Kimberly A. Crane v. James S. Crane

THIRD DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
MARKLE and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

February 5, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A2209. CRANE v. CRANE.

PADGETT, Judge.

James Crane (“Husband”) and Kimberly Crane (“Wife”) were married in

2005. In 2024, Husband filed for divorce and then moved to enforce the parties’

postnuptial agreement. The trial court granted Husband’s motion prior to entering the

divorce decree. Wife filed an application for an interlocutory appeal from that order,

which this Court granted. On appeal, Wife argues that the trial court erred by

enforcing the postnuptial agreement because there was not a full and fair disclosure

of material facts at the time of the postnuptial agreement. For the following reasons,

we agree and reverse.
This Court evaluates a trial court’s ruling on whether a postnuptial agreement

is enforceable under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, “we review

the trial court’s legal holdings de novo, and we uphold the trial court’s factual findings

as long as they are not clearly erroneous, which means there is some evidence in the

record to support them.” Murray v. Murray, 299 Ga. 703, 705 (791 SE2d 816) (2016)

(citation modified). Moreover, “[a]lthough this standard of review is deferential, it is

not toothless. An abuse of discretion occurs where a ruling is unsupported by any

evidence of record or where that ruling misstates or misapplies the relevant law.”

Arlotta v. Arlotta, 372 Ga. App. 828, 830–31 (906 SE2d 912) (2024) (citation

modified).

So viewed, the record shows that Husband and Wife entered into a prenuptial

agreement in 2005. In 2014, the couple entered into a postnuptial agreement (the

“Agreement”) that would govern the distribution of their assets in the event of a

divorce. In pertinent part, the Agreement provided that each party would retain their

respective interests in their joint marital residence, with the Wife having the right of

first refusal to buy the home. The Agreement further contemplated that each spouse

would retain his and her respective vehicles and financial accounts, including

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retirement and stock accounts. With respect to Husband’s future inheritance from his

mother, the Agreement provided that he would pay $50,000 of those funds to Wife

and the remainder would be his separate property. Under the Agreement, neither

party would pay spousal support to the other. It is undisputed that the Agreement did

not include a financial disclosure form or a listing of the Husband’s and Wife’s

separate property.

Husband filed a complaint for divorce in 2024. Wife filed an answer and

counterclaimed for divorce and other relief. Husband then filed a motion to enforce

the Agreement. In his motion, Husband asserted that the parties entered into the

Agreement with full knowledge of each other’s assets, income, and financial

information, and that he should be awarded his separate and premarital property. Wife

responded and argued, in pertinent part, that she was unaware of the value of his

assets before executing the agreement because Husband maintained exclusive control

over the family’s finances.

The trial court conducted a hearing at which Husband, Wife, the attorney who

drafted the Agreement, and the notary who signed the document testified.

3
The attorney testified that although he prepared the Agreement, there was no

financial disclosure prepared to accompany that document. After hearing this

testimony, the trial court cautioned that it was “very good practice” to attach a

financial statement to such agreements.

Wife testified that although she had a college education and maintained her

nursing license throughout the marriage, she had not worked since 2007 because she

was a stay-at-home mother. She further testified that Husband took care of the bills

and family finances. The record revealed Wife did not know much about the details

of the family finances, denied knowing about Husband’s retirement account balance

or log-in information, the value of assets he owned, and did not have independent

access to their online accounts. Wife testified that the parties operated out of a joint

checking account, and that she had access to a credit and debit card throughout the

marriage and did not have to ask Husband for funds. Wife explained that when the

family decided to shop for a new house prior to the divorce, Husband had discussed

their budget but did not elaborate on their finances except to state that they wanted

to “break even” by selling their old house. Wife further testified that she never

reviewed or signed the joint tax returns prepared by Husband during their marriage.

4
She also testified that Husband invested in a textbook business without consulting her,

and that she was unaware of the amount of money that he invested or how much he

made from that investment. She further testified that when she received the check

from Husband’s inheritance, she opened a money market account in her own name

and deposited the check.

