Snow v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0176
Christopher Dean Snow
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Chatham County
No. 2023CR650LHB

Decided: May 19, 2026

MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Appellant Christopher Snow was convicted of malice mur-
der for stabbing his wife Casey Allen to death. 1 On appeal, Snow
argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony under the
residual hearsay exception; denying Snow’s pretrial motion for a
continuance; admitting a prior felony conviction into evidence un-

1 Allen died on the night of April 14, 2023. On June 14, 2023, a Hall
County grand jury indicted Snow for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, family violence (Count 2), and aggravated
assault, family violence (Count 3). At a trial held in May 2024, the jury found
Snow guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Snow to serve life in prison
without the possibility of parole for Count 1, merged Count 3 into Count 1, and
purported to also merge Count 2 into Count 1, although Count 2 was actually
vacated by operation of law. See Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 772–73
(2022). Snow filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended by new
counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Snow’s motion for new
trial, as amended, on June 30, 2025. Snow filed a timely notice of appeal on
July 22, 2025, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning
in December 2025 and thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs.
der OCGA § 24-6-609 (“Rule 609”); refusing to vacate Snow’s con-
viction because the indictment failed to allege Allen’s killing was
unlawful; and overruling Snow’s objection to a statement made
during the prosecutor’s closing argument. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
1. The evidence presented at trial showed that Snow
stabbed Allen to death in their apartment during the night of
their first wedding anniversary. They began dating in 2021 and
got married on April 14, 2022. About nine months later, Allen
gave birth to the couple’s son. On the night of their first wedding
anniversary, Snow’s aunt took care of their son at her home, so
they could go out and celebrate their anniversary.
At approximately 7:30 a.m. the next morning, Snow called
his father and told him, “Dad, I can’t fix this. I really F’d up and
did – you know, I’m really sorry. I’m really sorry …. We were
there and she had a knife and I don’t know if she meant to but
she might have nicked me. I’m not sure. I lost it …. She’s dead.”
Snow’s father urged him to call the police, but instead, Snow went
to his aunt’s house to pick up his son. Snow told his aunt that he
and Allen got in an argument the night before about her driving
home after drinking and that she did not come home, even though
Snow and Allen had plans to go with Snow’s aunt to a family
birthday party that day. Snow’s aunt went to the party without
them, where Snow’s father told the aunt that Allen was dead. Af-
ter Snow’s aunt left the party, she found Snow back at her house
when she arrived. Snow told his aunt, “I accidentally killed her.”
Snow said that after he and Allen had argued the night before,
she got a knife, and he tried to take it away from her to prevent
her from harming herself. But after Allen accidentally cut Snow
on the arm, he “lost it” and killed her. Snow showed his aunt a
cut on his arm, which she described as “not bad.” She did not see

2
any other wounds on Snow. After Snow told her that he did not
want to live and left, Snow’s aunt called 911 to report the killing.
Police responded to Snow and Allen’s apartment, where
they found Allen’s body under a pile of blankets with multiple
stab wounds. A chair with their baby’s pictures on it was facing
her body. The medical examiner who performed Allen’s autopsy
testified that Allen was stabbed and slashed about the head, face,
neck, chest, and arm 19 times, causing her death, the manner of
which was homicide. A large laceration on Allen’s left arm was
consistent with a defensive wound.
Later the same day that police discovered Allen’s body,
they responded to a vehicular collision on Interstate 85. Snow
had driven at a high rate of speed into an energy absorption de-
vice at an exit on the interstate. Snow was transported to the
hospital, where he was treated for injuries, which included “a
knife wound that was not crash related.”
At trial, Allen’s sister Tiffany Agee testified that she and
Allen used to talk “very often,” but “[i]t slowly started to decrease”
after Allen started dating Snow, and Allen had told Agee, “I’m
sorry. [Snow] doesn’t like how much we talk.” Agee also testified
about a specific instance of domestic violence by Snow that Allen
told Agee about before the couple was married. Allen told Agee
that “Chris and I got into an argument in the kitchen and he had
slammed my head into the cabinet and he choked me and said, ‘I
could kill you right now and no one would do anything or find
out.’” Agee testified that Allen “told me that she had gone to the
hospital to get stitches.” Agee testified that Allen told her,
“[p]lease do not hate him. He said he’s sorry. I’ve forgiven him.
Please don’t hold any anger towards him …. He’s said he’s sorry
and it will never happen again.” On cross-examination, Snow

