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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 17, 2026

S25A1158. CHAPPLE v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Johnny Chapple appeals his convictions for felony murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Latoria

Waller.1 At trial, the chief issue was whether Chapple shot and

killed Waller or whether, as Chapple asserted in defense, Waller

1 The crimes occurred on February 15, 2022, and on March 22, 2022, a

Baldwin County grand jury indicted Chapple for malice murder, two counts of
felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. After a jury trial that ended on April 6, 2023, the jury found
Chapple not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the remaining counts. On
April 6, 2023, the trial court sentenced Chapple to life in prison without the
possibility of parole on the felony murder verdict predicated on aggravated
assault and to ten consecutive years in prison for the firearm offense. The other
felony murder count was vacated by operation of law and the aggravated
assault count was merged for sentencing purposes. On April 26, 2023, Chapple
filed a motion for new trial, which he amended with new appellate counsel on
November 5, 2024. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended,
on March 26, 2025. Chapple filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was
docketed to this Court’s August 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
shot herself with a 9mm handgun and then placed the handgun in

the bottom drawer of a dresser before she became incapacitated. On

appeal, Chapple contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motion in limine to exclude expert testimony, that the trial court

erred in applying an incorrect standard when ruling on his motion

in limine, that the trial court erred in overruling his continuing

witness objection, and that his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

1. The evidence at trial showed that in February 2022, Chapple

and Waller were in a relationship and residing together in

Milledgeville, Georgia. On February 15, 2022, around 2:46 a.m., an

officer with the Milledgeville Police Department responded to their

home regarding a call that shots had been fired. He found Waller

lying motionless and unresponsive on the floor of a bedroom. Waller

was taken to a local emergency room, where she died from a gunshot

wound to the heart. The door to the bedroom, which had a large

crack in it and a scuff mark on it, was off its hinges, and was laying

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on the floor in front of a dresser. A witness who left the house that

night at about 1:30 a.m. testified that, before she left, she had gone

to Waller’s bedroom, did not remember the door being off its hinges,

and thought that she would have remembered if she had seen it in

that condition.

Chapple’s brother, Carlos Simmons, and his wife, Savallia Bell,

were in a back bedroom of the house at the time of the shooting.

Chapple came into their bedroom, woke them up, and said, “[c]all 9-

1-1. She’s been shot.” Chapple never said that Waller had shot

herself, and he did not come to their bedroom at any time before he

told them that Waller had been shot. Chapple then ran out the front

door of the house and down the road, but subsequently returned to

the house. Shortly after the shooting, a law enforcement officer

encountered Chapple in the street in front of his house, and Chapple

told him that he had heard a gunshot but had not seen a gun. Later

that same morning in an interview at the police station, Chapple

told a different officer that Waller “jumped on him” and slapped him

and that he told her that he was going to “[p]ack his s**t up and

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leave.” He also told the officer that he then went and talked with

Bell and that, while he was walking back to his bedroom, he heard

the sound of someone falling in the bedroom, but that he never heard

a gunshot.

A few days after Waller’s death, Chapple’s wife, from whom he

had been separated for some time, was invited by Chapple’s and

Waller’s landlord to go to the house and collect whatever of

Chapple’s belongings that she wanted. Chapple’s wife went to the

house with her mother and nephew. The mother testified that she

was searching for Chapple’s W-2 form when she saw a red notebook

in a nightstand in Chapple and Waller’s bedroom, where Waller was

shot. When she looked inside the notebook, the mother saw an

undated letter, which she described as “sad.” During the mother’s

direct examination, the prosecutor read the letter into evidence. It

said, among other things, that Waller knew that she had

“disappointed” her mother; that she was “sorry from [her] heart”;

that her father did not show her love because he put other things

“before [her]”; that she loved her uncle who had died in 2020 and

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missed him, but that she was “on the way”; that she had “found a

better place” and would see them “when [they] got there.” One of

Waller’s co-workers, Amanda Tipton, as well as Chapple’s brother,

Simmons, and his sister, Jamie Chapple, testified that they

recognized the handwriting in the letter as that of Waller, while Bell

testified that it was not Waller’s handwriting. GBI Agent Amelia

Maddox testified that she and another agent spent three and a half

hours searching Chapple and Waller’s bedroom for evidence on the

day of the shooting and they did not find a notebook or any written

documents when they searched the nightstand

Jamie Chapple testified about Waller’s mental condition,

saying that, in November 2021, she had a conversation with Waller

in which Waller told her that she “felt like she was in this by herself”

and that “no one really cared when she really needed them” and

that, on another occasion, Waller told her that she felt “ready to go

sometimes.” On the other hand, Tipton testified that on February

14, when she and Waller drove to and from work together, Waller

was like she was “any other day,” “smiling, calm, humble” and

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“happy.” Latonya Chapple, who testified that she was close to

