Evans v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 30, 2025

S25A0709. EVANS v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

A jury found Gordon Evans guilty of malice murder and other

crimes in connection with the shooting death of Jeffery Anderson.1

The crimes occurred on November 24, 2015. On April 19, 2017, a
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Gwinnett County grand jury jointly indicted Evans, Durell Lewis, and Dossie
Mann as parties to the crime for murder (Count 1), three counts of felony
murder (Counts 2, 3, and 4), aggravated assault (Count 6), false imprisonment
(Count 7), aggravated battery (Count 8), and criminal gang activity (Count 9).
Evans was separately indicted for an additional count of criminal gang activity
(Count 10). Lewis was separately indicted on one additional count of felony
murder (Count 5) and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
(Count 12). Mann was separately indicted on one count of criminal damage to
property in the first degree (Count 11).
Mann and Lewis pleaded guilty to the charges against them. Their cases
are not part of this appeal.
At an August 2018 jury trial, Evans was found guilty of all charges. The
trial court sentenced Evans to serve life in prison without the possibility of
parole on Count 1, twenty years consecutive on Count 6, ten years concurrent
on Count 7, twenty years concurrent on Count 8, fifteen years concurrent on
Count 9, and ten years concurrent on Count 10. The remaining counts were
vacated by operation of law. See Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 847–48 (2015).
Evans filed a timely motion for new trial on August 22, 2018, which was
amended through new counsel. Following a hearing in October 2024, the trial
Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Evans appeals,

arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence

against him. Evans also argues that trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective in two respects. Evans’s claims fail, so

we affirm in part. However, because we have noticed a sentencing

error with respect to his aggravated assault and aggravated battery

convictions, we vacate those sentences.

The evidence at trial showed that on November 24, 2015,

shortly before 11:00 p.m., law enforcement officers discovered

Anderson’s body at his residence. He had been shot twice in the

head. During the course of the investigation into Anderson’s murder,

investigators determined that Anderson was a Nine Trey gang

member and owed money to Evans, who held a leadership position

in the gang. A month before Anderson’s death, Anderson’s sister

received text messages from Evans intended for Anderson in which

Evans inquired about the money he was owed. When Anderson’s

court denied Evans’s amended motion on November 6, 2024. Evans then filed
a timely notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed to the April 2025 term
of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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sister informed Evans that he had the wrong number, Evans replied,

“[I]f you think I’m playin’ wit[h] you. I’ll have the last laugh.”

Anderson failed to repay the money, and Evans ordered two

fellow members of the Nine Trey gang—co-indictees Dossie Mann

and Durell Lewis—to kill Anderson. During a custodial interview,

Mann confirmed that Evans ordered Anderson’s murder. Mann also

indicated that he and Lewis had been to Anderson’s house

previously for a party and that, on the night of the murder, Lewis

restrained Anderson and attempted to drown him. 2 When that effort

failed, Anderson offered the men cocaine but then attempted to flee.

According to Mann, he shot at Anderson and missed, and Lewis then

shot Anderson in the head. Mann indicated that, on the night of the

crimes, he carried a .40-caliber gun and Lewis a .357-caliber gun.

Shell casings and bullets located at the scene were determined to

have been fired by a .40-caliber firearm and a .357-, .38-, or .41-

caliber firearm.

2 When Anderson’s body was discovered, investigators also found a
bathtub filled with water in the house.
3
Investigators determined that the last call to Anderson’s phone

was placed from Lewis’s cell phone, and cell phone records placed

Lewis’s cell phone in the vicinity of Anderson’s home the night of the

crimes. Data from a door entry system indicated that the front door

of Anderson’s residence was opened shortly after Lewis called

Anderson. And phone records indicated that Lewis placed a call to

Evans roughly 20 minutes later.

Police interviewed Evans, and he claimed he “knew of” Lewis

and denied knowing Mann. However, phone records indicated that,

shortly after the interview with police, Evans called Lewis and

Mann called Evans, and Evans admitted as much at trial. Lewis did

not answer, but records from a wiretapped conversation shortly

after the interview with police showed that Evans discussed the

investigation with Mann and what to tell investigators. Evans also

confirmed with Mann that the guns had been disposed of. And

records from a wiretapped conversation showed that Evans called

Lewis a few days before Evans’s interview with police to discuss the

investigation into the case and advised Lewis to leave the state.

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Phone records also showed Lewis’s and Evans’s phones

communicating around the time of the murder, and Evans admitted

at trial that Lewis called him that same evening.

Evans later discovered that Mann had spoken to police and

reportedly wanted Mann to recant his statements, but Mann

refused. Evans then ordered another incarcerated gang member,

Jermaine Lawrence, to kill Mann to keep him from testifying and to

kill Mann’s mother or his brother upon Lawrence’s release from

prison. Lawrence ultimately refused Evans’s order and, at Evans’s

behest, was subsequently attacked, suffering serious injuries.

