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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 17, 2026

S26A0465. JACKSON v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Devon Jackson was convicted of malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the beating death of Keonta Metts.1

Jackson’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial judge abused her

discretion by removing him from the courtroom due to his disruptive

behavior during his trial, which, he argues, violated his rights under

the United States Constitution to be present at trial and to testify

1 Metts was killed on May 8, 2019. In December 2020, a DeKalb County
grand jury indicted Jackson for malice murder, two counts of felony murder,
three counts of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and possession of a knife
during the commission of a felony. At a trial from April 17 to 21, 2023, the jury
found him guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced him to serve life in
prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, 10 concurrent years
for armed robbery, and 5 consecutive years for the weapons offense. The
remaining counts were vacated or merged. Jackson filed a timely motion for
new trial, which he amended in May 2025. After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied the motion on July 9, 2025. Jackson filed a timely notice of
appeal, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in
December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
in his own defense. As explained below, that claim fails, so we

affirm.

1. As pertinent to Jackson’s only claim, the record shows the

following. At a pretrial hearing on the Friday before Jackson’s trial

was set to begin on Monday, April 17, 2023, Jackson asked to

address the trial judge and began to express concern about his trial

counsel’s ability to represent him. The judge instructed Jackson and

his lawyer to approach the bench; there was an off-the-record

discussion; and the judge announced that Jackson’s trial counsel

was “capable of representing” Jackson and that the trial could “still

stay on the calendar.”

Jackson’s trial began as planned on April 17. After the State

presented its case-in-chief over the course of a few days, the defense

called Jackson to testify. When Jackson’s trial counsel began his

direct examination, Jackson interrupted: “First off, I would like to

let the record—.” The lead prosecutor objected, and the trial judge

had the jury removed from the courtroom as Jackson continued,

saying that he “told [the judge] that [his] public defender is not all

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reflecting and doing what he’s supposed to do as a public defender,”

and the judge “did not appoint [him] another attorney … and forced

[him] to go to trial.” Deputies eventually “escorted” Jackson from

the courtroom, as he repeatedly said, “Get off me.”

The lead prosecutor then recounted for the record what had

happened, saying that Jackson “immediately began reading from a

sheet of paper”; the jury was removed; “deputies had to physically

restrain … Jackson”; “[h]e was not tased, but a deputy did have to

take out a TAS[ ]ER”; he was escorted “to the back”; and “[s]ince that

time, he’s been making noise in the back.” The trial judge added

that “[f]or safety purposes,” she “left the bench” during the incident.

The trial judge had Jackson escorted back into the courtroom

and said, outside the presence of the jury: “Mr. Jackson, I’m going

[to] give you a couple of choices. One is that … you can behave

yourself, not have any additional outbursts and you can remain in

the courtroom. The other, if you cannot—.” Jackson interrupted:

“This man [Jackson’s trial counsel] came to the jail and said I’m

guilty. I came to you and told you-all out loud on Friday. You forced

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me to go to trial. Now you want me to be polite and pleasant with

you when I asked and told you to remove his a**—.” A deputy tried

to interrupt, repeatedly saying, “Sir,” as Jackson said, “So why am I

up here?” At that point, Jackson was again “escorted out of the

courtroom.”

Although the trial judge then said, “We’ll be proceeding

without him,” she told the lawyers that she planned to determine if

Jackson had “cool[ed] off” after a lunch break.2 After the break,

Jackson was brought to the courtroom again, and the trial judge

said, outside the presence of the jury, “[I]n order to remain in court,

2 The trial judge also told the lawyers that during the break, she would

“research” whether Jackson’s disruptive conduct meant that he had forfeited
his right to testify. And after the break, the judge, outside the presence of the
jury, explained to the lawyers that Haynes v. State, 356 Ga. App. 631 (2020),
instructed that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he
has “been warned by the judge that he will be removed” if he continues his
disruptive behavior, he “nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a
manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful” of the court that his trial
cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. The judge noted that Haynes
said that the right to be present can be reclaimed as soon as the defendant “is
willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect” inherent
in the concepts of courts and judicial proceedings. See Haynes, 356 Ga. App.
at 641–42 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 US 337 (1970)). She then said that she
planned to bring Jackson back to the courtroom to “make sure that he
understands that if he doesn’t conduct himself properly, he won’t have the
opportunity to testify.”
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you have to conduct yourself in an orderly manner. And so you

were—at the time of your outburst when the court instructed on a

couple of occasions to stop, you did not stop. Is it your intent to be

disruptive in this courtroom? I need an affirmative [response].”

