Taylor v. City of Mobile Police Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MONICA TAYLOR, 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-00328-KD-N
)
CITY OF MOBILE POLICE 	)
DEPARTMENT, et al., 	)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
This action is before the Court on the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
(doc. 20), Plaintiff Monica Taylor’s objection and exhibits (docs. 21, 23), and Defendants City of
Mobile Police Department, Officer Smith’s and Officer Bradley’s response (doc. 22). After due
and proper consideration of the issues raised, and a de novo determination of those portions of
the recommendation to which objection is made, and the recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)-(b),
dated April 23, 2024, is ADOPTED, as modified herein, as the opinion of this Court.
Section II. Analysis
The sentence and citation - “To the extent the operative complaint asserts claims
under Alabama law, they all appear based on the injury to Taylor from the incident, and
are thus subject to the same 2-year statute of limitations. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l). (“All
actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not
specifically enumerated in this section must be brought within two years.”) (doc. 20, p. 4)
are stricken.
The sentence – “Thus, by her own response, Taylor has shown that her
claims are time-barred” is modified to read “Thus, by her own response, Taylor
has shown that her § 1983 claims are time-barred.” (Id., p. 7).
The phrase “… and that summary judgment be granted on all of Taylor’s
claims as time-barred under the applicable 2-year statute of limitations” is
modified to read “… and that summary judgment be granted on Taylor’s § 1983
claims as time-barred under the applicable 2-year statute of limitations.” (Id., p. 8).
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Footnote Eight is STRICKEN (Id., p. 8, n. 8).
Section III. Conclusion
Subparagraph 1 is modified as follows:
1. that the Court treat the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss filed October 16, 2023
(Doc. 11), as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, and GRANT
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on Taylor’s § 1983 claims as being
time-barred under the applicable 2-year statute of limitations; and
Accordingly, Taylor’s § 1983 claims are dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.
Taylor’s remaining claims arise under Alabama law. In this circumstance, where the
Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”, the Court “may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state law claims and remand this action
to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Remand of Taylor’s
remaining state law claims is proper where “considerations of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity” weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Ameritox, Ltd., v. Millennium Laboratories, Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 537 (11th Cir. 2015); Lewis v.
City of St. Petersburg, 260 F. 3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (In deciding
whether to remand, the Court “should ‘take into account concerns of comity, judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and the like.’”).
Upon consideration, the Court finds these factors weigh in favor of remand and declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, this action is remanded to the Circuit Court
of Mobile County, Alabama.
Final judgment shall be entered by separate document in accordance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 58.
DONE and ORDERED this the 28th day of May 2024.
/s/ Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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