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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 21, 2026

S25A1213. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.

LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Russell Williams, who pleaded guilty to malice

murder and other crimes in connection with the beating death of

Marcos Guerra-Lopez, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion

to withdraw his guilty plea. 1 On appeal, Williams argues that the

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1 The crimes occurred on December 7 and 9, 2018. On February 27, 2019,

a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Williams and co-indictees Zarius
Jajuan Williams and Glenda Victoria Carter, individually and as parties to a
crime, for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on armed robbery
(Count 2); felony murder predicated on aggravated battery (Count 3); felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 4); armed robbery (Count 5);
aggravated battery (Counts 6, 10, and 11); aggravated assault (Counts 7, 8, 12,
and 13); and criminal intent to commit armed robbery (Count 9). On April 26,
2023, Williams entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to all counts. The trial
court sentenced Williams to life with the possibility of parole on Counts 1 and
5, to run concurrently; and 20 years in confinement on each of Counts 9–12, to
run concurrently with Count 1. The remaining counts merged or were vacated
by operation of law. On May 4, 2023, Williams was appointed new counsel, and
on May 23, 2023, counsel filed a motion to withdraw Williams’s guilty plea. On
March 12, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, and
the trial court entered an order denying the motion on May 1, 2025. Williams
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, and the case was docketed in this
Court to the August 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea

because (1) he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally

waive the rights mentioned in Boykin; 2 and (2) his plea counsel was

constitutionally ineffective by coercing him to enter a guilty plea. As

explained below, these claims fail. Accordingly, we affirm the trial

court’s denial of Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

However, because the trial court committed sentencing errors, we

remand the case to correct the sentence.

Williams’s trial began on April 24, 2023. On the third day of

trial, Williams’s co-indictee and brother, Zarius, testified against

him, and Williams’s other co-indictee, Carter, was scheduled to

testify after Zarius. 3 However, after Zarius testified, Williams

decided to enter a plea. The trial court then conducted a plea

hearing, and during the hearing, the prosecutor recited the following

facts4: On December 7, 2018, Guerra-Lopez went to an apartment,

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2 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238 (1969).
3 Prior to Williams’s trial, Zarius and Carter both pleaded guilty and

were sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.
4 The record does not include any testimony from Williams’s trial. As

such, this factual background is limited to the facts offered in the prosecutor’s
2
where he expected to meet Carter. When Guerra-Lopez arrived,

Williams and Zarius were hiding in a closet. Williams and Zarius,

who was armed with a bat, repeatedly struck Guerra-Lopez, who

later died from blunt-force trauma to the head. Williams, Zarius,

and Carter then stole a cell phone and money from Guerra-Lopez.

Williams, Carter, and Zarius left the apartment and used the

stolen money to buy food. Williams later invited another person,

Simon Fuentes, to the same apartment where Guerra-Lopez was

killed. When Fuentes arrived at the apartment on December 9, 2018,

Williams held a knife to Fuentes’s throat while Zarius hit Fuentes

with a bat. Fuentes fought back and escaped the apartment, drove

away, and got help. Law enforcement subsequently apprehended

Williams and found a knife, Guerra-Lopez’s wallet, and Guerra-

Lopez’s identification card in Williams’s vehicle. Law enforcement

also recovered Guerra-Lopez’s phone, which was found in the hotel

room where the suspects were apprehended.

During the plea hearing, Williams testified that he understood

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proffer from the guilty plea hearing.
3
the charges that he was facing. The State then asked the following

questions:

[PROSECUTOR]: Do you understand that there are
certain rights that you’re entitled to have and by coming
forward and entering a plea of guilty you’re essentially
waiving those rights? Those rights include the right to a
trial by jury, the right to be presumed innocent, the right
to confront any witnesses against you, the right to
subpoena witnesses for your defense, the right to testify
yourself as well as offer any other evidence, the right to
have an attorney assist you throughout trial, and the
right to not incriminate yourself. Do you understand that
you’re waiving those rights today?

