CourtListener 10846049

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 21, 2026

S25Y1501. IN THE MATTER OF W. MCCALL CALHOUN, JR.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of Special Master LaRae Dixon Moore, who

recommends that the Court accept the petition for voluntary

discipline filed by Respondent W. McCall Calhoun, Jr. (State Bar

No. 103915) after the filing of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule 4-

227(c). In his petition, Calhoun, who has been a member of the Bar

since 1990, admits to violating Rule 8.4(a)(8) of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102(d), and asks for a

public reprimand pursuant to Bar Rule 4-102(b)(3). The maximum

penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(8) is disbarment. The State Bar

agrees that a public reprimand is appropriate under the

circumstances of this case. However, having carefully reviewed the

record, we disagree that a public reprimand is adequate for the
reasons discussed more fully below.

1. Procedural History

Calhoun was convicted of a felony and several misdemeanor

federal offenses in connection with his participation in events at the

United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, and this Court suspended

him in an initial disciplinary matter pending the outcome of his

appeal based on his violation of Rule 8.4(a)(2) (it shall be a violation

of the Bar Rules for a lawyer to “be convicted of a felony”). See In the

Matter of Calhoun, 317 Ga. 726, 734–36 (2023) (Calhoun I). In 2025,

he filed an amended motion to lift the temporary suspension in this

Court based on the vacatur of his felony conviction by the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on October 24,

2024, and subsequent dismissal with prejudice of the indictment

resulting from his presidential pardon on January 20, 2025, for all

offenses for which he was convicted, both felony and misdemeanor,

related to events that occurred at the United States Capitol on

January 6, 2021. In response, the State Bar asked this Court to deny

the motion and remand the matter back to the Special Master

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pursuant to Bar Rule 4-106(f) (providing that if this Court “orders

the respondent suspended pending any appeal, upon the

termination of the appeal,” the State Bar “may petition the Special

Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether

the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate [the need

for further discipline]”). We denied the amended motion and

remanded the case to the Special Master to determine whether the

underlying conduct should be investigated and prosecuted further

under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon remand,

Calhoun filed a petition for voluntary discipline.

2. Petition for Voluntary Discipline

In his petition, Calhoun admits that, in late December 2020,

he decided to travel to Washington, D.C. to protest the results of the

2020 presidential election, because he was “upset with the outcome

of the election” and “believed that there was election interference

and that the election was stolen.” Formal Complaint (“FC”) at 35.

He traveled from his home in Americus to Washington, D.C. and was

present at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021 to protest

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the 2020 United States Presidential Election. Calhoun admitted

that he entered the Capitol Building and walked around the Capitol

Building. He further admits that when he entered the building, he

heard alarms going off and understood that he was entering a

restricted building that he should not enter. Moreover, Calhoun

admits he “understood [what he] was guilty of” and that he “could

be charged with criminal trespass.” FC at 36.

Calhoun stated that, by his conduct, he violated Rule 8.4(a)(8)

when he committed the criminal act of trespassing and

demonstrating in a restricted building, see 18 USC § 1752(a)(1),

which he admitted under oath to doing in his criminal trial and in

the show cause hearing in these disciplinary proceedings. See Rule

8.4(a)(8) (stating that it shall be a violation of the Rules for a lawyer

to “commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer’s fitness to

practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer had

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admitted in judicio, the commission of such act”). 1 As discipline,

Calhoun has asked for a public reprimand.

3. State Bar’s Response

The State Bar filed a response before the Special Master and

agreed that Calhoun’s factual admissions are sufficient to authorize

the imposition of discipline, and that he violated Rule 8.4(a)(8) by

virtue of his admitted criminal conduct in violation of 18 USC §

1752(a)(1), a federal criminal statute that prohibits a person from

knowingly entering or remaining in any restricted building without

lawful authority to do so, and which is a misdemeanor violation.

Moreover, the State Bar agreed that his criminal conduct was

subject to discipline under Rule 8.4(a)(8)—a rule it notes is unique

to Georgia and not part of the ABA Model Rules and that this Court

has not directly examined in a written opinion—because (1) Calhoun

admitted to committing criminal acts; (2) he admitted in judicio the

1 Comment 3 to Rule 8.4 (misconduct), provides in relevant part that “a
lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack
of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving … serious
interference with the administration of justice are in that category.”
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commission of those criminal acts; and (3) the criminal acts

committed by Calhoun reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer.

