Eldridge v. Armstrong et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISON
DANNY LOUIS ELDRIDGE, 	*
*
Petitioner, 	*
*
vs. 	* CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-00270-KD-B
*
JUDGE ROBERT ARMSTRONG III, 	*
et al., 	*
*
Respondents. 	*
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner 	Danny 	Louis 	Eldridge, 	a 	state 	pretrial 	detainee
housed 	at 	the 	Perry 	County 	PREP 	Center 	while 	awaiting 	trial 	in
Dallas 	County, 	Alabama, 	filed 	a 	petition 	for 	a 	writ 	of 	habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Doc. 1). 	The petition was referred
to 	the 	undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	appropriate 	action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R).
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	the 	undersigned 	recommends 	that
this habeas action be DISMISSED without prejudice because Eldridge
has 	not 	exhausted 	all 	available 	state 	remedies, 	and 	pursuant 	to
the Younger abstention doctrine.
I. 	HABEAS PETITION
In his § 2241 habeas petition, Eldridge purports to name the
following “Respondents/Defendants”: retired Dallas County District
Court Judge Robert E. Armstrong III; Alabama Law Enforcement Agent
Spencer 	P. 	Treywick; 	“District/State 	Attorneys 	Michael 	Jackson 	&
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Robert 	Turner, 	Jr.”; 	Dallas 	County 	Circuit 	Court 	Judge 	Marvin 	W.
Wiggins; 	“Dallas 	County 	Deputy 	Sheriff 	Kyser”; 	and 	Dallas 	County
Sheriff Michael Granthum.1 	(Id. at 2).
Eldridge asserts the following grounds for relief:
Ground One: 	Illegal bond. Present bond is equivalent to
no bond.
Ground Two: 	Never read my Miranda rights.
Ground Three: 	Arrested 	before 	arrest 	warrant(s) 	was 	ever
issued.
Ground Four: 	District 	Court 	Judge 	[Robert 	E. 	Armstrong
III] 	issued 	search 	warrant 	& 	gag 	order 	for
a 	company 	that 	sole 	addresses 	are 	in 	the
State of California, and never signed them.
Ground Five: 	Circuit Court Judge, Marvin W. Wiggins, has
failed 	to 	issue 	an 	order/ruling 	concerning
2 	motions 	of 	in 	limine 	and 	1 	motion 	to
exclude.
1 Although Eldridge names multiple Respondents, the Supreme Court
has made clear that there “is generally only one proper respondent
to a given prisoner’s habeas petition.” 	Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 	426, 	434 	(2004). 	This 	“is 	‘the 	person’ 	with 	the 	ability 	to
produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court.” 	Id. at 435.
Where a state pretrial detainee brings a federal habeas petition,
the county sheriff is usually the proper respondent because he is
typically 	the 	petitioner’s 	custodian. 	See, 	e.g., 	Baptiste 	v.
Whiddon, 	2015 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	27017, 	at 	*1 	n.1, 	2015 	WL 	997819,
at *4 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2015); Dillard v. Marshall, 2022 U.S.
Dist. 	LEXIS 	138757, 	at 	*1 	n.1, 	2022 	WL 	3051021, 	at 	*7 	n.1 	(N.D.
Ala. July 12, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 U.S.
Dist. 	LEXIS 	137061, 	2022 	WL 	3045307 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	Aug. 	2, 	2022).
Because 	they 	do 	not 	have 	custody 	of 	Eldridge, 	Judge 	Armstrong,
Judge Wiggins, Agent Treywick, District Attorney Jackson, District
Attorney 	Turner, 	and 	Deputy 	Sheriff 	Kyser 	clearly 	are 	not 	proper
Respondents in this case. 	However, the Court’s determination that
the 	instant 	petition 	is 	due 	to 	be 	dismissed 	makes 	it 	unnecessary
for the Court to make a definitive finding regarding who the proper
Respondent is in this action.
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Ground Six: 	Agent 	Spencer 	P. 	Treywick, 	of 	the 	Alabama
Law 	Enforcement 	Agency, 	conducted 	an
illegal 	search 	and 	seizure 	in 	the 	State 	of
California.
Ground Seven: 	Failure to receive free phone call.
Ground Eight: 	Illegal search and seizure conducted on the
addresses 	of 	the 	Petitioner/Plaintiff, 	his
mother and his sister.
Ground Nine: 	Circuit 	Court 	Judge, 	Marvin 	W. 	Wiggins
failure 	to 	issue 	an 	order 	or 	ruling
concerning bond, showing prejudicial bias.
