United States of America v. Gray et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Criminal Action No. 2:01-00007-KD-N
)
FELICIA JACKSON, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
This action is before the Court on the Motion for Sentence Reduction under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A) (Compassionate Release) filed by Defendant Felicia Jackson and supplement to
the Motion (docs. 438, 438-1, 438-2,1 439). Upon consideration, and for the reasons set forth
herein, the motion is DENIED.2
1 In support, Jackson provides her personal letters wherein she expresses remorse and regret and
outlines her abusive childhood and its affect into early adulthood (doc. 438-2, p. 1-2); her brief
regarding age at the time of the offense and length of sentence and argument that because she
was twenty-three when the offense occurred but is now mature, non-violent, no longer a danger
to society, and rehabilitated, her sentence should be reduced to time served (Id., at p. 3-11);
argument that the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory at time of her sentencing but are now
advisory and citations to cases wherein district courts have reduced similar mandatory life
sentences (Id., at p. 7); verification from her Factory Manager that Jackson works as a sewing
machine mechanic for Unicor and an open letter to Unicor Team Members to apply for work at
an Exxel facility (Id., at p. 12-13); letter of support by the reverend overseeing Jackson’s
religious education course and a list of donations she made to the ministry (Id., p. 14-15);
artwork dedicated to Jackson in recognition of her inspiration to other inmates (Id., p. 16); list of
Bureau of Prisons staff members who will witness to her character if contacted but cannot write
letters (Id., at p. 17); letters of support from co-inmates, friends, and her mother (Id., at 18-34),
current Inmate Program Review and Individualized Needs Plan (Id., at 35-37), high school
diploma and successful GED test results (Id., at 38-39); and certificates of completion and
appreciation for numerous prison programs (Id., at p. 40-68).
2 Jackson’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied (doc. 438, p. 16). There is no
constitutional or statutory right to appointment of counsel for motions filed under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c). Additionally, the Court finds that Jackson has shown the ability to effectively set forth
the facts and legal argument necessary to support the motion, and that the issues raised therein
are not so complex as to require appointment of counsel. See United States v. Mars, 2022 WL
1124804, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2022) (explaining that “equitable concerns, such as the

2
I. Background
In 2001, Jackson and four co-defendants were indicted for offenses related to a bank
robbery in Greensboro, Alabama (doc. 1). During the robbery, Jackson shot and killed a bank
employee. Jackson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank robbery (Count One), bank
robbery resulting in death (Count Two), and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence
(Count Three) (doc. 198). She was sentenced to five years as to Count One and life without
parole as to Count Two, to serve concurrently, and ten years as to Count Three to serve
consecutively to the sentences imposed for Counts One and Two. Jackson did not file an appeal.
Jackson’s first motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was denied and the denial
was affirmed on appeal (docs. 240, 244). Her second motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, based on Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), was authorized
for consideration by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (doc. 347). However, the
motion was dismissed upon finding that bank robbery resulting in death was a valid predicate
offense and did not implicate the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (docs. 362, 363). Jackson
appealed and her application for a certificate of appealability was denied by the Eleventh Circuit
(docs. 367, 384).
Jackson has now filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and addendum in support (docs. 438, 439). At present, she has served
complexity of the issues involved on appeal, may ‘make the appointment of counsel appropriate
to ensure a just outcome’ in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.”) (quoting United States v. Webb, 565
F.3d 789, 794-95 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rolon, No. 22-10970, 2022 WL 16959204,
at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (unreported opinion) (footnote omitted) (“The only basis for
appointment of counsel that Rolon asserted in his motion was his pro se status and that he was
‘not versed in the complexities of the law,’ but pro se status alone and lack of legal knowledge
does not establish that appointment of counsel is necessary. Rather, appointment of counsel in
this context is ‘a privilege justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as the presence of
facts and legal issues so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.’”)
(Citation omitted).

3
approximately twenty-two years in prison and is forty-five years old. She is incarcerated at FCI
Aliceville in Aliceville, Alabama. At present, FCI Aliceville is operating at Level One
precautions for Covid 19, the least restrictive level. The facility houses approximately 1,600
inmates. One inmate has tested positive for Covid 19.
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/covid19_statistics.html (last viewed April 19, 2023).
II. Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
“A district court has no inherent authority to modify a defendant's sentence and may do
so ‘only when authorized by a statute or rule.’” United States v. Gray, No. 22-11963, 2023 WL
1836789, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2023) (quoting United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–
606 (11th Cir. 2015)). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act,
provides that upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the Court
may reduce a sentence if there are extraordinary and compelling reasons which warrant a
reduction, certain procedural requirements are met3, the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
weigh in favor of a reduction in sentence, and the “reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that U.S.S.G. Ҥ 1B1.13 is an
applicable policy statement that governs all motions under Section 3582(a)(1)(A).” United States
v. Bryant, 996 F. 3d 1243, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021). The Policy Statement provides that upon
motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the Court may reduce a term of imprisonment if it
determines that the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh in favor of a reduction, there
3 Defendants may file a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion after they have “exhausted all administrative
rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or
the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility,
whichever is earlier[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Jackson filed a copy of the Warden’s denial
of her request that he file a motion for compassionate release on her behalf, dated May 16, 2022
(doc. 438-1). Her motion was filed in October 2022. She has met this requirement.

