BOSTIC v. THE STATE (Two Cases)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 30, 2025

S25A0821. BOSTIC v. THE STATE.
S25A0822. WRIGHT v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

A jury found Jerel Bostic and Timothy Wright guilty of felony

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Jamichael Walker.1 Following the denial of their motions for new

1 The crimes occurred on March 27, 2019. In August 2021, an Emanuel

County grand jury jointly indicted Bostic, Wright, and Da’Korey Somerville for
felony murder predicated on attempted armed robbery (Count 1), violation of
the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (Count 2), armed robbery
(Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 4), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 5). Bostic, Wright, and Somerville were tried
together before a jury in December 2022. The jury found Wright and Somerville
guilty of all charges. The jury found Bostic guilty on Counts 1-3, as well as a
lesser-included offense on Count 4; Bostic was acquitted on Count 5.
Somerville’s case is not part of this appeal. The trial court sentenced Wright to
serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a concurrent
20-year sentence on Count 2, a concurrent sentence of life in prison on Count
3, and a consecutive 5-year sentence on Count 5. The trial court sentenced
Bostic to serve life in prison on Count 1, a concurrent 20-year sentence on
Count 2, and a concurrent sentence of life in prison on Count 3. Count 4 was
merged.
Bostic and Wright filed timely motions for new trial, which were later
trial, they appeal. Bostic and Wright both challenge the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting their convictions. Both appellants also

assert that the trial court erred by denying their motions for new

trial on the general grounds and that the trial court erred in denying

their motions for directed verdicts. Bostic, for his part, also argues

that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence against him

and that these errors cumulatively harmed him. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence presented at trial showed the following. The crimes took

amended, and a hearing was held on the motions in June 2024. The State
conceded that the evidence supporting the appellants’ convictions on Count 2,
the Street Gang Act violation, was constitutionally insufficient, and the trial
court purported to grant a new trial as to that count. But, of course, the court’s
rationale for reversing those convictions bars retrial. See Jefferson v. State, 310
Ga. 725, 726 (2021) (“Although the trial court ‘granted’ [the appellant’s] motion
[for new trial] as to the armed robbery convictions, the State is legally barred
from retrying [him] on those counts given the court’s rationale for its decision.
Once a reviewing court reverses a conviction solely for insufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilty, double jeopardy bars retrial.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)). The trial court denied the appellants’
motions as to their remaining convictions. Thereafter, on the State’s motion,
the trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi on Count 2 as to both
defendants. Bostic and Wright filed timely notices of appeal, and their cases
were docketed to this Court’s April 2025 term. Bostic’s case, S25A0821, was
orally argued on June 12, 2025. Wright’s case, S25A0822, was submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
2
place outside a local game room at which Walker and, separately,

Wright and Da’Korey Somerville were all gambling. Walker was

shot multiple times outside the game room’s front door, and he died

at the scene. After the shooting, Walker’s phone was missing from

his person. Multiple witnesses observed the shooting from various

vantage points, and they testified at trial about what they saw.

Hubert Artis, Walker’s cousin, had exited the game room some

time before the shooting, going to his car parked outside. As he was

leaving the parking lot, Artis saw a fight start outside the game

room’s front door, though he could not determine how many people

were fighting or see who they were. When the fight broke apart, one

participant withdrew a pistol and shot another participant. Artis

testified that his friend Khalil Davis told him that he saw Bostic

“washing hi[m]self off” sometime after the shooting.

Timothy Clark, another cousin of Walker’s, was outside the

game room at the time of the shooting and testified that he knew

Wright and that Wright was the shooter. While he denied seeing

Bostic or Somerville, he observed that the guy “tussling” with

3
Walker looked like Bostic. A woman living in a nearby apartment

complex heard the shots and saw three men leaving the scene

together through the complex, though she could not see who they

were.

Walker’s acquaintance Ashia Gordon was parked outside the

game room with Laportia Johnson shortly before the shooting. While

there, Gordon saw Somerville and Bostic talking outside the game

room for a couple of minutes. As she and Johnson drove out of the

parking lot, Gordon saw a person exit the game room’s front door

and then saw Walker being pushed against a car as he exclaimed,

“Whoa, whoa, whoa, what’s going on?” Though Gordon could not see

exactly what transpired next, she recalled seeing people shoving

each other and then hearing gunshots as she and Johnson drove

away. Johnson confirmed that she and Gordon were in a parked

vehicle outside the game room, that she saw Walker outside the

game room with another person, and that she heard gunshots as

they drove away. Johnson denied seeing who any of the participants

were in the shooting and testified that she only heard rumors

4
afterward.