Ground Ten: 	Two (2) motions mailed to the Dallas County
Circuit Court were never filed.
Ground Eleven: 	Dallas 	County 	District 	Court 	Judge 	not
properly signing any documents according to
law.
Ground Twelve: 	Failure 	to 	list 	property 	taken 	on 	property
inventory sheet.
Ground Thirteen: 	Failure 	of 	prosecutor 	(State) 	to 	operate
within the confines of the law.
(Id. at 7-12 (alterations to spelling)).
For relief, Eldridge requests: “1) $2,853.000.00 (for illegal
incarceration), 	$500,000,000 	for 	pain, 	suffering 	and 	mental
anguish, 	2) 	immediate 	release 	with 	all 	pending 	charges 	dismissed
with 	prejudice, 	3) 	any 	and 	all 	nonconforming 	documents 	(past 	and
present) 	stricken, 	Petitioner’s/Plaintiff’s 	criminal
record/history 	expunged 	and 	all 	rights 	restored.” 	(Id. 	at 	8
(alterations to spelling)).
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II. 	DISCUSSION
Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which
applies 	to 	§ 	2241 	petitions,2 the 	assigned 	judge 	“must 	promptly
examine” 	Eldridge’s 	petition, 	and 	“[i]f 	it 	plainly 	appears 	from
the 	petition 	and 	any 	attached 	exhibits 	that 	[Eldridge] 	is 	not
entitled 	to 	relief 	in 	the 	district 	court, 	the 	judge 	must 	dismiss
the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 	Rules
Governing 	§ 	2254 	Cases, 	R. 	4. 	Here, 	the 	Court 	should 	dismiss
Eldridge’s 	§ 	2241 	petition 	without 	prejudice 	because 	his 	habeas
claims 	are 	unexhausted, 	and 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Younger 	abstention
doctrine. 	Additionally, 	Eldridge’s 	claims 	for 	monetary 	damages
should 	be 	dismissed 	because 	monetary 	relief 	is 	not 	available 	in
this § 2241 proceeding.
A. 	Failure to Exhaust
As 	a 	state 	pretrial 	detainee, 	Eldridge 	may 	challenge 	his
confinement as unconstitutional by petitioning for a writ of habeas
corpus 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2241. 	See 	Stacey 	v. 	Warden, 	Apalachee
Corr. 	Inst., 	854 	F.2d 	401, 	403 	n.1 	(11th 	Cir. 	1988) 	(per 	curiam)
(“Pre-trial 	habeas 	petitions 	. 	. 	. 	are 	properly 	brought 	under 	28
2 See Clerveaux v. Wilkinson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261000, at *3
n.3, 	2021 	WL 	9406650, 	at 	*1 	n.3 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	July 	20, 	2021) 	(“Rule
4 	of 	the 	Rules 	Governing 	Section 	2254 	Cases 	applies 	to 	petitions
under 	both 	sections 	2254 	and 	2241, 	as 	provided 	in 	Rule 	1(b).”);
Rules 	Governing 	§ 	2254 	Cases, 	R. 	1(b) 	(“The 	district 	court 	may
apply 	any 	or 	all 	of 	these 	rules 	to 	a 	habeas 	corpus 	petition 	not
[filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254].”).
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U.S.C. 	§ 	2241, 	which 	applies 	to 	persons 	in 	custody 	regardless 	of
whether final judgment has been rendered.”).
However, 	“a 	district 	court 	may 	not 	grant 	a 	§ 	2241 	petition
unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.”
Johnson 	v. 	Florida, 	32 	F.4th 	1092, 	1095-96 	(11th 	Cir. 	2022)
(quotation 	omitted). 	“The 	exhaustion 	doctrine 	was 	crafted 	on
federalism 	grounds 	to 	protect 	the 	state 	courts’ 	opportunity 	to
confront 	and 	resolve 	any 	constitutional 	issues 	arising 	within
their jurisdiction and to limit federal interference in the state
adjudicatory process.” 	Id. at 1096.
“Exhaustion 	has 	two 	essential 	requirements 	relevant 	to 	this
case.” 	Id. 	“First, 	to 	be 	exhausted, 	a 	federal 	claim 	must 	be
fairly 	presented 	to 	the 	state 	courts.” 	Id. 	(quotation 	omitted).