4
are extraordinary and compelling reasons which warrant a reduction, the defendant is not a
danger to the safety of any other person or the community as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g),
and the “reduction is consistent with this policy statement.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. However, the
district courts need not analyze the above requirements in any specific order. See United States
v. Tinker, 14 F. 4th 1234, 1237-1238 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Importantly, should the
movant fail to make a showing on any one requirement, that failure “would foreclose a sentence
reduction.” Id. at 1238.
As extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction of sentence, Jackson points out
that she was twenty-three years old and from an abusive family background at the time of the
offense which resulted in her life sentence. She argues that there is now a change in the
sentencing landscape and a trend away from life sentences for similar defendants (doc. 438, p. 5-
13; doc. 438-1, p. 3-11). She also asserts that the “intervening changes in sentencing laws” since
she was sentenced in 2002, “create a basis for a substantial reduction” in her sentence (doc. 438,
p. 7). Jackson points out that the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory and not mandatory,
and argues that if she were sentenced today, she would not receive a life sentence (Id.). Jackson
admits that her age and health do not place her in a high-risk category as to Covid 19, but asserts
that her “incarceration in the midst of a global pandemic has sufficiently increased the severity of
the sentence beyond what was originally anticipated such that the purpose of sentencing [is] fully
met even with the proposed reduction” (Id., p. 11-12).
As previously stated, a reduction in sentence based on extraordinary and compelling
reasons must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 “is an applicable policy statement
that governs all motions under Section 3582(a)(1)(A).” United States v. Bryant, 996 F. 3d at
1262. 	The Policy Statement lists four examples of extraordinary and compelling reasons under

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§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Specifically, the “medical condition of the defendant” such as a terminal
illness, or serious physical or medical condition, or serious functional or cognitive impairment,
or age-related physical or mental health deterioration. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A). Also, the
“age of the defendant” where the “defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a
serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has
served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.” Id.
at cmt. n.1(B). Additionally, certain “family circumstances” may provide grounds for a
reduction of sentence. Specifically, “(i) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the
defendant's minor child or minor children. [or] (ii) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse
or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or
registered partner.” Id. at cmt. n.1(C).
And last, any “other reason [a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
[when] there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or
in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” Id. at cmt. n.1(D).
Although the catch-all phrase “other than” has been broadly interpreted by some courts, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that “Application Note 1(D) does not grant discretion to courts to
develop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant's sentence” United States v.
Bryant, 996 F.3d at 248; United States v. Beckford, No. 22-10638, 2022 WL 4372553, at *2
(11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2022) (the “district courts may not ‘find[ ] extraordinary and compelling
reasons within the catch-all provision beyond those specified by the Sentencing Commission in
Section 1B1.13.’”) (quoting United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th at 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021)).
Thus, because the Policy Statement allows other reasons as “determined by the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 at cmt. n.1(D), the Court is constrained by the
determinations of the Director. See Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5050.50,

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Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence: Procedures for Implementation of 18 U.S.C. §§
3582 and 4205(g). Review of Program Statement 5050.50 indicates that the Director has
determined that certain medical conditions regardless of age, i.e., terminal or debilitating medical
conditions; certain medical or mental conditions affecting inmates 65 and older who have served
at least 50% of their sentence; and certain family circumstances involving the death or
incapacitation of the caregiver for the inmate’s minor children, or disabled spouse or registered
partner, may, if conditions are met, constitute grounds for a reduction of sentence.
Since Congress specifically states that a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i) must be consistent with the applicable Policy Statements and the Eleventh
Circuit has held that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is an applicable Policy Statement, Bryant, 996 F. 3d at
1262, this Court is without authority to disregard the Policy Statement’s plain language. Thus, a
reduction of sentence based upon the alleged extraordinary and compelling reasons Jackson
presents, which are primarily based on changes in sentencing law and the increase in severity of
her punishment caused by the Covid 19 pandemic, would not be consistent with Policy
Statement § 1B1.13. United States v. Lorfils, No. 21-12177, 2023 WL 355102, at *3 (11th Cir.
Jan. 23, 2023) (unreported opinion) (affirming the district court’s decision that circuit precedent
“precluded it from considering a change in sentencing law as an extraordinary and compelling
basis for granting relief.”).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that if a defendant’s circumstances do not meet any of
the four reasons in the Policy Statement, then he or she is ineligible for consideration of a
reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1254. Since Jackson failed to make this showing,
she is ineligible for consideration for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Therefore, the Court need not address whether the time she has served is
sufficient to comply with the sentencing purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), whether the

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Covid 19 pandemic “has sufficiently increased the severity of the sentence beyond what was
originally anticipated such that the purpose of sentencing are fully met even with the proposed
reduction,” (doc. 438, p. 12), whether there is a disparity between her sentence and that of her
co-defendants or disparity between her sentence and that of a similarly-situated defendant
sentenced under the now-advisory Sentencing Guidelines, whether her release would not pose a
danger to the community as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and the extent of her rehabilitation,
including her conduct while in prison, numerous programs completed, consistent work history,
maturity, and remorse for her actions. See United States v. Lorfils, 2023 WL 355102, at *3 (“If
one of the compassionate-release conditions is missing, the District Court need not address the
others.”) (citing United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2021)).
III. Conclusion
Since Jackson failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons which would warrant
a reduction of sentence, her Motion is denied.4
DONE and ORDERED this the 21st day of April 2023.
s / Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4 Jackson states that she went to trial on advice of counsel and that her life sentence was
punishment for her decision to proceed to trial (doc. 438, p. 14). The docket indicates that
Jackson did not go to trial. Instead, she entered a plea of guilty to Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the
Indictment (doc. 198, Judgment in a Criminal Case).