Sometime after the shooting, Jamie Walker, the victim’s

brother, met up with Johnson, who reported that she saw Bostic

fighting Walker outside the game room just before the shooting and

pointed Bostic out to Jamie as the person Walker was fighting. In

addition, Johnson told Jamie that she saw Wright shoot Walker.

According to Jamie, Johnson also told him that she was afraid to

report what she had seen to the police for concern that something

would happen to her family.

Investigators eventually met with Bostic for an interview and

collected a sample of his DNA. DNA collected from beneath Walker’s

fingernails matched the sample obtained from Bostic. When

interviewed by investigators, Bostic offered conflicting accounts of

his whereabouts at the time of the shooting. First, Bostic claimed

that he left the game room around 9:00 p.m., before the shooting.

But when confronted with the evidence of his DNA under Walker’s

fingernails, Bostic admitted that he was outside the game room at

the time of the shooting. He claimed, however, that he was walking

5
around the building toward the front when he heard gunshots ring

out and that he started running and ran into Walker, which, he

speculated, was how his DNA transferred.

At trial, the State introduced evidence that Bostic, Wright, and

Walker were all members of the Bloods street gang, that Walker was

cooperating with police in their investigation of a gang-related

murder, and that Walker was expected to testify at trial, which was

reportedly known on the “streets.” The State suggested in its

opening and closing arguments that the motive underlying Walker’s

murder was his cooperation in that investigation. Bostic and Wright

both moved for directed verdicts at the close of the State’s evidence,

which the trial court denied.

Case No. S25A0821

2. In his first claim of error, Bostic challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting his convictions, both as a matter of federal

constitutional due process and Georgia statutory law. His

arguments fail on both fronts.

(a) In reviewing Bostic’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

6
evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts and

consider whether any rational trier of fact could have found him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US

307, 319 (1979). But “[o]ur limited review under the standard set out

in Jackson leaves to the jury the resolution of conflicts in the

testimony, the weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses,

and reasonable inferences to be made from basic facts to ultimate

facts.” Jones v. State, 312 Ga. 696, 700 (2021) (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (2009)

(“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and

to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation

and punctuation omitted)).

Here, eyewitness testimony established that Bostic was

outside the game room with Wright and Somerville around the time

of the shooting and that Bostic was fighting with Walker

immediately before Walker was shot. In addition, Bostic’s DNA was

found beneath Walker’s fingernails, lending support to testimony

7
that Bostic and Walker were engaged in a physical confrontation.

And Bostic gave conflicting accounts about his activities around the

time of the crimes. The jury was authorized to find from this

evidence that Bostic was guilty, at least as party to the crime, of the

crimes for which he was convicted.

Bostic attempts to downplay the eyewitness testimony as mere

“rumors” rife with inconsistencies and the DNA evidence as showing

nothing more than physical contact. But Bostic’s complaints go to

the weight and credibility the jury assigned to the evidence against

him, “and, as we have explained many times, it is the role of the jury

to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the credibility

of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts adversely to the

defendant does not render the evidence insufficient.” Graham v.

State, 301 Ga. 675, 677 (2017). See also Williams v. State, 313 Ga.

325, 328 (2022) (“Although the eyewitness accounts of the shooting

did vary to some extent, it was for the jury to determine the

credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or

inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

8
Bostic further asserts that the evidence was insufficient to

establish that he shared a common criminal intent with his co-

defendants, a necessary showing to secure his conviction as a party

to the crimes. See Powell v. State, 307 Ga. 96, 99 (2019)

(“[C]onviction as a party to a crime requires proof that the defendant

shared a common criminal intent with the principal perpetrator of

the crime, which may be inferred from presence, companionship,

and conduct before, during, and after the offense.” (cleaned up)). See

also OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a crime). But here, there

was evidence from which the jury could infer a shared criminal

intent. The evidence showed that Bostic was outside the game room

with Wright and Somerville during the crimes, fought with Walker

immediately before Wright shot Walker, and then fled the scene

with Wright and Somerville. Walker’s cell phone, which he was seen

using shortly before the shooting, was also missing, indicating that

it was taken by the defendants sometime during the confrontation.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, this evidence was

sufficient for the jury to conclude that Bostic shared a common

9
criminal intent with the direct perpetrators of the crimes. See

Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450, 453–54 (2020) (evidence of appellant’s

actions before and after crimes, including communicating with the

direct perpetrators and lying to investigators, supported finding

that appellant was a party to the crimes); Kim v. State, 309 Ga. 612,

617 (2020) (“[T]he [factfinder] could reasonably infer that

[appellant] lied to the police because he shared a common criminal

intent with his associate and that the two acted in concert in

committing the crimes.”); State v. Green, 321 Ga. 204, 214 (2025)