Waller, testified that she spoke with Waller by phone about 10:00

p.m. on Valentine’s Day, that Waller was “happy, she was laughing,

having fun,” and that she and Waller made plans to get together the

next day to celebrate the birthday of Latonya’s daughter.. When

asked if Waller seemed depressed on Valentine’s night, Bell

responded, “No. Always happy. She was happy.” In addition, another

witness who arrived at Chapple and Waller’s home about 9:30 p.m.

on Valentine’s Day said that she and Waller had fun making some

videos that night, discussed going to work the next day, and

exchanged phone numbers.

There was evidence admitted at trial that Waller and Chapple

had a sometimes tumultuous relationship. One of Chapple’s friends

testified that Chapple and Waller argued “all the time” and that he

had seen Chapple and Waller push each other. Bell added that she

was aware that Chapple and Waller had arguments and conflicts.

And Waller’s aunt, Sonia Simmons, who was very close to Waller,

testified that, during the summer of 2021, Waller called her and was

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“crying” and “upset.” Waller told her Chapple was hitting her and

asked Simmons to come get her, which she did.

Agent Maddox also testified that during her search of Chapple

and Waller’s bedroom she found a 9mm handgun in the “bottom

right-hand drawer” of a dresser and a 9mm cartridge casing on the

bed. Forensic evidence showed that the cartridge casing, as well as

the bullet taken from Waller’s body during the autopsy, were fired

from the 9mm handgun. In addition, Agent Maddox testified that

Waller’s black nightgown had a small circular bullet hole in it. She

added that, if the gunshot that caused the defect had been a press

contact or close-contact gunshot, she would have expected to see a

much bigger defect in the fabric. The agent further testified that she

examined Waller’s black nightgown with infrared photography,

explaining that she did not find any soot or stippling on Waller’s

nightgown, adding that this “meant that this was not a close range

or contact gunshot wound, which means that it had to be further

than about 18 inches” to two feet. In addition to the infrared light

testing of the nightgown, Agent Maddox used a “BlueClue

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presumptive gunpowder particle test,” to search for gunpowder

particles on Waller’s nightgown. That test was negative. Because of

the lack of “any sort of soot” and “any sort of stippling,” and because

the defect in the fabric was “so clean and circular,” “identical” to

what happened when she would shoot at “the range from three yards

away,” Agent Maddox concluded the gunshot to Waller’s chest “was

not close range,” “not contact,” and not “self-inflicted.”

GBI Special Agent Bryan Smith did not examine Waller’s black

polyester nightgown for gunpowder deposits, but he testified, over

Chapple’s objection, that he fired a 9mm handgun into black

polyester fabric while in contact with the fabric and from distances

of three, six, nine, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four inches and then

examined the fabric using infrared photography to determine

whether he could detect gunpowder particles, soot, or stippling in

the fabric. Agent Smith testified that the contact shot created “a lot

of tearing” in the fabric, which was consistent with a “contact range

gunshot.” He added contact gunshots were “most commonly” seen in

suicide cases and that the contact gunshot did not leave “soot” on

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the fabric because, with a contact gunshot, “there’s no gap” for gases

from the gunshot “to come out.” He added that, as the 9mm handgun

was fired farther from the fabric, the gases and soot from the

gunshot dissipated and did not go into the hole in the fabric, causing

a more circular hole in the fabric than the contact gunshot and

leaving a “soot ring” on the fabric that grew wider and fainter with

distance and disappeared entirely when the gunshot originated

twenty-four inches from the fabric.

Forensic testing showed that both Waller and Chapple had

gunshot residue on their hands, and the crime lab employee who

conducted those tests testified that he was not surprised that

gunshot residue appeared on Waller’s hands, as gunshot residue can

extend up to five to ten feet in the direction of the gunfire.

