Joshua Moss v. State

THIRD DIVISION
DILLARD, P. J.,
GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules

May 29, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0059. MOSS v. THE STATE.

DILLARD, Presiding Judge.

After a trial by jury, Joshua Moss was convicted of a variety of drug and firearm-

related offenses. Before trial, Moss moved to suppress evidence collected from a traffic

stop, but the trial court denied that motion and later denied a motion for new trial on

the same ground. Moss now appeals, solely arguing that the court erred in denying his

motion to suppress evidence discovered during an unlawfully prolonged traffic stop.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

When we review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we must “construe

the evidence most favorably to uphold the ruling of the trial court.”1 In doing so, we

1
Valles v. State, 357 Ga. App. 167, 167 (850 SE2d 212) (2020) (punctuation
omitted). Accord State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 2(1)(a) (779 SE2d 248) (2015).
review the court’s application of law to undisputed facts de novo,2 and examine “not

only the evidence in the record of the hearing on the suppression motion, but also the

evidence from the trial.”3 Importantly, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial

judge, that judge sits as “the trier of facts,” and the judge’s decisions “with regard to

questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.”4

So viewed, the evidence shows that on March 9, 2022, Officer Jeffrey Krueger

with the City of Lawrenceville Police Department was observing all activity taking place

at 187 Culver Street in Lawrenceville. Krueger had done this for a week or so because

the department received an anonymously emailed illegal-drug tip about the home’s

owner (Katie Wardlaw) and her Jeep. On the date in question, while parked at an

abandoned home across the street, Krueger saw a man—later identified as Moss—exit

the house at 187 Culver Street, approach the Jeep parked outside, and then approach

a Nissan Altima. After approaching the Altima, Moss went back inside the house before

2
Valles, 257 Ga. App. at 167 (punctuation omitted). Accord Mizell v. State, 304
Ga. 723, 727(2) (822 SE2d 211) (2018).
3
Valles, 257 Ga. App. at 167 (punctuation omitted). See generally White v. State,
263 Ga. 94, 98 (5) (428 SE2d 789) (1993) (considering both the transcript of the
hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress and the trial transcript).
4
Valles, 257 Ga. App. at 167 (punctuation omitted). Accord Allen, 298 Ga. at
2(1)(a).
2
again emerging carrying two bags (one of which was white), and placing them inside the

Jeep’s engine compartment. The officer believed this activity was drug related.

While the foregoing transpired, Officer Krueger ran the Jeep’s tag and the

vehicle returned as being owned by Wardlaw. He then contacted the investigator who

initially received the drug complaint and was told to leave the area because undercover

vehicles were on the way. Krueger then parked at a nearby business, waited until the

Jeep began driving, and initiated a traffic stop based on a suspected window-tint

violation. The stop was recorded on both his patrol car’s dashcam and on his body

camera.

After approaching the vehicle and speaking with the occupants, Officer Krueger

identified Moss as the driver and Wardlaw as the passenger. He placed his window-tint

meter on the windshield and it returned results confirming the tint exceeded the legal

limit—allowing only three percent of sunlight to penetrate the windows and making it

impossible to see inside the vehicle. Krueger then discussed his findings with Moss and

Wardlaw. While doing so, he noticed a wallet on Moss’s lap containing a good deal of

money.

While Officer Krueger spoke with Moss, a K9 officer—who had been less than

a half mile away—responded to the scene. Around this same time, other backup officers
3
also arrived, and one of them ran both Moss and Wardlaw through the GCIC system.

The K9 officer then did a free-air sniff of the vehicle while a backup officer started

writing a citation for the window-tint violation. Before conducting the free-air sniff,

Moss and Wardlaw were asked to step out of the vehicle for the officers and canine’s

safety. During the free-air sniff (which was also captured on a body camera), the dog

alerted at the front of the vehicle, at the driver’s side headlight. At the point the dog

alerted, the citation for the window-tint violation was not yet complete.

After the dog alerted during the free-air sniff, officers searched the vehicle and

located two bags under the hood—the same bags Officer Krueger had seen Moss place

inside the engine compartment. Inside the bags were a 45-caliber handgun and

substances the officers suspected were methamphetamine, cocaine, heroine, Xanax,

and Deca Steroids, along with a scale. Then, after searching Moss, officers located a

good deal of money. The officers also recovered an AR-15 pistol from inside the vehicle.