[WILLIAMS]: (No response.)

[Whereupon an off-the-record discussion was held
between Williams and his counsel.]

After Williams spoke to his plea counsel,5 the trial judge

advised Williams that the trial court would not “mind continuing on

with this trial to its conclusion” but that Williams’s plea counsel

indicated Williams wanted to enter a plea. The following exchange

then occurred:

[TRIAL JUDGE]: If you don’t want to do that, that’s fine,
let’s continue on with the trial. If you want to do that, I’m
going to need you to listen carefully to the questions that
—————————————————————
5 Williams’s plea counsel also represented Williams during his jury trial.

4
are being asked of you, and I’m going to need you to
answer loudly so that everyone can hear and that we can
make a record of these proceedings. Do you understand
me?

[WILLIAMS]: Yes, sir. Yes, your Honor.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: In fact, do you want to go ahead and
enter a plea of guilty to these charges?

[WILLIAMS]: It’s in my best interest, Judge.

The trial judge asked the prosecutor if the State would accept

an Alford6 plea, and the prosecutor indicated that the State was

willing to do so. The trial judge then described the nature of an

Alford plea and again asked Williams if he wanted to continue with

a “best-interest plea,” to which Williams responded, “Yes, sir.”

Following that response, the prosecutor asked Williams, “Do you

understand that if you were to plead not guilty or [do] not enter a

plea at all then we would go ahead and proceed with the jury trial?”

Williams responded, “Yes, ma’am.” The prosecutor then detailed the

following on the record: (1) the minimum and maximum

—————————————————————
6 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 US 25 (1970).

5
punishments for each of the charges that Williams was facing; (2)

the nature of a non-negotiated guilty plea in which the trial judge

determines the sentence; and (3) the possible conditions of probation

if the trial judge were to include probation in the sentence. For all

three, Williams stated that he understood.

Next, the prosecutor asked Williams if “anyone forced

[Williams] or promised [Williams] anything in exchange for entering

this plea of guilty here today?” Williams responded, “Yes,” and the

prosecutor then asked, “Someone has forced you to enter a plea of

guilty?” Williams again responded, “Yes.” The trial judge

interjected, stating the following:

Okay. Sir, basically, we have got to have a plea that you
are doing of your own free will. I understand that things
have changed here in the courtroom during the course of
the trial, but I cannot accept a plea that somebody says is
being forced upon them. This has to be your decision and
your decision alone. So if your response is that somebody
is forcing you to enter this plea, then we’re going to need
to continue on with the trial of this case.

Williams and his plea counsel then had another off-the-record

conversation, and when it concluded, the following exchange

6
occurred:

[PLEA COUNSEL]: Are you being forced to enter this
plea?

[WILLIAMS]: I’m good, Judge.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: I’m sorry?

[WILLIAMS]: I’m good.

[PLEA COUNSEL]: Well, you haven’t answered the
question. Are you being forced to enter the plea?

[WILLIAMS]: No.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: Okay. So, Mr. Williams, I want there to
be a record of what’s going on here today. Other than what
is going on in terms of the evidence that has been
produced in this case, is anyone or anything forcing you
to enter this plea or putting pressure on you to enter this
plea?

[WILLIAMS]: No.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: And is this your decision to enter a best-
interest plea of guilty to all 13 counts of the indictment?

[WILLIAMS]: (No response.)

[PLEA COUNSEL]: You need to answer the question.

[Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held
between Williams and his counsel.]

7
[TRIAL JUDGE]: Is that your decision?

[PLEA COUNSEL]: You have to answer the judge’s
question.

[WILLIAMS]: Yes, Judge.

Following that exchange, the prosecutor asked Williams if he

was satisfied with his plea counsel, and Williams indicated that he

was. Williams and his plea counsel then had another off-the-record

conversation. Afterwards, Williams affirmed that he had enough

time to speak to his plea counsel and that he was entering the guilty

plea both freely and voluntarily. The prosecutor then reiterated the

nature of an Alford plea and asked Williams if he wanted to proceed

with the Alford plea, to which Williams responded, “Yes, ma’am.”

