Mitchell v. Perdido Trucking

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICO MITCHELL 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-cv-220-TBM-RPM
PERDIDO TRUCKING, LLC 	DEFENDANT
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
Pro se Plaintiff, Rico Mitchell, brought this suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act. He alleges
that Perdido Trucking, LLC, his employer, discriminated against him based on his race; that his
workplace was hostile and unsafe; and that he was terminated for reporting a safety issue. Instead
of filing an answer, Perdido has instead filed the instant Motion [10] to Transfer Venue to the
Southern District of Alabama. Perdido argues that, based on the special venue provision for Title
VII cases—42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)—venue is improper in the Southern District of Mississippi.
Alternatively, Perdido argues that, for the convenience of the parties, venue should be transferred
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As discussed fully below, although venue is proper in the
Southern District of Mississippi, upon review of the Section 1404(a) factors, this action should be
transferred to the Southern District of Alabama. Thus, Perdido’s Motion [10] to Transfer Venue
is denied in part and granted in part. This action will be transferred to the Southern District of
Alabama.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May of 2022, Rico Mitchell was hired by Perdido Trucking, LLC as a driver. [1-1], pg.
4. Mitchell alleges that Perdido began to discriminate against him because of his race “after a
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meeting on September 29, 2022. The work place became hostile and unsafe.” [1], pg. 4; [1-1], pg.
4. Mitchell also asserts that he was “subjected to offensive comments by a shop foreman” in
November of 2022. [1-1], pg. 4. In January of 2023, Mitchell reported that his truck “was being
tampered with by a mechanic.” [1-1], pg. 4. And after reporting this safety issue, Mitchell claims
that he was “discharged for insubordination on or about May 10, 2023.” [1-1], pg. 4; [1]; pg. 4.
Mitchell then filed a “Charge of Discrimination” with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on June 15, 2023. After receiving his right to sue letter, Michell, a resident
of Jackson County, Mississippi, filed suit in this Court on August 30, 2023, against Perdido
Trucking a resident of Mobile County, Alabama, asserting various claims for violations of Title
VII, the Civil Rights Act, and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act. Because Mitchell is
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, the Court conducted an Omnibus hearing on November
30, 2023, where Mitchell clarified his claims. Following the Omnibus hearing, the Court directed
the United States Marshal Service to serve the summons on Perdido.
After receiving service, Perdido filed the instant Motion [10] to Transfer Venue. Mitchell
opposes transfer, arguing that “defendants are worried about trying this case before the Southern
District [of] MS, so in the interest of justice this case should remain here.” [12], pg. 1.1
II. TITLE VII VENUE PROVISION
Perdido argues that venue is improper in the Southern District of Mississippi and that this
action should be transferred to the Southern District of Alabama in accordance with the special
venue provision for Title VII cases. This special venue provision for Title VII cases “displaces the
1 When asked why he filed suit in this Court rather than in the Southern District of Alabama, Mitchell testified
at the Omnibus hearing that he “thought [this court] handled the area—like the area maybe even in Alabama,
Louisiana, whatever that case. That’s what I thought y’all covered.” [9], pg. 11.
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general venue provision set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.” Allen v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 514 F.
App’x 421, 422 (5th Cir. 2013). Under Title VII’s venue provision, venue is proper “in any judicial
district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,
in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained
and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but
for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
Although Perdido argues that this action was filed in the wrong venue, Perdido concedes
that “but for the alleged unlawful employment practice Plaintiff . . . would have worked in both the
Southern District of Alabama and the Southern District of Mississippi.” [11], p. 3. This satisfies
the third way that venue can be shown under the Title VII venue provision. So venue is proper in
the Southern District of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and Perdido’s Motion is
denied on this ground.
III. SECTION 1404(a) GENERAL VENUE PROVISION
Although venue is proper in the Southern District of Mississippi, Perdido alternatively
seeks transfer of this action to the Southern District of Alabama for the convenience of the parties
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) permits transfer of a case “[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which
all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
A. Proper Venue
In applying Section 1404(a), a district court must first determine “whether the judicial
district to which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the claim could have been
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filed.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Horseshoe Ent., 337 F.3d
429, 433 (5th Cir. 2003)). “Where a case involves more than one cause of action, venue must be
proper as to each claim asserted.” Emelike v. L-3 Commc’ns Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2470, 2013 WL
1890289, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2013) (citing Tucker v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 42 F.3d 641, 641 (5th
Cir. 1994)). The Court will first consider venue as to Mitchell’s Title VII claim and will then turn
to his claims arising under the Civil Rights Act and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act,
respectively.