The medical examiner testified that the bullet that struck

Waller entered the top of Waller’s left chest and traveled at a

downward angle about 24 inches, from left to right and front to back,

lodging on the back, right side of her body. He added that he

examines gunshot wounds to determine whether they were a contact

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wound; a close-range wound, meaning that the gun is fired from just

off the surface of the skin to six inches from the surface; an

intermediate wound, meaning that the gun is fired from about six

inches to three feet from the skin; or an indeterminate wound, where

there is no evidence of any of the previous classifications. The

medical examiner testified that Waller’s wound was not a contact

wound because there was “no searing” or “muzzle impression.”

There was also no evidence of a close-range wound on Waller due to

the absence of soot and searing, and the wound was not an

intermediate one, as there was an absence of stippling. Due to the

absence of features of contact, close range, or intermediate range

wounds, the medical examiner concluded that Waller’s wound was

of indeterminate range. In response to questioning from defense

counsel, the medical examiner agreed that Waller’s gunshot wound

was not “immediately incapacitating”; that she would “have been

able to move around a little bit after she was shot”; and that it was

“possible” that Waller would have been “able to lean forward and

put the gun in the drawer,” explaining that she would have had

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about ten seconds to do so. The medical examiner also admitted that

he had seen one case in which a person shot himself and put the gun

in a drawer before falling over, but he added that he had performed

over 1,000 autopsies and could only give one such example. When

defense counsel asked if it was reasonable to characterize this case

as a suicide, the medical examiner said, it was “possible,” but that

his “strong concern would be the absence of any evidence of close-

range firing” and that “based on [his] experience, [he] would expect

to see something.” Finally, the medical examiner testified that he

concluded that the case was a homicide, “[b]ased primarily on the

physical findings, direction of the wound track, [and] the absence of

any features of close or intermediate range firing.”

2. Chapple contends that the trial court improperly permitted

Agent Smith to testify as an expert under the Daubert 2 standard and

OCGA § 24-7-702(b) about his use of infrared photography to test

2 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

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black polyester fabric for gunpowder particles, soot, or stippling. 3 We

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

With the amendment of OCGA § 24-7-702 in 2022, “the General

Assembly extended to criminal cases the federal standard of

admissibility of expert testimony articulated in Daubert ... and its

progeny.” Arnold v. State, 321 Ga. 434, 451 (2025) (quotation marks

omitted).

In determining the admissibility of expert testimony
under the Daubert standard, the trial court acts as a
gatekeeper, assessing both the witness qualifications to
testify in a particular area of expertise and the relevancy
and reliability of the proffered testimony. And the trial
court examines reliability through a consideration of
many factors, including whether a theory or technique
can be tested, whether it has been subjected to peer
review and publication, the known or potential rate of
error for the theory or technique, the general degree of
acceptance in the relevant scientific or professional
community, and the expert’s range of experience and
training.

3 We have recently explained that “OCGA § 24-7-702 was amended in

2022 to apply in all proceedings rather than only in all civil proceedings” and
that “[w]ith that amendment … the General Assembly extended to criminal
cases the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony articulated in
Daubert ... and its progeny.” Arnold v. State, 321 Ga. 434, 451 (2025) (quotation
marks omitted).

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Id. “The determination of whether a witness is qualified to render

an opinion as an expert is a legal determination for the trial court

and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that Agent Smith’s testimony

satisfied the requirements of Daubert and OCGA § 24-7-702(b).

Before trial, the State notified Chapple that it would seek to

introduce expert testimony through Agent Smith related to the use

of infrared photography to detect gunshot soot, particles, and

residue on black polyester clothing, like the nightgown worn by

Waller at the time of her death. Chapple moved to exclude the

testimony, and the trial court held a pre-trial hearing on the matter.

At that hearing, Agent Smith testified that he had extensively

studied the use of infrared light sources, that he has taught others

at the GBI to use infrared and alternate light sources, and that he

had conducted “at least 80 to 100 infrared light source examinations

of evidence.” He explained the technique for using infrared lighting

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to discover gunpowder deposits, said that it is the primary tool for

examining “dark-colored fabrics for gunpowder deposits,” and added

that the technique he uses is the one used by others in the field.