Husband testified that he works as an executive director and producer with a

media company. He testified that he wanted the postnuptial agreement so that the

couple’s retirement accounts and his inheritance would remain separate because it

was important to him that Wife return to work after the children were born. Husband

testified that he had Fidelity accounts, including a retirement account, through his

employer and that Wife did not have access to those accounts, although he claimed

that they discussed the contents at some point. Specifically, Husband testified that

when the parties signed the Agreement, that Wife was aware of the account balance

of Husband’s 401(k). Husband further claimed that Wife had access to the joint bank

accounts through his log-in information. He testified that he prepared their joint

income tax returns via Turbo Tax and then allow Wife to review them before filing

electronically. He testified that sometimes Wife would have questions about the taxes

5
and sometimes she would not. Husband admitted that he did not have independent

proof that he shared his annual income or the value of his separate assets with Wife

at the time the Agreement was signed, but testified that they discussed their financial

condition at that time.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court announced its findings and

granted Husband’s motion to enforce the postnuptial agreement. The trial court

concluded that the postnuptial agreement was “not a result of fraud, duress, mistake

or misrepresentation” and it was not unconscionable. The trial court later entered a

written order consistent with its oral pronouncement. We granted Wife’s application

for interlocutory review of that order.

On appeal, Wife argues that the trial court erred by finding that there had been

a “full and fair disclosure of material facts” at the time the Agreement was executed

and thus, it is invalid. In deciding whether a postnuptial agreement should be

enforced, the trial court “essentially sits in equity” and has the discretion to “approve

the agreement in whole or in part, or refuse to approve it as a whole.” Alexander v.

Alexander, 279 Ga. 116, 117–18 (610 SE2d 48) (2005) (citation modified). Our

Supreme Court has held that the same three-part test that was first made applicable

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to antenuptial agreements is equally applicable to postnuptial agreements. Curry v.

Curry, 260 Ga. 302, 303(2) (392 SE2d 879) (1990); Spurlin v. Spurlin, 289 Ga. 818,

819(2) (716 SE2d 209) (2011). When determining whether a postnuptial agreement

is enforceable, the trial court must determine:

(1) [W]as the agreement obtained through fraud, duress or mistake, or
through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) [I]s the
agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances
changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its
enforcement unfair and unreasonable?

Alexander, 279 Ga. at 117 (quoting Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641(3) (292 SE2d

662) (1982)). “Whether an agreement is enforceable in light of these criteria is a

decision made in the trial court’s sound discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). However,

as noted previously, we review the trial court’s legal holdings de novo. Murray, 299

Ga. at 705.

The first prong of this test, and the only prong at issue here,1 requires the party

seeking enforcement to show that there was both a “full and fair disclosure of the

assets of the parties prior to the execution” of the agreement, and that “the party

1
Neither party challenges the second or third prong of this test.
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opposing enforcement entered into the agreement freely, voluntarily, and with full

understanding of its terms after being offered the opportunity to consult with

independent counsel.”2 Brantley v. Brantley, 345 Ga. App. 644, 646–47(1) (814 SE2d

787) (2018) (citation modified). Georgia law imposes an “affirmative duty of pre-

execution disclosure on parties” seeking to enforce such an agreement. Id. at 647(1)

(citation modified). Notably,

the burden is not on either party to inquire, but on each to inform, for it
is only by requiring full disclosure of the amount, character, and value of
the parties’ respective assets that courts can ensure intelligent waiver of
the statutory (and other) rights involved, and when a spouse has a duty
to fully and completely disclose his financial wealth, we would eviscerate
and render meaningless that duty if we imposed upon the other spouse
a duty to investigate.

Kwon v. Kwon, 333 Ga. App. 130, 135(1) (775 SE2d 611) (2015) (citation modified). To

this point, there was no express financial disclosure made and included with the

2
Husband testified that he suggested that Wife seek independent legal advice
and offered to have the cost of that consultation be paid from marital funds. Wife
denied that she ever had a conversation with Husband relating to her seeking
independent legal counsel.
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Agreement,3 and Husband testified that he had no independent evidence, other than

his testimony, that he identified his assets or income to Wife prior to the Agreement

being signed.

Here, the trial court found that the Agreement “was not the result of fraud,

duress, mistake, or misrepresentation.” In doing so, the trial court made findings that

the parties were married for nine years prior to the Agreement being executed, Wife

“trusted” Husband to “take care of the finances,” that she had “access” and login

information to the parties’ joint bank accounts and that she was “allowed” to use the

debit card out of the joint accounts freely. The trial court acknowledged that Wife

testified that she was aware that Husband earned a good salary, Husband did not put

any set spending limit on Wife, and their children were able to freely participate in

extracurricular activities.