Finally, the State Bar agreed that, under the circumstances of this

case and considering the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Discipline, a public reprimand is appropriate.

4. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation

After reciting the findings of fact and procedural history as set

forth in Calhoun’s petition, the Special Master concluded that

Calhoun’s factual admissions were sufficient to authorize the

imposition of discipline. Moreover, the Special Master determined

that the petition contained sufficient admissions of conduct to

conclude that Calhoun violated Rule 8.4(a)(8). As for the ABA

Standards, the Special Master concluded that Calhoun violated his

duty to the public with his admitted criminal conduct; that he

engaged in criminal conduct intentionally for the purpose of

interfering with the election certification process; and that his

conduct injured the public’s confidence in the integrity of the officers

of the court and the justice system. The Special Master then noted

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that the presumptive penalty of a suspension was applicable in this

case because the criminal conduct was committed intentionally and

publicly for the purpose of disrupting a legal proceeding. See ABA

Standard 5.12.

In deciding what sanction to recommend, the Special Master

noted that the generally applicable penalty can be adjusted upward

or downward depending on the weight assigned to the mitigating

and aggravating circumstances. In terms of aggravating factors, the

Special Master concluded that Calhoun had substantial experience

in the practice of law, having been admitted to practice in 1990. See

ABA Standard 9.22(i). As for mitigating factors, the Special Master

concluded that Calhoun had no prior disciplinary record; lacked a

dishonest or selfish motive; provided full and free disclosure of his

misconduct and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; and

expressed remorse. See ABA Standard 9.32(a), (b), (e), and (l).

Regarding Calhoun’s remorse, the Special Master noted that

Calhoun’s opinion regarding his actions had changed since the

initial show cause hearing, as he now acknowledged that his conduct

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was inappropriate and reflected poorly on the legal profession.

Moreover, the Special Master noted that his conduct did not arise in

the context of the representation of a client and that he had been

suspended from the practice of law since November 7, 2023.2 In

sum, the Special Master concluded that because of the

circumstances presented here, a public reprimand was warranted.

5. Conclusion

Having reviewed the entire record in this case, we disagree

with the parties that a public reprimand is appropriate here. While

it is true that we have never directly examined a Rule 8.4(a)(8)

violation before, this subsection of Rule 8.4(a) provides discipline for

committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s

fitness as a lawyer and, therefore, Rule 8.4(a)(8) imposes discipline

for conduct similar to that specified in Rule 8.4(a)(2), (3), and (4).

2The Special Master concluded that Calhoun’s pardon could not be
considered mitigating, as it does not operate to confer or restore a public office
which was previously held, but which on account of the previous conviction and
sentence was necessarily relinquished. See Morris v. Hartsfield, 186 Ga. 171,
173 (1938). Moreover, the Special Master noted a presidential pardon does not
annul the act or affect the right of the court to punish a person holding a
professional license for professional misconduct. See In the Matter of Abrams,
689 A.2d 6, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Violations of those subsections in general are considered very

serious. See, e.g., In the Matter of McCall, 314 Ga. 200, 206 (2022)

(holding that “a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) is among the most serious

violations with which a lawyer can be charged.”). And while

violations of Rule 8.4(a)(2), (3), and (4) do not necessarily require it,

they frequently result in disbarment. See In the Matter of Barnes,

320 Ga. 589, 590–91 (2024) (on Special Master’s report and

recommendation, disbarring attorney who violated Rule 8.4(a)(2) by

being convicted of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer and

noting that “disbarment is an appropriate sanction in matters

involving felony convictions for crimes of interference with the

administration of justice, in this case felony obstruction of police”);

In the Matter of Head, 320 Ga. 316, 316 (2024) (on Special Master’s

report and recommendation, disbarring attorney who violated Rule

8.4(a)(3) by pleading guilty to a misdemeanor involving moral

turpitude, with the Special Master defining “moral turpitude” to

include actions “done contrary to justice”); In the Matter of

Cummings, 291 Ga. 654, 654–55 (2012) (disbarring attorney on

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notice of discipline who violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) by submitting

invoices for work she did not perform and making false allegations

of improper conduct against city officials). The cases involving Rule

8.4(a)(2) and (3) violations are particularly relevant here, given that

while Calhoun may have ultimately been pardoned for federal

offenses, pardons do not prevent disbarment for the underlying

activity that formed the basis of the crime that was later pardoned.