Agent Smith testified that “there’s a wealth of research on infrared

light sources being used to identify gunpowder deposits and blood

going probably back to the mid ‘80s at least”; that he stayed current

“with those peer reviews and publications”; and that the work that

he did in this case was “consistent with the publications and

research.” According to Smith, the GBI had used infrared lighting

on denim and cotton fabric but had not used infrared lighting on

polyester fabric. Agent Smith testified that “there’s no doubt that

gunpowder particles, whether it’s on polyester, cotton, metal,

whatever, will still absorb light.” He explained that infrared

photography washes out dark materials so that the material looks

white and that “[i]t was just a question of whether polyester would

absorb light, or refract light, or reflect light” to create a washed out

background on which he could see the gunpowder particles. He

added that his experiment showed that polyester “did absorb light

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to wash out the background and look almost white or gray like cotton

and other substances.” Smith added that the technique he used to

conduct those tests was generally accepted within the scientific

community and that his experiments were in line with best practices

in the field of study and nationally accepted.

In denying Chapple’s motion in limine, the trial court found

that, “following the analysis of [Rule] 702 as it’s amplified by

Daubert,” Agent Smith’s testimony was relevant and reliable; that

his “scientific or technical knowledge is going to help the trier of fact

understand the evidence at issue”; and “that the testimony will be

based on sufficient facts or data,” as “[t]his appears to be an

empirical test based on the science as it has been applied routinely

in this area.” The court also explained

that Agent Smith’s testimony appears to be based on …
sufficient facts or data that he was able to discern based
on his learnings as well as the ones he collected himself.
That testimony that is presented appears to be the
product of reliable principles and methods. As I said
earlier, this area of inquiry, this discipline appears to be
settled and clear. Finally, the expert appears to have
reliably applied the principles to the facts of this case, or
at least to a limited subset of facts in this case, which

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could be relevant or helpful to the trier of fact.

The trial court’s ruling demonstrates that “it applied the applicable

standard in this case, assessing both the witness’s qualifications to

testify in a particular area of expertise and the relevancy and

reliability of the proffered testimony.” Arnold, 321 Ga. at 453

(quotation marks and punctuation omitted).4 Chapple contends,

however, that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting

Agent Smith’s testimony, contending that the evidence at the

hearing showed that his testimony was unreliable because he had

not used infrared photography on polyester fabric to identify soot,

stippling, and gunpowder residue. However, based on Agent Smith’s

4 Chapple also enumerates as error that the trial court applied the
former standard set forth in Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519 (1982), for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, instead of the current
standard of Daubert and OCGA § 24-7-702(b). Chapple bases this claim on a
statement by the trial court at the hearing on the motion in limine regarding
whether Harper or Daubert was the more lenient standard. However, as the
above discussion illustrates, the trial court correctly applied Daubert and
OCGA § 24-7-702(b) in this case. See Garrison v. State, 319 Ga. 711, 725–26
(2024) (explaining “that we appear not yet to have expressly analyzed the
extent to which the Daubert standard and the former Harper standard differ”
and declining to analyze the differences in the standards in that case, “other
than to clarify that they are not the same”). Accordingly, this separate
enumeration lacks merit.
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testimony that infrared photography is designed to wash out colors

so that dark materials look white and that his experiment was

conducted according to best practices in the field and nationally

accepted standards, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in finding that Agent Smith’s testimony was reliable.

Moreover, contrary to Chapple’s contention, although Agent Smith

did not conduct his tests with the murder weapon and a piece of

fabric from the victim’s polyester nightgown, the test was

nevertheless adjusted to the facts of this case, which involved a fatal

gunshot wound with a 9mm handgun through a black polyester

nightgown. Again, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting Agent Smith’s testimony under Daubert and

OCGA § 24-7-702(b). See Arnold, 321 Ga. at 452-453 (concluding

that the trial court applied the correct standard in assessing an

expert’s qualifications to testify and thus did not abuse its discretion

in admitting the testimony).

3. Chapple contends that the trial court erred by overruling his

continuing witness objection and permitting three crime lab reports

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to go out with the deliberating jury. More specifically, he contends

that the court erred in sending out the two reports from the GBI

concluding that samples from the hands of Chapple and Waller

contained gunshot residue and the GBI firearms report concluding

that the 9mm bullet recovered from Waller and the cartridge casing

found on the victim’s bed were fired from the 9mm handgun found

in the dresser. We conclude that the trial court did not err.

The continuing witness rule “regulates which documents or

recordings go into the jury room with the jury during deliberations

and which ones do not.” Lofton v. State, 310 Ga. 770, 785 (2021)

(quotation marks omitted), disapproved in part on other grounds by

Outlaw v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 401 n.5 (2021). We have explained that

“the continuing witness rule is directed at written testimony that is

heard by the jury when read from the witness stand,” pointing out

that “[t]he rule is based on the principle that it is unfair and places

undue emphasis on written testimony that has been read to the jury

for the writing to be sent out with the jury to be read again during

deliberations whereas oral testimony is received by the jury only

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once.” Muse v. State, 316 Ga. 639, 659 (2023) (quotation marks

omitted). We have noted that “[t]he types of documents that have

been held subject to the rule include affidavits, depositions, written

confessions, statements, and dying declarations.” Lofton, 310 Ga. at

786.

Here, the crime lab reports in question “w[ere] not written

testimony and did not derive [their] evidentiary value solely from

the credibility of its maker.” Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. 543, 553

(2020). Instead, the reports were “original documentary evidence,

and w[ere] properly allowed to go out with the jury.” Id. (holding that

a letter written by a fellow inmate of the defendant that said that

the defendant had told him about the crimes was original

documentary evidence”). See also Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534,

536-537 (2007) (holding that it did not violate the continuing witness

rule to allow a blood test report from the crime lab to go out with the

jury, as the report was “direct evidence of the manner in which a

scientific test was conducted and of the results thereby obtained”

and that “[t]he proscription on the jury’s possession of written

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testimony does not extend to documents which are themselves

relevant and admissible as original documentary evidence in a case”

(quotation marks omitted)); Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 98

(2003) (same).

Chapple relies on Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 552 (2007), to

argue that the crime lab reports in this case could not go out with

the jury as original documentary evidence. But Roberts involved a

report of a documents examiner that summarily said that a test had

been conducted and the opinion of the examiner. We concluded that

the report therefore did not “amount to evidence of the manner in

which a test was conducted and does not make the document

original documentary evidence.” Id. at 552–53. Here, in contrast to

Roberts, the crime lab reports stated the types of scientific tests

conducted and the results of the tests and did not contain an opinion

of the person conducting the test. For example, the gunshot residue

reports say that the samples from the hands of Chapple and Waller

were “examined by scanning electron microscopy/energy dispersive

spectroscopy … and analyzed for elemental composition and particle

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morphology” for gunshot residue particles; that such particles “are

single, discrete, microscopic particles, molten in morphology, that

contain the elements lea, barium, and antimony”; and that gunshot

residue particles were found in the samples. We conclude that the

reports in this case were original documentary evidence that the

trial court properly allowed to go out with the jury.

4. Chapple contends that trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective in several respects. We disagree.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant

must prove both that the performance of his lawyer was deficient

and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the

deficiency prong of the Strickland test, the defendant “must show

that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable

way considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing

professional norms.” Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 360 (2020). “This

requires a defendant to overcome the strong presumption that

counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable

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professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions were made in the

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Scott v. State, 306 Ga.

417, 419–20 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). “Decisions regarding

trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness

claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent

attorney would have followed such a course.” Thomas v. State, 311

Ga. 706, 714 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant must

also show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,

which requires showing that “there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 US at 694. If an

appellant “fails to meet his burden of proving either prong of the

Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the

other prong.” Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 797, 806 (2023).

(a) Chapple first claims that trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective by failing to object to testimony of Agent Maddox that

amounted to improper character evidence.

At trial, when defense counsel was questioning Agent Maddox

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about the thoroughness of her search of Chapple and Waller’s

bedroom, the agent said that she collected “pertinent information.”

Defense counsel asked whether that included anything with “the

person’s name” on it. Agent Maddox responded that “it includes the

person’s name, it can be things of evidentiary value like the

Gangster Disciple drawing that was on top of the night stand. It

could also include the suitcase of marijuana that was found in the

back yard.” Defense counsel did not object to this testimony or ask

for it to be struck.

We conclude that Chapple has failed to show that trial counsel

performed deficiently by failing to move to strike Agent Maddox’s

testimony. Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing

that his general trial strategy was not to draw attention to

prejudicial matters. Although he did not “think” or “believe” that he

engaged in that analysis with regard to the Gangster Disciple

testimony, that is not controlling, because “if a reasonable lawyer

might have done what the actual lawyer did—whether for the same

reasons given by the actual lawyer or different reasons entirely—

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the actual lawyer cannot be said to have performed in an objectively

unreasonable way.” Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 223 (2023)

(punctuation and quotation marks omitted). Here, an objection to

Agent Maddox’s testimony could have drawn more attention to the

alleged prejudicial matter, so not moving to strike the testimony was

not objectively unreasonable and did not constitute deficient

performance. See Scott, 317 Ga. at 224 (holding that trial counsel’s

choice not to draw further attention to a prejudicial matter could

have been objectively reasonable and strategic and was not deficient

performance, even though counsel did not have a strategic reason

for not requesting a limiting instruction on the matter).

Moreover, with regard to Agent Maddox’s statement about

finding marijuana in the backyard, trial counsel testified at the

motion for new trial hearing that he had a strategic reason for not

moving to strike that testimony, explaining that he could use the

marijuana testimony to attack the credibility of the GBI agents, if

he needed to, on the ground that “they couldn’t even prove, you

know, what was going on with suitcases of marijuana sitting right

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outside the property line.” “The matter of when and how to raise

objections is generally a matter of trial strategy,” Tyson v. State, 312

Ga. 585, 599 (2021), and here, we cannot conclude that Chapple has

shown that counsel’s decision to forgo an objection “was so patently

unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have made the same

decision.” Id. (holding that counsel’s strategic decision not to object

to allegedly improper character evidence was not patently

unreasonable and not deficient performance) (quotation marks

omitted).

(b) Chapple next contends that the search warrant for Chapple

and Waller’s home was not supported by probable cause and that

trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to move to

suppress the 9 mm handgun found pursuant to the search warrant.

“When we evaluate a claim that counsel was deficient for

failing to file a motion to suppress, we ask whether a motion to

suppress on the specific basis proposed by the appellant would

clearly have succeeded if counsel had raised it.” Moss v. State, 322

Ga. 757, 767 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). “In determining

25
whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant, the

magistrate’s task is simply to make a practical, common-sense

decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the

affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Copeland v.

State, 314 Ga. 44, 49 (2022) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover,

“the test for probable cause is not a hypertechnical one to be

employed by legal technicians, but is based on the factual and

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and

prudent men act.” State v. Britton, 316 Ga. 283, 286–87 (2023)

(punctuation and quotation marks omitted). “On appellate review,

our duty is to determine if the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’

for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search

warrant,” and the magistrate’s decision “to issue a search warrant

based on a finding of probable cause is entitled to substantial

deference by a reviewing court, and even doubtful cases should be

resolved in favor of upholding a magistrate’s determination that a

warrant is proper.” Copeland, 314 Ga. at 49 (punctuation and

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quotation marks omitted).

Here, Chapple argues that the handgun was subject to

suppression because the affidavit failed to establish a “probable

cause nexus” between the handgun and the house. Chapple’s claim

of ineffective assistance fails because a motion to suppress on this

ground would not clearly have succeeded. In the warrant affidavit,

a detective with the Baldwin County Sheriff’s Office said that he

responded to the scene of the crimes on the night of the shooting,

that the address he responded to was Waller and Chapple’s

residence, that Waller had died from a gunshot wound suffered at

the couple’s home on the night of the crimes, that Chapple was in

the house on the night of the crimes and told another person in the

house that Waller had been shot, that the person then saw Chapple

leave the house, and that the person returned to the house, finding

Waller lying on the floor. Given these circumstances, if trial counsel

had filed a motion to suppress on the ground now asserted by

Chapple, the magistrate reviewing the warrant would have been

authorized to conclude that there was a fair probability that

27
incriminating evidence, including the handgun, would be found at

Chapple and Waller’s house. See Prince v. State, 295 Ga. 788, 792-

93 (2014) (holding that probable cause to search the defendant’s

house was established by information in the affidavit that the victim

had been found beaten to death, that items belonging to the

defendant’s girlfriend had been found near the victim’s body, that

the defendant and his girlfriend fled to Florida when they learned

that they were wanted for questioning, and that the girlfriend told

investigators that she was with the defendant on the night of the

murders and let him use her van that night). Because Chapple has

not established that a motion to suppress would have been

successful, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See

Moss, 322 Ga. at 767–68; Prince, 295 Ga. at 793.

court errors and trial counsel deficiencies requires his convictions to

be reversed. But, as explained above, Chapple has failed to establish

any trial court errors or instances in which trial counsel was

professionally deficient. For this reason, “there are no errors to

28
aggregate, and his claim of cumulative error also fails.” Blocker v.

State, 316 Ga. 568, 583 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.