CourtListener 10845989

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 17, 2026

S26A0368. JACKSON v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

In November 2015, Johnny Jackson was convicted of malice

murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a

felony related to the shooting death of Mark Williams. He appeals

his convictions, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance by improperly advising him regarding a plea offer made

by the State. Because Jackson has failed to show that counsel’s

alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice, we affirm his convictions. 1

1 Williams was killed in January 2012. In April 2012, a Fulton County
grand jury indicted Jackson for malice murder, two counts of felony murder,
aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At a jury trial in October
2015, the jury found Jackson guilty on all counts. In November 2015, Jackson
was sentenced to serve life in prison for malice murder and a consecutive five
years in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Although the trial court originally merged all remaining counts, it later
entered a corrected sentencing order showing that the felony murder counts
1. On January 16, 2012, Jackson shot and killed Williams in

the parking lot outside a nightclub.

(a) Trial

At trial, Jackson claimed that he shot Williams in self-defense,

testifying as follows. Williams first attacked Jackson in the

nightclub, “jump[ing] on” Jackson and putting “his forearm over

[Jackson’s] throat.” Both men then went outside to the club’s

were vacated by operation of law and merging the other two remaining counts.
In November 2015, Jackson filed a timely motion for new trial pro se; the
trial court did not act on it. In June 2018, Jackson filed a motion for out-of-
time appeal, which the trial court granted in November 2018, and Jackson filed
a motion for new trial based on that order. In April 2022, the trial court,
relying on this Court’s elimination of the judicially created out-of-time appeal
procedure in Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (2022), granted the State’s motion to
vacate the order granting Jackson’s out-of-time appeal and dismissed the
motion for new trial Jackson had filed based on that order. Jackson filed a
notice of appeal from that vacatur and dismissal. In March 2024, this Court
held that “the trial court’s entry of an order vacating its prior order granting
[Jackson’s] motion for out-of-time appeal and dismissing the motion for new
trial which had been permitted as a result presents no cognizable basis for an
appeal” and dismissed the appeal. Jackson v. State, Case No. 24A0596 (2024).
However, this Court also noted that Jackson “may seek to have the trial court
exercise its discretion to determine whether to recognize and rule on his pro se
motion for new trial.” Id. In August 2024, the trial court entered an order
recognizing Jackson’s November 2015 pro se motion for new trial “as a valid
filing.” In October 2024, Jackson amended the motion for new trial with
counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied Jackson’s motion for new trial
in July 2025. Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal. The appeal was docketed
to this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision
on the briefs.

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parking lot, where Jackson armed himself with a shotgun “for

intimidation purposes.” Williams walked toward Jackson and

“swung around [with] a gun in his hand.” When Jackson saw the

gun in Williams’s hand, Jackson fired the shotgun at Williams

multiple times, and Williams fell to the ground.

In his trial testimony, Jackson maintained that he was the

victim in the encounter. During cross-examination, when the

prosecutor referred to Williams as “the victim,” Jackson corrected

her, saying, “I’m the victim,” and explaining that he was “only trying

to protect [him]self.” Jackson also testified that when the club’s

manager offered to tell a story that indicated Williams and Jackson

“had a beef” so Jackson could “get manslaughter,” Jackson

responded, “[t]hat’s a lie … don’t tell them that, tell the truth.”

Jackson further testified, “I believe in the truth…. If you tell the

truth, then everything will come out.”

The jury rejected Jackson’s self-defense claim and found him

guilty of malice murder and the other charged crimes. At his

sentencing hearing, Jackson made a statement, apologizing to

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Williams’s family “for the situation,” but saying, “I didn’t want it to

go the way it went,” and “I would have never put us in this situation.

At all. Period. But my life was in danger.”

(b) Motion for New Trial

In his motion for new trial, Jackson alleged, among other

things, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance regarding

the plea offer made by the State. At the motion for new trial hearing,

Jackson testified as follows. Before trial, his counsel told him that

the State had offered to let him plead guilty to manslaughter and

would recommend a sentence of 20 years. However, counsel said

“we’re not taking that,” and told Jackson “the most that they can

give you is manslaughter, just looking at this case…you want the

truth to come out?” Jackson responded, “I do want the truth to come

out,” and agreed with counsel not to take the plea. If counsel had

told Jackson that he “could face a life sentence and that was a real

possibility,” Jackson “would have” taken the plea offer. On cross-

examination, Jackson acknowledged that he knew he was charged

with murder, but explained that counsel said “looking at the case,”

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“at worst, [Jackson] would only get convicted of manslaughter.”

