Blanks v. Gulf Coast Security, LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CONTESSA BLANKS, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 25-00511-KD-N
)
GULF COAST SECURITY, LLC, )
Defendant. )
ORDER
This action is before the Court on Plaintiff Contessa Blanks’s Renewed Motion for Default
Judgment (Doc. 17) against Defendant Gulf Coast Security, LLC (“Gulf Coast Security”). Upon
consideration, for the reasons below, the Court will DENY the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 11, 2025, Blanks filed this action against Gulf Coast Security alleging
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). (Doc. 1). On February 19, 2026, Blanks
applied for entry of default. (Doc. 9). She explained that she had served Gulf Coast Security’s
registered agent on January 22 and that Gulf Coast Security had failed to respond to her complaint
by the deadline of February 12. (Id. at 2; Doc. 9-3 at 3). The Clerk entered default against Gulf
Coast Security on February 20. (Doc. 10).
On February 23, Blanks filed a motion for default judgment. (Doc. 11). On April 29, the
Court denied the motion, (Doc. 12), explaining that “the complaint fails to assert facts to show that
Blanks is covered by the FLSA,” (id. at 8). On May 11, Blanks filed an amended complaint “to
cure some of the issues raised in this Court’s Order of April 29, 2026.” (Doc. 13 at 1). Eight days
later, Blanks filed an executed amended alias summons. (Doc. 16). On July 6, Blanks filed the
instant renewed motion for default judgment. (Doc. 17).
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II. LAW
“There are two steps in the default process: (1) getting the clerk to make an entry of default;
and then (2) obtaining judgment on the default.” Steven S. Gensler, 2 Fed. R. Civ. P., Rules and
Commentary Rule 55 (2024).1 “The core of default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is
the failure to timely file a required responsive pleading.” Id. § 55.1. The Eleventh Circuit has a
“strong policy of determining cases on their merits,” so “default judgments are generally
disfavored.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2015). Still,
the default mechanism is necessary “so that ‘the adversary process [will not be] halted because of
an essentially unresponsive party.’” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir.
2014) (alteration in original) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder
Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam)). Default judgment is “warranted when
there is ‘a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.’” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245
(quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
But default judgment is possible only if the Court has both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.
See Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009).
III. JURISDICTION
In a previous order, the Court explained that Blanks had established subject-matter
jurisdiction: “Here, federal question jurisdiction is presented on the face of the Complaint because
this is a civil action brought pursuant to federal law—the FLSA.” (Doc. 12 at 3). The Court also
explained that “Gulf Coast Security is subject to specific jurisdiction in Alabama because (1) this
lawsuit arises out of Blanks’ employment in Alabama, (2) Gulf Coast Security formed in Alabama,
1 The Clerk has already entered default against Gulf Coast Security, leaving only the issue of
whether default judgment is now warranted.
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and (3) Gulf Coast Security conducts business in Alabama.” (Id. at 5). Those facts stand
unchanged. But “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is a composite notion of two separate ideas: amenability
to jurisdiction, or predicate, and notice to the defendant through valid service of process.” Prewitt
Enters., Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916, 925 n.15 (11th Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, the Court must also be satisfied that Gulf Coast Security has received notice through
proper service of Blanks’s amended complaint.
A. Service is governed by Rule 4 because Blanks’s amended complaint contains a
new claim for relief.
Ordinarily, service of “a pleading filed after the original complaint,” including an amended
complaint, is governed by Rule 5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(B). “Formal service under Rule 4 is not
necessary for downstream pleadings when the court already holds power over the affected parties”;
“Rule 5 is merely a way of giving notice.” Steven S. Gensler, 1 Fed. R. Civ. P., Rules and
Commentary § 5:3 (2026). In other words, Rule 5 applies “in circumstances where the court
already has personal jurisdiction over the defendant with regard to the plaintiff’s claims.” Fischer
v. Fed. Express Corp., 42 F.4th 366, 386 (3d Cir. 2022). “No service is required on a party who is
in default for failing to appear. But a pleading that asserts a new claim for relief against such a
party must be served on that party under Rule 4.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2).
The Eleventh Circuit has addressed what constitutes “a new claim for relief” several times.
See, e.g., Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. & Canada, 674 F.2d 1365
(11th Cir. 1982); Campbell v. Bennett, 47 F.4th 1362 (11th Cir. 2022). A new claim for relief
arises when “the defendant would not be on notice of [the claim] via the allegations in the original
complaint or the statutes charged therein.” Id. at 1366. In other words, a defaulted party must be
served an amended complaint if it contains a new claim that (1) was not requested in the initial
complaint and (2) is not authorized by the statute cited in the initial complaint.
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In Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit vacated default judgment after it concluded that the
amended complaint needed to be served on the defaulted defendant. Id. at 1367. After default had
been entered against a defendant, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, id. at 1364, which for
the first time requested “joint and several liability as to actual damages and profits,” id. at 1367.