The prosecutor also detailed Williams’s appellate and habeas corpus

rights, and Williams affirmed that he understood those rights.

After argument from plea counsel, Williams made a statement

to the trial judge, which included the following remarks: “I just want

to let you know, your Honor, that I’m not a murderer. I’m not who

they’re trying to accuse me of being.” The following exchange then

8
occurred:

[TRIAL JUDGE]: So, Mr. Williams, we are here in trial.
It’s now 12:40 on the third day of trial. The jury is still in
the deliberation room, expecting to come back here and
continue with the trial of the case, if that’s what you want.
Do you understand what I just told you?

[WILLIAMS]: Yes, your Honor.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: And we’ve had some discussions. We’ve
cleared the courtroom so that you could speak with your
stepfather after your brother, Zarius Williams, gave his
testimony. And you had that opportunity, correct?

[WILLIAMS]: Yes, your Honor.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: So this is your opportunity at this point
in time to basically continue on with the trial, if that’s
what you want to do. Do, in fact, you want to continue on
with this trial?

[WILLIAMS]: No, your Honor.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: Do you need any more time to talk to
your attorney before we conclude this matter?

[WILLIAMS]: Yes, your Honor, if that’s all right with the
Court.

The trial judge asked Williams if he would like to speak to his

plea counsel in the back of the courtroom. Williams indicated he

would, but while the trial judge was arranging to clear the back of

9
the courtroom, Williams’s plea counsel said, “Judge, he said he

didn’t need any more time.” The trial judge asked Williams if he was

sure, and the trial transcript reflects that Williams nodded his head.

The following exchange then occurred:

[TRIAL JUDGE]: I want you -- I want you to have as much
time as you need, Mr. Williams, because this is an
important decision. So if you need more time, I’m willing
to give you that time. Do you need more time to talk to
your attorney?

[WILLIAMS]: We can proceed, your Honor.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: Do you need more time to talk to your
attorney?

[WILLIAMS]: No, your Honor.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: Are you sure?

[WILLIAMS]: Yes, sir.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: Do you want me to accept your plea as
a best-interest plea?

[WILLIAMS]: Yes, your Honor.

[TRIAL JUDGE]: Do you have any questions or concerns
about entering that plea?

[WILLIAMS]: No, your Honor.

10
The trial judge accepted Williams’s guilty plea, determining it

was “freely, voluntarily, and intelligently entered based upon the

responses [Williams had] given to the questions that were asked of

[Williams].” After sentencing Williams, the trial judge asked

Williams if he had any questions concerning the sentence, and

Williams stated that he did not.

Following entry of the final disposition, Williams, represented

by new counsel, timely filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In

the motion, Williams claimed that withdrawal should be permitted

because (1) he did not waive the rights mentioned in Boykin, (2) his

plea counsel was ineffective, and (3) his plea was not voluntary. At

a hearing on Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, both

Williams and his plea counsel testified.

Williams’s plea counsel testified that, when the trial stopped

and the plea hearing commenced, he believed there was sufficient

evidence to convict Williams. According to plea counsel, Williams

“didn’t want to enter the plea when [they] were having discussions

initially” and “continually maintained that he was not a murderer.”

11
Plea counsel then explained to Williams that, “under the law as a

party to a crime,” Williams would probably be convicted “because

the evidence was overwhelming.” Plea counsel testified that he

believed it was in Williams’s best interest to enter a plea, but

Williams did not want to enter a plea and felt pressure to do so.

Nevertheless, plea counsel confirmed that the decision to enter a

plea ultimately belonged to and was made by Williams.