“[T]o ensure that state courts have the first opportunity to hear
all 	claims, 	federal 	courts 	have 	required 	a 	state 	prisoner 	to
present 	the 	state 	courts 	with 	the 	same 	claim 	he 	urges 	upon 	the
federal 	courts.” 	McNair 	v. 	Campbell, 	416 	F.3d 	1291, 	1302 	(11th
Cir. 	2005) 	(quotation 	omitted). 	To 	do 	that, 	a 	petitioner 	“must
present his claim to the state court in a manner that would allow
a 	‘reasonable 	reader’ 	to 	understand 	the 	legal 	and 	factual
foundation 	for 	each 	claim.” 	Johnson, 	32 	F.4th 	at 	1096 	(citation
omitted).
Second, 	a 	petitioner 	“must 	take 	his 	claim 	to 	the 	state’s
highest 	court, 	either 	on 	direct 	appeal 	or 	on 	collateral 	review.”
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Id. 	(quotation 	omitted). 	To 	exhaust 	a 	claim 	fully, 	a 	petitioner
must 	first 	present 	any 	federal 	claim 	through 	“one 	complete 	round
of the State’s established appellate review process.” 	O’Sullivan
v. 	Boerckel, 	526 	U.S. 	838, 	845 	(1999). 	“Alabama 	law 	allows
pretrial 	detainees 	to 	challenge 	their 	confinement 	through 	the
state criminal proceedings or collaterally in a state habeas corpus
action.” 	Lee 	v. 	Alabama, 	2022 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	236755, 	at 	*5,
2022 	WL 	22822887, 	at 	*3 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	Dec. 	28, 	2022), 	report 	and
recommendation 	adopted, 	2023 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	13451, 	2023 	WL
11796436 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2023).
Here, it is clear from Eldridge’s § 2241 habeas petition that
he did not exhaust all available state remedies before filing his
petition in this Court. 	In the petition, Eldridge states that he
“mailed 	a 	complaint 	of 	fraud 	upon 	the 	court” 	on 	June 	12, 	2024,
which raised the following issues:
District court judge issuing search warrant & gag order
for out of state, state law enforcement agent conducting
search outside of state, failure to read Miranda rights,
illegal search & seizure, arrest before warrant issued,
circuit 	court 	judge 	continual 	failure 	to 	issue 	order
concerning 	matters 	of 	law, 	prejudicial 	bias 	by 	circuit
court 	judge, 	violation 	to 	state 	& 	U.S. 	constitutional
rights, 	withholding 	free 	phone 	call, 	taking 	property
that 	was 	not 	on 	search 	warrant 	and 	failure 	to 	list 	all
property 	seized, 	failure 	of 	prosecutor 	to 	disclose
evidence in accordance with law and circuit court judge
failure 	to 	hold 	prosecution 	liable 	for 	violating
discovery 	rules, 	case 	law, 	and 	laws, 	district 	court
judge’s 	failure 	to 	sign 	each 	warrant, 	and 	gag 	order,
outrageous bond amount.
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(Doc. 1 at 6 (alterations to spelling)). 	Eldridge states that his
“complaint 	of 	fraud 	upon 	the 	court 	. 	. 	. 	was 	filed 	as 	a 	Writ 	of
Mandamus Supreme Court of Alabama,” 	and that the mandamus petition
is “[p]ending” before the Supreme Court of Alabama. 	(Id.).
Thus, 	it 	is 	apparent 	from 	the 	face 	of 	the 	instant 	petition
that 	Eldridge 	did 	not 	exhaust 	all 	available 	state 	remedies 	with
respect to any of his habeas claims by going through one complete
round 	of 	the 	State’s 	established 	appellate 	review 	process 	before
filing 	the 	instant 	petition 	in 	this 	Court.3 	Consequently, 	his 	§
2241 petition is due to be dismissed without prejudice for failure
to exhaust all available state remedies.4
3 By 	asserting 	claims 	such 	as 	“illegal 	search 	and 	seizure” 	and
“never read my Miranda rights,” Eldridge appears to be attempting
to 	litigate 	constitutional 	defenses 	in 	federal 	court 	while 	state
criminal proceedings against him are still pending. 	However, the
Supreme 	Court 	has 	made 	clear 	that 	a 	federal 	habeas 	corpus
proceeding 	may 	not 	be 	used 	as 	“a 	pretrial-motion 	forum 	for 	state
prisoners.” 	See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410
U.S. 	484, 	493 	(1973). 	“[T]he 	derailment 	of 	a 	pending 	state
proceeding 	by 	an 	attempt 	to 	litigate 	constitutional 	defenses
prematurely in federal court” is not allowed. 	Id.
