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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 21, 2026

S25A1014. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.

LAND, Justice.

Qamar Williams was convicted of malice murder and other

crimes related to the shooting death of Calvin Chappell. 1 On appeal,

1 The crimes occurred in the early morning hours of April 15, 2019. On

July 9, 2019, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Williams, charging him with
malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault
(Count 2), felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 4), possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 5), and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (Count 6).
After a trial from September 20 to 22, 2022, a jury found Williams guilty
on all counts. On November 7, 2022, Williams was sentenced to serve life in
prison without the possibility of parole for Count 1, ten years in prison for
Count 5 (consecutive to Count 1), and five years in prison for Count 6
(consecutive to Count 5). Count 4 merged into Count 1 for sentencing purposes.
The trial court stated that it was merging Counts 2 and 3 into Count 1 for
sentencing purposes, but Counts 2 and 3 were actually vacated by operation of
law.
Williams filed a timely motion for a new trial on December 5, 2022, which
he later amended on May 24, 2024. On June 20, 2024, the trial court denied
Williams’s amended motion after an evidentiary hearing. Williams timely filed
a notice of appeal on July 19, 2024. On this case’s first appearance before this
Court, the State moved to remand it in order to incorporate the motion for new
Williams argues that the trial court erred in finding that newly

discovered evidence would likely not have produced a different

verdict and in both failing to give an involuntary intoxication charge

and finding that the failure to give the jury that charge was

harmless. Williams also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

in several respects. For the reasons below, we affirm Williams’s

convictions.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed as follows. On April

14, 2019, Williams and Chappell, who grew up together and were

friends, went to several nightclubs with Mahamoud Fofana and

Horatio Walker. Williams, a rap artist, was scheduled to perform at

one of those clubs, Club One Fifty-One. In the early hours of April

15, the group returned to Fofana’s residence in Decatur and then

Williams and Fofana went to a Waffle House. Fofana testified that,

while at Waffle House, Williams went to the bathroom for about 20

trial hearing transcript. This Court granted that motion, struck the case from
its docket, and remanded the case to the trial court. Williams v. State, No.
S25A0393 (Jan. 23, 2025). The case is now again before this Court, with the
supplemented record. It has been docketed to the August 2025 term of this
Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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minutes and a worker asked what was wrong with Williams and if

he was okay. Fofana stated that he “could see something was wrong

with [Williams],” although he later clarified that Williams was not

stumbling or slurring his words and did not appear to be on drugs.

Likewise, when Walker was asked whether he saw Williams take

drugs that night, he testified “no.” When asked whether Williams

was slurring or having trouble walking that night, Walker

responded, “Not that I recall.”

When Fofana and Williams returned home in the early

morning hours, Fofana went to sleep in an upstairs bedroom.

Another resident of the home, Joshua Baker, also slept upstairs, and

Chappell slept in the downstairs living room. Walker went to work

after returning home from the clubs.

While Chappell was getting ready for bed, Williams paced

outside the house and smoked “something,” stopping to “stare” at

Chappell. Williams then entered the house, sat in a chair directly

across the room from Chappell, and “star[ed] at [Chappell] for an

extended period of time.” At around 6:30 a.m., Williams shot at a

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security camera in the living room and then shot Chappell several

times while Chappell was sleeping. Baker woke up when he heard

the gunshots, grabbed his firearm, and went downstairs to find

Williams holding a handgun and mumbling while standing over

Chappell’s body. At trial, when asked about his interactions with

Williams immediately after the shooting, Baker testified that

Williams did not “seem like he was on drugs” and that he was

“walking normally [and] talking normally.”

Baker went upstairs, woke up Fofana, and told him that he

believed Williams shot Chappell. Fofana came out of his room, saw

Williams, and took the gun from him. Fofana “tried to ask [Williams]

what was going on” and Williams stated that “[Chappell] was trying

to do something to him.” Baker called 911, and Fofana made

Williams leave the house.

When police officers responded to Baker’s call, they found

Chappell dead and determined that he was killed by a gunshot

wound to the head. The DeKalb County Medical Examiner’s Office

confirmed Chappell’s death was a homicide and observed that

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several of his multiple gunshot wounds would have resulted in death

in “minutes.” A crime scene investigator recovered security footage

from inside the house, which captured the shooting, as well as nine

spent shell casings and the handgun used in the shooting.