When the State asked Jackson if he still believed, as he testified at

trial, that he was “the victim,” Jackson responded, “I do.”

Jackson’s trial counsel also testified at the motion for new trial

hearing, giving the following testimony. He could not remember if

the State offered Jackson a plea of manslaughter, but thought it was

“entirely possible” that the State did. If the State had made such an

offer, counsel “would have communicated it to” Jackson and “would

have given [Jackson] the benefit of [his] judgment as to what the

evidence is likely to show, what the risks are, what the witnesses

are likely to say and do,” but “ultimately, it was the client’s call”

whether to take the plea.

The trial court rejected Jackson’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. The court concluded that “Jackson failed to offer credible

evidence that he would have taken the plea-bargain offered but for

counsel’s advice,” explaining:

[W]hile Jackson testified at the hearing on his motion for
new trial that he would have pled guilty had he been
advised differently by his attorney, this Court does not

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find this testimony credible.
Throughout the trial and at the hearing on his
motion for new trial, Jackson maintained that he was the
actual victim in this case. He also testified that, in
rejecting the plea deal, he “want[ed] the truth to come
out.” Given this position, it strains credulity for him to
assert that he would have ever pled guilty. The Court
does not credit this testimony.

(Cleaned up.)

2. In his sole enumeration of error on appeal, Jackson claims

that counsel’s performance regarding the State’s plea offer was

deficient and that, if not for such deficiency, Jackson would have

accepted the plea offer. A defendant has a right under the Sixth

Amendment to the effective assistance of competent counsel during

plea negotiations. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 US 156, 163 (2012). To

prevail on a claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance

during plea negotiations, an appellant must satisfy the two-part test

set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984), which

requires a defendant to prove “both that his trial counsel’s

performance was constitutionally deficient and that he was

prejudiced by this deficient performance.” Dresbach v. State, 308

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Ga. 423, 425 (2020). Because an appellant must satisfy both parts

of the Strickland test, if the appellant fails to meet one part of the

test, we need not examine the other part. Id.

To establish prejudice under Strickland when an appellant

claims that “trial counsel’s deficient advice led to the rejection of a

plea offer,” the appellant must show:

(1) that but for the ineffective advice of counsel, there is a
reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been
presented to the court, meaning that the defendant would
have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not
have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances;
(2) that the trial court would have accepted the terms of
the negotiated plea; and
(3) that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the
offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the
judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.

Dresbach, 308 Ga. at 425–26 (quotation marks omitted). Jackson’s

claim falters on the first requirement.

Although Jackson testified at the motion for new trial hearing

that he would have accepted the State’s plea offer for manslaughter

if counsel had told him that a life sentence “was a real possibility,”

the trial court expressly discredited that testimony. We defer to

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credibility determinations of the trial court unless they are clearly

erroneous. See Rhodes v. State, 322 Ga. 262, 268 (2025). In light of

the other evidence relied on by the trial court—particularly

Jackson’s repeated assertions, both at trial and at the motion for

new trial hearing, that he was the actual “victim” in this case and

that he “want[ed] the truth to come out”—we conclude that the trial

court’s credibility determination as to Jackson’s testimony that he

would have taken the plea was not clearly erroneous.

Because Jackson’s discredited testimony was the only evidence

he offered to show that he would have accepted the State’s plea offer

if counsel had advised him differently, Jackson has failed to

establish prejudice, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

fails. See Dresbach, 308 Ga. at 426. See also Cleveland v. State, 285

Ga. 142, 145, 147–48 (2009) (holding that the appellant failed to

show prejudice under Strickland where “the trial court did not find

[appellant’s] after-the-fact, self-serving assertion [that he would

have accepted the plea] credible” and “[b]efore, during, and after

trial, [appellant] adamantly and consistently insisted” that he was

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innocent, including testifying in his own defense and telling the jury

after being found guilty, “you guys are wrong”).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.