Margaret Hether v. Justin Tyler Campbell

SECOND DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
DAVIS, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

June 15, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0347. HETHER v. CAMPBELL.

FULLER, Senior Judge.

This is the second appearance of this child custody dispute before this Court.

In Hether v. Campbell, 374 Ga. App. 320 (912 SE2d 349) (2025) (“Hether I”), we

reversed two portions of the trial court’s initial modification order, concluding that

the court had no authority to grant educational decision-making authority to the father

or to impose a self-executing custody provision because the court expressly found that

no material change of circumstances had occurred. Id. at 323(1) & 325(2). Following

remittitur, the trial court held a new trial and awarded primary physical custody to the

father, Justin Tyler Campbell. The mother, Margaret Hether, appeals, asserting that

the trial court lacked authority to hold a new trial and enter a second modification
order. For the reasons that follow, we agree, and we therefore reverse in part, vacate

in part, and remand with direction.

The procedural history and facts necessary to resolve this appeal are

undisputed. The parties, who were never married, share one minor child. In 2018, a

Tennessee court entered an initial custody order granting the mother primary physical

custody and sole educational decision-making authority. In 2020, the Tennessee court

entered an order allowing the mother to relocate with the child to Georgia, leaving the

mother with decision-making authority but requiring her to consult with the father on

any significant welfare decisions affecting the child, and providing that all unaffected

provisions of the original custody plan remained in effect.

The mother subsequently moved to Georgia and married. In 2023, she notified

the father of her intent to relocate to Utah, where her husband had obtained

employment. In response, the father filed a petition in Catoosa County Superior Court

seeking domestication and enforcement of the Tennessee decree, modification of

visitation and child support, and requesting, inter alia, that the mother be prohibited

from relocating to Utah.

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On May 16, 2024, following a trial, the trial court entered an order expressly

finding that “the fact that the [mother] is moving to Utah is not enough for the court

to find that there has been a material change in circumstances.” Despite this finding,

the court awarded the father primary educational decision-making authority and

instituted a self-executing provision that automatically vested primary custody in the

father if the mother moved to Utah. The court also domesticated the Tennessee

judgment. The mother appealed those decision-making and custody modifications to

this Court. In Hether I, we reversed those modifications, explaining that the trial court

was unauthorized to make them in light of its determination that no material change

in circumstances had occurred. See 374 Ga. App. at 323(1) & 325(2). See also Odum

v. Russell, 342 Ga. App. 390, 393(1) (802 SE2d 829) (2017) (explaining that a custody

or decision-making change is not authorized where the trial court expressly finds there

has been no material change in circumstances).

Our remittitur in Hether I issued in February 2025. No substantive activity

occurred in the case until two months later, when the father’s attorney filed a “Notice

of Hearing” purporting to schedule the case for a “final hearing.” The trial court then

issued a rule nisi for the mother to “show cause . . . why the [father]’s prayers and all

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other issues should not be granted in a trial on this matter,” without specifying which

issues were left to be decided. In response, the mother moved to close the case,

arguing that our reversal in Hether I left no remaining issues to address.

The trial court heard argument on the mother’s motion, and ultimately

concluded that our judgment of reversal without direction in Hether I necessitated

further proceedings. The court subsequently held a new trial, during which the father

was allowed to present further evidence regarding the modification he sought,

including testimony about events occurring after the May 2024 order. On July 18,

2025, the trial court entered an order finding a material change of circumstances based

on the mother’s move to Utah, concluding that it was not in the child’s best interest

to move, and designating the father as the child’s primary legal and physical custodian

with final decision-making authority. The court once again domesticated the

Tennessee judgment. This appeal followed.1

In two related claims of error, the mother contends that the trial court erred by

conducting a new trial and issuing the second modification order because our decision

in Hether I conclusively resolved all issues of controversy in the case. We agree.

1
On July 22, 2025, we granted the mother’s emergency motion for supersedeas
and stayed the July 18, 2025 order pending the resolution of this appeal.
4
After remittitur of an appellate court decision, “[t]he decision and direction

shall be respected and carried into full effect in good faith by the court below.” OCGA

§ 5-6-10. Thus, “[t]he trial court is required to enter an appropriate disposition that

reconciles with the [appellate court’s] ruling.” Sponsler v. Sponsler, 353 Ga. App. 627,

632(3) (838 SE2d 921) (2020). In doing so, a trial court must construe the appellate

court’s rulings “according to their substance and function and not merely by

nomenclature.” Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 284 Ga. App.

387, 391(1) (643 SE2d 864) (2007) (quotation marks omitted).