Plea counsel also testified that he had represented criminal

defendants in over 100 jury trials and had handled thousands of

guilty pleas. Additionally, before trial, Williams received a mental

evaluation and was determined to be competent to stand trial. Plea

counsel reviewed all the discovery and discussed the case with

Williams prior to trial, and plea counsel noted that he found

Williams to be “thoughtful and intelligent.” At trial, after Zarius

testified and inculpated Williams, plea counsel told Williams, “[I]t’s

over.”

Plea counsel further testified that, in his conversation with

Williams at the plea hearing, he never threatened or physically

12
touched Williams, and he did not force Williams to enter a plea. Plea

counsel also stated that, when discussing the plea with Williams, he

understood Williams’s “position” regarding the plea but noted that

Williams’s “position [wa]s not supported by the law [related to party-

to-a-crime].” Plea counsel testified that Williams “didn’t seem

confused, just more so, you know, really apprehensive and, you

know, remorseful that it had gotten this far.” Plea counsel said he

was confident Williams understood the nature of a guilty plea,

despite his reluctance to enter a plea.

Following the testimony from Williams’s plea counsel,

Williams testified at the plea hearing as follows: After Zarius

testified at trial, Williams was reluctant to enter a plea, but his plea

counsel was “forceful” and “overbearing” in “pressuring” him to do

so. Williams affirmed that his plea counsel spoke to him in a “harsh

manner,” but Williams denied that plea counsel ever used “profane

language” towards him. Williams testified that he did not want to

enter the plea because he did not believe he was a murderer, and he

felt “coerced” to enter a plea. Williams indicated that, when he

13
entered the plea, he did not understand that he was waiving his

right against self-incrimination, right to question witnesses, and

right to remain silent. Williams testified that he did not voluntarily

enter his plea, and he would have continued with trial if not for his

plea counsel’s actions.

However, Williams also conceded that he recalled (1) telling the

trial judge that it was in his “best interest” to enter a plea; (2)

hearing the maximum penalties for each charge; and (3) and hearing

the trial judge say that the court was prepared to continue with the

trial. When asked whether he recalled telling the trial judge that he

was not being forced to enter a plea, Williams responded: “Yeah. I

only said that because [plea counsel] didn’t want to continue on with

the trial. He already said that he didn’t want to fight the case. He

said the case was over with. He said he really didn’t want to be here.”

Williams testified that, when asked at the plea hearing if he

was being forced to enter a plea, his response was initially “yes,” but

he later changed it to “no” because his plea counsel was “trying to

get [him] to sign [the plea form],” which he reluctantly signed. When

14
asked at the motion hearing if he was satisfied with the services of

his plea counsel, Williams testified, “I guess so.”

The trial court subsequently denied Williams’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, concluding as follows: “Prior to entering

his guilty plea, [Williams] was appropriately advised of his rights

and the [trial court] found that he understood those rights. The

testimony presented during [the] hearing does not cause the [trial

court] to alter its conclusion.”

1. Williams argues on appeal that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because

he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally waive the rights

listed in Boykin. This claim fails. 7

“After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea

only to correct a manifest injustice.” Hood v. State, 315 Ga. 809, 812

—————————————————————
7 Williams raises additional arguments for the first time in his reply

briefs, but “[a]n appellant who raises an argument for the first time in a reply
brief is not entitled to have that argument considered.” City of Atlanta v. Mays,
301 Ga. 367, 372 (2017); see also Williams v. State, 307 Ga. 689, 689 n.2 (2020).

15
(2023). We have said that “withdrawal is necessary to correct a

manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective

assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or

without an understanding of the nature of the charges.” Id. (citation

omitted).

“[A] guilty plea is valid as a matter of federal constitutional law

if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent

under the totality of the circumstances.” Green v. State, 318 Ga. 610,

636 (2024). “A voluntary and intelligent guilty plea is one that is

made of the defendant’s own choice with sufficient awareness of the

relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 615–16

(quotation marks omitted). Such relevant circumstances and likely

consequences typically “include the nature of the charge to which

the defendant is admitting guilt, the factual basis of the charge, the

punishment to which the plea will expose him, the terms of any

negotiated agreement with the government, and the rights the

defendant will waive by entering the plea.” Id. at 616.