(“[J]urors are authorized to consider their disbelief in a defendant’s

testimony — and the inconsistencies between it and the eyewitness

accounts of others — as substantive evidence of his guilt where some

corroborative evidence exists for the charged offense.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)).

(b) Bostic also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as a

matter of Georgia statutory law, arguing that the evidence against

him was circumstantial and that the State failed to exclude all

reasonable hypotheses other than his guilt. See OCGA 24-14-6 (“To

10
warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts

shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall

exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of

the accused.”).

But not every hypothesis is a reasonable one, and the
evidence need not exclude every conceivable inference or
hypothesis—only those that are reasonable. Whether an
alternative hypothesis raised by a defendant is
reasonable is a question committed principally to the jury,
and where the jury is authorized to find that the evidence,
though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused, we will not disturb that finding unless it is
insupportable as a matter of law.

Graves v. State, 306 Ga. 485, 487 (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Even assuming without deciding that all of the testimony

against Bostic was circumstantial, the jury was authorized to reject

Bostic’s hypothesis that some unrelated third party committed the

crimes at issue. Bostic was seen outside the game room with Wright

and Somerville during the crimes, fought with Walker immediately

before Wright shot Walker, offered inconsistent accounts of his

11
activities around the time of the crime, and gave an implausible

explanation for the presence of his DNA under Walker’s fingernails.

From this evidence, the jury could reject as unreasonable the

hypothesis that Bostic was at the scene when Walker was “killed by

actors unrelated” to him. See id. at 488. See also Peacock v. State,

314 Ga. 709, 714 (2022) (holding that the circumstantial evidence

presented at the appellant’s trial was sufficient under OCGA § 24-

14-6, as it authorized the jury to reject his alternative hypothesis

that someone else killed the victims, given his “shifting stories that

conflicted with other evidence”). Bostic’s challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence therefore fails.

3. Bostic next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion

by admitting two witnesses’ testimony against him, over his hearsay

objections. 2 As we explain below, both arguments fail.

2 Bostic also argues in his appellate brief that the testimony of an
investigator regarding certain other hearsay statements, which he concedes
was properly admitted, should only be given “de minim[i]s” weight. But it is
for the jury to decide the weight of properly admitted evidence. See Shaw v.
State, 307 Ga. 233, 243 (2019) (“Questions as to weight and credibility are for
the jury to decide.”).
12
(a) Bostic first challenges the admission of Artis’s testimony

that Davis reported seeing Bostic “washing hi[m]self off” sometime

after the shooting, after Davis testified that he said no such thing.

The trial court admitted this evidence as a prior inconsistent

statement, and on appeal, Bostic asserts that the State failed to lay

a proper foundation for these statements under OCGA § 24-6-613

(b). While Bostic objected to the testimony on hearsay grounds, he

did not raise any objection regarding a lack of foundation for

admission of the testimony as a prior inconsistent statement.

Accordingly, we review only for plain error.

To show plain error, Bostic must show that: “(1) there was an

error that [he] did not affirmatively waive; (2) the error was obvious;

(3) the error affected [his] substantial rights; and (4) the error

seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Smith v. State, 309 Ga. 240, 250 (2020). “This

Court does not have to analyze all elements of the plain-error test

where an appellant fails to establish one of them.” Durden v. State,

318 Ga. 729, 733 (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).

13
OCGA § 24-6-613 (b) provides:

[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a
witness shall not be admissible unless the witness is first
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the prior
inconsistent statement and the opposite party is afforded
an opportunity to interrogate the witness on the prior
inconsistent statement or the interests of justice
otherwise require.

Bostic asserts that the State’s questions to Davis were too vague to

afford him a sufficient opportunity to explain his prior statement, as

required by OCGA § 24-6-613 (b). But the record does not support

Bostic’s argument.