4 The Court notes that Eldridge attempts to excuse his failure to
exhaust his “illegal bond” claim by claiming that he “can’t appeal
when 	Judge 	refuses 	to 	enter 	an 	order.” 	(See 	Doc. 	1 	at 	7-8).
However, 	the 	undersigned 	has 	reviewed 	Eldridge’s 	state 	court
criminal case records on Alacourt, Alabama’s online court records
database, available at https://v2.alacourt.com. 	And those records
show 	that, 	contrary 	to 	Eldridge’s 	assertion 	that 	Dallas 	County
Circuit 	Judge 	Marvin 	W. 	Wiggins 	“fail[ed] 	to 	issue 	an 	order 	or
ruling concerning bond, showing prejudicial bias,” (see id. at 10),
Judge Wiggins entered orders denying Eldridge’s motions to set or
reduce his bond on February 5, 2024.
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B. 	Younger Abstention Doctrine
Eldridge’s petition is also subject to dismissal because the
Younger abstention doctrine precludes this Court from interfering
with 	Eldridge’s 	ongoing 	state 	criminal 	proceedings. 	See 	Younger
v. 	Harris, 	401 	U.S. 	37 	(1971). 	“When 	a 	petitioner 	seeks 	federal
habeas 	relief 	prior 	to 	a 	pending 	state 	criminal 	trial 	the
petitioner 	must 	satisfy 	the 	‘Younger 	abstention 	hurdles’ 	before
the 	federal 	courts 	can 	grant 	such 	relief.” 	Hughes 	v. 	Att’y 	Gen.
of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Younger established that, based on principles of comity and
federalism, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state
criminal 	proceedings 	where 	the 	state 	court 	conviction 	and/or
sentence 	is 	not 	yet 	final.” 	Johnson, 	32 	F.4th 	at 	1099.
“Application 	of 	the 	Younger 	abstention 	doctrine 	is, 	therefore,
appropriate when the federal constitutional claims at issue can be
raised 	in 	an 	ongoing 	state 	court 	proceeding 	and 	the 	individual
seeking 	relief 	has 	not 	established 	that 	he 	lacks 	an 	adequate
opportunity 	to 	present 	those 	claims 	in 	the 	state 	proceedings.”
Lewis 	v. 	Broward 	Cnty. 	Sheriff 	Off., 	2021 	U.S. 	App. 	LEXIS 	33249,
at *3, 2021 WL 5217718, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2021) (per curiam)
(citing 	Younger, 	401 	U.S. 	at 	49). 	“There 	are 	three 	narrow
exceptions 	to 	the 	abstention 	doctrine: 	(1) 	there 	is 	evidence 	of
state 	proceedings 	motivated 	by 	bad 	faith; 	(2) 	irreparable 	injury
would 	occur; 	or 	(3) 	there 	is 	no 	adequate 	alternative 	state 	forum
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where the constitutional issues can be raised.” 	Johnson, 32 F.4th
at 1099.
Here, 	there 	is 	no 	question 	that 	a 	criminal 	prosecution 	of
Eldridge is pending in Dallas County, Alabama. 	Eldridge does not
allege, and the petition does not reflect, that one of the Younger
exceptions is present. 	Moreover, even if Eldridge’s petition can
be 	construed 	to 	suggest 	that 	one 	or 	more 	of 	these 	exceptions 	is
present, his factual allegations are not sufficiently “substantial”
to 	merit 	relief.5 	See 	Hudson 	v. 	Hubbard, 	358 	F. 	App’x 	116, 	118
(11th 	Cir. 	2009) 	(per 	curiam) 	(quoting 	Younger, 	401 	U.S. 	at 	48).
Eldridge 	“believes 	that 	he 	has 	. 	. 	. 	potential 	constitutional
defense[s] to the [pending] charges, but . . . he can raise th[ose]
defense[s] 	in 	the 	state 	courts 	of 	[Alabama].” 	Johnson, 	32 	F.4th
at 	1102. 	He 	is 	also 	free 	to 	challenge 	the 	amount 	of 	his 	bond
through a state habeas petition. 	See Barnes v. Goggans, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 270066, at *4, 2020 WL 13742923, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov.
5 In particular, Eldridge does not make a “substantial allegation”
showing 	his 	state 	prosecution 	is 	motivated 	by 	bad 	faith, 	nor 	has
he alleged sufficient facts to show irreparable injury would occur.