From those factual findings, the trial court determined there was a sufficient

disclosure to meet the requirements of Scherer. Those findings did not include any

3
Although attaching financial statements to the postnuptial agreement that
show “both parties’ assets, liabilities, and income . . . is the most effective method of
satisfying the statutory disclosure obligation in most circumstances[,]” it is not
required. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 286 Ga. 309, 313(3) (687 SE2d 421) (2009) (citation
modified).
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reference to whether Husband made a full disclosure of his assets and income. Instead,

the trial court found that Wife was aware their family was financially comfortable and

that she had access to documents and accounts from which she could have learned

about the details of their financial picture. Specifically,the trial court noted that Wife

had access to joint account statements, tax returns and other documentation from

which she could have gleaned relevant financial information. However, in the context

of a postnuptial agreement, the burden is on the Husband to affirmatively disclose all

material facts in order to have the Agreement enforced. The burden does not fall to

Wife to accumulate information from available sources. See Kwon, 333 Ga. App. at 135

(when examining an antenuptial agreement, the burden is not on either party to

inquire but on each to inform); Blige v. Blige, 283 Ga. 65, 71(2) (656 SE2d 822) (2008)

(“[T]he ‘duty of inquiry’ envisioned by [the husband] is incompatible with the duty

of full and fair disclosure recognized by Scherer and its progeny.”); Dodson v. Dodson,

298 Ga. 117, 119 (779 SE2d 638) (2015) (the spouse seeking enforcement must show

full and fair disclosure of his or her material assets, and in the absence of such full and

fair disclosure, the other spouse does not have a general duty to investigate (emphasis

supplied)). This duty to disclose is particularly significant when one party is waiving

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his or her right to alimony. Corbett v. Corbett, 280 Ga. 369, 370(1) (628 SE2d 585)

(2006). “It is also undisputed that the agreement fails to disclose Husband’s income

and that Wife waived her right to seek alimony as part of the agreement. Husband’s

income, therefore, was material to the antenuptial agreement and would have been a

critical factor in Wife’s decision to waive alimony.” Id.

Husband has pointed to the holding in Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43 (622 SE2d

812) (2005), as being important to the determination of this case. However, in several

material respects, Mallen is factually and legally distinguishable from the present case.

In Mallen, the parties entered into a antenuptial agreement which included financial

disclosure forms wherein each party set out their respective assets and liabilities.

Neither financial disclosure form included any reference to income. Mallen, 280 Ga.

at 46(1)(c). Additionally, the agreement there provided that the wife would receive

alimony adjusted for the number of years of marriage. Id. at 43. In affirming the trial

court’s determination that the agreement was enforceable, a divided Supreme Court

held

although the financial statement did not include income, it did reveal
Husband to be a wealthy individual with significant income-producing
assets, including an 80% ownership share of a business bearing his name.

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Wife had lived with Husband for four years and was aware from the
standard of living they enjoyed that he received significant income from
his business and other sources. Under those circumstances and in light
of the authority cited above, Wife cannot be said to have demonstrated
that the absence from Husband’s financial statement of precise income
data constituted the nondisclosure of material facts which would render
the prenuptial agreement unenforceable.

Mallen, 280 Ga. at 47(1)(c). In the present case, no financial disclosures were made

a part of the Agreement. Within the Agreement, Wife waived her right to seek

alimony. Both of these differences distinguish the facts of Mallen from the facts here.

And those different facts are material to the issue on appeal. As our Supreme Court

noted in later decisions, the decision in Mallen was based upon “the unique

circumstances of that case.” Blige, 283 Ga. at 71(2). “Of course, Mallen did not hold

that cohabitation before marriage always, or even usually, renders nondisclosure of a

party’s income ‘immaterial’ as a matter of law for purposes of the first prong of the

Scherer test. To the contrary, the majority opinion emphasized the unusual facts of the

case.” Id. n.21 (citation modified). We thus find that the holding in Mallen does not

control the outcome of this case.

12
In another case from our Supreme Court, the wife appealed from a trial court’s

finding that the postnuptial agreement was enforceable, alleging that there was no

financial disclosure made by the husband. Spurlin, 289 Ga. at 819(2) . In affirming the

trial court, the Court noted that the wife keyed all of the family’s financial information

into a computer, she handled all of the paychecks received by her husband and paid

all the family bills, thereby giving her “substantial knowledge of his financial status.”

Id. In contrast, the undisputed evidence in this case shows that Wife had no

involvement with paying family bills. Although Husband testified that Wife had access

to information about their collective finances, both parties acknowledged that

Husband handled all of the family financial matters. Stated another way, in Spurlin,

the wife had actual knowledge of the family financial situation. In this case, Wife may

have had access to some financial information, but she had no actual knowledge of

their financial situation, or more specifically, the “amount, character, and value of the

parties’ respective assets.” See Kwon, 333 Ga. App. at 135(1).