Jackson responded that if the judge recused herself and appointed

him new counsel, he would “politely do what [she said].”

The trial judge said, “Okay. So you were in the middle of

testifying. Do you understand that if you do not—.” Jackson

interrupted: “Are you going to re[cuse] yourself?” When the judge

asked what Jackson was alleging she did, he replied that he “told”

her that his trial counsel “came to the jail … saying that [Jackson

was] guilty,” and the judge “forced [Jackson] to trial.” The judge

said, “Okay, so what I’m asking you now is: Do you want[ ] to

continue to testify?” Jackson then asked to “go back to the jail.” The

trial judge told Jackson that if he did that, he would be “waiving

[his] right to continue to testify,” and Jackson replied, “I’m not

waiving my right. I did. You cut me off when I was testifying.”

When the judge asked if Jackson was going to remain in the

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courtroom for his trial, he responded, “I’m still going to say what I’m

going to say off the paper that I wrote. So if that’s what you want,

if you’re going to let me [be] here and no one [will] be objecting or

anything, yes.”

The trial judge instructed Jackson that he could not read his

testimony and that he would be required to answer the lawyers’

questions. The judge then said to Jackson, “You need to indicate

whether you’re going to follow the courtroom decorum or not. Are

you going to continue to testify, ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ sir?” Jackson said,

“Testify.” The following exchange then took place:

[THE JUDGE]: Are you going to do so without disrupting;
that is, you’re not going to be reading from the paper,
you’re going to answer questions from the State as well as
from … the defense?

[JACKSON]: Okay.

[THE JUDGE]: Do you understand that if you do not do
so, then that means you’re going to be in contempt of
court. Do you understand that.

[JACKSON]: Okay.

[THE JUDGE]: Okay. So that’s what you’re going to do.
Are you going to be disruptive?

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[JACKSON]: You asked me this already. Why do you
keep asking me this. You get me more upset.

A deputy interrupted, saying: “You’re not going to sit here and talk

to the judge like that. Do you understand me?” The exchange

between the trial judge and Jackson continued:

[JACKSON]: Why are you asking me the same things over
and over?

[THE JUDGE]: Sir, are you going to be—

[JACKSON]: I answered that.

[THE JUDGE]: Answer it “Yes” or “No.”

[JACKSON]: I answered it already.

[THE JUDGE]: Okay, you’re not going to be disrespectful
to the court.

[JACKSON]: Okay. Well, then stop asking me the same
questions.

[THE JUDGE]: Okay, thank you so much. At this point[,]
the court finds that you will remain disruptive, alright;
and, therefore, for the purposes of this trial, the court will
remove you. Here’s what I’m going to do: I’m going to take
you downstairs. We’re going to continue this trial without
you. At any point in time you believe that you can do so
without being disruptive, you’ll let a deputy know and
we’ll bring you back up; but you cannot come and be

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disruptive. You cannot come and say what you want to
do. Do you understand that?

[JACKSON]: Take me back.

[THE JUDGE]: At some point if you decide that you wish
to do so, without being disruptive, you can let us know
and we’ll bring you back up. Do you understand that?

[JACKSON]: I don’t need to be brought back. I need to be
taken back to the facility, which they were getting ready
to do. I was calmed down until you-all brought me back
in here.

[THE JUDGE]: So we’ll take you back to the facility if
that’s your request. Alright, take him back where he
wants to go.

Jackson left the courtroom; the jury was brought in; and the defense

rested. After a charge conference, the proceedings concluded for the

day.