3
elicited testimony that if Allen had received stitches at an emer-
gency room, Agee believed that Allen would have gone to the local
hospital in Gainesville, and that Agee had never seen Snow “put
his hands” on Allen. Later in the trial, Snow tendered the emer-
gency room records for the hospital in Gainesville, which con-
tained no record of Allen receiving stitches during the time period
of her relationship with Snow, and also elicited the testimony of
a friend of Snow and Allen, who said he never observed Allen with
stitches.
Snow’s defense at trial was that he committed voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder. Snow testified that after he
and Allen had been out for their anniversary, they got in an argu-
ment about her driving home drunk. He said that Allen got a
knife from the kitchen, but he blocked her from going into the
bathroom because she had cut herself in the past and he was con-
cerned she would self-harm. He “tried real fast to grab [the knife].
And she realized [he] was going for it and kind of – she didn’t
mean to. She snatched it up and it caught me in the arm.” Snow
said that he was angry and said, “[n]ow that I have an injury, I
can call the cops and get [our son] myself,” and that when he
turned to walk away, he felt a “like a pinch … In my shoulder,
neck area,” that felt like being stabbed. Snow testified that he
“snap[ped] and los[t] it,” “tackled” Allen, took the knife from her,
and was on top of her in “not even a second.” When asked by his
trial counsel if he inflicted all of the wounds identified by the med-
ical examiner, Snow responded, “I had to.” Snow said he did not
remember all of it, but thought he heard Allen say his name, re-
alized what he had done and that she was dead, covered her body,
put photos of their son in a chair beside her body, and got rid of
the knife. Snow acknowledged that Allen “didn’t deserve to die.”
He further testified that the next day he drove down Interstate
85 “looking for the perfect exit to end my life on …. At the same

4
time, I put a knife to my neck. And somehow I lived.”
Snow also testified on direct examination about two prior
convictions he has, from 2017 and 2022. Snow acknowledged that
in 2017, he committed “[a]ggravated assault with a weapon, com-
mission of a felony with a weapon, and attempted armed robbery,”
that the attempted armed robbery was a “horrible idea” and due
to being “all doped out,” and that no one was hurt in the process;
he was released from prison in July 2021. As for the 2022 convic-
tion, Snow testified that it was for an aggravated assault that in-
volved an incident with Allen’s ex-boyfriend, which included
Snow stabbing himself and getting into a physical altercation
with the ex-boyfriend. 2 At the start of cross-examination, the
State tendered the certified copies of Snow’s prior convictions,
which were admitted. The State did not ask any further questions
about them.
2. Snow contends that the trial court erred in admit-
ting, under the residual hearsay exception, Agee’s testimony that
Allen told her Snow had physically assaulted Allen, causing her
to get stitches. More specifically, Snow argues that the trial court
erred because: (1) the statement did not have sufficient guaran-
tees of trustworthiness; (2) the statement was not more probative
on the point for which it was offered than other evidence the State
could have located through reasonable efforts; and (3) the notice
was not given sufficiently in advance of trial to provide Snow with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it.
The record shows that on May 1, 2024, (the Wednesday be-
fore Snow’s trial was set to begin on Monday, May 6) the State
filed a notice of intent and motion to admit under the residual

2 Before Snow testified, trial counsel questioned Snow’s father about
this incident, eliciting that Snow had stabbed himself.

5
hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-807 (“Rule 807”), 3 Agee’s testi-
mony about Allen’s statements that Snow had previously as-
saulted her. The trial court held a hearing that Friday, May 3,
where the prosecutor made a proffer of Agee’s residual hearsay
testimony, and Snow’s trial counsel presented some evidence at-
tempting to undermine the Rule 807 evidence and requested a
continuance, which was denied. On the following Monday morn-
ing, counsel filed a written motion for a continuance, arguing that
the State’s notice was “late” and that “[w]ithout any evidence re-
garding the State’s new discovery, going to trial at the present
time would prejudice [Snow] and would cause defense counsel to
try the case without competent investigation or preparation.” The
trial court denied the motion and called the case for trial.
Trial counsel then requested a ruling on the Rule 807 evi-
dence prior to jury selection, arguing that the residual hearsay

3 Rule 807 provides:
A statement not specifically covered by any law but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness shall
not be excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines
that:
(1) The statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(2) The statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can pro-
cure through reasonable efforts; and
(3) The general purposes of the rules of evidence and the inter-
ests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this Code
section unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the partic-
ulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.