See Scott v. Leathers, 78 Ga. App. 661, 664 (1949) (“disbarred

attorney may not automatically be reinstated either by a special act

of the legislature … or an executive pardon” (internal citations

omitted)); Payne v. State, 52 Ga. App. 425, 426 (1936)

(“reinstatement to the bar [does] not follow automatically from the

grant of the pardon.”).3 See also In the Matter of Beck, 264 Ind. 141,

146–47 (1976) (citing Payne as part of the overwhelming line of

authority nationwide to this effect).

Moreover, while it is true that Calhoun has been suspended

3 Leathers and Payne were decided by the Court of Appeals before this
Court made clear that the regulation of the practice of law was part of our
inherent authority.
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from practicing law since 2023, it would be improper to impose

discipline in partial reliance on an involuntary interim suspension

because we do not consider such a suspension to be mitigating. See

In the Matter of Warnock, 272 Ga. 2, 4 (2000) (“[w]e disagree with

the special master’s conclusion that Warnock’s … interim

suspension … [is a] mitigating factor[ ]”). See generally In the Matter

of Huber, 320 Ga. 314, 315 (2024) (accepting petition for voluntary

surrender of license nunc pro tunc, because attorney had

“demonstrated that he voluntarily stopped the practice of law”

(emphasis added)).

Even in the absence of his admission here that he violated Rule

8.4(a)(8) based on a felony offense, Calhoun admitted to violating

Rule 8.4(a)(8) based on a misdemeanor criminal act, which if not

pardoned could have resulted in a Rule 8.4(a)(3) violation. See

generally Calhoun I, 317 Ga. 726, 734 (noting that the “Special

Master’s determination that Calhoun violated Rule 8.4(a)(3) is

premature, as the Special Master made no effort to analyze whether

the conduct underlying Calhoun’s misdemeanor convictions

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involved moral turpitude or related to his fitness to practice law”).

Moreover, as the State Bar noted in its response to the petition

for voluntary discipline, the criminal acts committed by Calhoun

reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer. See Rule 8.4(a)(8). As

part of the State Bar’s response to Calhoun’s petition for voluntary

discipline, it introduced Calhoun’s social media posts from January

6, 2021, which clearly suggest that he intended to participate,

willingly and knowingly, in a violent takeover of the Capitol to

overturn the 2020 election and that he sought to interfere with the

administration of justice. Calhoun commented on social media that

he was part of a group that “physically took control of the Capital

[sic] building in a hand to hand hostile takeover”; they “occupied the

Capitol and shut down the Government”; he was one of the “first two

hundred to rush up the steps and inside after the Vanguard had

clashed hard with the police and had made them retreat”; they

brought the “Government to its knees”; and they were “all going

back armed for war.” FC at 101. In addition, he commented that once

in the Capitol building, they were met with a police barricade, which

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they “push[ed] through,” and that this caused “some people [to]

bleed[] pretty badly.” Id. at 100. Even more concerning were his

comments directed towards certain members of Congress that the

group intended to harm. Calhoun stated that they “stormed upstairs

… looking for members of Congress” and that they then:

kicked in Nancy Pelosi’s office door and pushed down the
hall towards her inner sanctum, the mob howling with
rage – Crazy Nancy probably would have been torn into
little pieces, but she was nowhere to be seen – then a swat
[sic] team showed, and we retreated back to the rotunda
and continued our hostile take over of the Capitol
Building.

FC at 102–03.

If Calhoun was as involved as his posts indicate, then it is hard

for us to see how anything less than disbarment can be accepted

here. Accordingly, we reject the petition for voluntary discipline and

remand this matter for further proceedings. See ITMO Joshi, 315

Ga. 477, 483–84 (2023) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline

and remanding the matter for consideration of additional serious

allegations).

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices
concur.
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