When the trial began again the next morning, the trial judge

had Jackson brought back to the courtroom. She informed him,

outside the presence of the jury, that closing arguments were going

to begin and asked if he wished to be present. When he said, “Yes,”

the judge asked if he understood that he had to “conduct [him]self

in a proper manner.” He said, “Understood.” After the judge and

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counsel discussed certain jury charges, Jackson’s counsel said there

was “some confusion here” because “Jackson was hoping to testify at

this time.” Jackson then said that he had been “told” that the judge

“wanted to revisit and see if [Jackson] wanted to testify again[.]”

The trial judge explained that because the defense had rested,

Jackson’s “case [was] closed.” She then asked if Jackson was going

to stay for closing arguments, and he said that he would.

The jury entered the courtroom, and when the lead prosecutor

began to speak, Jackson interrupted, claiming that his counsel

“came up to the jail [and] said that [he] was guilty”; Jackson told the

trial judge to “appoint [him] another attorney”; “[s]he refused to do

so”; and “[t]his is a trial slam [sic]. She know[s] she is wrong and

[Jackson] told her that numerous [ ] times—.” While Jackson spoke,

the jury was taken out of the courtroom. Jackson was also

eventually “escorted” from the courtroom. The trial judge stated for

the record that Jackson “took the microphone, placed it in his hand

and started indicating that his rights were violated”; “[t]he deputies

had to escort him out of the courtroom”; and Jackson “was resisting

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moving out of the courtroom.”

The jury was brought back to the courtroom, and the trial

proceeded with closing arguments and the jury charge. After the

parties were informed that the jury reached a verdict, Jackson’s

counsel asked if the trial judge wanted “to see if … Jackson wishes

to be a part of this proceeding.” The judge said: “I think he has

waived his right to be a part of the proceedings at this juncture. We

can’t have him acting out. He has already acted out on three

occasions. I think he has made it very clear he is not going to behave

and just for security purposes I am not going to do that at this time.”

The jury verdict was then published, and the trial concluded.

At the hearing on Jackson’s motion for new trial, one of the

prosecutors at Jackson’s trial testified for the State about Jackson’s

behavior; his testimony was largely consistent with the record, as

set forth above. He added, however, that during Jackson’s first

outburst at the beginning of his testimony, Jackson “grabbed the

microphone” at the witness stand, “increased his pitch,” and “tensed

up,” such that the court deputy turned his attention from escorting

10
the jurors out of the courtroom to addressing Jackson “because there

was a security issue”; the deputy “got right on top of [Jackson] to

physically restrain him,” but Jackson did not submit to the deputy’s

commands; Jackson pulled the microphone sideways as he

continued to speak; the deputy called for assistance; and three or

four additional deputies came into the courtroom, “grabb[ed]”

Jackson, and “pulled him” through a side door to a holding cell. The

prosecutor also said that Jackon continued to “yell[ ]” from the

holding cell, so he was eventually taken to another holding area in

the basement. In addition, the prosecutor testified that when the

trial judge spoke to Jackson after the lunch break, he was

“interrupt[ing]” her and “talk[ing] over her.” And finally, the

prosecutor noted that when Jackson had another outburst in front

of the jury at the beginning of closing arguments, he “had both hands

wrapped around the microphone”; he “pulled the microphone’s felt

cover off” while deputies tried to remove him; and he “had to be

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manhandled back out into the inmate door.”3

In its order denying Jackson’s motion for new trial, the trial

judge found that she “properly exercised [her] discretion in removing

[Jackson] from the courtroom” because he “repeatedly acted out,

both verbally and physically, he was warned each time, and his trial

could not be carried on with him in the courtroom.” The judge

concluded, in pertinent part, that although Jackson was given

“every opportunity to remain in the courtroom and testify,” “he

persisted in his disruptive behavior,” such that “[t]he loss of his

opportunity to testify was attributable solely to [Jackson].”