On direct examination, Davis denied talking to anyone about

Walker’s murder and further stated that any person who informed

investigators that Davis had information connecting Bostic to

Walker’s murder was “lying.” Davis’s flat denial that he ever made

any statement about the murder obviated the need for the State to

ask Davis whether he made the specific statement at issue here. See

Bridgewater v. State, 309 Ga. 882, 887 (2020) (holding that a

witness’s “unambiguous denial that he had ever spoken with

[another witness] — as well as his assertion that he did not recall

14
ever speaking with [the second witness] — obviated the need for the

prosecutor to ask [the first witness] about specific statements he

made to [the second witness] and provided sufficient foundation for

the State to present extrinsic evidence of such statements”);

Sconyers v. State, 318 Ga. 855, 865 (2024) (witnesses’ denial of

conversation occurring “relieved the prosecutor of the need to ask

about specific statements”). Accordingly, there was a sufficient

foundation for the admission of Artis’s testimony, and Bostic has

failed to establish that the trial court erred, much less obviously so,

by admitting this testimony.

(b) Bostic also argued in his initial brief that the trial court

erred in admitting Johnson’s prior inconsistent statements over a

hearsay objection because the State failed to establish a proper

foundation. Specifically, Bostic alleged that the State failed to

explicitly ask Johnson about her statements to Jamie. However,

Bostic correctly conceded in his reply brief that the State laid a

proper foundation for the admission of these statements, as Johnson

denied seeing who shot Walker and claimed she could not remember

15
driving around with Jamie and identifying who had been involved

in the shooting. See Hayes v. State, 320 Ga. 505, 518 (2024)

(witness’s failure to recall his prior interview relieved the State from

having to ask about specific statements made during that

interview); Sconyers, 318 Ga. at 864; Bridgewater, 309 Ga. at 887.

In that same reply brief, Bostic argues for the first time that this

Court should overturn unspecified precedent and hold that a prior

inconsistent statement made without being sworn or recorded can

only be used for impeachment purposes rather than substantive

evidence, citing various federal rules of evidence. “But an appellant

who raises an argument for the first time in a reply brief is not

entitled to have that argument considered.” Bradley v. State, 318

Ga. 142, 145 n.4 (2024).

4. Bostic next seems to argue that if the trial court had granted

the directed verdict on the Street Gang Act count, then he could have

secured a mistrial on the remaining counts because all of the State’s

evidence that had depended on the Street Gang Act count for

admissibility would become inadmissible. It is not at all clear to us

16
whether Bostic has preserved this unusual argument for appeal. But

even assuming that he has, Bostic cites no authority for the

argument, and we are aware of none. The only specific gang evidence

that Bostic points to – the testimony of a GBI agent – was relevant

to establishing that the Bloods was a gang, which is an element of

the Street Gang Act count. See OCGA §§ 24-4-401 (“‘relevant

evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence”), 24-4-402 (providing that “[a]ll relevant evidence” is

generally admissible). See also Butler v. State, 310 Ga. 892, 898

(2021) (the gang evidence was highly probative and necessary to

prove several elements of the Street Gang Act offense, including the

existence of the gang). And aside from baldly asserting that the

State brought the Street Gang Act count under false pretenses,

Bostic fails to establish how, even if the directed verdict had been

granted at the time he first made it, the gang evidence would have

been excluded under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) (“[r]elevant

17
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay,

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence”).

Finally, to the extent Bostic claims that the trial court erred in

denying his directed verdict as to the Street Gang Act count, that

claim is moot because the court nolle prossed the Street Gang Act

count. See Broxton v. State, 306 Ga. 127, 136 n.6 (2019). And, as we

explained in Division 2, above, there was sufficient evidence to

support a conviction with respect to the remaining charges. See

Clements v. State, 317 Ga. 772, 783 (2023) (“The standard of review

for the denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal is the same

as for determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction.”). Accordingly, Bostic’s enumeration fails.

5. Bostic next argues that the trial court erred in determining

in its order denying his motion for new trial that gang evidence was

admissible despite the Street Gang Act count being nolle prossed

following the conclusion of the trial. Bostic argues that because the

18
Street Gang Act count failed, he should get a new trial in which the

trial court evaluates the relevance of the gang references in

conjunction with Rule 403 prior to retrial. However, the cases Bostic

points to in support of his argument do not provide authority for his

assertion that because the State’s prosecution of this count

ultimately failed to secure a conviction, he is automatically entitled

to a new trial scrubbed of the evidence introduced in support of the

failed count. 3 And Bostic fails to point to any other authority holding

that where the evidence is found to be insufficient as to one charge,

then a new trial must be had on all of the other charges, and we have

found none. Accordingly, Bostic’s argument fails.