6
notice “was given to us at 2:45 Friday,” before the trial court cor-
rected counsel that the notice had been given on Wednesday, and
trial counsel conceded, “Well, Wednesday, and then I’m in an-
other murder trial and I don’t have any opportunity to investigate
it until Friday.” When questioned by the trial court, trial counsel
acknowledged that he had made no attempt to contact Agee or to
subpoena Allen’s medical records from the local hospital until
that Monday morning – conceding later that “maybe I should
have done this Friday when directed by the Court” – and counsel
asked the court to re-assess the issue when he received the rec-
ords.
That afternoon, outside the presence of the jury, Agee tes-
tified that she and her sister Allen were “extremely close,” talked
regularly, and confided in each other, and Agee testified about the
incident in question, when Allen once told her that Snow threat-
ened and assaulted Allen, causing her to get stitches. On cross-
examination, Agee testified that she had previously told someone
on the prosecution team about the incident, prompting Snow’s
trial counsel to argue that the prosecutor had acted in bad faith
in failing to give notice earlier of the intention to use the evidence,
to which the prosecutor responded:
I’ve been going through our notes. I understand that
she said on the stand that she told us. I maintain
that she did not. … And you’ll just have to decide …
is Ms. Agee mistaken that she told me about it or am
I risking my entire career to lie about this one small
piece of evidence in a murder case.

Snow’s trial counsel also presented Allen’s medical records from
the emergency department of her local hospital, which contained
no record of Allen receiving stitches during her relationship with
Snow.

7
The trial court found that “after having the benefit of hear-
ing [Agee] testify, the Court finds there is sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness,” and further “that it is material and that there’s
no alternative way of getting this evidence presented to the jury.
And so the Court would find that the residual hearsay could be
admitted.” The trial court further found that Agee “appeared to
the Court as being uncertain in regards to who she has actually
told …. So the Court is not going to find bad faith. The Court is
not going to find that [the prosecutor] just stood up and lied to the
Court.” 4
Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception “applies when a
hearsay statement is not ‘covered’ by other exceptions to the rule
against hearsay but,” as noted above, “has ‘equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness,’ is ‘offered as evidence of
a material fact,’ is ‘more probative on the point for which it is of-
fered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts,’ and its admission would best serve
the ‘general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of
justice.’” Williams v. State, 322 Ga. 710, 712 (2025) (quoting Rule
807). And “[i]n determining whether to admit a statement under
this provision, the trial court should consider the totality of the
circumstances.” Williams, 322 Ga. at 712 (citation and punctua-
tion omitted). This Court reviews a trial court’s Rule 807 admis-
sibility ruling for an abuse of discretion, and we are “‘particularly
hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the
residual hearsay exception absent a definite and firm conviction

4 Before that ruling, Snow’s trial counsel had also asked for another
continuance, this time to speak with a friend of Snow and Allen about Agee’s
allegations, but after ruling that Agee’s testimony was admissible under Rule
807, the trial court also denied trial counsel’s newest continuance request be-
cause counsel now had the medical records from Allen’s local hospital and the
friend’s relationship to Snow and Allen was not new information.

8
that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.’” Thomp-
son v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 544 (2017) (quoting Rivers v. United
States, 777 F3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015)).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
Agee’s testimony recounting Allen’s out-of-court statement about
domestic violence under Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception.
Snow does not contest materiality, and the record supports the
trial court’s finding that the statement had sufficient guarantees
of trustworthiness based on the evidence of the “extremely close”
relationship between sisters Agee and Allen, as well as the trial
court’s own observations of Agee’s demeanor while testifying in
court. See Williams, 322 Ga. at 712 (“[W]e have repeatedly held
that circumstances involving ‘a victim’s description of prior acts
of domestic violence against her to her family and friends’ carry
‘an increased level of trustworthiness.’” (quoting Merritt v. State,
311 Ga. 875, 887 (2021)). See also Ward v. State, 313 Ga. 265, 271
(2022); Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209, 214–15 (2020); Jacobs v.
State, 303 Ga. 245, 250 (2018).
Snow also argues that the trial court erred in not consider-
ing the lack of any other evidence corroborating the statement –
pointing to the medical records, which lacked any indication that
Allen ever got stitches around the relevant time – but the record
actually indicates the opposite. The trial court stated on the rec-
ord that it found sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness “even
considering [the defense’s] evidence.” Moreover, we are aware of
no rule in this context, and Snow has pointed to none, requiring
a trial court to make specific findings on this or any other factor
in considering and ruling on whether to admit residual hearsay
under Rule 807. See Smith v. State, 311 Ga. 288, 291 (2021) (“Ap-
pellant cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court