See 	Younger, 	401 	U.S. 	at 	48 	(noting 	bad 	faith 	prosecutions 	are
brought with no intention of securing conviction or with intention
to harass); id. at 53–54 (explaining irreparable injury exists if
statute under which petitioner is being prosecuted is “flagrantly
and patently” unconstitutional, or if unusual circumstances exist
warranting equitable relief). 	Eldridge also fails to show that he
has 	no 	available 	state 	corrective 	process 	for 	any 	of 	his 	federal
claims, 	and 	he 	presents 	no 	information 	or 	argument 	that 	would
warrant 	federal 	court 	interference 	in 	the 	normal 	functioning 	of
Alabama’s criminal processes.
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9, 2020) (“[T]he petitioner may seek relief from the orders issued
by 	the 	trial 	court 	regarding 	his 	bonds 	by 	filing 	a 	petition 	for
habeas 	corpus 	relief 	with 	the 	Alabama 	Court 	of 	Criminal 	Appeals.
If 	unsuccessful 	before 	the 	Alabama 	Court 	of 	Criminal 	Appeals 	on
his bond reduction claim, the petitioner may petition the Alabama
Supreme Court for relief.”). 	Thus, Eldridge has failed to present
facts 	that 	would 	warrant 	this 	Court 	interfering 	in 	the 	normal
functioning of Alabama’s criminal process.
C. 	Request for Monetary Relief
As 	noted, 	Eldridge’s 	habeas 	petition 	requests 	monetary
damages 	for 	“illegal 	incarceration[,] 	. 	. 	. 	pain, 	suffering 	and
mental 	anguish.” 	(Doc. 	1 	at 	8). 	However, 	as 	this 	Court 	has
already informed Eldridge,6 monetary relief is not available in a
habeas 	case. 	See 	Preiser 	v. 	Rodriguez, 	411 	U.S. 	475, 	494 	(1973)
(“If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something
other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking
something 	other 	than 	immediate 	or 	more 	speedy 	release 	- 	the
traditional 	purpose 	of 	habeas 	corpus. 	In 	the 	case 	of 	a 	damages
claim, 	habeas 	corpus 	is 	not 	an 	appropriate 	or 	available 	federal
remedy.”). 	Since monetary relief is not available in this § 2241
habeas 	proceeding, 	Eldridge’s 	monetary 	damages 	claims 	are 	due 	to
be dismissed.
6 See Eldridge v. Granthum, No. 2:24-cv-00194-KD-B (S.D. Ala. 2024),
ECF No. 3.
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III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
“Unless 	a 	circuit 	justice 	or 	judge 	issues 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals
from 	the 	final 	order 	in 	a 	habeas 	corpus 	proceeding 	in 	which 	the
detention 	complained 	of 	arises 	out 	of 	process 	issued 	by 	a 	State
court.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2253(c)(1)(A). 	State 	pretrial 	detainees,
like Eldridge, “must obtain a COA to appeal the denial of a federal
habeas 	petition 	filed 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2241.” 	Daker 	v.
Warren, 	2012 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	87517, 	at 	*22-23, 	2012 	WL 	2403437,
at *8 (N.D. Ga. June 25, 2012) (citations omitted); see Sawyer v.
Holder, 	326 	F.3d 	1363, 	1364 	n.3 	(11th 	Cir. 	2003) 	(“Based 	on 	the
statutory 	language 	of 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2253(c)(1), 	state 	prisoners
proceeding 	under 	§ 	2241 	must 	obtain 	a 	COA 	to 	appeal.”). 	A
certificate 	of 	appealability 	may 	issue 	only 	where 	“the 	applicant
has 	made 	a 	substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a 	constitutional
right.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
When 	a 	habeas 	petition 	is 	denied 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	the
underlying 	constitutional 	claims, 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability
may 	issue 	only 	when 	the 	petitioner 	demonstrates 	“that 	reasonable
jurists 	would 	find 	the 	district 	court’s 	assessment 	of 	the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 	Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 	473, 	484 	(2000). 	When 	a 	habeas 	petition 	is 	dismissed 	on
procedural 	grounds 	without 	reaching 	the 	merits 	of 	any 	underlying
constitutional claim, a certificate of appealability should issue
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only 	“when 	the 	prisoner 	shows, 	at 	least, 	that 	jurists 	of 	reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its 	procedural 	ruling.” 	Id.; 	accord 	Miller-El 	v. 	Cockrell, 	537
U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“Under the controlling standard, a petitioner
must 	show 	that 	reasonable 	jurists 	could 	debate 	whether 	(or, 	for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a 	different 	manner 	or 	that 	the 	issues 	presented 	were 	adequate 	to
deserve 	encouragement 	to 	proceed 	further.”) 	(quotations 	and
brackets omitted).