6. Bostic raises two claims of error related to the trial court’s

denial of his motion for new trial on the “general grounds.” See

OCGA §§ 5-5-20 (authorizing grant of new trial if the trial judge

determines that the jury’s verdict is “contrary to evidence and the

3 In Shaw v. State, 301 Ga. 14, 19 (2017), we held that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in excluding certain references to gang affiliation
during the cross-examination of a witness. And in Lingo v. State, 329 Ga. App.
528, 533 (2014), the Court of Appeals held that admission of evidence of the
defendant’s prior gang affiliation was harmless error.
19
principles of justice and equity”), 5-5-21 (authorizing grant of new

trial if the trial judge determines that the jury’s verdict is “decidedly

and strongly against the weight of the evidence”). First, he asserts

that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in considering the

general grounds and instead only applied the Jackson sufficiency

standard. And second, he asserts that the trial court’s denial of his

general grounds motion was erroneous on the merits. But Bostic’s

first argument is unsupported by the record, and the second

presents nothing for our review.

When a defendant raises the general grounds in his motion for

new trial, “a trial court has broad discretion to sit as the ‘thirteenth

juror’ and consider certain matters beyond the sufficiency of the

evidence. These additional matters include conflicts in the evidence,

the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.”

Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 484 (2020) (citations and

punctuation omitted). On appeal from the denial of such a motion,

this Court reviews “whether the trial court exercised its discretion

as the thirteenth juror.” Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 102–03 (2024).

20
We have held that “[w]hen the record reflects that the trial court

reviewed the motion for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the

evidence, the trial court has failed to exercise” its discretion under

the general grounds. Holmes v. State, 306 Ga. 524, 528 (2019)

(emphasis supplied). But when the record shows that the trial court

in fact exercised its discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21,

“the decision to grant [or deny] a new trial on the general grounds is

vested solely in the trial court and is not subject to our review.”

Weems, 318 Ga. at 102–03.

Here, the trial court separately considered Bostic’s challenges

to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions as a

matter of constitutional due process before turning to Bostic’s

general grounds claim. The court acknowledged at the outset both

the general-grounds standard and its understanding of the

discretionary nature of its review under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.

After noting that it had considered “all the testimony and evidence,

and any motive each witness may have to testify to something other

than the truth,” the trial court concluded that the verdict was “fair,”

21
“supported by sufficient evidence,” and “rationally based upon

evidence shown to be consistent and therefore reliable.” The court

further noted that the evidence “did not preponderate heavily

against the verdict.” On those bases, the court declined to use its

“substantial discretion to undo the work of the jury.” The record thus

reflects that the trial court applied the correct standard to Bostic’s

general-grounds claim and did not abuse its discretion in that

respect. See King v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (2023) (rejecting

appellant’s claim under the general grounds because the trial court

expressly “found that ‘the weight of the evidence [did] not

preponderate heavily against the verdict and the verdict was not

contrary to the evidence or the principles of justice and equity’”).

Bostic’s argument is otherwise not subject to review by this Court.

See id.; Weems, 318 Ga. at 103.

7. Finally, Bostic argues that the asserted errors are

cumulatively prejudicial and warrant reversal. “Reversible

cumulative error requires a showing that (1) at least two evidentiary

errors … were committed at trial, and that (2) those errors,

22
considered along with the entire record, so infected the jury’s

deliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair

trial.” Smith v. State, 320 Ga. 825, 839 (2025) (citation and

punctuation omitted). However, the cumulative prejudice analysis

does not apply where, as here, there are not multiple errors to

consider cumulatively. Thomas v. State, 311 Ga. 573, 579 (2021).

Accordingly, this claim fails.

Case No. S25A0822

8. Wright first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions as a matter of constitutional and

statutory law. These arguments fail. 4

(a) Wright argues that there was insufficient evidence under

Jackson to sustain his felony murder and robbery convictions

because there was no evidence that anything was taken from Walker

and no one saw him demand anything from Walker at gunpoint.

Relatedly, he asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion

4 Wright also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

Street Gang Act count, but that conviction was reversed, as detailed in footnote
1, so his argument is moot. See Dixon v. State, 309 Ga. 28, 32 n.4 (2020).
23
for a directed verdict for the same reasons. The standard of review

for both arguments is the same: “whether, after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Shelton v. State, 313 Ga. 161, 168 (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted). So viewed, the evidence in this case was

sufficient to sustain Wright’s convictions.