Evans testified in his own defense at trial. He denied ordering

Lewis and Mann to kill Anderson, claiming that he found out about

the murder after the fact and let other gang members believe that

he was responsible to build up his reputation. Evans claimed that

he spoke with Mann only afterwards to warn him about the

investigation. Evans also denied ordering hits on other gang

members.

1. Evans first argues that the trial court erred by denying his

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pretrial motion in limine to exclude a handwritten letter found in

his prison locker. The letter, which was written by another

incarcerated gang member, Anthony Bostick, was addressed to “Big

Homie” and also identified the recipient as “QB,” was introduced by

the State for the limited purpose of proving Evans’s identity as “QB”

and as having a leadership position in the gang as a “Big Homie.”

On appeal, Evans contends, as he did in the trial court, that the

letter was admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to

confront his accuser under the United States Constitution and that

its contents amounted to inadmissible hearsay. These arguments

fail.

Turning first to the Confrontation Clause issue, we have

explained that “[a] Confrontation Clause violation occurs when an

out-of-court statement admitted into evidence is testimonial in

nature and the declarant is unavailable at trial and was not

previously subject to cross-examination.” Lynn v. State, 310 Ga. 608,

614 (2020) (punctuation omitted). But here, even assuming the

letter was testimonial in nature, the author of the letter, Bostick,

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testified at trial, and Evans cross-examined him. As such, the

admission of the letter did not violate the Confrontation Clause. See

Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 725 (2022) (no Confrontation Clause

violation where declarants testified at trial and were subject to

cross-examination).

Having concluded that Evans failed to establish a

Confrontation Clause violation, we turn to his argument that the

letter should nevertheless have been excluded as inadmissible

hearsay. Assuming without deciding that the letter should have

been excluded on this basis, we conclude that any error in admitting

the letter and testimony about it was harmless. “The test for

determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly

probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Kingdom

v. State, 321 Ga. 363, 367 (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted)

(assuming that evidence at issue constituted hearsay and assessing

for nonconstitutional harmless error). Here, there was a substantial

amount of other evidence establishing Evans’s identity as “QB” and

his leadership position in the gang as a “Big Homie,” including

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Evans’s own testimony. The letter was therefore cumulative of other

properly admitted evidence, and we conclude that any error in the

admission of the letter did not affect the outcome of the trial. See

Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 872 (2012) (erroneous admission of

hearsay evidence is harmless where evidence is merely cumulative

of other properly admitted evidence). Accordingly, this enumeration

of error fails.

2. Evans next argues that the trial court erred by admitting the

testimony of a handwriting expert, asserting that the expert did not

possess the requisite skill or training to be qualified as an expert

and that her testimony otherwise failed to satisfy the standard for

admissibility. 3 However, pretermitting whether the trial court erred

by admitting this testimony, we conclude that any error was

3 Evans asserts in his appellate brief that the expert’s testimony failed

to meet the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
US 579 (1993). With the 2022 legislative amendment to OCGA § 24-7-702,
which became effective on July 1, 2022, the General Assembly has extended to
criminal cases the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony
articulated in Daubert and its progeny. See Reddick, 321 Ga. at 84 n.6. But
Evans’s trial occurred in 2018, at which time the standard of admissibility of
expert testimony articulated in Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525 (1982), was
applicable in criminal cases. See Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 84 n.6 (2025).
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harmless.

At trial, the expert testified that she conducted a handwriting

analysis to determine whether Evans wrote certain entries listing

details about the Nine Trey gang on a notepad that was found in his

jail cell locker. However, Evans acknowledged during his own

testimony at trial that he was a leader of the gang, and when asked

about the notepad found in his cell, he did not disclaim authorship

but rather explained that it included a roster of gang members and

details pertaining to gang dues. Moreover, multiple witnesses

testified to Evans’s position as a gang leader at trial. Accordingly,

the expert’s testimony ultimately was cumulative of other properly

admitted evidence and therefore harmless. See Mack v. State,

S25A0773, slip op. at 11–12 (Ga. Aug. 26, 2025) (2025 WL 2444626)

(even assuming that certain expert testimony was improperly

admitted, evidence “was cumulative of [the witness’s] unchallenged

expert testimony” and therefore harmless).

3. In his final claims of trial court error, Evans argues that the

trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce

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into evidence Mann’s videotaped interview with investigators,

asserting that the video constituted hearsay and that it was

admitted in violation of his Confrontation Clause rights under the

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We disagree.