The goal is to give full effect to the totality of the opinion rendered rather
than to read words in a vacuum. As such, the words “reversal” and
“vacated” should not be treated as magic words that can be read in
isolation, separate and apart from the underlying substantive language
and reasoning of the various appellate opinions issued in the case.

Id. (citation modified).

“For an appellate court opinion to authorize further action by the trial court

requires a clear direction, whether express or by necessary implication.” State v.

Jackson, 295 Ga. 825, 828 (764 SE2d 395) (2014). As a general rule, “[w]here a

judgment in favor of one of two parties litigant is reversed by the appellate court

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without direction, and where only questions of fact, or mixed questions of law and fact

are involved, the legal result is a new trial.” Superior Rigging & Erecting Co., Inc. v.

Krofft Dev. Corp., 162 Ga. App. 810, 811 (293 SE2d 72) (1982) (quotation marks

omitted). However,

[f]ollowing a reversal without specific direction by the appellate courts
where only a question of law is involved, a new trial is not required.
Further, the whole judgment will not be set aside because of error as to
a part thereof, where it can be determined from the record how much is
erroneous.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14, 23(4) (566 SE2d 2) (2002)

(citation modified). Under such circumstances, the

judgment of the appellate court is final. Upon the remittitur from the
appellate court being filed in the trial court, the issue is res judicata, and
the lower court has no authority to allow the movant to amend his
motion. Nor can it hear further evidence or consider any other matter
that would otherwise affect the finality of the judgment of [the appellate
court].

Shepherd v. Shepherd, 243 Ga. 253, 254 (253 SE2d 696) (1979). The trial court’s only

authority or power is to make the appellate court’s judgment its own. See id.

6
Applying these principles here, we hold that our rulings in Hether I did not

warrant a new trial or new findings of fact. The trial court’s original finding that no

material change in circumstances had occurred was unappealed and thus remains

binding on the parties. See Maxwell v. Johnson, 365 Ga. App. 547, 549(1) (879 SE2d

642) (2022) (explaining that a trial court’s prior, unappealed determination that no

material change of circumstances had occurred up to a certain date had a preclusive

effect on subsequent modification proceedings). Because this factual foundation was

settled, no questions of fact remained to be resolved, and a new trial was not required.

See Clark, 255 Ga. App. at 23(4). Regarding decision-making, we held that without

a finding of a material change in circumstances, the trial court was “not authorized to

modify which parent had primary decision[-]making authority over [the child’s]

education” and “reverse[d] the trial court’s judgment in this respect.” Hether I, 374

Ga. App. at 323(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of that holding limited

the reversal to that specific modification, and it does not follow that the entire

judgment had to be reversed. See Hedquist, 284 Ga. App. at 391–92(1) (explaining that

the word “reversal” in an appellate decision did not nullify the decision being

reviewed in its entirety because the appellate decision’s holding included language

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limiting the “reversal” to specific aspects of the decision being reviewed). In an

additional holding, we also reversed the self-executing provision “[b]ecause the trial

court explicitly found that [the mother]’s move to Utah was not a material change in

circumstances” and, on that basis, we ruled that the court “was without authority to

vest [the father] with primary physical custody in the event [the mother] indeed

relocated to Utah.” Hether I, 374 Ga. App. at 325(2). As we have previously explained,

the reversal of an invalid self-executing provision is to be stricken by the trial court,

and, absent additional rulings on appeal, the lower court’s judgment is otherwise

affirmed. See Ezunu v. Moultrie, 334 Ga. App. 270, 273(2) (779 SE2d 44) (2015). “It

does not follow . . . that the entire judgment must be reversed and the case remanded

for a hearing.” Id. See also Dellinger v. Dellinger, 278 Ga. 732, 736(1) (609 SE2d 331)

(2004) (reversing case with direction that the trial court strike the self-executing

provision); Johnson v. Johnson, 290 Ga. 359, 360 (721 SE2d 92) (2012) (reversing that

“portion of the judgment” containing the invalid self-executing provision and

remanding with direction that the provision “be stricken”). Accordingly, our reversal

of the self-executing provision authorized the trial court to strike that provision. See

Ezunu, 334 Ga. App. at 273(2). See also Graham v. Graham, 376 Ga. App. 883, 890(3)

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(921 SE2d 440) (2025) (reversing invalid self-executing provision in the final

judgment and remanding the case for modification of that provision).

For these reasons, the court had no authority to hold a new trial or modify

decision-making authority or custody in a manner inconsistent with Hether I. It was

authorized only to strike the reversed provisions and make the judgment of this Court

its own, leaving the original, unreversed portions of the custody arrangement intact.