As an initial matter, Wright’s complaints pertaining to the lack

of physical evidence or additional witness testimony identifying him

as a perpetrator are unavailing, as there is no requirement that the

State “prove its case with any particular sort of evidence.” Plez v.

State, 300 Ga. 505, 506 (2017). Moreover, there was evidence from

which the jury could have inferred that Wright or one of his co-

defendants took Walker’s cell phone from him. Specifically, Walker

was seen walking out of the game room while talking on his cell

phone shortly before the physical confrontation with the co-

defendants and the subsequent shooting. Immediately after Walker

was accosted and shot, his cell phone was found to be missing from

24
his person. The jury could have concluded from this evidence that

Wright or one of his co-defendants took the phone before or after

killing Walker, either of which would constitute armed robbery. See

Thornton v. State, 312 Ga. 224, 227–28 (2021) (evidence was

sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant had used a knife to

take the victim’s cell phone away either before or after killing her,

either of which would constitute armed robbery). See also Fortson v.

State, 313 Ga. 203, 212 (2022) (even though the defendant did not

personally shoot victim and take his cell phone, the jury could

reasonably conclude from the evidence that the defendant

participated in the armed robbery and was therefore party to the

crime). Moreover, Wright’s complaints about the credibility of

Clark’s allegedly inconsistent testimony “go to the weight of the

evidence against him, which is a question for the jury to decide, not

this Court.” Kuhn v. State, 301 Ga. 741, 743 (2017). Accordingly,

Wright’s arguments fail.5

5 Wright’s argument that there was insufficient evidence supporting his

conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in the
absence of Clark’s testimony for these same reasons also fails.
25
Wright also argues that the evidence was insufficient as a

matter of Georgia statutory law because Clark’s accomplice

testimony was not corroborated and was otherwise unbelievable.

See OCGA § 24-14-8 (“The testimony of a single witness is generally

sufficient to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including ...

felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony

of a single witness shall not be sufficient. Nevertheless,

corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity of the

testimony of a second witness.”). Wright contends that Clark

“essentially functioned as an accomplice-witness” because he

admitted to being present and involved in the crimes when he

admitted to moving Walker’s vehicle. But a review of the record

shows that Clark testified that while he was outside the gambling

room, he heard Walker tell somebody to move his vehicle. Clark

indicated that he initially thought Walker was talking to him but

then determined that Walker was addressing someone else. There

was no evidence that Clark shared a common criminal intent with

the defendants to commit the crimes against Walker. See Stripling

26
v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 136 (2018) (“An accomplice is someone who

shares a common criminal intent with the actual perpetrator of a

crime.”). Thus, OCGA § 24-14-8 did not require that Clark’s

testimony be corroborated. See Dillard v. State, 321 Ga. 171, 177

(2025).

(b) Wright argues that, as a matter of Georgia statutory law,

the State failed to exclude other reasonable hypotheses for the

crimes that occurred, such as the possibility that the crimes could

have been committed by someone other than Wright, see OCGA §

24-14-16, and that the State failed to show anything beyond

Wright’s mere presence. See Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 24 (2022)

(“[A]lthough the defendant’s mere presence at the scene is not

enough to convict him as a party to the crime, the jury may infer his

criminal intent from his presence, companionship, and conduct

before, during, and after the offense.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)). But OCGA § 24-14-16 does not apply where there is direct

evidence presented by the State. Garay v. State, 314 Ga. 16, 20

(2022). And here, the State presented direct evidence of Wright’s

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involvement and guilt. In particular, eyewitness testimony

established that Wright was gambling in the same game room as

Walker shortly before the shooting and that Wright engaged in a

physical confrontation with Walker outside the game room, and

Clark testified that he saw Wright shoot Walker during that

confrontation. See Bradley v. State, 318 Ga. 142, 144 (2024)

(“[E]yewitness testimony … identifying [appellant] as the shooter

was direct evidence.”). Accordingly, Wright’s challenge to the

statutory sufficiency of the evidence fails. See Dillard, 321 Ga. at

175.

9. Finally, Wright argues that the trial court erred by denying

his motion for a new trial on the general grounds, pointing to various

evidentiary claims he asserts the trial court failed to fairly consider.

But, as we explained in Division 6 above, this claim presents us

nothing to review. See Thompson v. State, 318 Ga. 760, 765 (2024).

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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