For Mitchell’s Title VII claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) states that “[f]or purposes of
sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal
office shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Because Perdido Trucking’s principal office is in Mobile, Alabama, venue
for Mitchell’s Title VII claim is proper in the Southern District of Alabama.
Mitchell also asserts a claim under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1981) and the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act (49 U.S.C. § 31105)—neither of which contains a specific venue
provision. Tabler v. Davis, No. 1:20-cv-111-ZH, 2020 WL 1324772, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2020)
(citation omitted); Lara v. Mail Room Ferguson Unit, No. 9:23-cv-57, 2023 WL 2616094, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 23, 2023) (citing Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 458 (N.D. Ga. 1972)). Thus, the general
venue provision set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 applies to Mitchell’s claims arising under the Civil
Rights Act and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act.2 It provides that venue is proper in:
2 28 U.S.C. § 1391 “states that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law . . . this section shall govern the venue
of all civil actions brought in district courts of the United States.’” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the
W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 55, 134 S. Ct. 568, 187 L. Ed. 2d 487 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a)(1)).
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(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in
this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). “[A]n entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under
applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any
judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect
to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
Mitchell alleges, and Perdido agrees, that Perdido has its principal place of business and
place of residence in Mobile, Alabama. As a result, the Southern District of Alabama may exercise
personal jurisdiction over Perdido.3 Venue is therefore proper in the Southern District of Alabama
for Mitchell’s claim under the Civil Rights Act and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act.
3 “Alabama’s long-arm ‘statute,’ which is actually Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P., extends to the limits of due
process.” Ex parte Aladdin Mfg. Corp., 305 So. 3d 214, 237 (Ala. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Leithead v. Banyan Corp., 926 So. 2d 1025, 1030 (Ala. 2005)). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when (1) ‘that defendant has purposefully
availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with the forum
state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d
333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Where, as here, a defendant’s contacts with the forum state “are so continuous and systematic as to render
[it] essentially at home in the forum state[,]” a court in that state may exercise jurisdiction over that defendant for all
purposes. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127, 134 S. Ct. 746, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d
796 (2011)). Additionally, “[t]his is not one of the rare cases where exercising personal jurisdiction would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” GSK Techs., Inc. v. Schneider Elec., S.A., No. 6:06-cv-361, 2007
WL 788343, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2007). Perdido’s ties to Alabama are extensive, and Perdido agrees that it is a
resident of Alabama.
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B. Convenience
Having determined that venue would be proper in the transferee court, this Court must
now determine whether Perdido has shown that the Southern District of Alabama is a more
convenient forum. In re Clarke, 94 F.4th 502, 508 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Transfer under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) is properly granted only if the moving party ‘clearly establishes good cause’ by ‘clearly
demonstrating that a transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice.’”). “The determination of ‘convenience’ turns on a number of private and public interest
factors, none of which are given dispositive weight.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
“The private [interest factors] include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of
attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d at 203 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n. 6, 102 S. Ct. 252, 70 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1981)). The public interest factors
include: (5) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (6) the local interest in
having localized interests decided at home; (7) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will
govern the case; and (8) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the
application of foreign law. Id. The Court will consider each in turn.
1. Relative ease of access to sources of proof
The first private interest factor focuses on the location of “documents and physical
evidence relating to the [case].” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 316 (5th Cir. 2008).
“The question is relative ease of access, not absolute ease of access.” In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d
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285, 288 (5th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). Although this factor bears less strongly on the
transfer analysis “when the vast majority of the evidence is electronic, and therefore equally
accessible in either forum,” this factor remains important to the transfer analysis. In re TikTok,
Inc., 85 F.4th 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted); In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545
F.3d at 316 (“That access to some sources of proof presents a lesser inconvenience now than it
might have absent recent developments does not render this factor superfluous.”).
Perdido asserts that “[i]t is expected that the primary sources of proof in this matter will
be corporate documents of Perdido” such as all of its employment records and policies and
practices, which are maintained and administered in the Southern District of Alabama. [11], pg. 5.
Mitchell does not rebut Perdido’s argument and “has given no indication that there is any proof
located in this District. Accordingly, because all the proof is likely located within the Southern
District [of Alabama], this factor weighs in favor of transfer.” Young v. Waldron, No. 1:15-cv-14-
ZH, 2015 WL 13694664, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2015); El Dorado Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Alaniz, No.
1:22-cv-248-LG, 2024 WL 289353, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 25, 2024) (finding that the transferee
forum “facilitates access to sources of proof.”).
2. Availability of compulsory process
“The second private interest factor is the availability of compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses.” In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 316. This factor “mainly
applies to compulsory process over unwilling, nonemployee witnesses.” Morgan v. Sewell, No.
5:22-cv-89-DCB, 2023 WL 2027806, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 15, 2023) (collecting cases). Neither
Perdido nor Mitchell identify any unwilling witnesses. And “[w]hen no party has alleged or shown
any witness’s unwillingness [to testify], a court should not attach much weight to the compulsory
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process factor.” Turner v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 6:19-cv-642, 2020 WL 210809, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 14, 2020). Accordingly, this factor is neutral. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission v. Faurecia
Auto. Seating, LLC, No. 4:16-cv-199-DMB, 2017 WL 4158624, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Miss. Sep. 19, 2017)
(collecting cases finding the compulsory process factor neutral when the movant “failed to show
that any of the prospective witnesses would be unwilling to testify absent a subpoena”).
3. Cost of attendance for willing witnesses
The third private interest factor is “the cost of attendance for willing witnesses.” In re
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 315. “Our circuit uses a ‘100-mile thresh-old’ in assessing
this factor.” In re TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th 352, 361 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 317). “When the distance between an existing venue for trial . . . and a
proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to the
witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” Id. (alteration
in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 317).
Additionally, “if a substantial number of witnesses reside in one venue and no witnesses reside in
another, the factor will weigh in favor of the venue where witnesses reside.” In re Genentech, Inc.,
566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This is an “obvious conclusion” because “it is more
convenient for witnesses to testify at home[,]” and “additional distance means additional travel
time . . . meal and lodging expenses” and time “witnesses must be away from their regular
employment.” In re TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th at 361.
To begin, Perdido’s proposed venue, the Southern District of Alabama, is in Mobile,
Alabama which is within 100 miles of this Court. And other than Mitchell, who resides 46 miles
from the courthouse in the Southern District of Alabama and 35 miles from this Court, no other
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Mississippi residents have been identified as witnesses.4 Perdido, however, has identified eleven
potential witnesses who reside in the Southern District of Alabama. And Mobile, Alabama, is
approximately 75 miles from this Court. So, Mitchell would drive an extra 11 miles to the Mobile
courthouse than he would to the Gulfport courthouse. But potentially eleven witnesses for Perdido
would drive around 75 miles to the Gulfport courthouse. Because the Court may consider the costs
imposed on witnesses when the proposed transfer is within the 100-mile threshold, the Court finds
this factor weighs slightly in favor of transfer. In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the 100 mile rule “did not, however, imply that a transfer within 100 miles does
not impose costs on witnesses or that such costs should not be factored into the venue-transfer
analysis, but only that this factor has greater significance when the distance is greater than 100
miles.”); Holloway v. City of Forth Worth, No. 4:23-cv-487, 2024 WL 96666, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Jan.
9, 2024) (finding the cost of attendance factor weighed slightly in favor of transfer when 30
witnesses resided in the transferee district).
4. All other practical problems
The last private-interest factor includes “all other practical problems that make trial of a
case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004).
Here, neither party submits evidence of any practical problems, so this factor is neutral. See
Swissdigital USA Co., Ltd. v. Wenger S.A., No. W-21-cv-453-ADA, 2022 WL 1491348, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. May 11, 2022) (finding this factor neutral where “[n]either party identified any other practical
problems); Trustmark Nat. Bank v. First NBC Bank, No. 3:13-cv-185-DPJ, 2013 WL 5278238, at *3
4 Mitchell testified at the Omnibus hearing that Pat Driver, who was Mitchell’s direct supervisor at Perdido’s
office in Alabama, may be a Mississippi resident but that he was not sure. [9], pg. 12.
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(S.D. Miss. Sep. 18, 2013); In re TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th 352, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2023) (discussing this
factor and finding it neutral).
5. Court congestion
The first public interest factor is “the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion.” In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 315. Here, the Court is unaware of any
administrative difficulties that would arise from transferring or retaining this case, and Perdido
does not address this factor in detail. Instead, Perdido simply states that the “transfer of this action
would result in no administrative difficulties for the Courts.” [11], pg. 5. Accordingly, this factor
is neutral. In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding district court correctly
found this factor neutral where the parties did not alert the court to any “potential administrative
difficulty.”).
6. Local interest
The second public interest factor is “the local interest in having localized interests decided
at home.” In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 315. In assessing this factor, a court must
determine whether there are “significant connections between a particular venue and the events
that gave rise to a suit.” In re TikTok, Incorporated, 85 F.4th at 364 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 435 (5th Cir. 2022)). Accordingly, “the
place of the alleged wrong is one of the most important factors in venue determinations.” In re
TikTok, Incorporated, 85 F.4th at 364 (quotation omitted). Based on Mitchell’s testimony at the
Omnibus hearing on November 30, 2023, the majority of the conduct giving rise to his claims for
race discrimination, hostile work environment, and wrongful termination occurred in the Southern
District of Alabama. For example, Mitchell testified that his race discrimination claim arose out of
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conduct that occurred at Perdido’s office in Mobile, Alabama, when he took his work truck in for
maintenance. [9], pp. 10, 13-17. He also testified that his hostile work environment claims arose out
of conduct that primarily occurred in Mobile, Alabama—Mitchell specifically testified that if
anyone disagreed with Ray Spencer’s rhetoric, a Perdido employee, “he’d say, ‘Well I’ve got my
gun right here. . . I ain’t gotta go far. I’ve got mine right here. I can get it and do whatever.’” [9],
pg. 31.5 Finally, Mitchell testified that Perdido wrongfully terminated him after he went to
Perdido’s office in Mobile, Alabama, on his day off to report a safety issue with his truck. [9], pp.10,
19, 33.
The Fifth Circuit has also held that “this factor can weigh against transfer when the
‘citizens of [the transferor district] have a greater stake in the litigation than the citizens of [the
transferee district].’” In re TikTok, Incorporated, 85 F.4th at 364 (citation omitted). This is because
“[j]ury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has
no relation to the litigation.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d at 206. Here, Perdido argues that the
local interest is in the Southern District of Alabama because that is “where Perdido’s headquarters
are located and where its corporate decisions are made[.]” [11], p. 6. Additionally, the Court finds
that the people of the Southern District of Alabama have a strong interest in whether a local
business has discriminated against one of its employees. See Clark v. United States, No. EP-23-cv-
305-KC, 2024 WL 1460764, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2024) (finding this factor weighs in favor of
transfer because the “factual allegations in the Complaint center on the allegedly negligent care
[plaintiff] received in [the transferee district].”); Lacey v. United States, No. EP-23-cv-466-KC,
5 Based on Mitchell’s testimony at the Omnibus hearing, it appears that one of his claims for hostile work
environment may arise from conduct occurring in Pascagoula, Mississippi, when his vehicle was repeatedly locked in
the parking lot at Bayou Concrete. [9], pg. 32. But this does not seem to be the crux of his hostile work environment
claim. Even still, Pascagoula is directly in between Mobile and Gulfport.
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2024 WL 1550443, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2024) (finding this factor weighs in favor of transfer
because “most of the events at issue took place” in the transferee district); Ritchie v. City of Austin,
No. SA-17-ca-377-FB, 2018 WL 11471668, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2018) (finding this factor
weighs in favor of transfer because “the majority of the witnesses are located there and the alleged
wrongdoing” occurred there and “is something of considerable interest to the residents in the
[transferee district].”); Coleman v. Trican Well Serv., L.P., 89 F. Supp. 3d 876, 885 (W.D. Tex.