2. Jackson contends that the trial judge abused her discretion

by removing him from the courtroom during the trial, such that his

rights under the United States Constitution to be present at trial

3 After the prosecutor testified, Jackson’s motion for new trial counsel

asked the trial judge to put on the record her recollection of an ex parte meeting
she had with Jackson and his trial counsel on the day before Jackson’s first
outburst. The judge said that trial counsel asked for the meeting because he
was concerned that Jackson was going to attempt to testify about his “issues”
with counsel; the judge explained to Jackson that “he could not do that”; and
the judge told Jackson that trial counsel was “a good attorney” who would
“protect his interest.”
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and to testify in his own defense were violated.4 This claim fails.

Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be

present during the critical stages of his trial, this right is not

absolute. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 US 337, 343 (1970). As the

United States Supreme Court has explained:

[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if,
after he has been warned by the judge that he will be
removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he
nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that
his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.
Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be
reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct
himself consistently with the decorum and respect
inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.

It is essential to the proper administration of
criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the
hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The
flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary
standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be
tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with
disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants
must be given sufficient discretion to meet the
circumstances of each case.

Allen, 397 US at 343 (cleaned up). See also, e.g., Kerns v. State, ___

4 Jackson raises no claims under the Georgia Constitution.

13
Ga. ___ (2026), S25A1115, slip op. at 18 (Ga. Feb. 3, 2026) (2026 WL

270943). The United States Supreme Court went on to explain that

one of the “constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to

handle an obstreperous defendant” is to “take him out of the

courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.” Allen, 397

US at 343–44.

And although it appears that neither the United States

Supreme Court nor this Court has expressly addressed a criminal

defendant’s claim that his right to testify was violated by his

removal from the courtroom after he disrupted his trial proceedings,

the federal circuit courts that have evaluated the issue have applied

the principles set forth in Allen. See, e.g., United States v. Evans,

908 F3d 346, 355 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Allen and explaining that

the defendant forfeited his right to testify after repeatedly

disrupting his trial); United States v. Nunez, 877 F2d 1475, 1477–78

(10th Cir. 1989) (applying the principles in Allen to evaluate the

defendant’s claim that the trial court’s decision to remove him from

his trial due to his disruptive behavior violated his constitutional

14
right to testify and explaining that “the right to testify is not

absolute … and may be waived by contumacious conduct” (quotation

marks omitted)).

Applying Allen’s framework here, we conclude that, under the

circumstances presented in this case, the trial judge did not abuse

her discretion by removing Jackson from the courtroom and

determining that, by continuing to disrupt the proceedings, he

forfeited his right to testify. To begin, the record, as set out in detail

above, shows that when Jackson took the witness stand to testify,

he immediately interrupted counsel’s first question, grabbed the

microphone, and began to read a speech about his frustrations with

counsel. As he read, he “increased his pitch” and “tensed up,” which

led the courtroom deputy to turn his attention to the “security issue”;

the judge left the bench “[f]or safety purposes”; and the deputy tried

to physically restrain Jackson but had to call additional deputies for

assistance because Jackson refused to yield. It took three or four

deputies—and threats to use a stun weapon on Jackson—to

eventually forcibly remove him from the courtroom and into a

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holding cell, where he continued to “yell[ ].” In light of the serious

and legitimate security concerns that Jackson’s behavior posed,

there was no abuse of discretion in his immediate removal from the

courtroom. See State v. Fletcher, 252 Ga. 498, 501 (1984) (explaining

that “[a]lthough Illinois v. Allen … conditions the right to remove a

defendant from the courtroom upon a warning being given, the

conduct of a defendant may be so violent that a warning would be a

totally useless act” and that “[a] trial judge must have discretion to

act immediately in the face of extreme violence and disruption”).

See also, e.g., United States v. Ward, 598 F3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir.

2010) (explaining that “[a] trial judge with a legitimate concern for

safety in the courtroom … clearly has discretion to take firm

action”).

And consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s

direction in Allen, the trial judge then had Jackson brought back to

the courtroom and warned him that he could “remain in the

courtroom” if he did “not have any additional outbursts.” Yet

Jackson persisted in his disorderly behavior—interrupting the

16
judge, complaining about his issues with counsel, and using vulgar

language—and was removed from the courtroom again as a result.

