DANIELLA MEJIA v. SK BATTERY AMERICA INC

SECOND DIVISION
RICKMAN, P. J.,
GOBEIL and DAVIS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

January 27, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A2164. MEJIA et al. v. SK BATTERY AMERICA INC. et al.

DAVIS, Judge.

In this wrongful death action, Daniella Mejia, as the personal representative of

the estate of Cameron Bell, appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of SK Battery America, Inc. (“SKBA”), BrandSafway Solutions, LLC,

Industrial Project Innovation, LLC (“IPI”), and Eastern Corporation. Because Bell

assumed the risk of his injuries, we affirm.1

“We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and construe the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” 9766, LLC v. Dwarf House,

Inc., 331 Ga. App. 287, 288 (771 SE2d 1) (2015) (citation omitted).

1
We thank the parties for their excellent oral arguments in this case.
So viewed, the record shows that Bell was a foreman overseeing electrical work

at the construction site of an SKBA electric vehicle battery plant in Commerce,

Georgia. He was an employee of non-party M. M. R. Constructor, Inc. (“MMR”). IPI

oversaw several departments for the project, including safety. Eastern Corporation

was the original general contractor, but IPI and SKBA eventually assumed the role

traditionally filled by the general contractor. BrandSafway Solutions was the

scaffolding and safety lifeline company that installed lifelines for the workers to tie-off.

In Bay 5 of the plant, there were 25 holes for the eventual installation of

permanent HVAC vents and ducts. SKBA covered the holes with non-weight-bearing

grilles or louvers that would fall to the ground if stepped on. As part of the site-safety

plan, employees were required to remain 100% tied off when working over six feet

above the ground. Bell received repeated training on this rule, and acknowledged the

tie off requirement in writing.

While at work on October 23, 2020, Bell stood 20 feet away from another

worker and witnessed that worker fall through one of the louvers in the ceiling. The

worker survived because he was tied off. Bell texted a video of the incident to Mejia,

2
his girlfriend,2 along with the comment, “[t]his job is dangerous af[.]” After that fall,

above-ceiling work was suspended for about two weeks. MMR held safety meetings

reiterating that 100% tie off was mandatory. While MMR lobbied to cover or reinforce

the louvers, IPI rejected that plan. Instead, SKBA placed large red-taped X’s over the

louvers, with “Danger” written on the tape.

After the plant re-opened above-ceiling work, Bell’s crew was assigned to

perform above-ceiling work in Bay 5 on November 4, 2020. That morning, on a “job

safety and environmental analysis worksheet,” Bell identified falls as a potential

hazard associated with the work and handwrote “100% [tie off]” as a mitigation for

that hazard.

MMR kept a log of employees working on the ceiling. When Bell started to go

up to the ceiling, the MMR logkeeper told him that MMR had not authorized anyone

to go up. Bell reassured her that he had spoken with MMR and had permission. Bell

was the first MMR employee above the ceiling that morning and the first MMR

employee to go up since the shutdown. Bell, however, did not tie-off when he went up

to the ceiling.

2
Mejia contended that she was in a Texas common law marriage with Bell, but
the trial court rejected that claim.
3
After Bell went up, other MMR employees followed, each tying off. When the

employees saw Bell moving quickly without being tied off, they repeatedly warned him

to tie off. But Bell replied that he was alright, and he told them, “hey, man, I’m

good.” Ultimately, the workers watched Bell step onto a red-taped, non-weight

bearing louver. Bell fell over fifty feet, and he died two weeks later from the resultant

injuries.

Mejia sued the defendants for wrongful death. The defendants moved for

summary judgment, which the trial court granted on the basis that Bell assumed the

risk of his injuries. This appeal followed.

In related enumerations of error, Mejia argues that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment because there was no evidence that Bell knew or should

have known the dangers of falling through a louver. She contends that conditions had

changed after the other employee’s fall twelve days earlier, including the defendants’

promise to reinforce the louvers and the removal of man-lifts intended to rescue

workers. She argues that whether Bell exercised care for his safety was a question for

the jury. We disagree.

4
Under “OCGA § 51-3-1, a landowner owes to an invitee a duty of ordinary care

in keeping the premises and approaches safe, and a landowner may be liable for

damages suffered by an invitee whose injuries were caused by the landowner’s failure

to exercise ordinary care in doing so.” SMG Constr. Servs., LLC v. Cook, __ Ga. __

(922 SE2d 76) (2025), S25G0389, slip op. at 8 (Ga. Oct. 15, 2025) (quotations

omitted). “[T]he true ground of liability is the landowner’s superior knowledge of the

perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the

property.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Thus, premises-liability litigation often turns

on issues related to the knowledge of the hazard possessed by the defendant, the

plaintiff, or both.” Id., slip op. at 8-9.

Assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense and applies “when the plaintiff,

with a full appreciation of the danger involved and without restriction of [his] freedom

of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion, deliberately chooses an obviously

perilous course of conduct.” Saulsbury v. Wilson, 348 Ga. App. 557, 559 (1) (823 SE2d

867) (2019). A defendant asserting assumption of the risk must establish three

elements: that the plaintiff “(1) had knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and

5
appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed

[himself] to those risks.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

“[Q]uestions related to the existence and extent of either party’s knowledge

should be decided as a matter of law only when the evidence of that knowledge is

plain, palpable, and undisputed.” Cook, slip op. at 11. Thus, assumption of the risk is

not ordinarily subject to summary adjudication, except “where the evidence shows

clearly and palpably that the jury could reasonably draw but one conclusion” — that

the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries. Saulsbury, 348 Ga. App. at 560(1).

