the first cut to travel as fast as it did. Witnesses testified that the first cut was moving
upstream faster than they had ever seen.

Deaton testified that he heard the line sizzling so he moved away from it because he
knew it was going to snap. He then called to Hatten to catch a line to prevent the first cut
from moving back into the chamber. Hatten, however, got tangled in his line. When Deaton
saw that Hatten’s line was going to snap, he ran back and pulled Hatten out of the tangled
line. From all accounts, Deaton’s actions appear to have saved Hatten’s life. Almost
immediately, Hatten’s line snapped and both Deaton and Hatten were injured.

Guilliams, who was still standing on the dam wall, immediately climbed down onto
the first cut and, using the same line that snapped and hurt Deaton and Hatten, attached the
line to the dam wall and brought the first cut to a complete stop.

The parties spent a great amount of time addressing the fitness of the lines provided
by Janoush. To this fact-finder, this evidence was not compelling because, as a practical
matter, the same lines were used on the voyage up the river and then back down the river.
Moreover, the same line that snapped and caused plaintiffs’ injuries was the line that

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Guilliams used to bring the John T. to a stop.

Although Deaton and Hatten present a very sympathetic picture, their inability to stop
the first cut from surging back toward the chamber must be considered. This is one of those
rare cases in which one does not have to guess what actions could have been taken or should
have been taken, because Guilliams’s actions clearly show that the first cut could have been
safely stopped had Hatten not gotten entangled in his line.

For all of these reasons, the Corps’s percentage of liability is forty-five percent because
much of this could have been avoided had Staton clearly communicated with the crew of the
John T. before initiating the flushing procedure. Moreover, as the lock operator, Staton was
responsible for the safety of the operation that day. If, as argued by the Corps, the wind was
so gusty that it created a dangerous condition, it was Staton’s duty to call off the operation
until the wind died down.

Notwithstanding Staton’s actions or lack thereof, Hatten’s negligence played a greater
role in the injuries he and Deaton suffered. Had Hatten not gotten tangled in the line, he
would have been able to step away from the line and avoid injury. Moreover, had he not been
in peril, Deaton would have avoided injury. We know this because Deaton avoided injury
when his line snapped. Moreover, any claim that Deaton and Hatten would have been injured
if the first cut had collided with the chamber doors is offset by the actions of Guilliams, who
was able to tie off the second cut without injury. For these reasons, fifty-five percent of the

liability is apportioned to Hatten.

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No liability is apportioned to Deaton because he properly tied off his line to the closest
pin and he later saved Hatten’s life. Although the Corps argues that he moved too far away
from the mid-kevel to check down the line once the flushing procedure began, this argument
is offset by the fact that the flushing procedure was initiated without notice and the evidence
seems to indicated that, by the time Deaton was able to get close to the line, it was already
sizzling and about to snap.

C. Damages

Deaton is seeking $1,157,474 in damages. This includes lost wages of $729,048:
$85,937 for wages lost from March 22, 2022 to July 7, 2025; and future lost wages of
$634,111 for July 8, 2025 to February 28, 2048. He is seeking found damages totaling
$437,426; $10,449 for the past and $426,977 for the future. Found damages account for the
value of living expenses that individuals receive while employed on a vessel, such as food,
lodging, and clothing. Hatten is seeking $1,709,179 in damages. This includes past lost
wages and benefits of $146,933 and future lost wages and benefits of $1,562,263.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Maritime negligence cases are somewhat similar to common law tort claims. To prove
their case, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Corps owed them
a duty, that the Corps breached its duty, and that plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of the
breach. Pearce v. United States, 261 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir. 2001) (elements); Gavagan v.
United States, 955 F.2d 1016, 1022 (Sth Cir. 1992) (preponderance of the evidence). The
standard of care in maritime negligence cases is that of ordinary care under the circumstances.

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Case 2:24-cv-00078-BSM Document17_ Filed 11/03/25 Page 11 of 12

Bordelon Marine, Inc v. LaShip, LLC, 703 F. Supp. 3d 766, 771 (E.D. La. 2023). This
standard extends to government agencies like the Corps of Engineers. See SCNO Barge
Lines, Inc v. Sun Transp. Co., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 356, 361 (E.D. Mo. 1984). As to causation,
defendant’s negligence must be a “substantial factor” in plaintiffs’ injuries. Thomas v.
Express Boat Co., 759 F.2d 444, 448 (Sth Cir. 1985).

Moreover, pure comparative fault principles apply. See United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975); Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1427-28 (Sth
Cir. 1983) (“[C]omparative fault has long been the accepted risk-allocating principle under
martime law); Doyle v. Graske, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082 (D. Neb. 2008) (proportional
division of liability applies in admiralty cases) (internal citations omitted). District courts
have considerable discretion when assigning comparative fault. See In re Marquette Trans.
Co., LLC, 292 F. Supp. 3d 719, 734 (E.D. La. 2018). Damages for past and future loss of
wages and earning capacity, past and future medical expenses, and pain and suffering
resulting from injuries caused by a defendant’s negligence are all recoverable. Matter of
Lasala, 644 F. Supp. 3d 245, 274-275 (E.D. La. 2022).

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ claims for past lost wages and benefits are reasonable and are awarded in
full. For lost wages and benefits up until the day of trial, Deaton is awarded $96,386 and
Hatten is awarded $146,933.

Neither plaintiff, however, has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he is
physically unable to ever return to work on the river or that he is mentally unable to obtain

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training that will permit him to earn as much as he would earn working on the river. For this
reason, both plaintiffs are awarded future lost wages for five years. This will permit them to
obtain additional training at a trade school or junior college so they can mitigate their damages
by finding a career that pays as much as they were paid by Janoush. For Deaton, that is
$234,339. For Hatten, that is $216,380.

Each plaintiff is entitled to an award of $100,000 for pain and suffering.

Finally, both awards are reduced by fifty-five percent to account for the amount of
liability apportioned to Hatten.

IV. DAMAGES

For all of these reasons, defendant United States Corps of Engineers is ordered to pay
plaintiff Bradley Deaton $193,826 ($96,386 + $234,339 + $100,000 x .45) and 1s ordered to
pay plaintiff Raymond Hatten $208,491 ($146,933 + $216,380 + $100,000 x .45). Plaintiffs
have fourteen days to submit their petitions for costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of November, 2025.

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; E0Ce Ce a > Ww QQ.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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