After a lunch break, the judge had Jackson brought to the courtroom

again; warned him a second time that “to remain in court,” he would

be required to “conduct [him]self in an orderly manner”; and tried to

elicit from Jackson assurances that he would properly conduct

himself in court and that he would answer questions from counsel,

rather than read a prepared speech, during his testimony. But

Jackson repeatedly interrupted the judge, continued to complain

about his counsel, and refused to answer the judge’s questions about

whether he would remain disruptive, so he was removed from the

courtroom again and instructed that he could return if “[a]t any

point in time,” he believed that he could “do so without being

disruptive.”5 The trial judge provided Jackson a third opportunity

to rejoin the proceedings the next day, again warning him that he

had to “conduct [him]self in a proper manner.” And although

5 Although Jackson’s primary argument in his appellate brief is that this

was the first time that the trial judge warned him that he would be removed if
he continued his disruptive behavior, that assertion is belied by the record.
17
Jackson asked the trial judge whether he could testify at that point,

the judge explained to him that he had forfeited his right to testify

and that the evidence was closed, and neither Jackson nor his

counsel asked to reopen the evidence. When the jury then entered

the courtroom and closing arguments began, Jackson immediately

interrupted the proceedings again to complain about the judge and

his counsel and had to be forcibly removed by deputies a fourth (and

final) time. The record does not indicate that Jackson ever asked to

rejoin the proceedings.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that Jackson’s

persistent conduct was “so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful”

that the trial judge was authorized to determine that the trial could

not continue while Jackson was present in the courtroom. Allen, 397

US at 343. Despite two clear warnings from the trial judge that

Jackson would be removed from the courtroom if he insisted on

conducting himself in such a manner and repeated attempts to

encourage Jackson to promise that he would behave properly if he

continued his testimony, see Allen, 397 US at 343–44, Jackson

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maintained his contumacious conduct and thus forfeited his right to

testify, see, e.g., Evans, 908 F3d at 352–55. And when given yet

another chance to return to the courtroom for closing arguments

(along with another warning about his behavior), Jackson persisted

in flagrantly disregarding “elementary standards of proper conduct”

in court and lost his right to be present for the remainder of the

proceedings. Allen, 397 US at 343.

In sum, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by removing

Jackson from the courtroom during a portion of his trial and

concluding that, as a result of his disruptive conduct, he forfeited his

rights to be present and to testify in his defense. See Kerns,

S25A1115, slip op. at 20–21 (holding that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by removing the defendant, after a warning,

because he continued to disrupt the proceedings to complain about

his trial counsel, and noting that “[a] defendant’s right to counsel

may not be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly

procedure in courts of justice[ ] and deprive such courts of the

exercise of their inherent powers to control the same” (quotation

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marks omitted)); Haynes v. State, 356 Ga. App. 631, 642 (2020)

(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by removing

the defendant, after warning him that he would be removed if he

continued to be disruptive, because he repeatedly argued with the

court, including about issues with his trial counsel; refused to

answer the judge’s questions; and repeatedly interrupted the judge).

See also Evans, 908 F3d at 352–55 (holding that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by removing the defendant and concluding

that he had forfeited his right to testify after he took the stand and

“immediately started complaining” about his attorney; he was

warned to limit his responses to answering counsel’s questions; he

told the court that he would nevertheless continue to lodge his

complaints; and when the court asked a final time if he would

change his mind, “he responded with another rant”); Nunez, 877 F2d

at 1478 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court violated

his rights to be present and to testify in his own defense where the

defendant was warned several times that he would be removed from

the courtroom if he continued his “outburst[s],” but he nevertheless

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continued to interrupt the proceedings; and noting that “[a] court

should, of course, vigilantly protect a defendant’s constitutional

rights, but it was never intended that any of these rights be used as

a ploy to frustrate the orderly procedures of a court in the

administration of justice” (quotation marks omitted)).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.