USA v. Haynes

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
United States v. Christopher Montel Haynes
Case No. 3:15-cr-00025-TMB
By: 	THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. BURGESS
PROCEEDINGS: 	ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
The matter comes before the Court on the Defendant Christopher Montel Haynes’s “Motion to
Stay Special Condition of Supervised Release Number 4 (the “Motion”).1 Haynes appealed the
special condition that he submit to a polygraph test and argues that this Court should stay the
condition pending resolution of his appeal.2 The Government opposes the Motion.3 For the reasons
discussed below, the Motion is DENIED.
In 2015, Haynes pleaded guilty to being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and, in 2016, he was sentenced to forty-six months of
imprisonment, with three years of supervised release to follow.4 His prior, underlying felony was
a 2006 Alaska state court conviction for First Degree Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Minor, in
violation of Alaska Statute 11.41.434(a)(1), for which Haynes was sentenced to ten years of
imprisonment, with five years suspended, and eight years of probation.5 Given his underlying
felony conviction and status as registered sex offender, the Court imposed conditions of release
that included a prohibition on contact with minors on his federal firearms conviction.6
On October 7, 2020, this Court revoked Haynes’s supervised release after Haynes admitted to
having unsupervised contact with a minor who lives with Haynes’s children.7 Although the United
States Probation Office (“USPO”) had no reason to suspect the contact was sexual, Haynes denied
the contact to his probation officer.8 When confronted again, Haynes admitted that he lied to his
probation officer.9 During the revocation hearing, the Court imposed a new condition of supervised
1 Dkts. 144 (Motion).
2 Id. at 1–5.
3 Dkt. 150 (Opposition).
4 Dkts. 51 (Plea Agreement); 54 (Minute Entry); 83 (Judgment).
5 Dkt. 56 at 6, 14, 16 (Final PSR).
6 See Dkts. 56 at 2; 83 at 4; 94 at 33–34 (Sentencing Hearing Transcript); 116 (Petition for
Revocation); 	125 	(Order 	Setting 	Conditions 	of 	Release); 	137 	(Violation 	Sentencing
Recommendation).
7 Dkts. 116 at 3; 140 (Minute Entry); 141 (Judgment on Revocation). Haynes is permitted to have
contact with his minor children. Dkt. 116 at 3.
8 See Dkt. 116 at 3.
9 Id.
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release based on the USPO’s recommendation requiring Haynes to participate in polygraph testing
(“Condition 4”).10 Condition 4 provides:
The defendant shall participate in physiological testing such as polygraph to assist
in planning, case monitoring, and supervision. . . . Any refusal to submit to such
testing as scheduled is a violation of the conditions of release. The defendant shall
waive his right of confidentiality and sign any necessary release of information to
allow the supervising United States Probation Officer to review the defendant’s
examination results with any treatment provider(s). If deception is indicated, that
will not be the basis for revocation, and the defendant will not be questioned about
any law violations or criminal conduct.11
Haynes opposed the imposition of Condition 4 at the hearing and has filed a notice of appeal
intending to challenge Condition 4 as an abuse of discretion.12 Meanwhile, Haynes filed the instant
Motion, asking the Court to stay the imposition of Condition 4 under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure (“Rule”) 38 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a).13 Haynes also requested
expedited consideration of the Motion14 after Haynes’s probation officer indicated that Haynes
will face a new petition to revoke supervised release if he does not cooperate with a polygraph
examination scheduled to take place on October 29, 2020.15 The Court granted expedited
consideration and held a hearing regarding the request for a stay on November 18, 2020.16 In the
interim, Haynes appeared for a polygraph examination and refused, on advice of counsel, to
participate.17
Haynes argues that a stay of Condition 4 is necessary to protect Haynes’s due process right and
right to appeal.18 Haynes argues he meets the standard for requesting a stay because: (1) he makes
a strong showing of success on the merits given prior Ninth Circuit precedent; (2) that requiring
Haynes to submit to a polygraph examination while his appeal is pending would result in
irreparable harm because it would moot his appeal; (3) it is unlikely that a stay would have an
adverse impact on the Government; and (4) the public interest in enforcing criminal judgment will
not be frustrated by a stay of Condition 4 because Haynes has not violated any other condition of
release and remains subject to numerous other conditions. 19
The Government opposes Haynes’s Motion, arguing a stay is unwarranted because Haynes is
unlikely to succeed on appeal and the harm to the public outweighs any harm to Haynes.20 The