As noted above, the trial court is entitled to significant deference in deciding

whether a postnuptial agreement is enforceable. Blige, 283 Ga. at 68 (familiar abuse

of discretion standard applies). However, as Scherer and its progeny make clear, the

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first step in the trial court’s legal evaluation of the enforceability of a postnuptial

agreement is a determination of whether the agreement was obtained following

affirmative, full and fair disclosure of material facts. See Scherer, 249 Ga. at 641(3).

And further, the burden is on the proponent to demonstrate that he fulfilled that

affirmative duty and that the opponent entered into the agreement, not just freely and

voluntarily, but with a “full understanding of its terms.” See Lawrence v. Lawrence,

286 Ga. 309, 313(4) (687 SE2d 421) (2009) (citation modified). We find that by relying

on the Wife’s ability to access joint accounts, joint tax returns, and joint mortgage

documents, and her general awareness of other investments the Husband made and

the family’s standard of living, the trial court erred in relieving the Husband of both

his affirmative duty to make full and fair disclosure of material facts and his burden to

demonstrate his fulfillment of that duty. Moreover, where the record is silent on the

value of the Husband’s annual income, his 401(k), and the profits, if any, from his

investment in a textbook business, we find the Husband could not carry his burden to

show that the Wife entered into the Agreement, in which she waived her right to seek

alimony, with a full understanding of its terms. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude

that there was not a full and fair disclosure of material facts prior to the parties signing

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the Agreement. Thus, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting

Husband’s motion to enforce the Agreement and we reverse.

Judgment reversed. Markle, J., concurs. Doyle, P. J., dissents.

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A25A2209. CRANE v. CRANE.

DOYLE, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

As set forth by the majority, we owe deference to the trial court’s ruling on the

enforceability of the postnuptial agreement. Because the record supports the trial

court’s determination that the postnuptial agreement was entered into after a full and

fair disclosure of the parties’ assets prior to its execution, I would affirm the trial court

and thus respectfully dissent.

The Cranes were married for nine years before they executed the postnuptial

agreement at issue, and 11 years following its execution.1 For the duration of the

marriage, they shared joint bank accounts, to which the wife had access via her debit

1
The husband and wife also executed a prenuptial agreement in 2005, which is
not at issue in this case.
card and the husband’s login information. They also regularly discussed their financial

situation and made joint decisions about their mortgage. The husband testified that

they “discussed everything” about their finances and that the wife would look at their

bank records to discuss expenditures with the husband. The husband also prepared

joint tax returns and provided them to the wife for review before filing. The wife

participated in discussions with the husband about the budget for the purchase of a

new home and was present at the closing, signing all the relevant documents. With

respect to the only accounts to which the wife did not have direct access, the husband

testified that they “had full discussions on that, and [the wife] knew what was in the

401(k) when she signed [the postnuptial agreement].” The husband specifically

testified that he told the wife “how much was in the 401(k).”

Although the wife claimed she did not know the value of the 401(k) and did not

recall exactly how much the husband earned on an investment in his brother’s

textbook company, it was within the trial court’s discretion to credit the husband’s

testimony that he discussed everything about his finances with the wife and informed

her of the amounts in the investment accounts.2 This supports the trial court’s

2
The trial court found that the only financial assets in dispute were the
husband’s 401(k) retirement account and a claim for alimony. Nonetheless, after
2
conclusion that the material facts of the husband’s financial situation were fully and

fairly disclosed at the time the postnuptial agreement was entered into.3 See Smith v.

Carter, 305 Ga. App. 479, 480(1) (699 SE2d 796) (2010) (“[T]he testimony of a single

witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact[.]”).

considering the exhibits and testimony of the parties and other witnesses, the trial
court found in favor of upholding the agreement.
3
While the preferred course is to attach all financial statements to a postnuptial
agreement, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that this is not a prerequisite to its
enforceability. See Lawrence v. Lawrence, 286 Ga. 309, 313(3) (687 SE2d 421) (2009).
Thus, I see no need in requiring, as the majority implies, that the husband provide
evidence in addition to his testimony to this effect by way of emails or other
corroborating documents. Neither do I see the significance of whether the associated
financial statements are placed into the divorce record after the fact. Whether the
husband later demonstrated the value of his income, 401(k), and the profits, if any,
from his textbook business has no bearing on whether he disclosed this information
to the wife before they entered into the postnuptial agreement.
3