USA v. Estrada et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
v. 	) 	CRIM. ACT. NO. 1:19-cr-15-TFM-B
)
LINDA LANCON 	)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Grand Jury for the Southern District of Alabama indicted the defendant, Linda Lancon
(“Lancon” or “Defendant”) on January 31, 2019. The Indictment charged Lancon with one count
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and one count of
possession with intent to distribute approximately 30 kilograms of cocaine. See Doc. 25. Pending
before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements and Evidence (Doc. 47, filed
2/22/19) and the Government’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc.
51, filed 3/4/19).
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on May 30, 2019. Based on the evidence presented
to the Court, arguments of the parties, and for the reasons set forth herein and contained in the
Government’s Response, the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 47) is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The facts of the case are essentially not in dispute as the encounter was recorded and a copy
of the video and audio was provided to the Court during the suppression hearing. The crux of the
Defendant’s argument is that the traffic stop was unreasonably lengthened beyond the scope of the
original traffic stop.
On or about January 15, 2019, Saraland Police Officer Austin Sullivan (“Officer Sullivan”)
saw a tractor with no trailer travelling northbound on Interstate 65. The exterior of the truck was
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very clean and freshly painted; however, there was “ghosting” on the side of the tractor where two
letters appeared to have been removed from the name of the trucking company. 	Additionally,
other portions of the tractor were rusty from lack of use which contrasted with the clean and newly
painted tractor. As Officer Sullivan passed the tractor, he observed that there was no tag displayed
on the front of the tractor as required by Alabama law. Therefore he conducted a traffic stop for
the tag violation. The tractor did not immediately stop, so Officer Sullivan followed it with his
blue lights on until it finally pulled over.
Officer Sullivan approached the vehicle on the passenger side, but Defendant Victor
Estrada Rodriguez (“Co-Defendant” or “Estrada”) jumped out from the driver’s side of the truck
to the ground to meet him. 	Officer Sullivan requested Estrada’s license, registration, and
insurance. Estrada had trouble locating the relevant documents so Officer Sullivan continued to
question him about those documents and explained that he stopped the vehicle for the tag violation.
Ultimately, Estrada produced paperwork which showed several companies associated with the
vehicle, including one which appeared on the side of the truck “Silient Trucking” and “Resilent
Trucking.” Further, Estrada produced a document taped to the windshield of the truck that showed
the vehicle registered “Lucky 5 Trucking.” 	Additionally, Officer Sullivan noticed a number of
personal items in the truck including a house plant and a DVD player.
Officer Sullivan and Estrada went to the patrol car where Officer Sullivan also began
checking law enforcement databases on the vehicle, the companies, and Estrada. 	Eventually
Officer Sullivan asked Estrada if he could search the truck to which Estrada agreed. 	Officer
Sullivan also heard back on his inquiry that a person with the same name was wanted on criminal
charges from another state with full extradition. Officer Sullivan asked for additional information
to see if Defendant Estrada had the same physical characteristics as the wanted subject. Though
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Estrada had denied prior arrests in their earlier conversion, Officer Sullivan eventually determined
from Estrada that he had been previously arrested. 	Officer Sullivan then requested, but never
received, a portable fingerprint device to confirm whether Estrada was the wanted person.
Around this time, Lt Culley responded as a back-up officer and arrived on the scene with
his drug detecting dog. Lt Culley walked his dog around the outside of the truck and the dog gave
a positive indication for the odor of narcotics on both sides of the truck near the doors. Officer
Sullivan confronted Estrada with the drug dog’s positive alert and Estrada admitted everything in
the truck belonged to him. At this time, Lt Culley and Officer Sullivan conducted a full search of
the truck and found cocaine bundles in a large box behind the passenger’s seat. 	They advised
Estrada of his Miranda rights and he admitted to his involvement in smuggling activity.
In sum, the traffic stop lasted a little over one hour. 	Midway through the traffic stop,
Officer Sullivan asked Lancon to get out of the truck to sit in a different police vehicle. 	She
remained there for the rest of the stop.
Lancon filed her motion to suppress and alleges the traffic stop was unreasonably
prolonged and therefore ultimately not a constitutionally valid stop. See Doc. 47 generally. The
Government filed its response on March 4, 2019. See Doc. 51. The Government argues the traffic
stop was supported by probable cause as the officer witnessed a traffic infraction for the failure to
display a tag. 	The Court convened an evidentiary hearing on the matter on May 30, 2019 and
heard testimony from Saraland Police Officer Austin Sullivan. The Court also received several
exhibits including the video from the dashcam and audio.
II. 	LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. 	Standing
It is well established that for a defendant to move to suppress evidence, he must have
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standing. United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 1991). A defendant has the
burden of showing standing under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120,
1147 (11th Cir. 1997). To claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an individual must have
a “reasonable expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143,
99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978). A defendant’s expectation of privacy must be “personal[]”
and “reasonable,” and it must have “a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference
to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted
by society.” 	Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted). That said, “[s]tanding does not require an ownership interest
in the invaded area.” United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that
the Supreme Court has recognized that an overnight guest in a home has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in that home).
An individual has standing to challenge a search if “(1) he has a subjective expectation of
privacy, and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable.”
United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Segura-
Baltazar, 448 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006). Courts assess on a case-by-case basis the standing
of a particular person to challenge an intrusion by government officials into an area over which
that person lacked primary control. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 191 n. 13, 104 S. Ct.
1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has held that where a defendant is
neither the owner nor the lessee of the place searched, in order to contest a search, he must
“demonstrate a significant and current interest in the property at the time it was searched.” United
States v. Miller, 387 F. App'x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation omitted).