10 Dkts. 140; 141 at 5; 144 at 2
11 Dkt. 141 at 5.
12 See Dkts. 138 (Haynes’s Disposition Memo.); 143 (Notice of Appeal); 144 at 1–2.
13 Dkt. 144 at 1.
14 Dkt. 145 (Unopposed Motion for Expedited Consideration).
15 Id. at 1; Dkt. 144 at 2.
16 Dkt. 147.
17 Dkts. 144; 150 at 3.
18 Dkt. 144 at 2.
19 Id. at 2–5.
20 Dkt. 150 at 1.
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Government argues that the polygraph examination “will help the USPO determine whether
additional action is necessary moving forward” and “[b]ecause the polygraph condition is
relatively unintrusive, is directly related to Haynes’s conduct, and is based on this Court’s specific
findings on the record, the Ninth Circuit is likely to uphold this Court’s decision.”21 Further,
Haynes cannot show he will be irreparably harmed if the Court does not grant his Motion because
his appeal will not become moot.22 Additionally, the Government argues that the USPO is likely
to suffer if a stay is granted due to the appeal timelines and the USPO being unable to conduct
polygraph examinations in the interim, hampering UPSO efforts to supervise Haynes.23 Finally,
the Government argues that the public interest weighs against a stay because the USPO needs the
ability to verify Haynes’s candor to properly supervise him and gauge his danger to the public.24
“[D]istrict courts have ‘wide latitude’ to craft conditions of release.”25 A district court may impose
a condition of supervised release if it “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary” to punish, deter, protect the public from or rehabilitate the defendant.26 “The condition
should also ‘reasonably relate[ ]’ to ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant.’”27 These factors are a “guide,” not “a checklist of
requisites.”28
A court may, through a condition of release, require that a defendant submit to period polygraph
examinations.29 The Ninth Circuit has held that a polygraph examination condition is “relatively
unintrusive” and not “overly burdensome.”30 Moreover, “when some recent event suggests that a
defendant still poses a risk of engaging in sexual misconduct, there exists a greater need for a
condition meant to address a defendant’s history of sexual misconduct.”31
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 38 allows district courts to stay imposition of a death
sentence, imprisonment, fine, probation, restitution, forfeiture, or civil or employment disability
pending appeal. The language of Rule 38 does not explicitly include conditions of supervised
21 Id. at 7.
22 Id. at 7–8.
23 Id. at 8–9.
24 Id. at 9.
25 United States v. Johnson, 697 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Weber,
51 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 2006)); United States v. Pinjuv, 218 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Given the unique nature of supervised release, we have recognized the broad discretion that
district courts enjoy in fashioning the obligations of a convicted person during a period of
supervision.”) (citing United States v. Bahe, 201 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)).
26 Johnson, 697 F.3d at 1251 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)).
27 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1)).
28 United States v. Johnson, 998 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1993).
29 See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9) (the court may provide that the defendant “undergo available
medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment[.]”); 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(22) (the court may
provide that the defendant “satisfy such other conditions as the court may impose[.]”).
30 United States v. Hohag, 893 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2018).
31 Id. at 1193–94 (emphasis omitted).
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release.32 However, other courts have assumed, without deciding, that a district court may also
stay a condition of supervised release pending appeal as part of the court’s “traditional equipment
for the administration of justice.”33 Both parties agree the Court has the authority to stay a
condition of release and urge the Court to decide the merits of Haynes’s motion.34
“A stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review, and
accordingly is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the
appellant[.]”35 The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances
justify such intervention.36 A court’s discretion to order a stay is guided by four factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested
in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.37
Here, the Motion for a Stay of Condition 4 is DENIED. First, Haynes has not made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits. The Ninth Circuit has characterized a “strong
showing” in various ways, including “reasonable probability,” “fair prospect,” “substantial case
on the merits,” and “serious legal questions . . . raised.”38 These formulations are “largely
interchangeable,” and each indicate that, “‘at a minimum,’ a petitioner must show that there is a
‘substantial case for relief on the merits.’”39
32 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 38; United States v. Iron Shield, No. 1:10-CR-059-02, 2011 WL 4007684,
at *1–2 (D. N.D. Sept. 9, 2011) (“Rule 38 discusses seven types of sentences that may or must be
stayed, but the text of the rule does not address a stay of supervised release.”).
33 Iron Shield, No. 1:10-CR-059-02, 2011 WL 4007684, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting, inter alia, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,427 (2009)); see also United States v. Von
Behren, 822 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2016) (circuit court granted emergency stay of polygraph
after district court denial).
34 See Dkts. 144 at 1; 150 at 3–4.
35 Nken, 556 U.S. at 427, 433 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
36 Id. at 433–34 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S.
248, 255 (1936)).
37 Nken, 556 U.S. at 426, 434 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); O’Brien v.
O’Laughlin, 557 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2009); see also Pomares v. United States, No. 1:06–cr–00167–
LJO, 2012 WL 6004158, at *2–3,*6–7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (applying Nken to a motion to
stay a condition of release).