The 	undersigned 	submits 	that 	reasonable 	jurists 	would 	not
conclude 	that 	this 	Court 	is 	in 	error 	in 	dismissing 	the 	instant
petition without prejudice, or that Eldridge should be allowed to
proceed 	further. 	As 	a 	result, 	the 	undersigned 	submits 	that
Eldridge 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability, 	and
that 	he 	should 	not 	be 	permitted 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	on
appeal.
Because a state § 2241 petitioner, like a § 2254 petitioner,
must 	obtain 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	to 	appeal, 	the
undersigned 	notes 	that 	Rule 	11(a) 	of 	the 	Rules 	Governing 	§ 	2254
Cases 	provides 	for 	the 	following 	procedure: 	“The 	district 	court
must 	issue 	or 	deny 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	when 	it 	enters
a final order adverse to the applicant. 	Before entering the final
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order, 	the 	court 	may 	direct 	the 	parties 	to 	submit 	arguments 	on
whether a certificate should issue.” 	Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,
R. 	11(a). 	Accordingly, 	if 	there 	is 	an 	objection 	to 	this
recommendation 	by 	Eldridge, 	he 	may 	bring 	this 	argument 	to 	the
attention 	of 	the 	District 	Judge 	in 	the 	objections 	permitted 	to
this report and recommendation. 	See Brightwell v. Patterson, Case
No. 1:11-00165-WS-C, ECF No. 14 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2011) (Eleventh
Circuit 	order 	denying 	petitioner’s 	motions 	for 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability 	and 	to 	appeal 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	in 	a 	case 	in 	which
this Court set out the foregoing procedure); see also Castrejon v.
United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83779, at *75, 2011 WL 3241817,
at *20 (S.D. Ala. June 28, 2011) (providing for the same procedure),
report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2011 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	84194,
2011 WL 3241580 (S.D. Ala. July 29, 2011); Griffin v. DeRosa, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106920, at *12, 2010 WL 3943702, at *4 (N.D. Fla.
Sept. 	20, 	2010) 	(providing 	for 	same 	procedure), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Griffin v. Butterworth, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 106921, 2010 WL 3943699 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	recommends
that Petitioner Eldridge’s § 2241 petition (Doc. 1) and this action
be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust all available
state 	remedies, 	and 	under 	the 	Younger 	abstention 	doctrine. 	The
undersigned 	further 	submits 	that 	Petitioner 	Eldridge 	is 	not
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entitled to a certificate of appealability and is not entitled to
appeal in forma pauperis.7
The 	Clerk 	is 	DIRECTED 	to 	serve 	copies 	of 	Eldridge’s 	habeas
petition 	(Doc. 	1) 	and 	this 	report 	and 	recommendation 	on: 	(1)
Sheriff Michael Granthum, 102 Church Street, Selma, Alabama 36702;
(2) 	Warden/Director, 	Perry 	County 	PREP 	Center, 	4805 	U.S. 	Highway
80 East, Uniontown, Alabama 36786; and (3) the Attorney General of
the State of Alabama.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A 	copy 	of 	this 	report 	and 	recommendation 	shall 	be 	served 	on
all parties in the manner provided by law. 	Any party who objects
to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14)
days of the date of service of this document, file specific written
objections with the Clerk of this Court. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c). 	The parties should
note 	that 	under 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	Rule 	3-1, 	“[a] 	party 	failing 	to
object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or 	recommendations
contained 	in 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation 	in 	accordance 	with 	the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge
on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period
7 Because this action is due to be dismissed, the undersigned takes
no 	action 	on 	Eldridge’s 	motion 	to 	proceed 	without 	prepayment 	of
fees and “Motion to Supply” (Docs. 2, 3).
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for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object.
In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review
on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
11th Cir. R. 3-1.
In 	order 	to 	be 	specific, 	an 	objection 	must 	identify 	the
specific 	finding 	or 	recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made,
state 	the 	basis 	for 	the 	objection, 	and 	specify 	the 	place 	in 	the
Magistrate 	Judge’s 	report 	and 	recommendation 	where 	the 	disputed
determination is found. 	An objection that merely incorporates by
reference 	or 	refers 	to 	the 	briefing 	done 	by 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge
is not specific.
DONE this 8th day of October, 2024.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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