Here, Defendant Lancon failed to present any evidence at the suppression hearing that she
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was anything other than a passenger in the vehicle. The Eleventh Circuit previously held that “a
passenger in a private car who has no possessory interest in the automobile, does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the automobile because he does not have the
right to exclude others from the car.” 	United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 864 (internal
modifications and citation omitted); see also United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“A passenger usually lacks a privacy interest in a vehicle that the passenger neither
owns nor rents, regardless of whether the driver owns or rents it.”). 	Co-conspirators and
codefendants have been accorded no special standing. 	Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
172, 89 S. Ct. 961, 965, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969). Moreover, at this point, the co-defendant Victor
Estrada pled guilty without reservation which renders his motion to suppress moot and not an issue
for the Court to decide. 	Even if there were a Constitutional infirmity with the search vis a vis
Estrada, only Estrada, not Lancon may be heard to complain about the violation.
Further, at no point during the search did Defendant Lancon do anything to object to the
search, counter the consent given by Estrada, nor did she assert ownership over the vehicle or its
contents. As such, her motion to suppress fails for want of standing.
B. 	Fourth Amendment Warrantless Searches
Even if Lancon could demonstrate standing to assert a suppression issue, the motion still
fails because the search, under the circumstances, was reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. AMEND.
IV. Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless an exception applies. Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). A traffic stop is a seizure
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct.
1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). A traffic stop is a constitutional detention when it is justified by
reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) or
probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342
F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). To determine whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion
has been met, the Court must determine whether the officer’s actions were reasonable. See Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661-62, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996).
Lancon asserts the officer unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop in violation of
Rodriguez v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015). Lancon does
not appear to challenge the initial basis of the Terry stop – in that Officer Sullivan stopped the
tractor for a tag violation. Rather, Lancon asserts the officer artificially prolonged the stop in order
for a K-9 unit to arrive.
The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed Rodriguez in two cases – one published and one
unpublished opinion. See United States v. Campbell, 912 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2019) and United
States v. Burwell, 763 F. App’x 840 (11th Cir. 2019). In Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the proper standard emanating from Rodriguez is that “a stop is unlawfully prolonged when an
officer, without reasonable suspicion, diverts from the stop’s purpose and adds time to the stop in
order to investigate other crimes. Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1353. “That is, to unlawfully prolong,
the officer must (1) conduct an unrelated inquiry aimed at investigating other crimes (2) that adds
time to the stop (3) without reasonable suspicion.” 	Id. 	The Eleventh Circuit also noted that
Rodriguez still permits an officer to conduct the “mission” of the traffic stop and attend to related
safety concerns. 	Burwell, 763 F. App’x at 844 (quoting Rodriguez). 	“That mission or purpose
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often includes checking the driver's license, attending to safety concerns, searching for outstanding
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance.” Id.
The key here is that the Officer Sullivan had probable cause to initiate the Terry stop and
then did not unlawfully prolong the stop during his investigation of the lack of tag. Officer Sullivan
clearly saw the truck driven by the codefendant Victor Estrada where Defendant Lancon was a
passenger committed a traffic infraction – specifically the failure to display a license plate.
Alabama law requires that
Every motor vehicle operator who operates a motor vehicle upon any city street or
other public highway of or in this state shall at all times keep attached and plainly
visible on the rear end of such motor vehicle a license tag or license plate as
prescribed and furnished by the Department of Revenue at the time the owner or
operator purchases his license.
Anyone violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and shall, upon conviction, be punished by fine not exceeding $500.00 and, in
addition thereto, shall be prohibited from driving a motor vehicle in Alabama for a
period of not less than 60 days nor more than six months.
Ala. Code. § 32-6-51.
The traffic infraction was ample justification for Officer Sullivan to briefly stop and detain
the truck and its passengers. After the stop began, neither Estrada nor Lancon had documents to
show the truck was not stolen. Indeed, the truck markings and the statements of Estrada indicated
the truck was either stolen, uninsured, or not properly registered. Further, neither the ownership
nor proper registration or insurance were resolved before a trained narcotics dog arrived and alerted
on the drugs. A positive alert by a trained canine establishes probable cause for a search of the
vehicle. 	Here, the search pursuant to the alert ultimately revealed a large quantity of narcotics.
There is no indication that Officer Sullivan unreasonably prolonged the stop in order to have the
narcotics K-9 arrive prior to “mission completion.” 	Rather, the evidence shows that the officer
continued to look into the tag violation and ownership of the vehicle. Ultimately, as time passed
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and the investigation into the tag violation progressed, Officer Sullivan understandably developed
reasonable suspicion that Estrada was involved in criminal activity. The vehicle was registered to
Lucky 5 Trucking Company in Illinois (which was nowhere near any of the cities mentioned by
Estrada). 	Estrada also mentioned different company names and registrations for trailers from
2014-2017 – though the truck itself was not pulling a trailer. In sum, neither Estrada nor Lancon
provided any documentation establishing they properly lawfully possessed the tractor/truck at
issue.
While the traffic stop may have been approximately an hour, there is no indication that the
stop was unlawfully prolonged. Rather, the evidence establishes that Officer Sullivan was actively
looking into the basis for the original Terry stop and as he investigated, reasonable suspicion
developed that the vehicle may have been stolen, uninsured, or otherwise involved in illicit activity
or that Estrada (the driver) was the subject of an arrest warrant. 	Questioning of Estrada only
heightened those suspicions as his explanations either changed or did not align with the limited
paperwork provided on the truck. 	Ultimately, Estrada consented to the search of the truck, but
even without that, the canine drug alert certainly established probable cause for the search which
resulted in the discovery of the drugs.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements and
Evidence (Doc. 47) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of June, 2019.
/s/ Terry F. Moorer
TERRY F. MOORER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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