See Shepherd, 243 Ga. at 254–55. See also Clark, 255 Ga. App. at 26 (concluding that

portions of the original trial court judgment that had not been reversed by the

appellate court remained in effect). Accordingly, the decision-making and custody

rulings in the second modification order are reversed, and upon remittitur, the trial

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court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with the holdings in Hether I.2 See

Long v. Long, 307 Ga. App. 790, 791 (706 SE2d 152) (2011).3

2
This result is not altered by Wilson v. Wilson, 279 Ga. 302 (612 SE2d 797)
(2005), on which the trial court relied in reaching the opposite conclusion. While
Wilson recognizes the “general rule” that reversal without express direction requires
a new trial, the reversal in that case was necessitated by a procedural error — denial
of the right to closing argument — which “denied [the] appellant her rights as to all
issues being tried.” Id. at 303. Here, no such defect exists. The parties fully litigated
the facts, and the trial court determined that no material change of circumstances has
occurred on the existing record. Similarly, the father’s reliance on Strickland & Smith,
Inc. v. Williamson, 281 Ga. App. 784 (637 SE2d 170) (2006), is also misplaced. That
appeal was taken from the denial of a motion for a new trial — the only relief sought
by the appellee — making a new trial the only available remedy. See id. at 785. In
contrast, the mother here appealed from a final judgment on the merits, challenging
only the trial court’s unauthorized legal conclusions. Where, as here, an appellate
court reverses a final judgment because the trial court misapplied the law to a
complete factual record, the losing party is not entitled to a second chance to meet a
previously-failed burden of proof. See Shepherd, 243 Ga. at 254; Superior Rigging, 162
Ga. App. at 811 (holding that where “only a question of law is involved, the losing
party forfeits his right to further proceedings after the judgment of the appellate court
on the remittitur is made the judgment of the trial court, since the case is no longer
pending” (citation modified)).
3
We recognize that the judgment lines for most of the authority supporting this
conclusion reversed the judgment “in part” and/or remanded the case with direction,
while our prior decision in this case merely stated “Judgment reversed.” Compare
Dellinger, 278 Ga. at 736 (reversing with direction); Johnson, 290 Ga. at 361 (affirming
in part, reversing in part, and remanding with direction); Ezunu, 334 Ga. App. at 274
(affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding with direction); and Graham, 376
Ga. App. at 892 (reversing in part, vacating in part, and remanding with direction),
with Hether I, 374 Ga. App. at 325 (reversing without direction). We acknowledge that
it may have been better practice in Hether I to explicitly affirm in part, reverse in part,
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Additionally, we note that the second modification order also grants the father’s

petition for domestication, although the court previously granted the petition in the

May 2024 order, and that ruling was unaffected by Hether I. The second grant of a

domestication petition is void ab initio. See Noaha, LLC v. Vista Antiques & Persian

Rugs, Inc., 306 Ga. App. 323, 325(1) (702 SE2d 660) (2010) (explaining that a court

is not authorized to enter a second or duplicate judgment); Arrowhead Alternator, Inc.

v. CIT Communications Fin. Corp., 268 Ga. App. 464, 465 (602 SE2d 231) (2004)

(“Where a second judgment is entered by a court after the first judgment has become

and remand with specific direction. However, that is what we ultimately did in effect
and substance. As noted above, our reversal was limited to the modifications regarding
primary educational decision-making and the self-executing custody provision. See
Hether I, 374 Ga. App. at 323(1), 325(2). Despite the judgment line, these rulings must
be construed by their substance and function, not nomenclature, with the goal of
giving full effect to the “totality of the opinion rendered” rather than reading words
“in a vacuum.” Hedquist, 284 Ga. App. at 391(1) (quotation marks omitted).
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final the second judgment is void.” (quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, that

portion of the second modification order is hereby vacated.4

Judgment reversed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction.

Doyle, P. J., and Davis, J., concur.

4
Nothing in this opinion should be read to preclude the father from filing a new
modification petition based on events subsequent to the trial court’s first ruling —
specifically, new facts arising after the trial court’s May 16, 2024 order in which it
found that no material change in circumstances had occurred. While the father cannot
relitigate whether a material change occurred prior to that unappealed ruling, evidence
of circumstances spanning from the last valid custody award in 2020 to the May 2024
denial may still be considered to provide context for any new claims. See Allen v.
McGuire, 339 Ga. App. 219, 223–24(2) (2016); Woodruff v. Choate, 334 Ga. App. 574,
580(2)(b) (2015). We express no opinion on whether the mother’s actual move to
Utah, or any alleged subsequent interference with the father’s visitation, might
constitute a material change in circumstances that would support a new request to
modify custody.
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