As a result of the items discovered during the traffic stop, law enforcement

obtained a search warrant for Wardlaw’s residence. And during the execution of that

warrant, officers located other illegal drugs and drug-related paraphernalia. Together,

Moss and Wardlaw were indicted on 21 drug and firearm-related counts.

4
Moss filed two motions to suppress evidence recovered as a result of the traffic

stop. In these motions, Moss argued there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to

support the stop and no warrant, consent, or probable cause to then search the vehicle.

His second motion challenged the search of both the vehicle and the later search of

Wardlaw’s residence, arguing there was no consent to search, no extenuating

circumstances to justify the lack of a warrant for the vehicle search, and a lack of

probable cause for the residence warrant, which he also argued was not properly issued.

After a hearing on these motions, the trial court denied both.

In denying Moss’s motions as to the search of the vehicle, the trial court found

the officer who stopped the vehicle had reasonable, articulable suspicion and “even

probable cause” due to the illegal window tint violation. The court also concluded that

there was no evidence the stop was prolonged beyond the point necessary to investigate

the window-tint violation because the free-air sniff was done while that investigation

was ongoing. The court made this finding sua sponte even though Moss never argued

the stop was prolonged. Then, after trial and conviction, Moss filed a motion for new

trial that was later amended to challenge the admission of evidence as a result of the

traffic stop, which the court denied. This appeal follows.

5
Moss’s sole contention is that the trial court erred in denying the motion to

suppress evidence when the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged. We disagree.

As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained,

a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment
if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by
the Constitution. A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing
a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged
beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.5

As a result, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is

“determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted

the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.”6 This means that after the tasks related

to the investigation of the traffic violation and processing of the citation have been

accomplished, an officer cannot continue to detain an individual without reasonable

5
Allen, 298 Ga. at 4(2)(a) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 407 (125 SCt 834, 160 LE2d 842 (2005)). Accord Terry v. State, 358 Ga.
App. 195, 200(1) (854 SE2d 366) (2021).
6
Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 200(1) (punctuation omitted). Accord Allen, 298 Ga.
at 4–5(2)(a).
6
articulable suspicion.7 And reasonable, articulable suspicion “requires a particularized

and objective basis for suspecting that a citizen is involved in criminal activity.”8

Importantly, when a free-air sniff is carried out during a traffic stop, it is “not

fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission, because it is a measure aimed

at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”9 So, prolonging a traffic stop

to conduct an open-air dog sniff “renders the seizure unlawful, even if that process

adds very little time to the stop.”10 To that end, executing an open-air dog sniff around

a vehicle “during a traffic stop does not itself violate the Fourth Amendment, and—like

other investigation unrelated to the stop—it can be lawfully done so long as it does not

7
Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 200(1) (punctuation omitted). See Allen, 298 Ga. at
6(2)(a) n.4 (explaining that “after the officer returns the occupants’ documents and
indicates that they are free to leave, any further detention may be viewed as a new
seizure that would require separate reasonable and articulable suspicion to be
lawful”).
8
Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 200(1) (punctuation omitted). See Hughes v. State, 269
Ga. 258, 260(1) (497 SE2d 790) (1998) (explaining that to conduct an investigative
stop, the detaining officer must have “a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity” (punctuation omitted)).
9
Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 200(1) (punctuation omitted). Accord Allen, 298 Ga.
at 5(2)(a).
10
Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 200(1) (punctuation & emphasis omitted). Accord
Allen, 298 Ga. at 5(2)(a).
7
lengthen the stop at all.”11 And while a trial court’s conclusion that a stop was

unreasonably prolonged is often a fact-intensive determination, it is ultimately a holding

of constitutional law subject to de novo review.12 With all of this in mind, we turn now

to the facts relevant to this appeal.