In examining Bell’s knowledge of the danger, this “requirement does not refer

to a comprehension of general, non-specific risks. Rather, the knowledge that a

plaintiff who assumes the risk must subjectively possess is that of the specific,

particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately

causes injury.” Saulsbury, 348 Ga. App. at 559–60(1).

Here, we conclude that the record conclusively established as a matter of law

that Bell possessed actual knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm. He

witnessed another worker fall through a non-weight bearing louver a mere twelve days

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before his own fall. And he witnessed what saved the worker — that the worker was

tied-off when he fell.

The Supreme Court of Georgia’s recent decision in Cook is particularly

applicable to this case. In Cook, the plaintiff, “[w]hile working as an independent

contractor installing cabinetry in a second-story bathroom of an active residential

construction project ... fell from an exposed ledge resulting in serious injuries. At the

time of his fall, [the plaintiff] was attempting to straighten an air hose while moving

backward toward the exposed ledge he had previously observed outside the

bathroom.” Cook, slip op. at 1.

The Court held that the plaintiff “had actual knowledge of the specific hazard

that was the proximate cause of his injuries,” namely, the existence of an unguarded

ledge. Cook, slip op. at 14-17. The Supreme Court vacated this Court’s holding that

the plaintiff only had knowledge of a “generally prevailing hazard,” that is, the

plaintiff’s distance to the ledge. Id., slip op. at 15-16. The Court viewed the specific

hazard as the unguarded ledge, not the plaintiff’s proximity to the ledge where he was

working. See id. (“[I]t was Cook’s fall from, not his mere proximity to, the unguarded

ledge that caused his injury.”). Like the plaintiff in Cook, Bell possessed specific

7
knowledge of the hazard — the non-weight-bearing louvers — and not merely a

generalized hazard from falling. See id.; see also Saunders v. Indus. Metals & Surplus,

Inc., 285 Ga. App. 415, 419–20 (3) (646 SE2d 294) (2007) (no genuine issue of

material fact regarding plaintiff’s knowledge of specific hazard where plaintiff knew

of skylights but fell “because he miscalculated his distance to the hazard” before

stepping backwards).

Mejia argues that conditions had materially changed since the worker’s fall

twelve days earlier. She contends that the defendants assured workers that the

problem had been fixed and that they removed certain safety equipment. But the

defendants gave no such assurances that the ceilings were safe to walk on and that the

louvers had been reinforced. Instead, they reiterated to all workers that 100% tie off

was necessary (which Bell acknowledged on the day of his fall) and marked the louvers

with red danger X’s. Compare Baker v. Harcon, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 749, 753 (a) (i) (694

SE2d 673) (2010) (issue of fact existed on the plaintiff’s knowledge of the hazard from

falling into a trash chute where the appearance of the trash chute had changed and

where there was a question as to whether the chute had been properly covered and/or

marked). And while some details of Bay 5 had changed, “a plaintiff’s misapprehension

8
of the precise details of a known hazard does not negate his actual knowledge of that

hazard.” Cook, slip op. at 16. See also id., slip op. at 16 n.5 (“actual knowledge

requires awareness of the hazard, not a crystal ball”).

The defendants have likewise established the second prong of the assumption

of the risk test, namely, that Bell understood and appreciated the risks associated with

such danger. After witnessing his coworker’s fall, Bell texted Mejia that the job was

dangerous. He also identified falling as a risk associated with his work and tying off as

a remedy to that hazard. See Liles v. Innerwork, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 352, 354 (2) (631

SE2d 408) (2006) (“We have repeatedly held that no danger is more commonly

realized or risk appreciated than that of falling.”) (citation modified).

Finally, Bell voluntarily exposed himself to the risk. It is true that we have held

that an employer ordering an employee into a hazardous condition may constitute

coercion so as to overcome this element of assumption of the risk. See Baker, 303 Ga.

App. at 755–56. But unlike the plaintiff in Baker, Bell made the “deliberate choice to

engage in obviously perilous conduct.” Id. He went up to the ceiling despite being

stopped by an MMR employee. He also refused to tie off against policy even when he

was warned by his colleagues several times to do so. See Muldovan v. McEachern, 271

9
Ga. 805, 809 (2) (523 SE2d 566) (1999) (decedent, without coercion, assumed the

risks in a game of Russian roulette when he told his friend to pull the trigger).

In summary, Bell “with a full appreciation of the danger involved and without

restriction of [his] freedom of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion,

deliberately cho[se] an obviously perilous course of conduct.”3 Saulsbury, 348 Ga.

App. at 559 (1). While Bell’s case is tragic, based on the evidence of record, the trial

court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants in this case.

Judgment affirmed. Rickman, P. J. and Gobeil, J., concur.

3
Given our reasoning above, we need not address the hired worker exception
to an assumption of risk defense. See Sinyard v. Ga. Power Co., 363 Ga. App. 195, 208
(2) (b) (871 SE2d 45) (2022) (“The hired worker exception is a narrow, specific
expression of the doctrine of assumption of the risk” that “can apply when the
property is an inherently and obviously unsafe area, such as a construction or
demolition site, and the worker is hired to assist in the repair, construction, or
demolition of the site.” (quotation marks omitted)).
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