The State filed, and the trial court ultimately granted, a motion

to admit Mann’s interview pursuant to the doctrine of forfeiture by

wrongdoing. Under this doctrine, “one who obtains the absence of a

witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to

confrontation.” Davis v. Washington, 547 US 813, 833 (2006). This

doctrine has also been codified in our current Evidence Code as a

hearsay exception under OCGA § 24-8-804(b)(5) (“The following

shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is

unavailable as a witness: … A statement offered against a party that

has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and

did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”). See

Hickman v. State, 299 Ga. 267, 272 (2016). “To admit a statement

against a defendant under the rule of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, the

government must show (1) that the defendant engaged or acquiesced

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in wrongdoing, (2) that the wrongdoing was intended to procure the

declarant’s unavailability, and (3) that the wrongdoing did procure

the unavailability.” Hendrix v. State, 303 Ga. 525, 528 (2018)

(citation and punctuation omitted). If a trial court finds by a

preponderance of the evidence “that a party has acted with the

purpose of making a witness unavailable to testify against him, a

trial court does not abuse its discretion in allowing the unavailable

witness’s statements to be admissible at trial against the party who

caused the witness’s absence.” Id.

Here, the State presented evidence supporting all three factors.

The State presented testimony that Evans ordered another gang

member to kill Mann and his family to keep him from testifying,

supporting the first and second factors. And after Mann refused to

testify at trial, the State called an investigator who testified that

Mann’s refusal arose from his belief that he would be hurt in prison

for testifying against Evans, supporting the third factor.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

determined that the preponderance of the evidence showed that

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Evans engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to and actually

caused Mann’s unavailability. See Hendrix, 303 Ga. at 529

(appellant intimidated witness and thereby prevented her from

testifying where witness indicated that she feared that she would be

killed if she did so). Accordingly, Evans’s claims of error fail.

4. Evans next argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance at trial by (1) failing to object to certain testimony and (2)

failing to conduct pretrial discovery. We conclude that Evans has not

shown that counsel performed deficiently in either regard.

To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance, Evans must

show both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984).

To show deficient performance, the defendant must
demonstrate that counsel performed counsel’s duties in
an objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional
norms. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.

12
Payne v. State, S25A0883, slip op. at 12–13 (Ga. Aug. 26, 2025) (2025

WL 2445309) (citations and punctuation omitted). And “[i]f a

defendant fails to establish one of these two prongs, we need not

examine the other.” Id. at 12.

(a) Evans first argues that counsel performed deficiently by

failing to object on the basis of hearsay and “harmful character

evidence” to the testimony of the investigator who said that Mann

would not testify for fear of being hurt in prison, that the District

Attorney had offered to move Mann to another prison for his

protection, and that Mann pleaded guilty to murder in connection

with Anderson’s death. It is well settled that “whether to raise a

specific objection” is “ordinarily” a matter of trial strategy, and

where “reasonable,” such strategic decisions “provide no ground for

reversal.” Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 486 (2017) (citation and

punctuation omitted). And our review of the record reflects that

counsel’s decision not to object to the investigator’s testimony about

Mann was part of a reasonable trial strategy.

We note at the outset that evidence that Mann had refused to

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testify due to fear of retribution was admissible. See Palmer v. State,

303 Ga. 810, 816 (2018) (“Evidence of a defendant’s attempt to

influence or intimidate a witness can serve as circumstantial

evidence of guilt.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). And, as we

explained above in Division 3, evidence of his refusal was admissible

as a hearsay exception under OCGA § 24-8-804(b)(5). Therefore, any

objection to that portion of the investigator’s testimony would have

been meritless. See Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 617 (2016) (“The

failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a

basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citation

and punctuation omitted)). Moreover, at the hearing on the motion

for new trial, counsel testified that when the evidence of Mann’s

guilty plea was admitted, she opted to use that evidence to advance

the defense theory that Mann and Lewis committed the murder

independently and without direction from Evans. This testimony

makes clear that counsel made the strategic decision not to object.

And “[a] defendant who contends a strategic decision constitutes

deficient performance must show that no competent attorney, under

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similar circumstances, would have made it.” Gittens v. State, 307 Ga.

841, 847 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Evans has not

attempted to make such a showing here, and, of course, “[t]he fact

that present counsel would pursue a different strategy does not

render trial counsel’s strategy unreasonable. Effectiveness of trial

counsel is not judged by hindsight or result.” Walker v. State, 294

Ga. 752, 757 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Given these

circumstances, Evans has failed to show that counsel was

constitutionally deficient for failing to object to the challenged

testimony, and this claim fails. See Palmer, 303 Ga. at 816–17.

(b) Evans also argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in connection with her decision to call a witness to

support Evans’s theory of defense because that witness’s testimony

ultimately was unfavorable to the defense. Specifically, Evans

asserts that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing “to

adequately interview” the witness and by failing to review a

recording of the witness’s statement to police that the State asserted

was turned over to Evans’s counsel during pretrial discovery. Of

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course, an attorney’s decision about which defense witnesses to call

is a classic matter of trial strategy and will not form the basis for an

ineffectiveness claim “unless it is so unreasonable that no competent

attorney would have made th[at] decision under the circumstances.”

Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga. 508, 511 (2020) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Evans has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that

counsel’s decision here was unreasonable.

As an initial matter, trial counsel’s testimony at the motion for

new trial hearing indicates that Evans himself requested that the

witness be called to testify in his defense, with counsel testifying

that Evans “had significant influence” on the decision to call the

witness and that Evans wrote “a three-page direct examination”

that counsel incorporated into her direct examination. Counsel also

testified that she and her private investigator conducted a nearly

two-hour interview with the defense witness before trial and that

she then had a similarly lengthy consultation with Evans about

whether to call the witness. And although trial counsel said at the

hearing on the motion for new trial that she would not have called

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this witness had she been aware of a recording of the witness’s

statement, she denied that the recording was produced during

pretrial discovery, testifying that she “reviewed every item that

[she] was served during this case and [the recorded statement] was

not in the discovery that [she] was provided.” In rejecting Evans’s

various ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the trial court

generally found counsel’s testimony to be credible, and we cannot

say that counsel’s decision to call the witness to testify at trial was

so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that

decision, and Evans has not shown otherwise. 4 Indeed, he offers

4 As Evans acknowledges in his brief, trial counsel ultimately moved for

a mistrial on the basis that the witness testified on cross-examination about
statements he made during a second interview with investigators and
information about that second interview “was not revealed to” counsel as part
of reciprocal discovery. In making that motion, counsel noted that she
“probably would not have called” the witness if she had been aware of the
witness’s statements made during the second interview. The prosecutor
responded that the recording of the second interview was produced as part of
reciprocal discovery but argued that, because the State did not call the witness
as part of its case in chief, he was “not required to” turn over notes from the
interview and Evans was “not entitled to it.” The trial court denied the motion
for mistrial without elaboration
On appeal, Evans relies on counsel’s statements during this motion to
support his claim of ineffective assistance, arguing that this Court must find
that counsel’s decision to call the witness was unreasonable unless we “find[ ]
that the [trial court] erred [by denying the motion for mistrial] and that the

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nothing more than speculation as to what additional time spent

interviewing the witness might have uncovered, and he has made

no effort to demonstrate that the recording in fact was available for

counsel to review. 5 See Gittens, 307 Ga. at 844 (“Unfounded

speculation about what additional investigation might have

uncovered … cannot support a claim that trial counsel was

professionally deficient, nor can it establish prejudice.”); Ruffin v.

State, 283 Ga. 87, 91 (2008) (trial counsel cannot be held ineffective

for failing to locate or review evidence not brought to her attention).

State did in fact commit prosecutorial misconduct by failing to turn over
required discovery[.]”But Evans has not enumerated as error either that the
trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial or that the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct, nor has he offered any argument in support of those
claims. As such, we express no opinion on them. See Williams v. State, 306 Ga.
365, 366 (2019) (“Matters not enumerated as error will not be considered on
appeal.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
5 To the extent Evans argues that we should presume from this record

that the recording was available for counsel’s review, he is incorrect. Evans
bears the burden of showing deficient performance and prejudice through
“competent evidence,” and “a silent or ambiguous record is not sufficient to
overcome the strong presumption of reasonable performance.” Thorpe v. State,
304 Ga. 266, 268 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). Taking into
account both the prosecutor’s statements detailed in footnote 4 and trial
counsel’s testimony detailed above about whether the evidence at issue was
produced as part of reciprocal discovery, the record is, at best, ambiguous as to
whether the evidence was even available for counsel’s review before trial, and
the trial court does not appear to have specifically resolved this factual
question.
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Accordingly, this claim, like the others, fails.

5. Finally, while there is no error with respect to Evans’s trial,

we do identify an error with respect to his sentencing. As discussed

in footnote 1, in addition to sentencing Evans for the murder of

Anderson (Count 1), the trial court also sentenced Evans for the

aggravated assault of Anderson with a firearm (Count 6), and

aggravated battery of Anderson for shooting him in the head with a

firearm (Count 8). But both of these counts should have merged into

Count 1. See Douglas v. State, 303 Ga. 178, 183 (2018) (aggravated

battery and aggravated assault counts should have merged because

the “injuries were sustained by one victim during a single,

uninterrupted criminal act”).

“To determine whether one crime is included in another, and

therefore merges as a matter of fact, the court must assess whether

conviction for one of the offenses is established by proof of the same

or less than all of the facts required to establish the other crime.”

Sullivan v. State, 301 Ga. 37, 43 (2017) (citation and punctuation

omitted). And here, the elements required to prove Evans, as a party

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to the crime, had committed the aggravated assault and aggravated

battery were among the elements required to establish that he had

committed the murder of the same victim. See id. Consequently, we

vacate the sentences imposed for Counts 6 and 8.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur.

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