As explained above, upon stopping the Jeep for a suspected window-tint

violation, Officer Krueger tested the window tint with his meter around one minute and

24 seconds into the traffic stop. Then, around two minutes and six seconds into the

stop, Krueger discussed the window-tint meter results with Moss and Wardlaw. Four

minutes and 18 seconds into the traffic stop, a responding backup officer was already

running Moss and Wardlaw through the GCIC system, and Krueger was directed to

begin writing a citation for the window-tint violation. Krueger then instructed another

officer to initiate the citation.

11
Allen, 298 Ga. at 5(2)(a) (emphasis supplied). See Terry, 358 Ga. App. at
201(1) (explaining that court needed to determine “whether the free-air dog sniff that
resulted in probable cause to search inside the car was done while some other task
related to the mission of the traffic stop was still being conducted, so that the sniff did
not add any time to the stop” (punctuation omitted)).
12
Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 201(1). Accord Allen, 298 Ga. at 4(2).
8
Concurrently with the foregoing, and while Officer Krueger was discussing the

window-tint violation with Moss and Wardlaw, a nearby K9 officer reported to the

scene. Approximately three minutes after doing so, the K9 officer initiated the free-air

sniff of the vehicle, which lasted another few minutes. During this time, the window-

tint traffic citation was still being prepared. So, at the time the free-air sniff was carried

out, the purpose of the stop was not yet completed.

But this does not end our inquiry. We must also determine whether the free-air

sniff prolonged the stop, and we conclude it did not. The evidence shows that because

the K9 officer was nearby, he arrived on the scene shortly after it began. And within

seven minutes, the K9 officer conducted the free-air sniff, with his dog alerting shortly

after that. This occurred while the citation for the window-tint violation was still being

prepared, and nothing shows that the free-air sniff delayed or prolonged that process

beyond what should have reasonably been necessary.13 As a result, the trial court

13
See Allen, 298 Ga. at 15-16(2)(e) (holding that stop was not prolonged when
free-air sniff was conducted while officer awaited the return of computer-records
check); Avant v. State, 376 Ga. App. 334, 340 (918 SE2d 70) (2025) (holding that
overall duration of traffic stop was not unreasonable when “the initial seizure—from
the time when the sergeant stopped the rental car until the drug-detection dog
indicated the presence of drugs—lasted approximately 11 minutes”); State v. Dean,
375 Ga. App. 171, 175 (914 SE2d 541) (2025) (holding that stop was not prolonged
when “a second law-enforcement officer arrived while [the stopping officer] was still
9
correctly denied Moss’s motion to suppress evidence and his motion for new trial on

this ground.

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Judgment affirmed. Gobeil and Pipkin, JJ., concur.

in the process of writing the citation; the second officer took over the task of
completing the citation; and while the second officer continued working on the
citation, [the stopping officer] conducted the free-air sniff”); Rush v. State, 368 Ga.
App. 827, 833(2) (890 SE2d 883) (2023) (holding that because “the free-air sniff
occurred within five minutes of the initial stop with a K-9 who was already present on
the scene and while the officers were still awaiting results from the check on [the
appellant’s] license, [the appellant] has failed to establish that the free-air sniff
unreasonably prolonged the initial detention”); Jackson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 630,
632 (782 SE2d 691) (2016) (holding that traffic stop was not prolonged when officer
conducted free-air sniff while waiting for the results of a criminal history check); Lewis
v. State, 332 Ga. App. 466, 470(1) (773 SE2d 423) (2015) (holding that free-air sniff
did not unreasonably prolong traffic stop when “it did not hinder the officers’ timely
completion of the mission of the traffic stop” and “was initiated by one officer while
a second officer finished filling out the written warning and while the officers waited
for dispatch to return the check on [the] driver’s license information”). Cf. McNeil v.
State, 362 Ga. App. 85, 90 (866 SE2d 249) (2021) (holding that traffic stop was
prolonged beyond the time required to issue a warning ticket for following too closely
when “the sergeant clearly diverted from the task of issuing a written warning citation
and abandoned the traffic investigation to instead pursue further questioning of the
driver about her candle business, a matter entirely unrelated to the traffic stop”);
Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 201(1) (holding that stop was prolonged when “the undisputed
evidence show[ed] that all tasks related to the mission of the traffic stop were
completed before the free-air dog sniff was conducted”).
10