DANIELLE FENSTER v. INTERNATIONAL VENTURES, INC.

FIRST DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
MARKLE and HODGES, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 4, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0402. FENSTER et al. v. INTERNATIONAL VENTURES,
INC.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

International Ventures (“Ventures”) filed suit against Waldon and Danielle

Fenster and Danielle’s parents, Christopher and Laura Ritter, alleging that they

defrauded it of more than $1 million. Danielle and the Ritters (“defendants”) filed

motions to dismiss, arguing in pertinent part that the trial court lacked personal

jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motions, and we granted defendants’

application for interlocutory review. Defendants argue that the grant was in error

because uncontroverted evidence showed that they were not subject to the trial

court’s jurisdiction. We agree and reverse.
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the defendant
bears the onus of proving lack of personal jurisdiction. Further, any
disputes of fact in the written submissions supporting and opposing the
motion to dismiss are resolved in favor of the party asserting the
existence of personal jurisdiction. Finally, because [such a] motion [is]
decided on the basis of written submissions, the appellate standard of
review is non-deferential.

Genesis Research Institute v. Roxbury Press, 247 Ga. App. 744, 744 (542 SE2d 637)

(2000) (citation modified).

So viewed, the complaint alleges that during 2023 and into 2024, Ventures

loaned Waldon, through his company Next Generation Legacy Fund, LLC (“Next

Gen”), approximately $1.6 million. To obtain the loan, Ventures claims, Waldon

provided falsified financial information and represented that Next Gen’s business was

providing financing to small companies throughout the country. To create this false

impression, Waldon relied on a sophisticated network of shell companies, the

fraudulent activities of which Danielle “corroborated . . . by [her] participation[.]”

According to the complaint, the defendants were “aware” that “representations

[Waldon] was making regarding Next Gen’s business were false” and “knowingly”

received stolen funds, with Danielle also “conspir[ing]” with Waldon in the operation

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of the shell companies. The complaint does not allege more specific activities by any

of the three defendants in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to defraud investors,

however. The complaint asserts that instead of providing the funding to those

businesses, Waldon and the defendants knowingly used Ventures’s money for their

own purposes. Eventually, Next Gen repaid Ventures $400,000, but Ventures, which

has its principal place of business in Fulton County, lost more than $1.2 million. The

complaint set forth counts for civil theft, RICO, and civil conspiracy, but was not

verified.

In response to the complaint, the defendants filed answers asserting that the

complaint failed to state a claim and that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction.

Waldon did not respond to the complaint, and the trial court entered a default

judgment against him.

Danielle and the Ritters filed separate motions to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-

12 (b) (2), arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Each motion

attached an affidavit avowing that each of the three defendants lived in Illinois and had

not been to Georgia in the past decade. Danielle averred that she had no property in

Georgia, had never transacted business with Ventures or its representatives, and had

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“never communicated by email, telephone mail or otherwise with” them. The Ritters

also attested that they had not transacted business in Georgia, had no contacts there,

and had not derived substantial revenue from the state.

After a June 2025 hearing, a transcript of which does not appear in the record,

the trial court denied the motions to dismiss, finding that it had jurisdiction over these

defendants. The court’s order focused on Waldon’s default judgment, finding that he

had admitted jurisdiction and that “to the extent that [Waldon] committed tortious

acts that subject him to jurisdiction under Georgia’s long arm statute, those acts are

imputed to his alleged co-conspirators for the purposes of personal jurisdiction.” The

court then certified its order for immediate review, and this interlocutory appeal

followed.

Defendants now argue that to invoke jurisdiction, a plaintiff must set forth more

than mere allegations of a conspiracy and that Ventures’ allegations were insufficient

to establish jurisdiction over them. Defendants further contend that the trial court did

not appropriately consider the affidavits they submitted, which required that Ventures

then rebut the evidence, and that Waldon’s admission of jurisdiction by default was

not binding on them.

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Because defendants sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, they bore

the burden of proof. Intercontinental Servs. of Delaware, LLC v. Kent, 343 Ga. App.

567, 568 (807 SE2d 485) (2017). Nonetheless, to the extent that the defendants’

affidavits controverted the allegations of the complaint, Ventures could not rely on

mere allegations, but was required to submit supporting affidavits or documentary

evidence. Scovill Fasteners v. Sure-Snap Corp., 207 Ga. App. 539, 539 (428 SE2d 435)

(1993).

Regarding the parameters of personal jurisdiction, our “courts will exercise

long arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when (A) the nonresident has

committed, in person or through an agent, one of the acts set forth in the Georgia

Long Arm Statute, OCGA § 9-10-91;1 and (B) the exercise of jurisdiction comports

with due process.” Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, 305 Ga.