9
must explicitly determine on the record that each requirement of
OCGA § 24-8-807 has been met before admitting hearsay under
the residual exception.”). See also Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423,
439–40 (2023) (noting, in context of reviewing trial court’s ruling
admitting defendant’s custodial statement, “we generally do not
require trial courts to make specific, on-the-record findings about
each aspect of the totality of the circumstances they evaluate or
to make explicit factual findings or credibility determinations on
the record”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Holmes v. State,
311 Ga. 698, 706 (2021) (“Trial judges [ ] are presumed to know
the law and apply it in making their decisions, absent some indi-
cation in the record suggesting otherwise.”) (citation and punctu-
ation omitted).
The trial court also acted well within its discretion in con-
cluding that the statement was more probative on the point for
which it was offered than any other evidence reasonably procura-
ble by the State, because a victim’s own statement describing the
defendant’s prior violence toward her is generally more probative
than other evidence about the same subject in light of the often-
secretive nature of domestic violence. See Williams, 322 Ga. at
713–14; Shellman v. State, 318 Ga. 71, 78 (2024). Snow specu-
lates that the State could have reasonably procured and utilized
Allen’s medical records instead as evidence of the domestic vio-
lence incident. But the only medical records that were presented
contained no evidence of the incident – a point Snow relies on in
also arguing that the trial court should not have admitted the
Rule 807 evidence for lack of corroboration. Moreover, as argued
by the State, even assuming such records existed, it is highly
doubtful they would include the type of details about the domestic
violence incident that Allen’s statement included, such that they
would not be more probative on that point than the Rule 807 evi-
dence. See Shellman, 320 Ga. at 867 (holding that “it was within

10
the trial court’s discretion to conclude that the victim’s own con-
temporaneous account was more probative than” other evidence
couched “in general terms” (cleaned up)).
Finally, Snow asserts that the State’s notice that it was re-
lying on residual hearsay evidence was untimely. Although we
acknowledge that five-days’ notice is limited, Rule 807 does not
specify a deadline for providing notice of such evidence, instead
requiring that “the proponent makes [it] known to the adverse
party, sufficiently in advance of the trial … to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it.” In five-days’
time, Snow’s counsel had both the opportunity to speak with Agee
and to subpoena Allen’s medical records, which he was able to use
both in voir diring Agee and as trial evidence to impeach her tes-
timony. Cf. Thompson, 302 Ga. at 545 (noting that under Elev-
enth Circuit precedent, even “failure to provide pretrial notice of
Rule 807 evidence is not fatal if the defendant is not harmed by
the lack of notice and had a fair opportunity to address the state-
ments” (citing United States v. Parker, 749 F2d 628, 633 (11th
Cir. 1984)). See also State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116, 125 (2020)
(“Georgia’s Rule 807 is based on the Federal Rules of Evidence (in
this case Federal Rule 807), so when construing our Rule 807, we
look to decisions of the federal appeals courts construing and ap-
plying the Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the Eleventh
Circuit.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). And the trial court
specifically found that the prosecutor was credible and not lying
about only first learning the information the week before trial.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in admitting the evidence under the residual hearsay excep-
tion.
3. Snow further contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motions for a continuance to investigate

11
more fully the allegations from the residual hearsay notice. Spe-
cifically, Snow argues that the State’s Rule 807 notice, filed five
days before trial, did not allow him sufficient time to obtain med-
ical records from other area hospitals or urgent care centers to
show that Allen did not receive any stitches around the relevant
time.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Snow’s continuance requests. “All applications for continuances
are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not
expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of
justice may require,” OCGA § 17-8-22, and “we will not disturb
such a ruling without a clear showing that the court abused its
discretion.” Kimbro v. State, 317 Ga. 442, 447 (2023). See also
Thornton v. State, 312 Ga. 224, 231 (2021) (“We will not disturb a
trial court’s decision to deny a motion for continuance without a
clear showing that the court abused its broad discretion.”). Fur-
ther, “the party making an application for a continuance must
show that he has used due diligence.” OCGA § 17-8-20. Here,
where trial counsel admitted that he was less than diligent in in-
vestigating the State’s Rule 807 notice, but still had the oppor-
tunity to interview Agee prior to trial and was still able to inves-
tigate and procure evidence to counter the Rule 807 evidence, we
do not see an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of
Snow’s continuance requests. See, e.g., Kimbro, 317 Ga. at 446–
48 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying de-
fendant’s motion for continuance on the ground that the State
filed additional discovery and an updated witness list 10 days be-
fore trial where defendant was provided opportunity to review
that discovery and interview those witnesses prior to presenta-
tion of the evidence at trial); Thornton, 312 Ga. at 231 (holding
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s mo-
tion for continuance where defendant failed to show he diligently