Fofana’s cousin, Walt Sysavane, testified at trial that Williams

called him on the afternoon of the shooting and asked him to ask

Fofana to delete the video footage. According to Sysavane, when he

asked Williams what happened, Williams said that Chappell “was

tripping” and was “on drugs sometimes” and that he “had to take

care of it because [Chappell] was tripping for real.”2

After a trial from September 20 to 22, 2022, a jury found

Williams guilty of malice murder, felony murder predicated on

aggravated assault, felony murder predicated on possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, aggravated assault, possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the

2 Williams did not testify at trial, although he did testify at the motion

for new trial hearing. At that hearing, Williams testified that he did not
remember asking Sysavane to destroy the video footage or telling him that he
“had to take care of” Chappell, although Williams remembered Sysavane
testifying to such at trial.
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commission of a felony. In Williams’s amended motion for new trial,

he argued, among other things, that he was entitled to a new trial

because newly discovered evidence would support his defense of

involuntary intoxication. In support of this argument, Williams

submitted affidavits from Robert Anderson and Dominique Dora

and called both individuals to testify as witnesses at the motion for

new trial hearing. At the time of the shooting, Anderson and Dora

were promoters who booked talent for club performances. In his

affidavit, Anderson stated that he booked Williams for a

performance at Club One Fifty-One in the early morning hours on

April 15, 2019.3 Anderson stated that he saw Chappell “crushing

pills” and “loading the pills into the [champagne] bottles” ordered by

Williams, and Dora likewise testified at the motion for new trial

hearing that she saw “somebody in [Williams’s] entourage …

3 Anderson’s testimony at the motion for new trial hearing appears to

contradict his affidavit with respect to whether he actually booked Williams at
Club One Fifty-One that night or just came to the club to “support” Williams.
Either way, it appears undisputed that Anderson spoke with Williams at the
club that night. Dora testified at the motion for new trial hearing that Williams
asked her to order him champagne “through the bottle girl” that night.
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crushing something,” which Dora believed to be drugs, and “pouring

it in the [champagne] bottles.” Anderson and Dora further testified

that they saw Williams drink from one of the bottles containing the

pills. Neither Anderson nor Dora identified the substance they saw

put into Williams’s champagne, nor could they identify how much of

the champagne Williams drank.

2. Williams argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Specifically, Williams argues that Anderson’s and Dora’s affidavits

and testimony – in which Anderson and Dora claim to have seen

Chappell putting an unknown substance into champagne that

Williams later drank – constituted new evidence which entitles him

to a new trial. The trial court denied Williams’s motion for new trial

on these grounds, finding that the evidence could have been

discovered prior to trial with due diligence, that Anderson and Dora

were not credible, and that the new evidence was not so material

that it would have resulted in a different verdict. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

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Georgia law requires a defendant seeking a new trial based on

newly-discovered evidence to establish the following:

(1) that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the
trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence
that he did not acquire it sooner; (3) that it is so material
that it would probably produce a different verdict; (4) that
it is not cumulative only; (5) that the affidavit of the
witness himself should be procured or its absence
accounted for; and (6) that a new trial will not be granted
if the only effect of the evidence will be to impeach the
credit of a witness.

Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491 (1980) (citation and

punctuation omitted). It is the defendant’s burden to prove the

existence of each of these factors. Id. A defendant’s failure to show

that even one of these requirements is met is sufficient to deny a

motion for new trial. Id. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a

new trial based on newly-discovered evidence is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. See Patterson v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 181 (2022).

Williams’s newly discovered evidence claim fails for two

reasons. First, Williams made no showing as to why Anderson’s and

Dora’s testimony could not have been acquired earlier with due

diligence. See Timberlake, 246 Ga. at 491 (“[A]lthough the defendant

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has stated that the evidence has come to his attention since the trial,

he has made no showing that it was not owing to want of due

diligence that he did not acquire it sooner.”). Williams claims that

neither he nor trial counsel were ever “made aware that these

witnesses had any information useful to Mr. Williams, let alone

regarding a possible defense.” However, Anderson and Dora were

known to Williams prior to the shooting, and the record shows that

they both spoke with Williams that night. Indeed, Dora was the one

who ordered Williams’s drinks that night. Given this evidence,

Williams provides no reason as to why he did not, and could not

have, interviewed Anderson and Dora prior to trial and has not

shown that he could not have obtained this evidence prior to trial

through the exercise of due diligence. This claim of error therefore

fails. See Timberlake, 246 Ga. at 491–92 (denying a motion for new

trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence when “[t]here was

no factual showing that this evidence could not have been discovered

by the exercise of ordinary diligence”).

Second, even if we were to accept Williams’s argument that he

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was unable to acquire Anderson’s and Dora’s testimony earlier with

due diligence, Williams has not demonstrated that this testimony is

“so material” that it would have probably produced a different

verdict. Timberlake, 246 Ga. at 491. If Williams’s newly acquired

evidence showed that he involuntarily ingested an intoxicating

substance in the form of a drink that had been drugged without his

knowledge, this would be a far more compelling case. However,

Williams’s evidence falls well short of making that showing. As the

trial court noted in its order denying Williams’s motion for new trial,

Anderson and Dora could not identify the substance allegedly mixed

into Williams’s champagne and could not testify as to whether

Williams wanted that substance mixed into his champagne or how

much of the champagne he drank. Thus, we are left to speculate as

to these issues, and speculation provides no basis for granting a new

trial. Without evidence that Williams involuntarily ingested an

intoxicating substance, there is no basis to conclude that Anderson’s

and Dora’s testimony was so material that it would have probably

produced a different verdict. Further, a defense of involuntary

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intoxication is available only when “the [defendant], because of

involuntary intoxication, did not have sufficient mental capacity to

distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act.” OCGA

§ 16-3-4(a). As the trial court observed in its order denying

Williams’s motion for new trial, Williams’s decision to shoot directly

at the living room’s security camera before shooting Chappell

suggests that he did have sufficient mental capacity to distinguish

between right and wrong because he knew video footage of the

shooting would be incriminating. Anderson’s and Dora’s testimony

is silent on this issue and therefore does nothing to rebut this

evidence. Further, witnesses who observed Williams’s behavior at

Waffle House and at the nightclubs they visited did not believe he

was on drugs. For all of these reasons, Williams has failed to show

that the proffered testimony of Anderson and Dora was so material

that it would have probably produced a different verdict. See Dick v.

State, 248 Ga. 898, 900 (1982) (concluding that newly discovered

evidence in the form of a letter from a co-conspirator stating that the

appellant had been involuntary drugged did not satisfy Timberlake’s

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materiality standard because the appellant “failed to show … how

the alleged consumption of drugs without his knowledge affected his

voluntary behavior”).

3. Williams claims that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury on Williams’s involuntary intoxication defense.

This claim fails.

A defense of involuntary intoxication is available only when

“the [defendant], because of involuntary intoxication, did not have

sufficient mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong

in relation to such act.” OCGA § 16-3-4(a). Generally, there need

only be “slight evidence supporting the theory of the [requested jury]

charge.” McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 863 (2019) (citation omitted).

Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to warrant giving a

charge is generally a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.

Id. Here, although trial counsel requested an involuntary

intoxication charge at trial, the record does not indicate that trial

counsel objected to the trial court’s failure to give this charge. Thus,

this Court reviews the trial court’s decision for plain error. See State

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v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 214 (2016) (applying plain error review to

trial court’s decision not to give a requested jury charge when

defense counsel failed to object to trial court’s decision not to include

that charge).

The test for plain error is comprised of four prongs.

First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of
deviation from a legal rule—that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e.,
affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary
case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally,
if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.

State v. Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 239 (2019) (quoting State v. Kelly,

290 Ga. 29, 33 (2011)). Williams does not demonstrate any error or

defect, much less a clear and obvious error or defect, for the purposes

of plain error review. Williams presented no evidence at trial that

he was involuntarily intoxicated. He presented evidence that he was

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in the bathroom at Waffle House for a long time and that he was

acting strangely before the shooting but he presented no evidence

suggesting that he had involuntarily consumed any substances or

that he lacked sufficient mental capacity to distinguish between

right and wrong at the time of the shooting. Accordingly, the trial

court did not commit any error by refusing to instruct the jury on

involuntary intoxication. Cf. Redding v. State, 311 Ga. 757, 760-61

(2021) (holding that the trial court did not err by not instructing the

jury that appellant had no duty to retreat when no evidence

supported appellant’s claim that the victim was the aggressor).

Further, even if we were to assume that the trial court did err

by not instructing the jury on involuntary intoxication because

Williams presented “slight” evidence of involuntary intoxication,

and even if that error were “clear or obvious,” Williams has not

shown that the trial court’s failure to do so “affected the outcome of

the trial court proceedings” as is required by our plain error

analysis. Johnson, 305 Ga. at 239. Williams was caught shooting

Chappell multiple times on camera while Chappell slept, and

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Williams failed to provide evidence at trial showing what substance

he allegedly consumed and how that substance affected his behavior

that night. Given this, we do not see how the outcome of Williams’s

trial would have been different had the trial court instructed the

jury on involuntary intoxication. See Munn, 313 Ga. at 723

(identifying no plain error in failing to give a justification charge

when appellant’s evidence supporting such a charge was meager and

was strongly undermined by other evidence presented to the jury).

4. Williams argues that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance because he failed to obtain

security footage from Club One Fifty-One from the night of the

incident and from the Waffle House that Williams and Fofana

visited after visiting the nightclubs. Williams alleges that this video

footage would have shown him acting strangely on the night of the

shooting and may have shown someone drugging his drink. Williams

also claims his counsel was ineffective because he failed to call an

expert to testify about the effects that involuntary intoxication may

have had on his behavior. We conclude that both of Williams’s

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ineffective assistance claims fail for the reasons stated below.

A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must

prove deficient performance by his counsel and resulting prejudice.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To prove

deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that “counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. To

establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that, absent

counsel’s error, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome

of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. “A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome,” and the burden on a defendant to prove

this prejudice is a “heavy” one. Eaker v. State, 315 Ga. 202, 206

(2022) (citation omitted). “If either Strickland prong is not met, this

Court need not examine the other prong.” Palmer v. State, 303 Ga.

810, 816 (2018).

(a) Williams argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to obtain surveillance footage from Club One

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Fifty-One and from Waffle House. We disagree.

Williams cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel

because he cannot show that counsel’s alleged errors prejudiced his

defense. A defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice with “mere

‘speculation.’” Arnold v. State, 321 Ga. 434, 449–50 (2025). See also

Martin v. McLaughlin, 298 Ga. 44, 47 (2015) (“[W]ith respect to

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘a silent or ambiguous

record’ is not enough to carry [appellant]’s burden.”); McClarin v.

State, 289 Ga. 180, 182 (2011) (noting that mere speculation cannot

carry a defendant’s burden because it makes it “impossible … to

show there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings

would have been different”).

Williams alleges that his counsel should have obtained video

footage from Club One Fifty-One and Waffle House, but he did not

produce that evidence in connection with his motion for new trial.

With respect to the Waffle House video footage, Williams concedes

on appeal that the footage no longer exists. Even if the footage did

exist, based on Williams’s allegations as to what occurred at Waffle

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House, it would only show Williams disappearing into the bathroom

for an extended period of time and potentially acting strangely in a

manner such that Fofana testified that he could “could see

something was wrong with [Williams].”It would not show him

involuntarily consuming an intoxicating substance or shed any light

on whether he was involuntarily intoxicated. Thus, Williams has not

shown that he was prejudiced by the failure of counsel to obtain the

Waffle House video footage because he cannot show that there is a

“reasonable probability” that the outcome of the trial would have

been different had the footage been obtained. Strickland, 466 US at

694.

Similarly, Williams has failed to show that he was prejudiced

by his counsel’s failure to obtain video footage from Club One Fifty-

One. There is no evidence that was presented to the trial court that

shows what the video footage would have depicted, if it ever existed.

Without such evidence, it is impossible for Williams to show that

there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceedings would

have been different but for counsel’s alleged deficient performance.

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See Woods v. State, 275 Ga. 844, 849-50 (2002) (concluding that

appellant failed to show that counsel’s failure to introduce a

videotape into evidence prejudiced the defense because it was not

possible to determine what the tape depicted, including matters

defendant claimed were critical to his defense).

(b) Williams argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to call an expert to testify as to the effects that

involuntary intoxication may have had on his behavior. However,

Williams did not provide or proffer any testimony from an expert on

involuntary intoxication in connection with his motion for new trial,

and it would be mere speculation for us to assume what such an

expert would have testified to if called at trial. This claim therefore

fails because Williams cannot show prejudice. See Pauldo v. State,

317 Ga. 433, 437 (2023) (“It is well established that a defendant fails

to establish prejudice under Strickland when he merely contends

that trial counsel was deficient for failing to present an expert,

without also presenting evidence at the motion-for-new-trial

hearing about what the potential expert would have testified to at

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trial.”).

combined effect of trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies when

determining whether the requisite prejudice under Strickland has

been shown. See Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 360 (2020) (“The

combined effect of counsel's unprofessional errors must be

considered in assessing whether the requisite prejudice has been

shown.”); Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 226 n.5 (2023) (“[A]ssessing the

cumulative effect of multiple deficiencies on the part of his trial

counsel ... has long been part of the Strickland analysis that governs

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (cleaned up)).

As discussed above, the record contains no evidence that trial

counsel’s alleged errors had any prejudicial effect on Williams’s

defense at trial. For this reason, there is no cumulative prejudice to

consider, and Williams’s claim of cumulative prejudice fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.