App. 283, 293 (IV) (699 SE2d 456) (2010) (physical precedent only). “The Georgia

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OCGA § 9-10-91 provides in pertinent part that: “[a] court of this state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . as to a cause of action arising from
any of the acts, . . . enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he or she were
a resident of this state, if in person or through an agent, he or she: . . . (2) Commits a
tortious act or omission within this state . . .; [or], (3) Commits a tortious injury in this state
caused by an act or omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state[.]”
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long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum

extent permitted by due process. Due process requires that individuals have fair

warning that a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign

sovereign.” Home Depot Supply v. Hunter Mgmt., LLC, 289 Ga. App. 286, 288 (656

SE2d 898) (2008) (punctuation and footnote omitted). Thus, to determine whether

a nonresident defendant transacts business in Georgia such that they are subject to

personal jurisdiction, we employ a three-part analysis:

Jurisdiction exists on the basis of transacting business in this state if (1)
the nonresident defendant has purposefully done some act or
consummated some transaction in this state, (2) if the cause of action
arises from or is connected with such act or transaction, and (3) if the
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this state does not offend
traditional fairness and substantial justice.

Intercontinental Servs., 343 Ga. App. at 571 (1) (citation modified).

Within this framework, this Court has expressly adopted the theory of

conspiracy jurisdiction, which is “based upon the notion that the acts of one

conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy may be attributed to the other members of

the conspiracy.” Hyperdynamics, 305 Ga. App. at 293-294 (IV). “Likewise, under the

theory of conspiracy jurisdiction, the in-state acts of a resident co-conspirator may be

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imputed to a nonresident co-conspirator so as to satisfy the specific contact

requirements of the Georgia Long Arm Statute.” Id. (punctuation omitted).

Nonetheless, as defendants point out, to invoke conspiracy jurisdiction, a plaintiff

must provide “more than mere conclusory allegations of the nonresidents’

participation in a conspiracy with a resident.” Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702, 704

(1) (b) (472 SE2d 515) (1996). This rule exists because it would “be unfair to be forced

to defend [a] conspiracy charge on the merits in order to belatedly establish the court’s

lack of jurisdiction[.]” Id.; see Coopers & Lybrand v. Cocklereece, 157 Ga. App. 240,

245-246 (3) (276 SE2d 845) (1981) (rejecting exercise of jurisdiction based on in-state

actions of co-conspirators because there was no purposefully sought activity with

Georgia and no reasonable anticipation of being brought to court here).

The unverified complaint before us alleges that Waldon fraudulently

represented Next Gen’s business to Ventures and that the defendants were aware of

these misrepresentations. As the trial court found, the complaint further asserts that

by using a sophisticated network of shell companies and falsified financial records,

Waldon, with the assistance of the defendants, created the illusion of a successful

investment business with the purpose of defrauding investors like Ventures. The

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complaint also alleges after stealing the money, each of the defendants used fraudulent

proceeds from the Next Gen account to pay for their own travel and luxury goods. A

Chase debit card statement in Waldon’s name shows, for example, that he spent more

than $100,000 at an Illinois casino.

The trial court’s reliance on Waldon’s default as a jurisdictional basis was

misplaced, however. As we held in Delpiano v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 345 Ga. App.

151, 154 (812 SE2d 506) (2018), an alleged co-conspirator’s admissions regarding

default are not binding on the other defendants because such an admission “does not

bind a co-defendant who appears and contests the litigation.” Id. In any event, this

complaint does not contain the specifics necessary to impute Waldon’s activities to

any of the remaining three defendants. “Due process requires, of course, that the

non-resident defendant have taken action purposefully directed toward the forum

state, such that he reasonably should have anticipated being haled into court there.”

Rudo, 221 Ga. App. at 703 (1) (a) (citation omitted).

Ventures’s complaint was unverified, and it submitted no evidence to rebut the

defendants’ submissions showing an absence of Georgia contacts. Compare Rudo, 221

Ga. App. at 703 (1) (“[w]e emphasize that plaintiff in this case has provided more than

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mere conclusory allegations of the non-residents’ participation in a conspiracy with

a resident”) (emphasis supplied). As to Danielle, the complaint alleges that she

assisted Waldon in running some of the shell companies, but gives no specific

examples of such activities, whereas Danielle’s own affidavit denies any contact with

Ventures or its representatives. As to the Ritters, the complaint likewise claims that

the Ritters were aware of Waldon’s fraudulent misrepresentations and received

money or property from him and that they paid for the house in which Waldon and

Danielle lived. But the complaint contains no specifics regarding the Ritters’

involvement in the scheme and is not supported by documentary evidence which

would authorize Waldon’s in-state acts to be imputed to any of the remaining

defendants. See generally Rudo, 221 Ga. App. at 704 (1) (b); Cascade Aircraft Mgmt.,

LLC v. Velazco, 374 Ga. App. 397 (913 SE2d 4) (2025) (finding insufficient contacts

when defendant company did not transact any business in Georgia, but simply mailed

invoices to Georgia residents and communicated electronically with them regarding

services rendered out of state); compare ATCO Sign & Lighting Co., LLC v. Stamm

Mfg., Inc., 298 Ga. App. 528, 535 (1) (680 SE2d 571) (2009) (upholding long-arm

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jurisdiction when company intentionally sought business in Georgia and company’s

agent engaged in various acts in Georgia relating to plaintiff’s claim).

On this record, then, the trial court erred when it denied the three remaining

defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Judgment reversed. Markle and Hodges, JJ., concur.

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