The district court determined that the amended complaint did not contain a new claim and thus did
not require service under Rule 4. Id. at 1366. The Eleventh Circuit, however, concluded that the
claim for joint and several liability as to actual damages and profits “constituted a new claim for
relief” for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff did not request this claim in his initial complaint, and (2)
the statute cited in the initial complaint “did not put [the defaulted defendant] on notice that he
could be subject to joint and several liability for actual damages and profits.” Id. at 1367. The
Eleventh Circuit explained that “[t]he Copyright Act provides expressly for the possibility of joint
and several liability for statutory damages,” but the provision that “provides for actual damages
and profits[] says nothing about the possibility of joint and several liability.” Id. (emphasis added).
Campbell relied on Varnes, in which the amended complaint requested attorney’s fees. 674
F.2d at 1367. That request was not present in the initial complaint, and the statute under which the
plaintiff sought relief did not authorize attorney’s fees. Id. at 1369. Because the request was thus
“based on equitable and not statutory grounds,” it constituted a new claim for relief. Id.
Had Blanks not asserted a new claim for relief in her amended complaint, she would not
have needed to serve it upon Gulf Coast Security. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2). But her amended
complaint requests relief that her initial complaint did not: “Grant Plaintiff a permanent injunction
enjoining Defendant, its agents, successors, employees, attorneys, and those acting in concert with
Defendant and on Defendant’s behalf from continuing to violate the FLSA.” (Doc. 13 at 7). 29
U.S.C. § 216(b)—the penalty provision cited in Blanks’s initial complaint—“says nothing about
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the possibility of” the permanent injunction sought in the amended complaint. See Campbell, 47
F.4th at 1367. In other words, this claim for relief is “based on equitable and not statutory grounds.”
See Varnes, 674 F.2d at 1369. Consequently, this Court can exercise personal jurisdiction—and
thus default judgment is possible—only if Blanks has properly served her amended complaint
upon Gulf Coast Security under Rule 4.
B. Service was proper under Rule 4 because it is reasonable to assume that
Cooley transmitted notice of the amended complaint to Landrum.
Blanks’s motion provides the details of service of the amended complaint. (Doc. 17 at 4).
Blanks’s process server made numerous attempts to serve Gulf Coast Security’s registered agent,
Patric Landrum, at his “home address where he was served with the original Complaint.” (Id.).
Eventually, the process server reached Gulf Coast Security’s Operations Manager, Janet Cooley,
who told the process server that Landrum was aware that the process server was trying to reach
him. (Id. at 5). At that point, the process server visited the office address listed on Gulf Coast
Security’s website. (Id.). The owner of the building told the process server that “Landrum had been
evicted from the space 4 months earlier,” but the owner found Landrum’s new address for the
process server. (Id.). The process server visited the new address and served the amended complaint
and amended alias summons on Cooley. (Doc. 16).
The issue is whether personal service on Cooley satisfies Rule 4’s requirements for serving
an unincorporated association within the United States. Under Rule 4(h)(1), service can be made
(1) in compliance with the law of the state where the district court is located or where service is
made, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A), or (2) “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Blanks’s renewed motion for default
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judgment does not address this issue, leaving the Court to review Blanks’s alleged facts and
determine whether service was proper.
The Court is not satisfied that Cooley is an “agent authorized” to accept service on behalf
of Gulf Coast Security. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). In the return of service form, the process
server indicated that Cooley is designated by law to accept service on behalf of Gulf Coast
Security. (Doc. 16). But Gulf Coast Security’s business entity record lists Landrum, not Cooley,
as its registered agent. See Gulf Coast Security LLC, Ala. Sec’y of State: Bus. Entity Recs.,
https://arc-sos.state.al.us/cgi/corpdetail.mbr/detail?corp=000830322 (last visited Sep. 4, 2026).
Blanks has not offered any evidence to support the process server’s assertion that Cooley was
authorized to accept service, and that assertion standing alone does not suffice to show that Cooley
was so authorized—especially in the context of default judgment. See Melton v. Wiley, 262
F. App’x 921, 923 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed
to show that the recipient was authorized to accept service because the plaintiff “proffered nothing
to support the process servicer’s assertion” that the recipient was so authorized); Surtain, 789 F.3d
at 1244–45 (“[D]efault judgments are generally disfavored.”); Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1) committee
comments to 1992 amendment (“[C]ourts should be vigilant to protect the rights of defendants
when default judgments are entered on the basis of service upon an agent of the defendant.”).
The Court is satisfied, however, that Cooley is “an officer, a managing or general agent”
authorized to accept service on behalf of Gulf Coast Security. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Courts
in Alabama look to federal case law to make that determination. Ala. R. Civ. P. 4 committee
comments to 2004 amendment (“The phrase ‘managing or general agent’ is used in a majority of
the states and has been interpreted in many federal cases. The intent is to adopt the majority rule
of federal caselaw in interpreting the phrase ‘managing or general agent.’”).
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Federal case law “focus[es] on the person’s role and level of authority within the
organization” to determine “whether a person is an officer or managing or general agent.” Steven
S. Gensler, 1 Fed. R. Civ. P., Rules and Commentary § 4:61 (2026). “The general rule is that a
managing or general agent is someone authorized to transact all business of a particular kind at a
particular place and who is ‘vested with powers of discretion rather than being under direct
superior control.’” Id. (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Rhyme Syndicate Music, 376 F.3d 615,
624 (6th Cir. 2004)). “Yet even a person who is not in charge of the corporation’s activities within
the state still may qualify as a managing or general agent for purposes of Rule 4(h)(1)(B)” if the
person “is in a position of sufficient responsibility so that it is reasonable to assume that the person
will transmit notice of the commencement of the action to organizational superiors.” 4A Wright &
Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1103 (4th ed. 2026). Overall, “the validity of service of
the summons and complaint on an agent pursuant to current Rule 4(h)(1)(B) depends upon the
facts in the particular case.” Id.
The facts here indicate that Cooley occupied a position of responsibility sufficient to
support a reasonable assumption that she transmitted notice of the amended complaint to her
superiors within Gulf Coast Security. Landrum, the registered agent, was made aware of this action
when Blanks served her initial complaint on him. Moreover, the process server has affied that he
made plans with Landrum to serve the amended complaint on him at his residence. (Doc. 17 at
10). The process server’s affidavit also indicates that Cooley told the process server that Landrum
“was aware that [the process server] was trying to reach him.” (Id.). Eventually, the amended
complaint was served on Cooley at Landrum’s new business address. (Id. at 11). It is reasonable
to assume that an operations manager who was evidently in close contact with Gulf Coast
Security’s registered agent would have transmitted notice of service to that agent and thus to Gulf
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Coast Security. Consequently, pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1)(B), service of Blanks’s amended complaint
upon Cooley was proper.
IV. ANALYSIS
The standard for determining whether there is a “sufficient basis” for default judgment is
“akin to that necessary to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Surtain, 789
F.3d at 1245. Under this standard, the court asks whether the complaint contains sufficient facts,
“accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Default judgment is warranted “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. By defaulting, a defendant is deemed to have admitted well-pleaded
factual allegations, but not unsupported allegations or legal conclusions. Cotton v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005).
A. Elements of an FLSA Claim
Blanks has alleged that Gulf Coast Security violated the FLSA by failing to pay her
overtime compensation. The Court denied Blanks’s previous motion for default judgment because
her complaint, which did not describe her duties or Gulf Coast Security’s business activities, failed
to demonstrate that Blanks was covered under section 207 of the FLSA. (Doc. 12 at 7–8). Blanks
then filed an amended complaint “to cure some of the issues raised” in the Court’s previous order.
(Doc. 13 at 1). Now, Blanks moves for default judgment under her amended complaint.
Section 207 of the FLSA prohibits an employer from working an employee for more than
forty hours per week “unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess
of [forty hours] specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular ratee at which
he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). “To state a claim under the FLSA for unpaid wages, an
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employee must allege (1) an employment relationship; (2) that the employer or employee engaged
in interstate commerce; and (3) that the employer failed to pay overtime compensation and/or
minimum wages.” Ray v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2022).
B. Blanks has not demonstrated that she is covered by the FLSA.
The Court’s previous order explained how an employee can demonstrate individual or
enterprise coverage: “To be eligible for overtime compensation under the FLSA, ‘an employee
must first demonstrate that he is “covered” by the FLSA’ through ‘individual coverage’ or
‘enterprise coverage.’” Guevara v. Lafise Corp., 127 F.4th 824, 829 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011)). But
neither Blanks’s amended complaint nor her renewed motion for default judgment directly
addresses whether she is covered by the FLSA through either form of coverage. The Court is thus
left to examine the facts alleged in her amended complaint to ascertain whether she is covered.
The amended complaint alleges that Blanks was employed by Gulf Coast Security, which
“provides security services to local business in and around Baldwin County, Alabama.” (Doc. 13
at 3). “Specifically, [Gulf Coast Security] provides security of contracted properties, along with
fire watch and beach patrol.” (Id.). Along with Blanks, Gulf Coast Security “employed
approximately 25+ Security Officers” and “provided security to Romar House, Plantation, The
Dunes, Kiva Dunes, Crystal West, Gulf Tower, Edgewater, and Island Royal.” (Id. at 3–4). “As a
Security Officer, [Blanks] would be required to do DAR (daily activity reports) for each shift for
each property.” (Id. at 4). “She would have to rove to ensure constant visual on properties to help
maintain the security and safety of the guests and/or properties she was assigned.” (Id.). “She
would also check guests’ vehicles on the property by issuing parking passes.” (Id.).
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These alleged facts do not suffice to demonstrate that Blanks is covered by the FLSA
through either individual or enterprise coverage.
1. Individual Coverage
The individual coverage analysis “requires us to examine the individual employee’s
activities.” St. Elien v. All Cnty. Env’t Servs., Inc., 991 F.3d 1197, 1198 (11th Cir. 2021). The
employee can demonstrate that she is individually covered by showing that she is “engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)).
Blanks does not allege that her job related to the production of goods, so she must show that she
was engaged in actual commerce.
[F]or an employee to be ‘engaged in commerce’ under the FLSA, he must be
directly participating in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate
commerce by (i) working for an instrumentality of interstate commerce, e.g.,
transportation or communication industry employees, or (ii) by regularly using the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in his work, e.g., regular and recurrent use
of interstate telephone, telegraph, mails, or travel.
Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006). The sweep
of commerce under the FLSA is narrower than “the full scope of [Congress’s] commerce power.”
Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 322 F. App’x 644, 645 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009). Consequently, “activities
merely affecting commerce” will not suffice; the FLSA “regulate[s] only activities constituting
interstate commerce.” Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266. For example, service of meals to interstate
railroad workers in a dining car running on the railroad’s tracks does not constitute commerce.
McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 492 (1943). Railroad work itself constitutes commerce, but
“employment that indirectly assist[s] the functioning of [railroads]” does not. Id. at 496–97.
In the context of the production of goods for commerce, individual coverage is extended
to employees a step removed from “the physical process of the making of the goods,” Kirschbaum
v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 524 (1942), because the FLSA deems an employee to be “engaged in
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the production of goods if [he] [i]s employed . . . in any closely related process or occupation
directly essential to the production thereof,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(j). The FLSA thus covers “employees
of a security force that protects the producer’s premises.” Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1268. In the context
of actual commerce, on the other hand, the FLSA brooks precious little wiggle room; nothing short
of direct participation will do. Id. at 1266.
For example, even an employee who works at the front desk of a hotel frequented by guests
from other states may not be individually covered by the FLSA. See Spears v. Bay Inn & Suites
Foley, LLC, No. 19-cv-00269, 2021 WL 2445889, at *4 (S.D. Ala. June 15, 2021). “Evidence that
the hotel was engaged in interstate commerce by catering to out-of-state guests does not establish
that the [employee] was personally engaged in interstate commerce.” Id. The employee must show
“that he was engaged in interstate commerce as opposed to providing services of a local nature”;
“interactions with out-of-state customers” do not alone “implicate[] interstate commerce or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.” Id. The employee in Spears eventually surmounted the
individual coverage hurdle by showing that he was engaged in commerce because he handled
interstate phone calls, emails, and credit card transactions when guests from other states made
reservations before arriving in Alabama. Spears v. Bay Inn & Suites Foley, LLC, No. 19-cv-00269,
2022 WL 3141878, at*3–4 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 2022), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
105 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2024).
Blanks has alleged that her job with Gulf Coast Security entailed providing security to eight
beachside condominiums in Baldwin County. Although Blanks does not say so, only a modest leap
of common sense is necessary to speculate that those condominiums hosted out-of-state guests,
with whom Blanks interacted when she checked their vehicles and issued parking passes to them.
But, although provided for the benefit of interstate travelers, those are “services of a local nature”
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that do not themselves constitute interstate commerce. See Spears, 2021 WL 2445889, at *4;
Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266. Blanks has thus failed to show that she was engaged in commerce.
Consequently, she has not demonstrated that she is individually covered by the FLSA.
2. Enterprise Coverage
The enterprise coverage analysis turns on “an assessment of the enterprise’s activities”
rather than the individual employee’s. St. Elien, 991 F.3d at 1198. An employer’s activities trigger
enterprise coverage when the employer has (1) “employees engaged in commerce,” “production
of goods for commerce,” or “handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that
have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person,” and (2) “at least $500,000 of
‘annual gross volume of sales made or business done.’” Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc.,
616 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)).
Blanks has not alleged any facts indicating that Gulf Coast Security’s activities satisfy
either of the criteria required to trigger enterprise coverage. Consequently, Blanks has failed to
demonstrate that she is covered by the FLSA through enterprise coverage.
Absent any demonstration that she is covered by the FLSA, Blanks cannot plausibly state
a claim for relief under it. Default judgment is thus not warranted.
CONCLUSION
Blanks renews her motion for default judgment against Gulf Coast Security. But Blanks’s
amended complaint still fails to demonstrate that she is covered by the FLSA. Accordingly, the
renewed motion for default judgment (Doc. 17) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED this the 14th day of October 2026.
/s/ Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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