12
investigated and subpoenaed relevant evidence).
4. Snow next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting his 2017 conviction for impeachment pur-
poses under Rule 609, 5 and, in the alternative, admitting the un-
derlying details alleged in its indictment, including that the con-
viction involved knife violence.
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of
Snow’s 2017 attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault
with a knife conviction and a 2022 aggravated assault conviction
as impeachment evidence pursuant to Rule 609 in the event Snow
elected to testify. At the outset of trial, when Snow’s trial counsel
announced that Snow would testify and requested a ruling on the
State’s motion, the trial court granted the motion, reasoning that
because Snow’s defense theory would be that he was guilty merely
of voluntary manslaughter, his “credibility is absolutely central
to the outcome of the case,” and the prior convictions were admis-
sible under Rule 609’s balancing test. The trial court stated that
it would give a limiting instruction as to the Rule 609 evidence,
which it did. On appeal, Snow only challenges the admission of
the 2017 conviction.
“A trial court’s decision under Rule 609 is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” Patterson v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 178 (2022).
Pretermitting whether the trial court abused its discretion in ad-
mitting the 2017 indictment and conviction under Rule 609, we
conclude that any error was harmless under the circumstances.
“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is

5 Rule 609(a)(1) provides in relevant part: “For the purpose of attack-
ing character for truthfulness of a witness … evidence that an accused has
been convicted of [a felony] crime shall be admitted if the court determines that
the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the accused.”

13
whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to
the verdict.” Id. at 179 (cleaned up). The State bears the burden
of making that showing, and we conduct our review by
“weigh[ing] the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to
have done.” Wilson v. State, 322 Ga. 76, 92 (2025). “In the context
of Rule 609, error is harmless if the witness’[s] credibility was suf-
ficiently impeached by other evidence, or if the State’s case was
strong enough to support the conviction even apart from the” er-
ror. Patterson, 314 Ga. at 179.
Here, the evidence supporting the State’s malice murder
case against Snow was strong apart from the 2017 conviction, and
there was weak, almost non-existent evidence of sufficient provo-
cation to support voluntary manslaughter, which was Snow’s pri-
mary defense at trial. OCGA § 16-5-2(a) provides:
A person commits the offense of voluntary man-
slaughter when he causes the death of another hu-
man being under circumstances which would other-
wise be murder and if he acts solely as the result of
a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting
from serious provocation sufficient to excite such
passion in a reasonable person; however, if there
should have been an interval between the provoca-
tion and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason
and humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all
cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be at-
tributed to deliberate revenge and be punished as
murder.

The jury heard evidence which included Snow’s own admis-
sion on the stand to killing Allen, including his testimony that he
was angry after she accidentally nicked him with a knife during
their argument and then “had to” to stab her 19 times in response

14
to feeling another “pinch” around his shoulder or neck as he
turned to walk away. But conduct that causes fear for one’s safety
and fighting in response do not constitute the type of serious prov-
ocation that supports a voluntary manslaughter charge. See
Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 862 (2023) (“[F]ear for one’s safety,
nor fighting are the types of provocation that demand a voluntary
manslaughter charge.”); Annunziata v. State, 317 Ga. 175, 179
(2023) (“Even a physical confrontation between two individuals
does not necessarily provide the slight evidence necessary to re-
quire a voluntary manslaughter charge.”). The jury also heard
testimony of Allen’s statement that Snow had previously as-
saulted and threatened that he could kill her and no one would
find out or do anything about it. This was overwhelming evi-
dence, apart from the 2017 conviction, from which a reasonable
jury could readily find Snow guilty of malice murder and reject
his theory of voluntary manslaughter. See McGuire v. State, 307
Ga. 500, 503–04 (2019) (holding there was strong evidence of guilt
from which the jury could find defendant guilty of malice murder
and reject his theory of voluntary manslaughter, which was based
on his argument that he wrestled the gun away from victim and
shot her in a rage after she first shot at him during a heated ar-
gument about drinking); Mathis v. State, 279 Ga. 100, 101 (2005)
(holding there was strong evidence of guilt from which the jury
could find defendant guilty of malice murder and reject his argu-
ment that he was guilty merely of voluntary manslaughter based
on his claim that he shot his wife after she reached for his gun
during a heated argument).
Moreover, Snow’s 2022 conviction, which he does not chal-
lenge on appeal, also involved a knife, and the State did not ques-
tion him about the facts and underlying circumstances of either
conviction. Instead, Snow chose to elicit details about the 2022
conviction through Snow and his father, including that Snow