We have explained that, “[w]hen reviewing a trial court’s

16
determination that a defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary,

we review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but the

ultimate determination is reviewed de novo.” Harris v. State, 319

Ga. 133, 137 (2024). And we will not disturb a trial court’s decision

on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “absent an obvious abuse of

discretion.” Wright v. State, 314 Ga. 355, 358 (2022) (quotation

marks omitted). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in

denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea if the record supports

the trial court’s determination that a plea was made knowingly,

intelligently, voluntarily, and without coercion.” Powell v. State, 309

Ga. 523, 524–25 (2020).

Here, the record shows that Williams entered a voluntary and

intelligent guilty plea. As the trial court found, Williams “was

appropriately advised of his rights and … understood those rights”

prior to entering his guilty plea. The trial court’s conclusion is

supported by the record, which shows that, at the plea hearing, the

prosecutor described the factual basis for the plea as well as the

rights that Williams would waive by pleading guilty; Williams

17
affirmed that he understood the nature of the charges to which he

was pleading guilty, the minimum and maximum punishments for

each of those charges, and the nature of a non-negotiated guilty plea;

and Williams was allowed to speak to his plea counsel at five

different points. Further, the trial court engaged in multiple

colloquies with Williams to ensure that he wanted to enter a plea

instead of continuing with the trial. During one of these colloquies,

after Williams initially indicated that he was being forced to enter a

plea, the trial court probed further, and Williams denied that anyone

was forcing or pressuring him to enter a guilty plea. Additionally,

Williams confirmed that he was entering his plea freely and

voluntarily, and he told the trial court that it was in his best interest

to enter a guilty plea. Thus, although Williams may have been

hesitant to enter a guilty plea, the record shows that, under the

totality of the circumstances, his plea was intelligently and

voluntarily entered. See Green, 318 Ga. at 636.

Williams also argues that the record does not affirmatively

show that he waived the rights mentioned in Boykin, and the trial

18
court therefore abused its discretion in denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. This argument is unpersuasive. We have

explained that the failure to advise an accused of the rights listed in

Boykin “does not require the reversal of a guilty plea where the

longstanding intelligent and voluntary standard has otherwise been

met.” Green, 318 Ga. at 637 (quotation marks omitted). Moreover,

the record shows that Williams was advised of these rights despite

his non-response after the prosecutor asked whether he understood

that he would be waiving those rights by pleading guilty. And, as set

forth above, the record shows that Williams’s guilty plea was

voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. As

such, Williams has not shown that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the

basis that he did not affirmatively waive the rights listed in Boykin

on the record at the plea hearing.

2. Williams also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to withdraw his plea on the basis that his plea

counsel was constitutionally ineffective by coercing him to enter a

19
guilty plea. This claim fails.

As noted above, “[a]fter sentencing, a defendant may withdraw

his guilty plea only to correct a manifest injustice,” Hood, 315 Ga. at

812, and “[i]neffectiveness of counsel can constitute manifest

injustice requiring that a defendant be allowed to withdraw his

plea.” Powell, 309 Ga. at 526. To establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Williams “must show both that his plea

counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that the

deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Wright, 314 Ga. at

357 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984)).

“To meet the first prong of the Strickland test,” Williams “must

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell

within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that

counsel’s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Hood, 315 Ga. at 812 (quotation marks

omitted). For the second prong of the Strickland test, Williams

“must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

20
have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 813. As we have explained,

“where the defendant is unable to establish that counsel performed

deficiently, the inquiry ends, and it is not incumbent upon this Court

to examine the prejudice prong.” Goodwin v. State, 319 Ga. 842, 845

(2024).

Further, “[t]his Court accepts a trial court’s factual findings

and credibility determinations on an ineffectiveness claim unless

they are clearly erroneous, but we apply legal principles to the facts

de novo.” Powell, 309 Ga. at 526–27. “And in the absence of explicit

factual and credibility findings by the trial court, we presume

implicit findings were made supporting the trial court’s decision.”

Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 430, 432–33 (2019).

Here, Williams has not shown that his plea counsel was

deficient. Williams asserts on appeal that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because his plea counsel “spoke to [him]

harshly, argued with him, raised his voice, and used curse words in

directing him to take the plea, causing [him] to be coerced into

entering the plea of guilty while under duress.” In his testimony at

21
the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Williams

stated that his plea counsel “was constantly pressuring [him] just to

sign this plea that [he] was reluctant to sign.” Williams further

testified that this pressure was “overbearing” and “forceful” because

Williams “didn’t want to sign [the plea agreement].” However,

Williams also denied that his plea counsel used “profane language.”

When plea counsel testified at the hearing, he stated that he

“never forced [Williams] to enter a plea,” and he was confident that

Williams understood the nature of a guilty plea despite Williams’s

reluctance to enter a plea. Additionally, although plea counsel

testified that he “fuss[ed] at” and “argue[d] with” Williams; was

“forceful” in his position regarding the plea; likely raised his voice;

and “may have cursed” during the conversation, plea counsel stated

that he did not threaten or physically touch Williams. And, while

plea counsel indicated that he believed it was in Williams’s best

interest to enter a plea, he also stated that it was ultimately

Williams’s decision whether or not to do so.

Thus, in denying Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

22
it is clear that the trial court implicitly credited plea counsel’s

testimony over Williams’s in finding that plea counsel’s

representation was not constitutionally deficient, and our review of

the record supports this implicit finding. See Goodwin, 319 Ga. at

845 (noting that the trial court was entitled to disbelieve the

defendant’s testimony and to credit plea counsel’s testimony).

Moreover, to the extent Williams argues that he was coerced into

pleading guilty because his plea counsel “spoke to [him] harshly,

argued with him, raised his voice, and used curse words,” Williams

does not cite any Georgia cases supporting this proposition, and we

have found none. 8 The record shows that Williams entered his plea

freely and voluntarily—without coercion. Accordingly, the trial

court did not err in concluding that Williams’s plea counsel was not

ineffective and denying Williams’s motion to withdraw his plea on

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8 For this argument, Williams does not cite any legal authority other

than Rules 1.4 and 2.1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in
Bar Rule 4-102(d). As we have explained, however, “[a]n ethics violation ... does
not necessarily establish a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.” Moore v. State,
306 Ga. 532, 537 (2019) (citing Blackshear v. State, 274 Ga. 842, 843 (2002)).
Although “compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct should always
be maintained, attorney discipline for a violation of those Rules is not before
us.” Green v. State, 299 Ga. 337, 342 (2016).
23
this basis. As such, this claim fails.

3. Although Williams did not raise an issue with his sentence

on appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing

Williams on Counts 11 and 12, and because the sentencing error

penalizes Williams, we exercise our discretion to correct the error.

See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (2017) (“For this reason, an

exercise of our discretion on direct appeal to correct a merger error

that harms a defendant (but of which he has not complained) may

avoid unnecessary habeas proceedings and thereby promotes

judicial economy.”). Here, the trial court sentenced Williams for the

aggravated battery of Fuentes (Counts 10 and 11) and the

aggravated assault of Fuentes (Count 12). Because the injuries

sustained by Fuentes—as alleged in Counts 10 through 13 of the

indictment—occurred during a single, uninterrupted act, Counts 11

and 12 should have merged with Count 10.9 See Douglas v. State,

303 Ga. 178, 183 (2018) (concluding that two counts of aggravated

battery and one count of aggravated assault should have merged

—————————————————————
9 The trial court properly merged Count 13 with Count 10 at sentencing.

24
because the “injuries were sustained by one victim during a single,

uninterrupted criminal act”). We therefore vacate Williams’s

convictions and sentences on Counts 11 and 12. See id.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur.