USA v. Maxie, et al.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
vs. 	) 	CRIM. ACT. NO. 1:24-cr-112-TFM
) 	CRIM. ACT. NO. 1:24-cr-113-TFM
ECHANDZA DIANCA MAXIE aka CHAN 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is the United States’ Motion to Revoke Release Order (Doc. 110
in 1:24-cr-112, filed 8/5/24; Doc. 59 in 1:24-cr-113, filed 8/5/24). The United States appeals the
Magistrate Judge’s Release Order after the detention hearing in the above cases. Defendant timely
filed her response (Doc. 117 in 1:24-cr-112, filed 8/7/24; Doc. 62 in 1:24-cr-113). This omnibus
order addresses both cases, but for the purposes of the record, the Court will primarily refer to case
citations in the first case, Crim. Act. No. 1:24-cr-112 unless otherwise specified. For the reasons
stated below, the United States’ motion is DENIED and the Magistrate Judge’s order on conditions
of release is AFFIRMED with the additional condition specified in the conclusion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On June 27, 2024, the grand jury returned two indictments involving Defendant Echandza
Dianca Maxie (“Defendant” or “Maxie”).1 The first indictment, Crim. Act. No. 1:24-cr-112 (Case
1), has twelve substantive counts against Maxie and seven co-defendants. See Case 1, Doc. 7. The
counts involving Maxie include Counts Two, Eleven and Twelve. Id. Specifically, these counts
involve allegations of drug conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kg of cocaine
1 There is another Maxie in Crim. Act. No. 1:24-cr-113 – specifically Edeszann Dailene Maxie.
However, as this order has no bearing on her case and solely relates to Echandza Dianca, the Court
need not distinguish between the two here.
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in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 2), tampering with evidence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1512(c)(1), and disposal of a firearm to a prohibited person (felon) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(d)(1). Id.
The second indictment, Crim. Act. No. 1:24-cr-113 (Case 2), has thirty-four counts against
Maxie and four co-defendants. See Case 2, Doc. 1. The counts involving Maxie are Counts One
through Twenty-One. Specifically, these counts involve allegations of conspiracy to commit fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, money laundering
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1956(h), aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.
Maxie was arrested on July 30, 2024 and the Magistrate Judge held an initial appearance
and arraignment on the same date. The United States moved to detain her. The pretrial services
report recommended release. See Doc. 94. On July 31, 2024, the Magistrate Judge held a detention
hearing of which there was both an audio recording and a transcript made. See Docs. 100, 101,
108. On August 2, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued her oral ruling denying the motion to detain
and issuing conditions of release. The Magistrate Judge determined that Maxie had rebutted the
statutory presumption of detention and concluded that there were conditions of release that
sufficed. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge determined that appropriate conditions would be (1)
home detention, (2) location monitoring, (3) a no contact order with any co-defendants to include
her husband and sister, E.D.M., (4) the surrender of Maxie’s passport, (5) a restriction on
performing any tax-related matters and opening any new lines of credit, and (6) the standard
conditions of release to include reporting to the Probation Office and reporting any contacts with
law enforcement. The United States request a stay of the release order pending an appeal to the
undersigned pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1) which was granted.
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On August 5, 2024, the United States timely filed its motion to revoke the release order.2
See Doc. 110. On August 7, 2024, Maxie timely filed her opposition to the United States motion
to revoke the bond order. See Doc. 117. The Court finds that a hearing is not necessary and has
performed a de novo review of the detention proceedings.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, governs the release or detention
of a defendant pending trial. “Section 3142(e) accords the judicial officer substantial latitude in
determining whether pretrial detention is appropriate.” United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 487
(11th Cir. 1988). A finding that a defendant poses a flight risk or is a danger to another person or
the community requires his detention pending trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).
“If a person is ordered released by a magistrate judge . . . the attorney for the Government
may file, with the court having origin al jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of
the order or amendment of the conditions of release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1). A district court
considering appeals under the Bail Reform Act must conduct an independent review to determine
whether the magistrate judge properly found that pretrial detention is necessary or release is
appropriate. 	See United States v. King, 849 F. 2d 485, 490 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1480-81
(11th Cir. 1985).
The 	United 	States’ 	burden 	of 	proof 	on 	the 	flight 	question 	is 	governed 	by 	the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1988)
(citing United States v. Medina, 775 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir. 1985). The United States’ burden
2 The United States initially only filed the motion (appeal) in Case 1. However, as this pertains to
both cases, for the purposes of the record, the Court directed the United States to file it in both
cases. References and PageID citations contained in the motion will relate to Case 1.
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to show danger to the community is by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at n.3 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f); United States v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 917 (11th Cir. 1990). A court may detain
a defendant based either on risk of nonappearance or dangerousness. King, 849 F.2d at 488.
Finally, applicable to this case is a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the
community. Specifically, it states:
Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is
probable cause to believe that the person committed—
(A)an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or
more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.),
the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.),
or chapter 705 of title 46;
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). “A grand jury indictment provides the probable cause required by the
statute to trigger the presumption.” 	Quartermaine, 913 F.3d at 916 (citing United States v.
Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Once the statutory presumptions are raised, the defendant carries the burden of
production to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumptions. The
defendant's obligation to come forward with evidence does not shift to the
defendant the government's burden of persuasion. […] King, 849 F.2d at 488.
Therefore, Quartermaine had the burden to produce evidence “to suggest that he . .
. [was] either not dangerous or not likely to flee if turned loose on bail.” Hurtado,
779 F.2d at 1479. Even if this evidence is sufficient to rebut the statutory
presumption, the presumption “remains in the case as an evidentiary finding
militating against release, to be weighed along with other evidence relative to
factors listed in section 3142(g).” United States v. King, 849 F.2d at 488 (quoting
United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted)). The
presumption becomes evidence to be considered along with other evidence listed
in the Act as indicative of risk of flight or danger to the community.
Quartermaine, 913 F.3d at 916. 	The Court then looks to the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g).
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III. 	DECISION AND ANALYSIS
The undersigned independently examined the proceedings before the Magistrate Judge.
The Court considered the written submission of counsel, the audio recording and transcript of the
detention proceeding before the Magistrate Judge, the audio recording of the Magistrate Judge’s
oral ruling on conditions of release and reasonings, the pretrial services report prepared by the
United States Probation Office, and the arguments made by counsel.
Having conducted this de novo review, the Court also finds that the factors enumerated in
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) support the Magistrate Judge’s finding that conditions of release are
appropriate. The Court will address the factors in turn.
§ 3142(g)(1) requires the Court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense[s]
charged.” Then under §3142(g)(2), the Court considers the weight of the evidence against the
Defendant. 	Maxie is charged with offenses involving controlled substances, tampering with
evidence by disposing of a firearm to a felon, conspiracy to commit fraud, wire fraud, money
laundering, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. 	While there is no
doubt that these charges are indeed serious, the Court also listened to the almost 2.5 hours of
evidence presented at the detention hearing and finds that the bulk of the evidence presented on
the drug charges related to co-defendants (including Maxie’s husband) and was admitted over the
defendant’s objection. 	While this may present a strong conspiracy case overall, there was little
evidence that directly tied Maxie to the actual drug transactions. 	At the detention hearing, the
United States did not present evidence that Maxie directly participated in the drug transactions.
There was evidence that she may have been aware of her husband’s activities, but that alone is
insufficient to hold her in custody. The strongest presentation from Case 1 related to the evidence
tampering and disposal of the gun in that she may have moved the gun out of her house and given
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it to her sister (who is a felon) and then later instructed her sister’s child (a 15-year-old) to dispose
of the weapon. Yet, Defense raises concerns about whether the evidence clearly established that
it was Maxie. Yet, even if the evidence is accurate as to Maxie, does not alone mean that there are
not conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or
the safety of any other person and the community. Regarding the financial case (Case 2), the United
States presented testimony from IRS Agent Curtis Wolf who testified as to the fraudulent tax
returns and movement of money after the search warrant was executed in December 2022. While
the United States certainly implies that the movement was improper, they do not actually present
evidence linking the movement to the crimes alleged. Finally, while Maxie may have or had access
to significant financial resources, that is insufficient to indicate that Maxie may flee. 	Rather,
though these two indictments may be relatively recent, the Court notes that the testimony from the
agents at the detention hearing show that in December 2022, Maxie was interviewed after a search
was conducted on her Raspberry Lane home. 	There was no indication that Maxie since that
interview tried to flee despite having access to those resources. 	Moreover, the presumption on
detention stems from the allegations in Case 1 and not Case 2. Regardless, because of the interplay
between the two cases, the Court lists both here. Yet, when looking at this factor on detention, the
Court finds that the evidence presented by the United States does not establish by clear and
convincing evidence as to dangerousness and preponderance of the evidence that detention is the
only outcome here. 	Even with the presumption of detention as to Case 1 and while the full
evidence against Maxie is not known at this point, the Court finds that these factors tilt towards
Maxie when considering the evidence presented at the hearing.
Next, § 3142(g)(3) requires the Court to consider “the person’s character, physical and
mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
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community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal
history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings.” Maxie has significant ties to the
local community to include 5 children of various ages who are dependent upon her. The youngest
is still nursing and the oldest has mental disabilities which have resulted in an adult guardianship.
She has been a lifelong resident of Mobile and has significant extended family ties to the area.
With regard to the risk of flight, the United States places great emphasis on a failure to appear in
2010 which related to a failure to pay a fine on her theft of property conviction earlier that year.
However, the record also shows that she did end up paying the fine in full. The United States also
presented testimony about a trip to France that Maxie took and there was no evidence that the trip
was tied to the charges at issue nor that the trip itself was improper. The Court notes that Maxie
had a valid passport and there was nothing presented that she would not have been permitted to
travel for the trip at issue. In summary, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the Defendant and
against the United States.
This brings the Court to the fourth requirement of § 3142(g)(4) which states “the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s
release.” There is nothing in her history that makes danger to the community clear. The firearms
have been removed from the home and the United States has conducted multiple search warrants
of different premises so there is no evidence that there would be an additional ability to tamper or
destroy evidence. Though the United States argues in its motion that Maxie’s affiliation with and
leadership role in the drug trafficking organization are relevant, the Court notes that the evidence
presented at the hearing did not establish a leadership role, but rather focused more on the fact her
husband may have done so. Mere affiliation alone is insufficient. If it were, then the United States
clearly would not have withdrawn its motions to detain other defendants in this case with far more
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significant criminal histories and evidence presented about their role in the conspiracy. 	As
previously noted, the strongest evidence at the detention hearing presented related to the charges
involving tampering with evidence and disposal of a firearm to a felon. 	While admittedly this
evidence gives the Court pause, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there are
conditions that can be set which address the concerns.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Government failed in its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and
the community. Nor did the United States prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Maxie
is a flight risk. Rather, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the stringent conditions
she imposed upon Maxie would be sufficient with one addition.
The conditions of release articulated by the Magistrate Judge shall go into effect with this
order with one expanded condition. In addition to the no-contact order on co-defendants including
Maxie’s husband and her sister (not a named defendant), the Court also instructs that Maxie may
not have unsupervised contact with any children related to the co-defendants3 or her sister. 	By
unsupervised, the Court means that she may not communicate with them in any way without the
express permission of the supervising pretrial services officer and on terms the pretrial services
officer finds appropriate. This would account for any emergent situations that may arise.
For the foregoing reasons and those reasons articulated by the Magistrate Judge, it is
ORDERED that the United States’ Motion to Revoke Release Order (Doc. 110 in 1:24-cr-112,
filed 8/5/24; Doc. 59 in 1:24-cr-113, filed 8/5/24) under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a) for revocation of the
Magistrate Judge's Order is DENIED and the Magistrate Judge’s order is AFFIRMED.
3 	This does not include her own five children though they are related to a co-defendant.
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DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of August, 2024.
/s/Terry F. Moorer
TERRY F. MOORER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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