15
stabbed himself during that incident. Because the prejudicial ef-
fect from the scant evidence about the 2017 conviction was mar-
ginal as compared to the overwhelming evidence of Snow’s guilt
and was largely cumulative of the evidence of the 2022 conviction,
the State has met its burden of showing that the admission of the
2017 conviction did not likely affect the verdict. See, e.g., Jones v.
State, 305 Ga. 653, 656–57 (2019) (concluding that any error in
admitting defendant’s prior conviction or in the elicitation of tes-
timony that the conviction rendered his firearm possession illegal
was harmless because it was highly probable the outcome of the
trial would have been no different had that evidence not been in-
troduced given the other strong evidence of guilt); Martin v. State,
306 Ga. 538, 541–42 (2019) (concluding that any error in admit-
ting defendant’s prior indictment and conviction for theft by re-
ceiving a firearm, which defendant argued made it appear he was
prone to carry firearms, was harmless given the other substantial
evidence of guilt).
5. Snow also argues on appeal that the trial court erred
in refusing to vacate Snow’s conviction because the indictment
failed to allege Allen’s killing was unlawful, a required element of
the charge. 6 But because Snow never filed any demurrer or mo-
tion in arrest of judgment and only first raised this issue in his

6 In full, Count 1 of the indictment alleged that the grand jury:
In the name and on behalf of the citizens of the State of Geor-
gia, charge and accuse CHRISTOPHER DEAN SNOW with the
offense of MALICE MURDER, for that the said accused in the
County of Hall and the State of Georgia, between the 14th day
of April, 2023, and the 15th day of April 2023, the exact date of
the offense being unknown to the Grand Jury, did with malice
aforethought cause the death of Casey Allen, a human being,
by stabbing her, in violation of OCGA 16-5-1(a), contrary to the
laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof.

16
motion for new trial, this dubious challenge of the indictment was
not preserved for appeal. See Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 583, 587
(2018) (“To raise a defective indictment claim on appeal, a defend-
ant must first raise the issue by general or special demurrer or by
a timely motion in arrest of judgment after conviction.”).
6. In his final enumeration of error, Snow argues that
the trial court erred in overruling Snow’s objection to the prose-
cutor’s statement during closing argument that “finding him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter would essentially say Casey Al-
len was asking for it.” Snow argues that this was a misstatement
of the law warranting reversal of his convictions.
Pretermitting whether the prosecutor’s statement fell
within the wide latitude afforded prosecutor’s during their closing
arguments, see Kimbro, 317 Ga. at 452, any error in overruling
Snow’s objection to it was harmless. See Allen v. State, 317 Ga.
1, 8 (2023) (“A nonconstitutional error is harmless if the State
shows that it is highly probable that the error did not contribute
to the verdict.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). The trial
court instructed the jury that the closing remarks of the attorneys
were not evidence and properly instructed the jury on the law of
voluntary manslaughter. And the evidence of Snow’s guilt was
overwhelming in comparison to the weak, almost non-existent ev-
idence that sufficient provocation existed for Snow to stab Allen
19 times, as would be required for a voluntary manslaughter con-
viction. Under the circumstances of this case, it is highly probable
that any error in overruling Snow’s objection to the prosecutor’s
statement did not contribute to the verdict. See, e.g., Taylor, 303
Ga. at 587 (holding that it was highly probable that trial court’s
overruling of defendant’s objection to prosecutor’s allegedly im-
proper comments during closing argument did not contribute to
verdict “[c]onsidering the overwhelming evidence of [defendant’s]

17
guilt, in addition to the trial court’s jury instruction”). 7 Therefore,
this claim fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.

7 Snow does not argue that the errors we have assumed for purposes
of analysis and determined individually to be harmless – admitting the 2017
conviction and allowing the prosecutor’s statement in closing – cumulatively
resulted in prejudice mandating a new trial, and in light of the other evidence
in the case, and from our review of the record, we discern no cumulative prej-
udice warranting reversal. See Guyton v. State, 321 Ga. 57, 64 n.7 (2025); see
also State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18 (2020) (“[A] defendant who wishes to take
advantage of the [cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court
just how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors.”).

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