38 Leiva–Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2011) (analyzing a stay in the context of
deportation proceedings) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
39 Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Courts have upheld the imposition of a condition of release involving polygraph examinations in
numerous instances.40 Further, courts have concluded the imposition of a polygraph examination
constitutes a limited infringement on personal liberties.41
Haynes relies on United States v. Sharp to argue that he will succeed on appeal.42 In Sharp, the
Ninth Circuit vacated a sex offender treatment condition for a defendant who, like Haynes, was
convicted of a firearms offense.43 The Ninth Circuit noted that the condition was not related to the
offense of conviction, was not related to the defendant’s prior violations of court-ordered
conditions, none of which involved sexual behavior, the district court provided no justification for
the imposition of the condition, and defendant’s’ conviction was too remote in time to justify the
condition by itself.44 Sharp is distinguishable from the present case. Here, the Court imposed
Condition 4 only following Haynes’s admitted violation of conditions of release that directly
involved (1) prohibited contact with minors and (2) lying about said contact. Though not
specifically related to the firearms offense, Condition 4 is directly linked to the violation and is
supported by the record. Although the question of “[w]hether a condition withstands review
remains a case-by-case inquiry,”45 given the current state of the law, this factor weighs against
granting the stay.
40 Johnson, 697 F.3d at 1250–51 (9th Cir. 2012) (The Ninth Circuit affirmed the reasonableness
of requiring the defendant to undergo a sex offender assessment during supervised release. The
defendant pleaded guilty to two firearms offenses, and his prior sex offenses were over twenty
years old. The district court observed that an assessment was a “very minor restraint on liberty”
and was justified for purposes of public safety and rehabilitation. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held
that “Johnson’s history as a sex offender, old as it may be, justified the district court’s decision to
order a sex offender assessment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v.
McGuire, 601 Fed. App’x 554, 555 (9th Cir. May 1, 2015) (affirming challenged conditions
requiring defendant to participate in an evaluation of sexual deviancy and affirming challenged
condition requiring defendant to complete a course of treatment related to his offense and
participate in polygraph testing if necessary; but reversing condition requiring defendant to
participate in polygraph testing regardless of the outcome of the evaluation); United States v.
Belman, 201 Fed. App’x 517, 518 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming a polygraph condition in a case where
a defendant was convicted of making a false statement); but see United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d
1235, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2003) (The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the
defendant’s twenty-one year-old conviction and forty-one year-old sexual offense charge did not
justify several stringent conditions of supervised release, including the requirement that he
participate in a sexual offender treatment program and submit to necessary testing, given the
remoteness in time of the conviction that the fact that none of defendant’s probation violations
related to his history of sexual misconduct).
41 Hohag, 893 F.3d at 1194; see also United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1105–06 (9th Cir.
2008).
42 Dkt. 144 at 3–4.
43 United States v. Sharp, 469 F. App’x 523, 525 (9th Cir. 2012).
44 Id.
45 Hohag, 893 F.3d at 1194.
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Second, Haynes, has not demonstrated he will be irreparably injured absent a stay. Although
mooting 	an 	appeal 	may 	constitute 	irreparable 	injury,46 	Haynes 	may 	still 	challenge 	the
constitutionality of this condition on appeal—and the Ninth Circuit may choose to vacate it—even
if he is subject to the condition in the interim.47 Accordingly, this factor weighs against granting
the stay.
Third, it does not appear that the issuance of a stay will substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding, namely the USPO. Although a stay would inhibit the UPSO’s
ability to conduct polygraph examinations, Haynes remains subject to other conditions of release
and under UPSO supervision. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting the stay.
Fourth and, finally, the broad concept of public interest appears to weigh against granting the stay.
Although Haynes successfully completed sex offender treatment,48 Haynes went on to violate the
terms of his federal probation by having contact with a minor under the age of 13,49 and when
confronted, Haynes lied to his probation officer about the contact.50 Further, subjecting Haynes to
a polygraph examination is not a substantial infringement on his liberty given the circumstances
of the case. Accordingly, this factor weighs against granting the stay.
Moreover, Condition 4 is narrowly tailored to accommodate the specific circumstances of
Haynes’s case. The condition is a minor invasion of privacy that protects Haynes’s Fifth
Amendment rights, as his answers to a polygraph would not address or implicate new criminal
conduct, while ensuring adequate supervision given Haynes’s history and past untruthfulness.51
After consideration of the relevant factors, the Court concludes that a stay is not warranted at this
time, therefore the Motion at Docket 144 is DENIED.
Entered at the direction of the Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, United States District Judge.
DATE: November 18, 2020
46 See City of Oakland v. Holder, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 105 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
47 Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (A case “becomes moot only when it is impossible
for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
48 Dkt. 56 at 2, 17–18.
49 Dkt. 116 at 3.
50 Id.
51 See Dkt. 141 at 5.
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