2015) (finding this factor favors transfer because the transferee district “has an interest in
adjudicating a dispute between an employer located within its boundaries and its workers.”);
Frederick v. Advanced Fin. Sols., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 699, 706 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (finding this factor
favors transfer in age discrimination case because the company’s principal place of business was in
the transferee district and citizens of the transferor district “should not be burdened with jury
duty.”). For these reasons, this factor therefore weighs in favor of transfer.
7. Familiarity with governing law
The third public interest factor is “the current district’s familiarity with the law that will
govern the case.” In re TikTok, Incorporated, 85 F.4th at 365 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 315). The only law to apply here is federal
law, which this Court and the Southern District of Alabama are “equally capable of applying[.]”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir.
2013)). So this factor is neutral.
8. Avoiding conflict of laws or foreign law problems
The fourth public interest factor is “the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of
laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” In re TikTok, Incorporated, 85 F.4th at 366 (internal
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quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 315). Perdido does
not raise any conflict of laws issues or application of foreign law issues, and the Court is unaware
of any such issues. Accordingly, this factor is unrelated to the transfer analysis. In re Radmax, Ltd.,
720 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2013) (“the district court properly reasoned that a transfer would not
present a conflict of law or require the application of foreign law, and it concluded that this factor
had no bearing on its transfer analysis.”).
C. Weighing the Factors
Having analyzed the factors—of which two factors weigh in favor of transfer, one factor
weighs slightly in favor of transfer, one factor is inapplicable, and four factors are neutral—the
Court must now determine whether Perdido has “clearly demonstrate[ed] that a transfer is for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” In re Clarke, 94 F.4th at 508
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Defense Distributed, 30 F.4th at 433). In weighing the
factors, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned courts against “a raw counting of the factors in each side,
weighing each the same and deciding transfer only on the resulting ‘score.’” In re Radmax, Ltd.,
720 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 2013). Instead, courts “must make factual determinations to ascertain
the degree of actual convenience, if any, and whether such rises to the level of clearly more
convenient.” SQIP, LLC v. Cambria Co., LLC, No. 4:23-cv-202-SDJ, 2024 WL 1346498, at *2
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2024).
Upon consideration of the facts and law, transfer to the Southern District of Alabama would
(1) reduce costs of attendance for potentially eleven willing witnesses located in the Southern
District of Alabama; (2) respect the stronger local interest in having this case decided in Mobile,
Alabama; and (3) facilitate the access of proof. Accordingly, the “degree of actual convenience”
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favors transfer to the Southern District of Alabama. And because nearly all of the conduct giving
rise to Mitchell’s claims occurred in Mobile, Alabama, Perdido has shown that transfer to the
Southern District of Alabama is clearly the more convenient venue to resolve this Action. In re
TikTok, Incorporated, 85 F.4th at 364 (finding that “the place of the alleged wrong is one of the
most important factors in venue determinations.”). This Court therefore chooses to exercise its
discretion to transfer this case to the Southern District of Alabama—a District with much stronger
ties to the evidence and interests in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Perdido Trucking, LLC’s
Motion [10] to Transfer Venue is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. This matter is
transferred to the Southern District of Alabama.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the instant transfer order shall be
stayed for 14 days.6
This the 7th day of August, 2024.
______________________________
TAYLOR B. McNEEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6 When a case is transferred out of a circuit (in this case from the Fifth Circuit to the Eleventh Circuit), certain
issues are presented that can present problems for the litigants and the district courts. District courts in the Fifth
Circuit have been proposing rules to help alleviate some of these concerns. Indeed, both the Northern and Southern
Districts of Mississippi recently proposed a local rule that would stay any transfer order to a district court outside the
Fifth Circuit “for 14 days from the date the order is entered on the docket, unless the court orders otherwise.” 2024
Proposed Amendments to Local Civil Rules, Rule 52. Orders and Judgments (last visited Aug. 7, 2024),
https://www.mssd.uscourts.gov/sites/mssd/files/Notice%20for%20Public%20Comment%20on%202024%20Propose
d%20Amendments%20to%20the%20Uniform%20Local%20Civil%20Rules.pdf. This local rule is still receiving public
comments. But at least for this particular case, this Court finds that a time period of 14 days is reasonable to stay the
transfer of the case.
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